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Abstract 
The question of validity of agreed damage clauses has always been a complex one: In 
common law, a valid and enforceable "genuine pre-estimate of damage', i. e. liquidated 
dcanages, has been distinguished from an invalid penalty ckuw which provides for a 
disproportionately large sum of money, compared to the likely actual loss, to be paid 
upon breach. Furthermore, equity has, in certain circumstances, been prepared to afford 
certain types of relief to a contract-breaker against forfeiture of his interest in the subject- 
matter, and/or moneys already paid. This area of the law, however, has always been 
subject to controversy: the basis of the penalty doctrine, its scope, the practical problems 
in its application in different areas of the law, the anomalies resulting from the application 
of the doctrine, and particularly the possible inter-relationship between the penalty 
doctrine and the rules relating to relieve against forfeiture are among the issues which 
have attracted academic and judicial discussions. Due to the importance of these 
contractual provisions, the uncertainties and controversies in this area, and the 
importance of a thorough examination of major national legal systems to pave the way for 
achieving uniformity at international level, this study is focused on a critical analysis of 
the law relating to penalties and associated doctrines in the English legal system, as the 
basis and origin of the common law. 
The thesis is presented in two parts: The first part, chapters 1-5, deals with the issues 
relating to the penalty doctrine, while the relief afforded against forfeiture is discussed in 
the second part, chapters 6-9. 
Chapter one, the introductory chapter, concentrates on the historical background and the 
possible justifications of the penalty doctrine. The practical rules to distinguish penalties 
and liquidated damages are discussed in the second chapter which air=, inter alia, at 
establishing that the intervention of courts should only be limited to a situation where the 
agreed sum is "substantially disproportionate! ' to the likely actual loss. The relationship 
between Penalty clauses and limitation clauses, and also the issue of the possible 
application of the penalty doctrine to acceleration clauses are discussed in the third 
chapter, while the fourth chapter focuses on the anomalies resulting from the well- 
established rule of the common law which limits the application of the doctrine to a 
situation where there is a breach of contract between the contracting parties. As one 
important and controversial area for the application of the penalty doctrine, chapter five 
concentrates on the application of the penalty doctrine to minimum payment clauses. The 
practical problems in this regard, the relevance of the basis for termination, and the 
necessary factors to be taken into account in drafting a minimum payment clause are 
among the issues considered in this chapter. 
Chapter six considers two preliminary issues for the main discussion about equitable relief 
against forfeiture: the remedies available to a breacher, at common law, to recover his 
advance payments, including a possible general basis for these remedies, and a historical 
review of the courts' equitable intervention to afford relief against forfeiture. Relief 
against forfeiture of the breacher's interest in the subject-matter is considered in the 
seventh chapter, while chapter eight focuses on the equitable jurisdiction of courts to 
relieve against forfeiture of advance payments, including both part payments and deposits. 
Both chapters aim towards illuminating the existence, scope and limits of the jurisdiction, 
and then concentrate on the possible application of the penalty doctrine when a court 
exercises its equitable power to relieve against forfeiture. Finally chapter nine discusses 
the scope and exercise of the statutory jurisdiction of courts to relieve against forfeiture 
of deposit in contracts for the sale or exchange of an interest in land, after a general 
consideration of the statutory measures to afford relief against forfeiture. 
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Introduction 
Shylock's bond, as presented by Shakespeare, is an extreme illustration of a penal bond: 
Antonio borrows three thousand ducats from Shylock for three months. To secure the 
repayment, he (Antonio) enters into a bond undertaking that in case of non-payment, 
Shylock shall be entitled to carve: 
4'... an equal pound 
Of your (Antonio's) fair flesh, to be cut off and taken 
In what part of your body pleaseth me. "' 
Although Shakespeare represents this bond as a valid contractual stipulation, yet the 
feeling of a need to do justice, leads him to finish the story by a very strict and literal 
construction of the contract: Shylock is given the right to have his "pound of flesh", but 
since there was no mention of blood in the contract, he is required to carve Antonio's 
breast without any blood coming through: 
"This bond doth give thee here no job of blood, 
the words expressly are a pound of flesh! "2 
This bond was a sophisticated form of self-pledge to secure performance of a contract 
in an era when men could not trust each other, and the machinery of the law was weak. 
At that time, as it will be seen in the next section, there was no serious resistance against 
use of penal bonds. The parties to a contract also had other incentives to agree upon a 
bond- or the developed form of it; that is, an agreed damage clause: pre-estimation of 
future likely damages in advance. The considerable uncertainty in the computation of 
damages, the difficulty of proving actual loss, and the delay and expenses involved in the 
judicial process of an action for damages have led the parties to agree upon the likely 
amount of damages in advance when they enter into the contract. Tindal C1 in 1829 
rightly pointed out that there was "nothing illegal or unreasonable in the parties, by their 
mutual agreement, settling the amount of damages, uncertain in their nature, at any sum 
3 upon which they may agree'. However, as it may also appear from this Passage, English 
law has, by the equitable power endowed upon Chancellors, differentiated between such 
1 William Shakespeare, The Merchant 4)f Venice, (penguin Books, 1994), Act One, Scow Three, Jim 
146-148, at p. 37 
2 Ibid., Act FOW, Scene One, lines 305-306, at p. 92 
3 Kenble v. Farmn (1829) 6 Bing 141,130 ER 1234, at pp. 148,1237 respectively 
I 
clauses and terms, agreed upon by the parties, acting in terrorem of the defaulting party4, 
which pressurises the promisor into performance and punishes him in case Of breach. In 
general terms, though the latter has been recognized as an unenforceable stipulation, the 
former remains legally valid. 
Nowadays, in most commercial and consumer contracts- even at international leveP- a 
clause is allocated to dealing with the pre-assessment of damages. Such clauses, 
commonly referred to as "agreed damage clauses", can, for example, be seen in most 
construction contracts, hire-purchase and conditional sale agreements, charterparties, 
contracts for the sale of land or chattel by instalments, and the like. They are, in general 
terms, the agreement of the parties about the amount of likely losses which might result 
from any probable breach of the contract by the promisor. Although in most cases, the 
subject of the clause is the payment of a certain sum of money to the innocent party, yet it 
has well been established that the parties' agreement may include certain adverse 
consequences other than payment of a specific sum of money: they, for instance, may 
agree that, upon breach, the contract breaker will have to transfer a certain property to 
the other partyý, or the breach will entitle the innocent party to withhold certain payments 
due to the pron-Asor7; or they may alternatively agree that the promisor will forfeit certain 
4 See Dunlop Pneumatic 7)re Co. Ltd v. New G4rage and Motor Co. Ltd. [1915] AC 79 per Loord 
Dunedin at p. 86 
5 An analysis of replies, by twelve different countries, to a questionnaire prepared by the Secretariat of 
United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL) showed that the provisions for the 
Payment Of liquidated damages or penalties were often inserted in international contracts; they could be 
seen in a large variety of contrac% among which "supply of goods, manufacture and installation of ph" 
and machinery, construction contracts, joint ventures, and supply of long-term services" were particularly 
mentioned: See Yearbook of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, vol. XH: 1981 
(New York: United Nations, 1983), pp. 44-45; cf. Beale H., Dugdale T., Contracts Between 
: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies (1975) 2 British Journal of Law aW 
Society 45, at p. 55 
6 See, e. g., Jobson v. Johnson 1198911 All ER 621 (an agreement to transfer share$ in 8 Certain fOOtball 
club in the event of breach); we infira., paras. 7.83 et seq. 
7 See Gilbert-Ash v. Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd. [1974] AC 689; see also Firma C-Trade S. A. v. 
Newcastle Protection and Indemnity Association (7he "Fanti 1ý Socony Mobil Oil Co. Inc. v. West of 
England Shipowners Mutual Insurance Association Ltd. (7he "Pa&v Island') (No. 2) [198911 Lloyds 
LR 239 (providing for the termination of one party's contractual right to be protected and indemnified in 
respect of his vessel against any claims relating to such vessel "whether already accrued or arising 
thereafter" in case, inter alia, he fails to pay the amounts due to the other party: the effoct of the clause 
was simply dimfitling a party to a sum of money which is due to him if he breaches the contract, we 
particularly per Stuart-Smith U at p. 262) 
2 
sum of money, like deposits' or instalments already paid4 in the event of breach. An 
agreed damage clause may also, in certain circumstances, act as the limitation of the 
promisor's liability resulting from breach: the parties may agree on an amount which is 
considerably less than the likely loss which may conceivably flow from breach. 9 
The question of validity of such stipulations has always been a complex one: In 
general, common law, following equitable intervention of Chancellors to relieve against 
penalties, has distinguished between a valid and enforceable "genuine pre-estimate of 
damagW- that is, liquidated dxnages- and an invalid penalty clause which provides for 
a disproportionately large sum of money, compared to the likely actual loss, to be paid 
upon breach. Furthermore, equity has always been prepared to afford, in certain 
circumstances, certain types of relief to a contract-breaker against forfeiture of his 
interest in the subject-matter, or moneys already paid. There are also some statutory 
measures providing for certam forms of relief against forfeiture. 
This area of the law, however, described rightly as the cloudy area of the law, has 
always been subject to controversy: the basis of the penalty doctrine, its scope, the 
practical problems in its application in different areas of the law, particularly as to 
minimum payment and acceleration clauses, the extent to which an agreed damage clause 
can validly Unit the liability of the contract-breaker, the anomalies resulting from the 
exclusive application of the doctrine when there is a breach of contract, are among the 
issues which have attracted attention in judicial, as well as academic, discussions. The 
problems and uncertainty are particularly tense where the issue of the possible equitable 
intervention of courts to relieve against forfeiture arises: the question of the scope of 
such an intervention, its limits, and circumstances upon which such an equitable power 
could be exercised, are by no means clear. Most importantly, despite the close similarity 
of an agreed damage clause and a forfeiture provision, it is uncertain whether, and how 
far, the penalty doctrine could be applied when a court exercises its equitable jurisdiction 
to relieve against forfeiture. 
a As it will be seen, deposits are generally forfeitable even without the agreement of the parties to that 
effect: infra., paras. 6.31,9.45 
9 See, for example, Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd. v. WWws Foundry (1925) Ltd. 11933) AC 20, see 
Infra., pam 3.12 
3 
Some attempts have also been made to harmonize the law relating to penalties at 
international level, the most important of which being the attempts made by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL)'O which culminated, in 1983, 
in drafting the "Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due upon Failure 
of Performance! "'. Although the General Assembly, recognizing the uncertainties in this 
area of the law due to "disparities in the treatment of such clauses in various legal 
systems! ', recommended the implementation of these uniform rules by the States "in the 
form of either a model law or a conventioW', it is less clear whether the Uniform Rules 
have achieved the desired objectives. No convention has been agreed upon by the states 
on the basis of the Uniform Rules, and in most countries the Rules have not been 
incorporated in the national law. Another attempt, made by Unidroit, is the insertion of 
an article dealing with the issue of agreed payment for non-performance in the set of rules 
entitled "Principles of International Commercial Contracts! '12 . 
These general principles 
would be applied where the parties "have agreed that their contract be governed by 
thenf,. 13 Although this kW of drafting has the advantages of coming into use much 
earlier than agreeing upon a form of convention or model law, and of being subject to 
adaptation by the parties to suit their needs, yet it may not be enforced when it conflicts 
the applicable mandatory national law. The degree of harmony achieved by this form, at 
least as to penalties, would therefore be very limited. 
Two attempts have also been made at European level: In its Resolution 78(3), the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, drafted a certain set of rules "relating 
10 Other attempts include the "General Conditions of Delivery of Goods between OrFoulizIttiOns Of the 
Member Countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance" 1968/1975, amended also in 1979, 
which contain provisions regulating penalty claitses and liquidated damages. "Bendux Convention 
relating to Penalty Clause adopted at Hague on 26 November 1973 should also be mentioned here- 
Article I of this Convention imposes on the contracting states the duty to bring their national legislation 
into conformity with the uniform set of rules, agreed upon in an annex to the Convention, at the latest by 
the date of entry into force of the Convention. 
11 For a full report containing the fumil text of the Rules see Report of the UNCITRAL on the Work of its 
Sixteenth Session (Vienna, 24 May- 3 June 1983) (A/38/17) (AICN. 9/243), Chapter Il [Published in the 
Yearbook of UNCITRAL, vol. XIV., 1983, (New York: United Nations. 1986), pp. 5-12]; see also the 
Reports of Secretary General: text of draft uniform rules on liquidated damages and penalty clauses 
(A/CN. 9/219) in Yearbook, vol. Xal: 1982, Chapter 1, section A, at pp. 27-34; and (A/CN. 9/235) in 
Yearbook, vol. MV. - 1983, Part Two, Chapter L pp. 27-32 
12 Article 7.4.13, Principles of International Commercial Contractsý Unidroit: Rome, 1994 
13 ]bid., preamble 
4 
to penal Clauses in Civil laW"14 , and- recognizing the necessity of 
having a judicial control 
over penalty clauses when they are manifestly excessive, and the importance of achieving 
unity regarding the applicable law- recommended the governments of the member states, 
inter afta, "to take the principles concerning penal clauses in civil law ... 
into 
consideration when preparing new legislation on this subjece'. More recently, the 
Commission on European Contract Law has been involved in the process of drafting a 
complete version of "The Principles of European Contract Law"". Article 4.508 16 of 
these principles deals with the issue of "Agreed Payment for Non-performance, and, 
with a slight change in wording, is exactly the same as Article 7.4.13 of Unidroit's 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts. These principles, like Unidroit 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, would be applied where "the parties 
have agreed to incorporate them into their contract or that their contract is to be 
governed by thele. 17 From the point of view of the form these principles will take, they 
may be subject to the same observation as made above. 
It appears that the most important hurdle in achieving unity in this area of the law is 
the great disparity of different legal systems as to the issue, particularly the manifest 
difference between the way common law and civil law legal systems handle these 
contractual clauses": In civil law jurisdictions, an agreed damage clause is generally 
regarded as a valid stipulation, and unless it is manifestly excessive in comparison with 
the loss suffered by the innocent party as a result of breach, the judge cannot adjust the 
amount agreed upon by the parties. In common law world, however, spealdng only in 
general terms, the clause is unenforceable if it is grossly disproportionate to the loss 
which is likely to result from breach at the time when the parties enter into the contract. 
Any potentially successfid attempt to harmonize the law in this regard should, therefore, 
it seems, start from a detailed analysis of the applicable rules in major families of legal 
systems to pave the way for formulating a set of rules which provide for compromise 
14 A&*Wd on 20 January 1978, at the 281st meeting of the Ministers' Deputies 
's TU fnV version of these rules has been made available, though the final version is expected to be 
published in 1997. IU whole project, howem, has been completed in May 1996. 
16 Article 9.509 in the revised version 
17 Article 1.101(l) 
I$ For a Comparative account see Treitel G. K, Remedies for Breach of Contract (A Comparative 
Account), (Oxford: ClarcudOn PrM, 1988), Chap. VII, pp. 208 et wq. 
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solutions which may satisfy, as far as possible, the policies in the law of different legal 
systems. 
Due to the importance of the agreed damage clauses, the uncertainties and 
controversies wisting in the law relating to this area, and the importance of a thorough 
vaunination of major national legal systems to pave the way for achieving uniformity in 
the law applicable to penalty clauses in international trade contracts, this study is aimed 
towards a critical analysis of the law relating to penalty clauses and associated doctrines 
in the English legal system, as the basis and origin of the common law. This thesis will 
thus be committed, as far as the competence of the writer permits, to swing the law, in a 
clear and well-organized way, in different areas relating to penalty clauses and associated 
doctrines; singling out the leading cases and examining how far, and how, the relevant 
authorities could be reconciled; discussing in detail the controversial areas, and pointing 
out the possible anomalies resulting from the e)dsting law, and suggesting possible 
solutions. Reference will also be made, where appropriate, to Australian law, as a well- 
developed common law legal system particularly in relation to penalty doctrine, to present 
a comparative account of how the subject is treated in these two legal systems. 
Although this study covers most controversial areas relating to penalty clauses and 
associated doctrines, it has, like other studies of this nature, specific firnits: In addition to 
being limited to two major common law legal systems, England and Australia'9, the thesis 
is limited, except as to the analysis of the statutory relief against forfeiture of deposit in 
contracts for the sale of land2l, to examining the different forms of relief afforded to a 
contract-breaker against penalties and forfeiture at common law and in equity. Thus, the 
statutory measures providing for relief against penalties and forfeitures in certain areas of 
the law and as to certain contracts, fall outside the ambit of this study. 
This thesis will be presented in two parts: The first part will deal with the issues 
relating to the penalty doctrine, while the relief afforded against forfeiture win be 
discussed in the second part. 
19 Occasional reference may also be made to American law, and some international documents. 
20 sec. 49(2), Law of Property Act 1925; see infra., paras. 9.10 et seq. 
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The first pad contains five chapters: Chapter one, the introductory chapter, discusses 
the historical background of the penalty doctrine, and the possible justifications of the 
doctrine. Both on the basis of the historical review and the diffierent legal and economic 
justifications provided for the doctrine, it is shown that the intervention of courts in the 
parties bargain by affording relief against penalties could possibly be justified on the basis 
of "faime&'. The practical rules to distinguish penalties and liquidated damages are 
discussed in the second chapter which, in addition to considering different rules, aims 
towards establishing that the courts" intervention should only be limited to a situation 
where the agreed sum is "out of all proportion" to damages which might conceivably 
result from breach at the time when the parties enter into the contract. The third chapter 
considers the relationship between the penalty doctrine and similar contractual provisions. 
An agreed damage clause which acts as limiting the liability of the contract-breaker, and 
an acceleration clause are two contractual provisions which are examined in this chapter. 
The chapter will deal, inter afia, with the question of the possible application of the 
penalty doctrine to these contractual provisions. Chapter four concentrates on the issue 
of the applicability of the penalty doctrine where there is a breach of contract. The 
anomalies resulting from this well-established common law rule will be given a detailed 
consideration here. Finally, as one important and controversial area for the application of 
the penalty doctrine, termination clauses, in financing transactions like hire-purchase and 
credit sale agreements, which normally provide for a minimum payment clause Will 
thoroughly be discussed. The practical problems in the application of the penalty doctrine 
to minimum payment clauses, the relevance of the basis for termination, and the necessary 
factors to be taken into account in drafting a minimum payment clause are among the 
issues which are considered in this chapter. 
Part Two focuses on the issue of relief afforded to a contract breaker against 
forfeiture of his interest in the subject-matter, and/or moneys already paid. This pan is 
generally responsible for illuminating the relationship between the penalty doctrine and 
the rules relating to relief against forfeiture. This pan includes four chapters: Chapter six 
discusses two preliminary issues which are of some importance in a detailed consideration 
of the rules relating to relief against forfeiture. Since the relief afflorded to a contract- 
breaker against forfeiture of advance payments is mainly equitable, it is appropriate to 
consider first whether these payments are recoverable in an action at common law. This 
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issue, and the possible general basis for such a remedy is discussed in the first section of 
this chapter. The second section presents a brief historical account on the equitable 
intervention of courts to relieve against forfeiture. Relief against forfeiture of the 
breacher's interest in the subject-matter is considered in the seventh chapter. This 
chapter illuminates the existence, scope, and limits of the jurisdiction to relieve against 
such a forfeiture; and then discusses the circumstances upon which the courts should 
exercise their equitable power. Chapter eight is responsible for an analysis of the relief 
afforded against forfeiture of advance payments. The relief against forfeiture of part 
payments is considered in the first section of this chapter, while the second section 
discusses the relief against forfeiture of deposits. Both sections will thoroughly consider 
the scope of the courts' equitable power in these areas, and will focus on the 
circumstances for the exercise of the jurisdiction. The possibility of the application of the 
penalty doctrine, when a court exercises its equitable jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture of advance payments, will be given a detailed analysis. A close analysis of the 
statutory relief against forfeiture of deposit in contracts for the sale or exchange of an 
interest in land is the responsibility of the ninth chapter. In this chapter, after a general 
consideration of the statutory measures to afford relief against forfeiture, the 
discretionary power of the courts under section 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 to 
order repayment of deposit to a defaulting purchaser will be examined. The reason for 
singling out this statutory measure is the possible relation of the penalty doctrine and the 
equitable rules relating to relief against forfeiture of deposit with the exercise of this 
statutory Power of the courts. The main area of attention in this chapter is the 
circumstances upon which the courts should exercise their power under the subsection, 
and the possible inter-relationship between this discretionary power and the equitable 







1.01 The intervention of courts to relieve against penalties has a historical origin arising 
from the relief afforded by the Chancellors against penal bonds. The doctrine has been 
developed during the course of time, and has well been established in about mid- 
seventeenth century. Common lawyers, though not unfamiliar with the concept of relief 
against penalties, have basically adopted the practice of the courts of Chancery in 
gratiting reliet and made significant contributions to the development of the doctrine to 
suit the needs of different eras. Although historically the intervention of courts was 
justified on the basis of fairness and being equitable, several attempts, by both lawyers 
and economists, have been made to put forward different justifications for the doctrine. 
Economists have tried to justify the doctrine from "economic efficiency" perspective, 
while some others have Presented justifications based on human's cognitive defects, or a 
concern for future freedom. This chapter will focus on these issues: After considering the 
historical development of the penalty doctrine in the first section, the reasons just&ying 
the intervention of courts to refieve against penalties will, in the second section, be given 
a rather brief analysis. 
1. Historical Background 
1.1. Introductory Remarks: Conditional Bond and Its Literal Enforcement 
at Common Low 
1.02 The penalty doctrine, in its present form, has historically originated from the 
Chancellor's intervention to relieve against penal bonds. It was, in medieval times, more 
convenient and usual, in the common law courts, to sue upon a debt than a covenant: the 
plaintiff, in such an action, had to produce a sealed instrument in which the defendant had 
acknowledged himself to be the debtor of the plaintiff. Such an instrument was referred 
1 PlucknW TAT, A Concise History of the Common IAw, 5th C&, 1956, p. 634 ; Simpson A. W. B., A 
History of the Common law of Contract: 7U Rise of the Action of Asmmqxdt, 1975, p. 88 ; Slol* S. L, 
A History of Contract at Common la% 1975, p. 7 
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2 to ua "bond", an "obWoe or a "writing obfigatory" . 
1.03 The popularity of the "action of debt" was probably the main reason for the rise of 
bonds with the condition of "defeasance endorsed upon it. 3 The obligor executed a 
bond of a certain sum of money subject to the condition that if be paid a certain sum or 
performed a certain agreed act by a catain date, the bond would be null and void. In 
effect, most agreements did normally take the form of one or more conditional bonds. In 
a contract of loan, for example, the borrower executed a bond in favour of the lender for 
a larger sum, normally twice the principal smn, subject to a condition of defeasance 
providing that if the debtor paid the principal up to a certain date, the bond would be of 
no effect. The subject of the condition of defeasance differed depending on what the 
main object of the partiee agreement was. In a sophisticated bilateral agreement, for 
instance, the parties elaborated the detailed terms and conditions of their contract in an 
indenture under seal, both retaining a part of the indenture. They, then, executed bonds 
of the same date as the indenture in favour of each other, binding themselves to pay a 
certain sum of money with the condition that in case of the due performance of their 
contractual obligations, as provided in the indenture, the bond would be unenforceable. 4 
Thus, each Party to an agreement was liable because he had executed a bond, not because 
he had entered to a specific contract. 
1.04 The genus[ attitude of the common law courts was to enforce the conditions! 
2 Simpson A-W. B., A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, 
1975, P. 88; SiMPSM The POW Bond and Conditional D*amiw (1%6) 82 LQR 392, at p. 393 
3 It is thought that ft device of penal bonds cam in with Italian bankem The instatices of the use of 
thm bonds before the wd of thirteenth century an rm Sm Yale D. E. C., An Essey on Mortgages and 
Trusts and Allied Topics in Equity (An Introduction to "Lord Nottingham's Chancay Cases, voL M 
1%1*), SOL Sm., voL 79,1, at p. 9 no. 4 
4 An =unple of Such a Condition, dtW by SlInpSM joc. cit. , no. 1, P. 91, taken 
Ikorn a band of 1634 ) is in the following terms: 'nke condition of the within written obligation is that if the within bounden 
Richard Nonnan his heirs executors administrators and assigns and anye of them Uvelie and falthfullie 
hold obsow falfil puforme and keep all and singuler the covenants promises; agreezoents articla 
clauses Ed smatesices which on the part of the old RichaM Norman his helm ... etc. ought to be hold 
observed NOW pedormed and kqX mentioned specified and ordeined in one part of indezitures bearing 
equal date with these presents made between the odd Richard Norman of the one pan and within named 
hunes Ybunge an the other part according to the trw intent purport and mcanin of the said indentu 
that then this present within written obligawn to be voyd and of none effect or elm to stand remaine and 
be in full force power strangth and virtue. " 
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bonds according to its terms. Such an attitude was inspired by the general philosophy 
that it was not the business of courts to remake the parties' bargain: having made their 
bed, the contracting parties had to He in it. ' Further, the bonds were normally regarded as 
of a compensatory nature, and it was this characteristic which kept them immune from 
being attacked under the canonist concept of usury. Usurious transactions were clearly 
regarded illegal in medieval common law. The concept of usury at this time, though it 
was "in some respects vague, flexible, and uncertaie, covered an area in which a creditor 
7 was bound to get some extra money for the use of money. Interest which was stipulated 
to compensate the creditor for the loss siffered as the result of failure to repay the money 
on time was not, therefore, regarded as of usurious nature. ' Penal bonds were considered 
as in conformity with this concept: the monetary sum provided for in the penal bonds 
normally served to compensate the creditor for his loss, and was not regarded as a sum 
paid for the use of the principal money. Moreover, the debtor, by the due payment of the 
principal or due performance of the promised actý could avoid the creditor from receiving 
the penal sum. In other words, the creditor was not certain, at the time of the execution 
of the bond, that he would be able to receive the penal sum provided for in the bond. 9 
This may be inferred from an early fourteenth century caselo in which Passeley's 
Simpson, Ilk PeOld Bond and CMditiOrAI DCftksawe., loc. cit., no. 2, at p. 411 
It is sometimes belWW that the "early law around this topic [Le- pend bonds] was a constant shifting 
and evasion of the prohibition of the canon law against usury" and it is, therefore, concluded that this 
was the reason why this issue did not come into the light until the ReformatiorL See Yale D. E. C., An 
Essay on MortpW and Trusts and Allied Topics in Equity (An introduction to -Lord Nottingham's 
Chancery Cases, Vol. IL 1961 *), Sel. Soc., vol. 79,1, at p. 9 
I Simpson A. W. B., A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Asstunpsit, 
1975, p. 114 
8 This included both dmnum emergens (compensation for consequential low excluding loss of potential 
profit) and Jumm cessans (compensation for loss of profit). See Simpson, loc. cit., no. 1, p. 114 
9 That is why the common law courts, accepting this canomst theory of usury, used the test whether it 
was contemplated by the parties that the debtor should be able to discharge himself by payment at the due 
date, or whether it was their intention that in any event the creditor would be able to receive a sum extra 
to the principal. Yale cites two cases from the King's Bench in 1591 and the Common Bench in 1598 
which clearly illustrate this attitude: In the former, the Burton Is cam (5 Co. Rep. 69a), it was held that 
... 
if it had been agreed between the grantor and the grantee, that notwithstanding such power of 
redemption, that the 100 1 Should not be paid at the day, and that the clause of redemption was inserted 
to make an evasion out of the Statute, then it had been an usurious bargain W contract within the said 
statute. In the latter case, it was clearly stated that It was the intent of the parties which makes an 
agreement as of usurious natum See Yale D. E. C., An Essay on Mortgages and Trusts and Allied Topics in Equity (An Introduction to "Lord Nottingham's Chancery Cases, vol. 11,1961*), Sel. Soc., vol. 79,1, 
at pp. 11-12 
10 Scott v. Berwv IlL, (1313-14) Eyre of Yent, 6&7 Edward ]I VOL IL Sel. Soc., vol. 27 (Year Book 
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argument again the validity of penal bonds was r0ected by Staunton 1. Passeley 
emphasised on the usurious, nature of penal bonds in the following terms: 
"This action of debt is based upon a penalty and savours of usury, of 
which the law will not permit you to have recovery. For v=ple, if I say 
that I hold myself bound to you to pay you ten pounds upon such a day, 
and that if I do not pay them to you upon that day I am then bound to you 
in forty pounds. And if I fail to pay the ten pounds upon the appointed 
day the law will not allow you to recover, by way of usury, the forty 
pounds. " 
Staunton J. observed: 
"Penalty and usury are only irrecoverable when they grow out of the sum 
in wWch the obligee is pfimarfly bound, but what is claimed here is claimed 
as a debt arising out of covenant ... 
" 
1.05 The rule concesning the literal enforcement of penal bonds was a tough law and 
worked hardly and harshly, especially in case of bonds to secure the performance of 
complex and sophisticated contracts. For, in case of any default in performance, though 
trivial, the whole penalty could be sued for. The story of Sir Thomas More's attempted 
reconciliation with the judges in the reign of Henry VM narrated by Lord Mansfield in 
Wyllie v. WilkeP, can well illustrate the harshness of this rule: 
he [the Chancellor, Sir Thomas More] summoned them to a 
conference concerning the granting relief at law, after the forfeiture of 
bonds, upon payment of principal, interest and costs; and when they said 
they could not relieve against the penalty he swore by the body of Grod he 
would grant an injunction. "13 
l. L Tho Advont and Evoluffon of tho Doctrino boforo tho Mid-Sovont"nth 
Contuty 
1.2.1. A Trace of the Intervention at Common Law in the Fourteenth Century 
1.06 Although towards the middle of the fourteenth century, because of the inflexibility 
Series, vol. VIM P. 26, at P. 27 
" See also another cam in 1352 (YB- Mich. 27 Edw. III, hit 17, pl. 9) where a debt of 9 marks was 
secured by a bond of 17 marks. Skipwith argued that this sounded usury but the colirt, rqecdn the 
argument, got judgmest for both the 17 marks wW an extra 6 marks as damages. (cited by Simpson, 
loc. cit., no. 1, P. 115) 
12 (1780) 2 Douglas 519,99 ER 33 1. Lad MuMeld describing the Act of the 4th and Sth of Qum 
Anne: as "an Act made to remove the abmu%UV which Sir Thomas M= unaccessfidly attempted to 
persuade the judges to remedy in the reign of Hetuy VM" referred to this story. 
13 Md., at p. 523 and p. 333 respeictively 
13 
of the common law and the fitilum of its courts to apply moral standards in cam 14 And 
gena7al increase in rigidity and formelism's, the Chancellor had established his own court 
to deal with the applications for relief addressed to him, there, apparently, could be found 
no case, in this century, in which relief against penalties had been given. 16 Some trace of 
intervention, however, on general equitable grounds, could be detected in the common 
law courts 17 :A man had bound himself to pay a hundred marks in case of his failure to 
tender a certain writing by a certain date. He was unable to deny that he had failed to 
tender it on the stipulated day, but he excused that he was in the East on that time and 
had left the writing with his wife for delivery. Declaring his readiness to submit the 
document, he claimed that there had been no damage suffered by the plaintiff as the result 
of his failure. Bereford I observed: 
"... this is not, properly speaking, a debt; it is a penalty; and with what 
equity (look youl) can you demand this penalty? ... 
What equity it would 
be to award you the debt when the writing is tendered and you cannot 
show that you have suffered damage by the detentioni So, will you 
receive the writing? "" 
And when Passeley refuses to receive the document unless there is a judgment of the 
court, the learned judge points out: 
"Were you to remain asking for our judgment, you would not come by 
your debt these seven years, for a judgment of the law is not to be given in 
that sort of way. "19 
Though the court did not appamfly give any clear judgment against the plainfie, it is 
"' See Newman R A, Equity and Law: A Comparatkv Study, 196 1, pp. 22-23,30 
Is See Yale D. E. C., An Essay on Mortgages and Trusts and Allied Topics in Equity (An Introduction to 
"LArd Nottingham's Ch8n=Y Cases, vOl. 11,196M Sel. Soc., vol. 79,1, at p. 11 
16 See Plucknett T. F. T, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th ed., 1956, p. 634 
17 It is believed that many rules which are now n=gnised as the distinctive of Chancely have made their 
first appearanoc W the common law courts. See Hazeltine, The Early History of English Equity, (in 
Essays in Legal History, editw. Vmogradoff), pp. 261-285. This cautious policy towards pwaltics in the 
early fourteenth century may be bmuse Of the probabiUly of the contraveation of the penal bonds with 
the church's pmbiNdon of usury, though it it, on the basis of the arguments which haive ban relied upon 
in cases very unW*. 
18 Unfiwille v. Lamwede (1308-9) Y. B. Edward IL Sel Soc, vol. 19 (Year Book Series, vol. II), p. 59, at 
P. 59 
19 Ibid 
" The court only told the plaintiff that he had to wait wm years before be could recerve a judginent 
according to the bond. Some commentators belim that the court granted relief in this cast "in the name 
of equity", though it took "the clumsy form of an indeWte postponement of that jwigment which is 
dictated by the rigour of the law. " Maitland, Introduction to Y. B. Edward 11, Sel. Soc., vol. 19, p. xiii 
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nonetheless clear that the notion of the non-enforceabifity of penalties and limiting the 
plaintiff to damages actually suffered has not been strange to a common lawyer. The 
case, of course, is apparently a unique one2l, and the practice of the common law courts 
becomes harder and harder towards the middle of the fourteenth century, emphasising the 
literal enforcement of the penal bonds, examples of which have already been given-22 
1.2.2. Limited Relief Against Penal Bonds in the Chancery in the Fifteenth and 
Sixteenth Centuries 
1.07 It was not until the early fifteenth century that the Chance1lor started to grant relief 
in cases where, though there was an actual payment, no formal acquittance or release had 
been taken, nor there was cancellation of the deed. 23 St. German in Doctor and Shicknt, 
speaking of a situation where "a man that is bounde in an oblygacyon to pay certain 
moneys paye the money: but he taketh no acquytaunce or yf he take one & it happenyth 
hym to lese V, refers to this equitable jurisdiction in the following terms: 
"... yf suche defaute happen in any personel whereby he is without 
remedye at the common lawe: yet he maye be holpen in equity by a sub 
pena... "24 
Further, in this century the Chancellor, from time to time, came to intervene in cases of 
w&eme hardship and oppression. 25 Turner cites three cases from Edward IV's reign 
where relief against forfeiture of bonds has been granted, but concludes that in a1l these 
cases the relief has probably been based on the general ground of fi-aud. 2's It does 
2' See Pludkmft MET, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th e&, 1956, p. 677 
22 SU .' CLUS Cited 
in notes 10 11 Pra v 
23 See 9 Edw. IV, f. 25, pl. 34; 7 Ifen. VIL f. 10, pl. 2 (cited by Simpson, loc. cit., no. 1, p. 118, no. 3) 
24 St. German's Doctor and Student, edited by: plucknott T. F. T & Barton LL. (Sol. Soc., vol. 91,1974), 
First Dialogue, ch. XIL pp. 77-79 
25 See Simpson A. W. B., A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of 
Agsumpsit, 1975, p. I IS (citing Bodenharn v. Halle, Sol. Soc. vol. 10, p. 137); Potter says that petitions 
have been found praying for relief about the middle of the fifteenth century if the money be paid at a later 
date: Potter H.. An Introduction to the History of Equity and its Courts, 193 1, p. 99; Yale believes that 
though it is not possible to trace in clear outline the jurisdiction later developed as the penalty doctrine in 
the sixteenth century and earlier, "the Principles supporting the jurisdiction go back a great distanW. 
Yale D. E. C., An Essay on Mortgages iuml Trusts and Allied Topics in Equity (An introduction to "Lmd 
Nottingham's Chancery Cases, vol. IL 19610ý Sol. Soc., vol. 79,1, p. 9 
26 in the first of then cons (I Cal. XLV), the bond had been fraudulently obtained lite other two vage 
originally quoted by Sir Georp Cary (Cary, 1,2,23): In out of themý the bond "was joint and soveral, 
and the obligoe extended the time to one debtor, and then sued the other at law", and in the other, the 
bond had been paid but no formal acquittance had been taken. See Tumor R. W, The Equity of 
Redemption, 193 1. p. 24 
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therefore appear that, in spite of the Chancellor's intervention in certain ca of accident 
or fiaud, no genwal jufisdiction to relieve against penal bonds can be detected in this 
century. However. these interventions may be considered as a general basis upon which 
the Chancellor grounded his jurisdiction of relief against penalties and forfeitures in later 
centuries. 
1.08 Numerous cases of biUs for relief could be found in the Calendars of Proceedings in 
Chancery in the reign of Elizabeth I, though few of than have appeared in reports. 27 This 
shows the common practice of the Chancellor's intervention to relieve against penal 
bonds in the sixteenth century. 28 Though this common intervention might have been 
practised before the reign of Elizabeth, no reason supporting this proposition could be 
evinced; for, as pointed out by Turne? 9, them is little knowledge of the case law of the 
Chancery Courts during this interval. 
1.2.3. Extension of the Relief by the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century 
1.09 The position with regard to relief against penalties and forfeitures, by the beginning 
of the Seventeenth century, has been Summansed by Sir George Cary (on the basis of 
notes taken by Widliam Lambard who became a Master in Chancery in 1592) and cited by 
Simpson" who saw no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of his work. Cary states: 
"If a man be bound in a penalty to pay money at a day or place, by 
obligation, and intending to pay the same, is robbed by the way, or hath 
intreated by some other respite at the hands of the obfigee, or cometh 
short of the place by any misfortune; and so hiling of the payment, doth 
nevertheless provide and tender the money in short time after; in these, 
and many such 10ce cam the Chancery will compel the obligee to take his 
principal, with some reasonable consideration of his damages, (quantum 
expeaW) for if this was not, men would do that by covenant which they 
now do by bond. *31 
He, then, adds, pointing out a further ground for relief. -: 
"if the obligee have received the most part of the money, payable upon the 
27 Turner R. W., 7be Equity of Redemption, 193 1, P. 24 
1 See Pkdmeft T. F. T, A C=kciw History of the Common Law, 5th ad., 1956, p. 608; Simpson AMA., 
A History of the Common Law of Contract: Mw Rise of the Action of Asgumpdt, 1975, p. 118 
" Turner R. W., The Equity of Redemption, 193 1, p. 24 
30 Simpson A. W. B., A History of the Common Law of Contmct: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, 
1975, p. 119; we also Turner R. W., The Equity of Redemption, 193 1, p. 25 
31 Coy I (cited by Simpson, loc. cit, no. 1, p. 119) 
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obligation at the peremptory time and place, and will nevertheless extend 
the whole forfeiture immediately, refusing soone after the default, to 
accept, of the residue tendered unto him, the obligor may find aid in 
chanc , ery. *32 
This shows the established practice of the Courts of Chancery to Smut relieC but as it 
appears from the passages quoted above, the Chancellor exercised his jurisdiction only in 
special circumstances where, as a result of accident, misfortune, fraud or trivial breach, 
the exaction of bond would result in hardship and oppression. There is still no hint 
showing the general exercise of the jurisdiction to relive against penal bonds simply on 
the ground that they were penaltieS. 33 
1.3. The PosNon After the Mid-Seventeenth Contuty 
1.3.1. The Established Jurisdiction to Relieve Against Penalties 
1.10 Towards the middle of the seventeenth century, the scope of the jurisdiction to 
relieve against penalties and forfeitures was extended. 34 The Chancellor gradually started 
to turn his attention from cases of accident apt for relief where compensation had been 
made to cam where compensation could be made . 
33 The tendency to eXtend the 
jurisdiction in this period can clearly be inferred from a letter written by Norburie in 1621 
to Lord Keeper Williams in which he states that Lord Ellesmere, who became Chancellor 
in 1596 and was succeeded by Sir Francis Bacon in 1617, "would not relieve any that 
forfeited a bond, unless it were in cases of extremity, or that he could make appear that 
by some accidental means he was occasioned thereunto ... . 
Whereas of late much lenity 
has been used to all debtors, so that many, after four or five years suit and charges in this 
court, were glad to go away with their principal without costs or damages". 36 The word 
32 Cary 2 (cited by Simpson, ibid) 
33 See Simpson A. W. 13., A History of the Common Law of ConMict: The Rise of the Action of 
Assompdt, 1975, p. 119; Turner R. W., The Equity of Redemption, 1931, pp. 25-26; Yale D. E. C., An 
Essay on Mortgages and Trusts 2M Allied Topics in Equity (An Introduction to "Lord Nottingham's 
cbmm=y C; ases, vol. U, 1961*X Sel. Soc., vol. 79,1, p. 13; Holdsworth W., History of Puldish Law, 
edited by- Goodhm A. L. & Hanbury 11G., 7th ed., vol. 1,1956 (Reprinted 1%6), pp. 457-458 
34 See Turner R. W., Ile Equity of Redemption, 193 1, pp. 26-27,31-32; Simpson A. W. B., A History of 
the Common Law of Contract. The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, 1975, pp. 119-120; Yale D. E. C., An 
Essay on Mortgages and Trusts and Allied Topics in Equity (An inuuluction to "Urd Nottingham's 
Chancery CASM VOL U, 1961"). Sel. Soc., vol. 79,1, p. 15 
" Yale, 10c. cit., no. 1, P. 15 
36 Hargrave's Law Tracts, 431 (cited by Turner kW., The Eqjity of Redemption, 193 1, p. 3 1) 
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"lenity' in the letter suggests that Sir Francis Bacon had extremely extended the relief 
afforded to debtors against exaction of penal bonds. it has been suggested that this 
"laity" was "pethaps the ordering of a stay of execution at common law where the 
debtor seemed likely to pay money within a short time of the contractual date. "37 
1.11 After the Restoration, the jurisdiction to relieve against penal bonds became well 
established. The Chancellor relieved against penal money bonds on the payment of the 
principal, interest and costs. Relief against penal performance bonds [i. e. a bond 
executed to secure the performance of a certain covenant] was also granted upon the 
payment of damages and costs. " For the purpose of determining the amount of damages, 
in can of bonds to secure performance of covenants, the case would be remitted to a 
Master of the Court or the Sheriffs jury to assess damages on quantum donnificatus. " 
Many cases can clearly illustratie this established jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts to 
relieve against penalties: In Hall v. Higham, for example, as to a bill for relief against 
the penalty of a bond it was ordered that the plaintiff had to "pay interest and costs, 
which [would] extend unto the Defendant's costs at IAw as well as in Chancery, ", and 
thus, the plaintiffwas relieved against the penal bond upon payment of interest and costs. 
In Wilm v. Bw%wO' there. was a bill for relief against penalty of a bond to secure 
performance of a certain act. Although it was insisted on behalf of the defendant that, 
because of the plaintiffs wffW breach, no relief could be granted in this case, an 
injunction against Penalty was granted by the Master of Rolls, and a trial to ascertain the 
amount of damages was directed. 42 
" Simpson A. W. B., A Histtory of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, 
1975, P. 120 
38 See Yale D. E. C., An Essay on Mortgages and Trusts and Allied Topics in Equity (An btraduction Io 
"L4xd Nottingham's Chancery Owes, vol. 11,1961'% Sel. Soc., vol. 79,1, pp. 15,20-, Simpson A. W. B., 
A History of tbO Common Law Of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, 1975, p. 120 
" "It is a common case to give relief agkinst the penalty of such bonds to perlbrut covenAntI6 -etc., and to 
send it to a trial at law to ascertain the damages in a quanhm damnljkatus. " quoted by Yale, loc. cit., no. 
3, p. 15, from I Eq. CIL Ab. 91 
40 (1663) 3 OL Rep. 3,21 ER 711 
41 (1671-72) Nelson 148,21 ER 212 
42 Set also HodUx v. BlacAnw & aL (1674-75) 2 CIL Rep. 103,21 ER 623; DmWI v. Terry (1694) 
Shom P. C. 15,1 ER II (relief against penalty of a bond of 140 1. to be vacted in case of default in 
psyment of 72 L on the corAdon that the prinmpal, interest and costs had to be paid by a certain date); 
Mend v. Burgh (1679) Rep. Temp. Finch 437,23 EEL 233 (an order for the refund of the penally already 
is 
1.12 By the extensive practice of the Chancery Courts in relieving against penalties, them 
was a decline in the use of bonds to secure performance of covenants, for the bonds could 
not any more be regarded as a better security than the covenant itself This can clearly be 
inferred from the words of Heneage Finch, first Earl of Nottingham, in Us Prokgomene 
where he, describing the practice of the Chancery Courts to award an injunction against 
penal bond, says: 
equity will not suffer any advantage to be taken of this bond beyond 
the true damnification, and therefore usually awards an injunction till a 
trial at law be had either upon an action of Covenant or upon a special 
issue quantum dmd)? datus. So that a penal bond to secure the 
performance of covenants is not much better security than a mere 
covenant, as equity now orders the matter. " 
Though the development of the jurisdiction to relieve against penal bonds led to a decline 
in the use of these bonds towards the close of the seventeenth century, it did nonetheless 
become a basis for a well-established equitable doctrine, empowering the courts to relieve 
against penalties and forfeitures. The twelfth maxim of equity stated by Richard Francis 
in 1728 could neatly illustrate this doctrine: 
"Equity suffers not advantage to be taken of a penalty or forfeiture, where 
compensation can be made. "44 
1.3.2. The Basis for the Relief 
1.13 The very first basis for the equitable intervention of the Chancellor was probably 
that it was inequitable to exact penalties when the defendant could fully be compensated 
by the payment of principal, interest and CostS. 45 Conscience, in a wide sense meaning the 
desire of the Chancery to do justice when the common law worked hardship, was one of 
the basic principles upon which the Chancellor grounded his equitable jurisdiction. " The 
paid less principaL interest and costs). Them are some cases of the same period in which reW bas been 
refjised. This is most probably due to special circumstances of each particular case: see, c. &, Wab v. 
Calley (1661-62) 1 Ch. Rep. 201,21 ER 550, wheM emphasizing that the plaintiff had to pay principal, 
interest and costs, the payment of E1600 penalty of a bond in lieu of the principal, Interest and COW was 
ordered. The order, however. was by the consent of the Parties. See also Dixon v. Read (1668-69) 2 CIL 
Rep. 21,21 ER 6(9; Crisp v Bluck (1673-74) 2 Ch. Rep. 89,21 ER 624 
43 1, ord Nottingham's "Mitnual of Chancery Practice" and , proicsomena of Chancery ad Equity", 
Edited by Yale DXC. (Cambfidg% 1965), Chapter xx, para. 5, at p. 275; see also Simpson, 7U Pod 
Bond and Conditional Defeasance, loc. cit, no. 2, at p. 415 
44 FA PriIIC- 1728 ; cited by Simpson, 10c. cit., no, 1. p. 121 
45 Simpson A. W. B., A History of the Common jAw of Contract: nw Rise of the Action of Assumpsit. 
1975, pp. 120-121 
46 See Tam ILW., The Equity of Redemption, 193 1, p. 35; HdIdsworth W, History of Eno& law, 7th 
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first cam of relief aigainst penal bonds were also probably cases of conscience: the 
harshness and harklship restflted from the exaction of penalties led the Chancellor to lend 
his aid to defaulting obligors where compensation was possible. Holdsworth's 
observations can clearly ilhutrate this: 
"At bottom it Y e., the relieg rests upon the idea that it is not fair that a 
person should use his legal rights to take advantage of another's 
misfortune, and still less that he should scheme to get legal rights with this 
object in viW. 47 
1.14 The other concept which helped the Chancellor to extend and develop his 
jurisdiction to grant relief against penalties and forfeitures was the recognition of the fact 
that a bond was to be regarded as a security for a principal obligation to pay a certain 
sum of money or perform a certain act. 41 With this conception in tnindý the obligor 
paying the principal, interest and costs (or damages and costs in case of bonds to secure 
of a covenant), it was regarded as inequitable that the obligee should take an 
unfair advantage of his legal rights which, in certain cases, might have also been acquired 
with the object of taldng advantage of the need of the obligor compelling him to agree to 
a penal bond or a forfeiture provision. 
1JJ. A Trace of the Concept of "Genuine Pre-estimate of Damages" 
1.15 A trace of the concepts of "genuine per-estimate of dwagei, or being merely -in 
terrore*" may be detected in several Chancery cases decided in this century. it has been 
suggested" that the vagaries Of the, Procedure at law on the basis of quantum 
damnificalm was probably the reason why the Chancellor gave effect to stipulated 
e&, vol. 5, p. 293 
47 HOWSWOftk Hist"Y Of ISIOldish L&W, 7th ei, VOL 5. P. 330 
48 See Emanuel Colkge v. Evans (1625) 1 C3L Rep. 18,21 ER 494, where the Court "conceived the said 
Imse being but a security, and that Money paid. the said Lem had been void". (emphasis added) It has 
convincingly been argued that the concept of bonds being a security had long ago been recognised by the 
Common law, though its role in the devtIopment of the equitable doctrWe of relief aWnst PoWties and 
forfeitures could M be denied. (See Turner, pp. 37-39) It was after Restoration that this concept was 
widely uWd. the Chief Of Which being by Lord Nottingham in 77sornbrough v Baker (1676) 3 Swans. 
628,36 ER 1000, where it was decided that "the interest of the mortgagee was personalty and henot descended to Ids v=utors instead of to his heirsr. From Lord NottingMm's time onwards, the concept 
has certainly been a leadin Pfi'xAPle Of the Court of Chancery. See Turner R. W., 17he Equity of Redemption, 193 1. pp. 38-39 
49 See Hwpum C., FAPdt*b RAW. P=dtics MW Forfeitum (1989) 48 CLJ 370, at p. 371 
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damages, and distinguished them from penalties. In Tall v. JbýbmP, the plaintiff was 
sued on a bond of 120 given to the defendant, after some differences between the parties, 
on the condition that the plaintiff should behave civilly and like a good neighbour. The 
ground for the action was that as a result of the plaintiffs bad and unacceptable 
behaviour, the defendant had lost a customer. The bill was for relief against the penalty 
of the bond, alleging that damages were neither considerable nor valuable. The Lord 
Chancellor was reported as deciding that "as this was, the penalty being but 120, he did 
not think fit to put the Defendant to answer, for the costs of suit here and at Law would 
exceed the Penalty". The demurrer was, therefore, allowed. Ifis lordship, however, 
declared that "this was not to be a Precedent in the Que of a Bond of VOO or the 
fike"51. This may well im* ffiat the Lord Keeper refused the relief on the ground, inter 
alia, that the amount agreed by the parties was a modest and reasonable, and not an 
excessive and extravagant, sum. Had the parties agreed on a penalty of I 100 or the like it 
would have seemed extremely unlikely for his lordship to refuse the relief 
1.16 In Small v. Lord FittwiffiamP, 1400 was retained by the defendant to secure the 
release of the dower by Vs wife to A in two years time. After the expiry of this time and 
before release, thewife died, and the defendant retained the sum absolutely. The bill was 
for the recovery of MOO on the ground that it was penal in nature to secure against the 
dower. Lord Chancellor agreed with the contention that "this was not in the nature of a 
penalty, but ... the meawe of the safisfaction for the condngent incumbrance of 
dMer... "33 
, and the relief was accordingly refused. The decision may clearly show the 
trend towards the view that an agreed sum being a reasonable pre-estimate of actual 
probable damages which might result from breach should be unobjectionable. 
1.17 In BkAe v. East India Co. "4, the pWntif& the agent of the defendant company, 
" (1670) 1 Chan. Cos. 133,22 ER 753 
31 Emphasis added 
52 (16") PM Ch. 102,24 ER 49 
53 E Inipbasis added 
-44 (1674) Chm Cas. 198,22 ER 909, A mom dftfled acwunt of the can can be foqmd in JAwd NOtfingham'l Chan=Y Cases, VOL I (W. Sm., Vol. 73). cast 105 at pp. 59-61 
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covenanting not to trade in certain commodities, undertook to pay "several Rates for 
every Pound ... so traded in contrary to the covenant". The plaintiff traded in certain 
prohibited commodities for himself to his own use. The company brought an action in 
debt claiming f26,000 as a penalty. A bill by the plaintiff to be relieved against the 
penalty was dismissed, "though it was objected that this covenant was a greater Penalty 
than a Bond of double the value'. The Lord Keeper was quoted as saying: 
"A Lem is made rendering Rent, and if a Meadow be plowed to pay L5 
per Acre, is this relievable? I see not how the company can subsist unless 
such Trade be restricted. Dismiss the Bill. " 
in his lordship's view, such a term could not be considered as a penalty, for it "might be 
incurred and yet the offender be a gainer by it too! '". Although the term "in terrorem7 
was not employed here, yet the decision may imply that a contractual term by which the 
defendant, though having to pay a sum of money referred to as a penalty, may also be a 
gainer, cannot be regarded penal in nature, for it cannot be considered as acting "in 
terrorete of the defaulting party. 
1.3.4. A Trend Towards the Rule of Compensation 
1.18 Lord Nottingham's chancellorship witnessed a clear trend in equity towards the rule 
of compensation with regard to granting relief against penalties and forfeitures. It was in 
his time that certain limits for the application of the jurisdiction were introduced and too 
liberal measure of equitable relief was avoided. Yale describes the situation in the 
following terms: 
"Lord Nottingham seem to have appreciated the dangers of too liberal a 
measure of equitable relief, threatening as it did the very right of the 
parties to assess and provide for in advance possible liabilities for breach 
of contract. ... Agreements deliberately entered into ought to be kept, but, 
on the other hand, it is inequitable that one party shall take an unfair 
advantage of another. Both these considerations go to the making of the 
rules of equity in C&SM of forfeitures and penalties. 947 
IEs ftmous, ma)dm that the Chancellor mends no mans bargain can to some odent 
illustrate his general approach towards the equitable intervention to grant relief against 
penalties and forfeitures. "He was", in the words of Yale, "often prepared to keep a party 
Notfingham'S Chan=y CASM VOL I (ss, VOL 73X Can 105, at p. 60 
See &Uo East India Co. v. Mainston (1676) 2 Chan. Cas. 218,22 ER 9 18 
57 Yale D. E. C., An Essay an biortpga aW Trusts RW Allied Topics in Equity (Aji, Introduction to 
'ILOrd NOmingbaln's Chancery Cases, vd. IL 19611. Sel. Soc., vol. 79,1, at p. 19 
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to his barpin in circtimstances of no Me hardslip. Generally he was not prepared to 
allow relief because of a mistake unless that mistake were induced by fi-aud or some 
species of deMtion. "2's 
1.19 The tea which was applied by the Lord Chancellor was to consider whether the 
term in question was in the nature of a security; if it were, then the case would be 
considered as a proper one for compensation, and upon the compensation being made, 
the obligor would be relieved against forfeiture. In Puleston v. Puleston", his lordship 
stated: 
"... conditions are of two sorts, either they are such as if they are broken 
are capable of equivalent recompense, and then the breach is always 
relieved in equity, as conditions for the payment of money or the like, or 
such conditions as are not capable of any compensation, and then the 
breach is never relieved 
Thus, where was not possible, no relief would be given against penalty or 
forfeiture. 6' This can also be illustrated by the judgment of Lord Macclesfield in the 
" Ibid. 
" (1677) Rep. Temp. Finch, 312 ; 23 ER 171, Nottingham's ChauCery CAM Vol. I (Sel. sac., vol. 73ý 
case 429 at p. 295 
60 NOttilighm's Chancery cases. vol. 1, at p. 296 ; we the application of this principle in Wheeler V. 
H%i" (1676) 2 Freeman 9,22 ER 1023, where the Lord Chancellor, hold: -this condition being for 
payment of money, although in strictness Of law the estate wen forfeited by the non-payment of the 
money ... 
but as it were a mortgage or security for money, and the daughters being paid the aid money 
and damages, they were at no damage; and so ... Andrew [the plaintiff) paying the same should have the land. " at p. II and p. 1023 rMecdv*, set also Rom v. Rose (1756) Amb. 331,27 ER 222, at pp. 332, 
223 respectively, Northcote v. Duke (1765) Amb. 5 11,27 ER 330 where Lord Nottingham obwmvd. - "I 
take the rule to be, that in all cases where a person has broke a condition, and forfeited a penalty, Equity 
will reli0vý if there Can be 2 =11pensation. " at pp. 513-514,331 respecdv*, Faton v. Lyon (1799) 3 
Ves. Jun. 690,30 ER 1223, per Sir RP Arden MIL at pp. 692-693,1224 respectively. 
61 See, C4. Tall v. RAInd (1670) 1 ChalL Cas. 193,22 ER 753, the facts of which have already been 
given (see nPra. text relating 10 DOW 50). In this cam the defendant was reported as arguing: "... the 
Bond was to pmmrvc Amity and neighbourly hiendship, for the breach of which the Plaintiff did submit 
to pay that penally, and then cau be no trial had to measure the Damage for breach of the condition, 
other than the parties have submitted to. " This may, it appears, be one of the reasons why the relief was 
refused. Further, as to Blake v. FA& India Co. (1674) 2 Chan. Cos. 198,22 ER 909 (=pra., text relating 
to note 34), it has bow pointed out that "no reason is gim in the book why the bill was desmissed Big it may be olxmmd that no compensation could be nutdeý for it was impossible to asoertain what damage 
might arise to the =11PRnY by such UldiD& by the emuragement it would SM to other people. " am Francis's Maxims of Equity, X11,52 (cited by Yale D. E. C., An Essay on Mortgages and Trusts and Allied Topics in Equity (An Introduction to "Lord Nottingham's Clumcery Cases, Vol. IL 19610), Sel. Soc., vol. 79,1. no. I at p. 17). SOO also Simpson A. W. B., A History of the Common Utw of Cambia: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, 1975, at p. 12 1; Yale, loc. cit., at p. 25 
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leading case of Peachy v. Duke of Somerset' where he said: 
"It is recompense that gives this court a handle to grant relief... " 
13.5. Adoption of the Jurisdiction by the Common IAw Courts 
1.20 The establisW equitable jurisdiction to relieve against the v=tion of penal money 
bonds was adopted by the Common Law Courts by the mid 1670s. 63 Lord Nottingham in 
his Prolegoment? describes the situation in the following terms: 
-... in all suits on bonds it's now become the course of the Court, that, if 
the defendant will pay the principal and interest and charges, the plaintiff 
___y 
6 sW be obliged to acc it till plea pleaded, else the defendant shall have 
a perpetual imparlance , and all this to prevent a suit in Chancery, which 
otherwise would give the same relief "" 
1.21 The position was regularised by the close of the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries by the enactment of the Statutes of 1696-9767 and 170551: under the first 
statute, the plaintiff suing on a bond to secure performance of a certain covenant was 
permitted to assign as many breaches as he wished, and then it was the duty of the jury to 
assess damages for theses defaults. The judgment could be entered for the whole penal 
sum, but the plaintiff was restricted to the recovery of merely his damages and costs. The 
judgment as to the balance secured him agamst any finther breach. The latter statute 
empowered the court to discharge an obligor upon the payment of the principaL interest 
and costs which was due under a penal money bond. " The defendant was also entitled to 
plead payment in bar of an action on a bond, where, in spite of the actual payment, there 
62 Eq. CAL Abc- 2n- 22 ER 193 ; CiWd bY Yidt, loc. cit, at P. 28 
63 Sao TUMerILW-, TIWEquitYOfR*leMPdon, 1931, p. 33; Simpson A. W. B., A Flistory of the Common 
Law of ContraM The Rise of the Acdon of Assumpsit, 1975, p. 122 
" Lord Nottingham's "Manual of Cliancery Practice" and "Prolegomens. of Clanoery and Equity", 
offited by: Yale D. E. C., 1965, chap. v, pam 11, at p. 203 
65 A licence to imparl (i. e. to talk the MaW over) which stayed the proceeding. (see Simpson, loc. cit, 
note 2 at P. 122) 
66 Tumor believes tha the Common lAw Courts had already wwrcised this jurisdiction under James 1 
(1406-1437) by vefining to ahm " pond money boads which had become impow"ble of performiance 
through no Amh of the obligor In Ids view, therefore, then courts wen dweloping their Junsdiction in 
the same way as the Courts of Mumy had done but "they took half a century longer to reach the same 
desduadW. set Turner ILW., The Equity of Redemption, 193 1, p. 33 
17 g&9 Will. 11]4 C. 11, L8 
'm 4&5 Anne, c. 16, s. 12,13 
OL 13 
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was no formal acquittance by deed. 70 The effect of these statutes was, however, only to 
regularise the situation which had already been achieved by the Common Iaw Courts by 
adopting the procedure of the Courts of Chancery in granting relief 71 It should, 
however, be noted that even after the enactment of these statutes, the defendant, who 
was unable to tender the principal, interest and costs while the action was tried, had to 
seek equitable relief in the Chancery Courts. ' 
1.3.6. Further Development of the Doctrine: Towards the Recognition of Settled 
Rules to Distinguish Liquidated Damages from Penalties 
1.3.6.1. In Equity 
1.22 By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, equity had introduced certain settled 
rules to distinguish liquidated damages from penalties. By this time, relief against 
penalties which wem collateral to pefformance contracts was granted as of course: In 
Sknm v. ftfter", for instance, as to a bond entered into by the plaintiff in the penalty. 
of 1500 to secure to him the use of a room in a certain coffee-house, Lord Chancellor 
Thurlow held: 
"The rule, that where a penalty is inserted merely to secure the enjoyment 
of a collateral object, the enjoyment of the object is considered as the 
principal intent of the deed, and the penalty only as accessional, and, 
therefore, only to secure the damage really incurred, is too strongly 
established in equity to be shaken. "74 
It was accordingly held that, the bond being unenforceable, nothing but the actual 
damages could be recovered. 75 
1.23 The practice of the Courts of Chancery, in distinguishing liquidated damages from 
penalties, was to put much emphasis on the true intent of the parties in order to "really 
70 
s. 12 
71 SM SiMpgon, IOC. CiL, no. 1, p. 122 
72 SinVson, ibid. 
73 (1783) 1 Brown Chm COL 418,28 ER 1213 
74 Ibid., at pp. 419,1214 respwdvely 
75 See also Hardy v. Map-tin (1783) 1 Cox 26,29 ER 1046 where in an action on a bond in the penalty of 
MW to secure the defendant's promise not to sell any brandy within five miles of a certain placp upon 
the PaYmOnt Of actual loss. the Plaintiff was restrained by the Court of Chancery from talcing out 
cocution for penalty. 
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and substantially" perfolm covenant? 6. Nonetheless, the description of the stipulated 
sum by the parties and the form in which the penal provision was agreed by the parties 
were of great unportance m detertnining whether the agreed sum was a penalty. This 
could well be illustrated by the following extract from the Court's decision in Low v. 
Peers7: 
"They [Courts of Equity] will relieve against a penalty, upon a 
compensation: butwhere the covenant is "to pay a particular liquidated 
sum7, a court of Equity can not make a new covenant for a man, nor is 
there any room for compensation or relief As in lease containing a 
covenant against plowing up meadow; if the covenant be "not to plow" 
and there be a penalty; a court of Equity will relieve against penalty, or 
will go further than that (to preserve the substance of the agreement) but 
if it is worded- "to pay 0 an acre for every acre plowed up; " there is no 
alternative, no room for any relief against it; no compensation, it is the 
substance of the agreement. "78 
1.3.6.1 In the Conumn Law Cwrts 
1.24 The practice of the Common Law Courts in granting relief against penalties led to 
the advent of the principle that a penalty is not enforceable. Thus, the law courts, 
following the Chancery, began to evolve rules to distinguish between liquidated damages 
and penalties. Astley v WeA"" and Kemble v, Farrenso were two instances where the 
court, applying the Statute of William 1696-97, exercised its power to relieve against 
penalty: Both cases concerned theatrical performance contracts where the parties had 
agreed that, in case of a breach of any of several undertakings, the contract-breaker 
would have to pay a large amount to the other. In the former case, the agreed sum was 
76 in the words of Sir Arden Kk in Eaton v. Lyon (1798) 3 Ves. Jun. 690,30 ER 1223, "At LAw a 
covenant must be strictly and literally performed: in Equity it must be rally and substantially performed 
aOOOtdiug to tbC true intent and 100miug Of the partiM so far as the circumstanoes will admit.. " at pp. 
692,1224 respectively 
77 (1768) 4 Burr. 2225,98 ER 160 
78 Ibid., at pp. 162,2228-29, NO also Ponsmby v. Adam (1770) 2 Brown. Parl. COL 43 1,1 ER 1044 (A 
covenant for the rise of the rent froin E125 to L150 in case of tbg tc=nt's failure to re" in the leased 
estate. Mw E25 additional tot wu regarsed as stipulated damaga); Rolfe v. Peterson (1772) 2 Brown. 
Pgd. Cas. 436,1 ER 1048 (A covenant to py LS per annum for every acre converted into tillage. The 
increased rent was not misidered as a penalty, but as a "liquidated safisftdon fixed and agreed upon by 
the pardW; Fletcher v. Dyck (1797) 2 Term Rep. 32,100 ER 18 (A covenant to pay mid forkit a sum 
of UO for every week in can of Mure to perform cerWn work in a certain tim was considered as 
liquidated damages) 
79 (1801) 2 Bos. & Pul 346,126 ER 1319 
00 (1829) 6 Bingham 141,130 ER 1234 
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not given any description, but in Kemble v. Fw-ren it was agreed to be paid as, "liquidated 
and ascwtained damages, and not a penalty or penal sum, or in the nature thereof'. In 
the plaintiffs action to recover the agreed sum, upon the performer's breach, the sum 
was recognised as a penalty, and actual damages were only held to be recoverable. 
Chambre I in Asdey v. WeAdm$l observed: 
"The jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in relieving on penalties is of very 
high antiquity. The leg6latm had now adopted this practice and affords 
the same benefit to Defendants in action at law. " 
In both cases, the court applied the presumption that a single sum provided to be paid 
upon dfferent contingencies, one of which is the non-payment of a smaller sum, should 
be taken as intended to act as a penalty. 
1.25 Kembk v. Firren marks an important turning point in the history of penalties in the 
early nineteenth century: Despite the usual and continuous practice of courts in giving 
effect to the description given by the parties to the agreed surno, Tindal CJ refused to 
endorse the declaration by the parties that the agreed sum was a liquidated and 
ascertained damages, and, construing the contract, determined the true nature of the 
clause as a penalty. It was in this century that the doctrine gradually became associated 
with the am agreed to be paid upon breaches of contract. A tendency towards the view 
that the mere nuignitude of the sum agreed to be paid does not turn its nature to a penalty 
can be detected in several cam decided in this century, among which the observations of 
Chief Justice Coleridge in Reynokk v. Bridge'o deserve to be quoted here: 
"In Astley v. Weldon Lord Edon distinctly laid down that the mere 
magnitude of the sum named could not prevent it from being liquidated 
damages. ... The principle seems to be that if you find a covenant the breach of which will occasion a damage, not uncertain, but such as is 
capable of being ascertained, as where there is a particular sum to be paid 
which is much kss than the sum named as payable upon the breach, there 
21 (1801)2 Bot &Pul 346,126ER 1318, at pp. 354,1323 respectiv* 
82 0* Six YOM bd"e that Pa* I in ReillY V- AM (1823) 1 Bing. 303,30 ER 122 bad observed: "No 
case has been adduced, in which, after the parties hm themselves employed the expreadon liquidged 
damages, the court has holden the plainW should not recover, on breach of the agrMnent, the sum 
named as sdpubftd damaW at pp. 306,123 respectively. And the judgawnt of Burrough I was much 
stronger on this point: 'rhere is no case which has decided that ft J)efendaut smil not pay the whole 
sum, where the expression liquidated damages has been employed to designate the nature of the 
POYIDUIL"; see also Bamm v. GA"r (1915) Holt, N. P. C. 43,171 ER 154; Farimt v. Ohnius (1920) 3 B. 
& AU 692,106ER814; CWsdee v. Bolton (1927) 3 Carr. &p. 240,172ER403 
83 o356) 6 M. & 13L 528; 119 ER 961 
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it is held that the last named aim is specified by way of penalty because a 
Court of Equity would limit the amount to be actually paid. "" 
Jessel NEIL clearly inclined to this view in his iUuminatingjudginent in Wallis v. SMM". 
In his view, the performance of contracts entered into by "adults- persons not under 
disability, and at arm's length", according to the intention of the parties is of great 
importance: the Courts of Law, in his words, "should not overrule any clearly expressed 
intention on the ground that Judges know the business of the people better than the 
people know it themselves. "" 
13.7. The Judicature System 
1.26 Until 1873, Law and Equity were two co-odsting systems with certain recognised 
jurisdictions. '" The enactment of the Judicature Act, however, led to the unification of 
.. 'o though the different principles originating in Law and Equity continued to 
remain as legal or equitable. u Although the penalty doctrine had already been recognised 
" 'bid" at PP* 540.541- 966 OMP**"* (OWhilsis added). In ASUAY V. Weldon (180 1) 2 Bcs. & Pui 346, 
126 EEL 13 18 LAW Eldon had bdd: -A principle has be= aid to hut been gated in several CaM6 tM 
adoption of which one cannot but Isament nanwly, that if the sum would be very ewrmous and excessive 
considered as liquidated danmom it shall be taken to be a penalty, though agreed to, be paid in the fom of 
contract. " at pp. 351,1321 respectively 
85 (1882) 21 CLD. 243, at pp. 263-266 
86 Ibid., at p. 266 
'" ft is believed that "equity is the appendix that the Chancery was composing for the saving of the 
Common Law, and is not an independent system of law". (Sir Frank Kitto, Foreword to the First Edition 
of Meagber, Gummow and LehaM Equity: Doctrines and Remedies , (Butterworths, 3rd ed, 1992), p. 
vi); Viscount Simonds in an Essay objects to this description of Equity daftg that such a description 
cannot adequately refied the contrihWon made, and the ribstantive law brouglit into existence, by the 
Chanceft. (we The CharecW of England edited by Barker (Oxford, 1947), p. 112, at pp. 117,124; 
also seless to in Sir Frank KittO .5 Forewonk ibid. ) 17he description, though it has been ngartled as an 
accurate historical vqAanation of Equity, considering the devielopments of equitable doctrines, bas been 
referred to as "an utterly misleading sUftned of equity's place in the scheme of things today". (we the 
illuminating article of Sir Anthony Mison, 71k Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the 
Contemporary Common Law World (1994) 110 LQR 238) 
n This seems to be the prevailing view both in EnIdand and Australia [see, e. g., Salt v. Cooper (1880) 16 
Ch. D. 544, at p. 549 whem Jessel MX observed: "It is stated very plainly that the main object of the Act 
was to assimilate the trarisaction of Equity business and Common Law business by different courts of 
judicature. It has been sonlewn= inaccurately called "the AWon of Law and Equity"; but it was rot any 
fusion, or anything of that kind; it was the vesting in one tribunal the administration of Law and Equity 
in rMy Call action, or dispute which should come before the himmal. "; see also Goode R., 
Commercial Law, 2nd ed., (Penguis Books, 1995), p. 117; Jackson D. C., Principles of Proputy Law. 
(Australia: The Law Book Company Limited, 1967), p. 62; MelpaTy R., Thompson K P., hlegRM's 
WWnW of the Law of Real Property, 7th ad., (London: Swed & NfimweA IM), pp. 55 at seq. ], though 
the observations of IAwd Diplock in United sciently7c Holdinp Ltd v Bwnley Borough counca f 1978] 
AC 904 suggests to the contrary: In his Lordship's opinion, -[t]he innate conservatism of Vnriish 
laveym haw mzft them slow to TCODgmse that by the Suprem& Court of Judicature Act 1873 the two 
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by the Courts of IAw, the Judicature systM nonetheless, strengthened the principle. 
There was, therefore, no need, in an action to recover a penalty, to invoke the Chancery's 
equitable jurisdiction in a separate set of proceedings, because any possible relief could be 
granted by the court in a single action. By s. 25 of the Act, however, in case of any 
conflict between lAw and Equity, the equitable rules prevailed. 
1.27 The development of the doctrine in the nineteenth century was clearly reflected in 
the leading decisions of the House of Lords in Clydebank Engineering And ShipbujOng 
Co. Ltd v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y CastanedP and Dunlop Pneumatic Yýre Co. 
Ltd v. New Garage andMotor Co. Ltd. " cases. Both cases recognised and endorsed the 
concept that an agreed sum to be paid upon breach amounted to a penalty where it was 
"extravagant", "unconscionable7 or "exorbitant" in comparison with the damages which 
might conceivably result from breach. 91 The leading judgment of Lord Dunedin in the 
latter case, which is still to be considered as the most important authority with regard to 
the doctrine, expounded certain rules and guidelines to distinguish fiquidated damages 
from penalties. 92 Though the concept of "being extravagantly large in order to be a 
penalty" was later ignored by some more recent decisions", nonetheless, as we shall 
sr"M of substantive Old 8140c" law formerly administered by courts of law and Courts of Chanawy 
... were 
fusecr (at P. 925), and "to speak of the rules of equity as being part of the law of iFinglAnd in 1977 
is about U M=iA& As to sf=k similarly Of the Statutes of Uses or of Quia EmptoreC (at p. 924). 
Then otmvations have been regarded as representing "the low water-mark of modem English 
JurisprudenW [MeOgba. GUMMOW and Lehane, Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, Prefim to the Second 
Edition, (Butterworths, 1984), p. xil, and have sharply been criticised by Sir Anthony blason who rohn 
to the possibility that loord Diplock's intention was only to convey the fad that the MCUM Act should 
not be vegarded as prohibiting "the cOnUnuing development by judicial decision of the aftantive 
principles of common law and equity". (Mason A- (1994) 110 LQR 239, at p. 240) In his view. Law and 
Equity should be sem a two distind systems in origin, which have been administered by out Court, 
boffowmg ftom each other, in the course of the development of the law as a whole, certain concepts and 
doctrines. (Ibid., at p. 242 citing with appmYal the commenu of Somm L in Elders Pastmat Ltd v. 
Bank ofNew Zealand [198912 N. Z. L. P- 180, at p. 193) This has resulted in the coavergc= of equity 
mid common law, and they, in the words of His Honour, "win continue to converge so that the 
differences 1n Ongin Of particular principles should become of decrusing importance. (Ibid, at p. 259) 
89 (1905) AC 6 
go (1915) AC 79 
91 Set Qwdrbank EjWneering (1905) AC 6, at p. 10 per Lord Haldpuy LC; Dunlop v. New Gamp 
(1915) AC 79, at p. 97 per Lord Dunedin 
92 These rules will be Ailly discussed later: btfiv., d4ptcr 2, secdon 4: paras. 2.24 et wq. 








a move towards the return to this concept has forceflufly been started. 
1.4. Conclusion 
1.28 This historical review of the doctrine reveals, inter afta, that 
1. Though the concept of relief was not strange to a common lawyer, the doctrine of 
relief against penalties was first established in equity in mid-seventeenth century. The 
doctrine was, then, adopted by the Common Law, and was reaffirmed by the Statutes of 
1696-97 and 1705. 
H. The relief in equity would only be granted upon fall compensation being made. 
Therefore, there would be no relief where compensation was not possible. The amount 
of damages was assessed in an action at law, either by an action of covenant or upon the 
issue of quantm dwodficatus. 
III. The basis for the intervention was the clash between the bargain principle and the 
compensatory principler on the one hand, and the recognition of the true nature of a 
penalty as being a security on the other: it was regarded as inequitable to exact the 
penalty where it was possible to compensate the promisee for the loss he had actually 
suffered. it was not, in fact, in the eyes of equity, fair that a party should take an unfair 
advantage of his legal rights, or to scheme to get these rights with this object in mind. 
2. Justification of the Penalty Doctrine 
2.1. In&oduction 
1.29 Although the main concern of this thesis is to approach the practical issues, and to 
see how the practical Problems can best be solved, it is nonetheless inevitable to go, 
rather briefly, through the theoretical justifications put forward for the penalty doctrine, 
and to consider whether the intervention of courts as to invalidating an agreed damages 
clause on the ground that it amounts to a penalty could, by any means, be justified. 
1.30 The enforcement of an agreed damages clause is, at first glance, supported by the 
94 infra, pams. 2.26-2.27,2.35,2.54 
" The notion that a party to a contract should M be allowed to recover as compensation a sum which is 
higher than an amount needed to compensate him for the loss suffere& see Simpson, loc cit., no. 1, pp. 
123-124 
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principle of freedom of contract- the basic principle which requires that the parties' 
agreement should be enforced according to its terms. This principle, however, has never 
been an absolute one, and its scope has, during decades, upon many justifications, been 
limited. Some of these limitations may, rather easily, be explained- for example, refusing 
to enforce a contract on the ground that one of the contracting parties lacks capacity- but 
as to some others, such an explanation, considering the long historical intervention of 
courts in the parties' bargain, is not an easy task. " 
1.31 As the historical review of the penalty doctrine shows, the enforcement of the 
parties' agreement as to an agreed damages clause has gradually been limited to a 
situation where the agreed sum does not disproportionately exceed the amount of 
damages which might be conceived to result from breach at the time when the contract is 
made. Historically, such a blatant intervention with the parties' freedom in contracting 
has been explained on the general grounds of fairness and being equitable: In short, it was 
said that it was inequitable to allow a party to a contract to take an unfair advantage of 
his legal tights by recovering a disproportionately large sum of money as damages; 
especially where the clause had been agreed upon with this object in mind. 97 This 
explanation, however, has been criticised by some economists, who have put forward 
some altemative justifications. " There have also been some attempts to explain the 
situation on the ground of cognitive defects: the core of such an explanation is that 
penalties are normally the result of a defective cognition, and therefore not susceptible to 
be subject to the principle of freedom of contract. " Some also have tried to justify the 
doctrine on the basis of a concern for future freedom'00: they regard penalties as an undue 
limit on the promisor's future freedom, and argue that, like self-enslavement contracts, 
96 In Robophone Facifides Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128, for example, Lord Justice Diplock, while 
stating the rule as to the non-enforceability of penalties said: "I make no attempt, where so many others 
have failed, to rationalise this common law rule. It seems to be sui generis. " at p. 142 
97 See HoldswOrth W., History Of English Law, edited by: Goodhart A. L. & Hanbury RG., 7th ed., vol. 1, 
1956 (Repdated 1966), vol. 5, p. 330; Simpson A. W. B., A History of the Common Law of Contract: The 
Rise of the Action of Assmpsit, 1975, pp. 120-12 1; see also mpra., paras. 1.13-1.14 
98 See infra., paras. 1.5 1 et seq. 
99 See infra., paras. 1.60 et seq. 
loo See Infra., paras. 1.37 et seq. 
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the parties could not be free to unduly limit their future freedom. "' 
1.32 This section will, thus, be devoted to exploring- and as far as the competence of the 
writer allows, to analytically discussing- the main justifications for the non-enforceability 
of penalties. Consideration will first be given to "public policy" as a possibly suggested 
basis for the intervention of courts. Then the attempts to justify the doctrine on the 
ground of a "concern for future freedom7' will be discussed. The final part of this section 
will deal with "fairnesC as the most plausible basis for the doctrine. The cognitive 
interpretation of penalties, though it may be considered as a specific version of procedural 
unfairness, will, due to its importance, be separately considered. 
ZZ Public Policy 
1.33 The non-enforcement of penalties has sometimes been grounded on being against 
public policy. The argument may run as follows: the promisee by stipulating a large sum 
of money- which is out of all proportion to damages which may result from breach- to be 
paid upon breach, in fact, intends to terrorize the promisor into carrying out his 
contractual promise, and penalize him in case of breach. This is, in effect, a private 
punishment'02, and since punishment should normally be considered as something only the 
State can impose", it is, therefore, against public policy to allow the contracting parties 
to agree upon a private punishment. 
1.34 Some judicial statements may support this justification: In Bridge v. Cwnpbell 
Discount Co. Ltd. 104, Lord Radcliffe, considering the nature of penalties and liquidated 
101 The MaW bads of this analysis is John Stuart NM's justification for the non-enforcmbility of self- 
enslavement contracts Where he argues that "[t1he principle of freedom cannot requm that he [i. e., the 
promisor] should be f1ree not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his f1reedonL" See 
John Stuart NMI, On Iberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray, (Oxford University Press, 199 1), p. 
114 
102 See Burrows A S, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contracý (Butterworths, 1994,2nd ed), pp. 330- 
331-, cf. CollinsH, TIN Law of Contract, (Butterworths, 1993,2nded. ), p. 345 
" See Ugo bland, Tbe Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Chures in Contracts (1995) 45 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 427, where he observes: -rhey [i. e., courts) believe that 
punishment is a prerogative of the state and that this prerogative should be safeguarded against private 
parties seeking private justice. In other words, courts are jealous of their jurisdiction, and they are 
traditionally loath to accept alternative dispute resolution schemes removed from their control. " at p. 443 
104 [1962] AC 600 
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damages, observed: 
"The refusal to sanction IegaI proceedings for paWties is in fad a rule of 
the court's own, Produced and maintained for purposes of pubfic poficy 
(except where imposed by positive statutory enactment, as in 8&9 WiII. 
3, c. 11; 4&5 Anne, c. 16). "105 
In Robophone Facilities, Lid v. Blank'06, Lord Justice Diplock, speaking of the right of 
the parties to provide for their secondary ob1igations and rights which arise on non- 
performance of a primary obligation, added: 
"The right of parties to a contract to make such a stipulation is subject, 
however, to the rule of public policy that the court will not enforce it 
the party in breach if it is satisfied that the stipulated sum was not a 
genuine estimate of the loss likely to be sustained by the party not in 
breach, but was in the nature of a penalty or punishment imposed on the 
contract-breaker. "107 
1.35 It is, however, to be noted that the rule as to penalties is hardly explainable on the 
ground of public policy in its strict sense: providing for a certain sum of money to be 
paid, or a certain property to be transferred, upon breach, though it might in certain 
circumstances act as a penalty for the offending party, is not a sort of punishment which 
is only exercised by the state. Public policy, in its strict sense, "reflects the mores and 
fundamental assumptions of the community"108. Being a member of a certain society 
entails some obligations which are of overriding character and cannot be displaced by the 
private agreement of the parties. 109 These are normally a sort of obligations that are 
somehow linked to certain external considerations relating to the interests of public"O, 
105 Ibid., at p. 622 
106 [196613 All ER 128 
107 Ibid. at pp. 141-142; see also 77se Angelic &ar [1988] 1 Lloyd's Law Rep. 122, when Gibson LJ 
said: "The doctrine relating to penalties ... is A rule by which the Court reruses to sanction legal 
Proceeding for MOOMY Of a Penalty sum, a rule which the Court bad produced and maintained for 
Purposes Of public Policy -- The rule is, in my judgment, not designed to strike down any more of a 
lawful contract than Is D0=MIY to give cffcct to the Court's purpose of applying public poliq ... N at pp. 126-127 
"MP FurmstcA Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's law of Contract, (London: Butterworths, 1996,13th 
ed. ), p. 373 
11 See Lloyd D, Public Policy: A Comparative Study in English and French Law, (University of London: 
The Athlone Press, 1953), p. 9 
"I To give an example, a contract by which a Mafia group hires a person to assassinate the leader of a 
rival group is against Public Policy. Such a contract- though it my well be a valid agreement, as far as 
the internal considerations are concerned- is against some external policy considerations which renders it 
unenforceable. 
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and ignoring these or eliminating them by private agreements will result in social injury. " I 
If the contracting parties agreed upon a penalty, as an agreed remedy, which is merely 
under the control of state- like a clause providing for the imprisonment of the defaWting 
party for a certain period of time- then such a stipulation may be invalidated on the basis 
of public policy. For this agreement affects the social order of the society, and 
consequently is against public interest: It is obvious that permitting individuals to provide 
for and enforce criminal punishment- which should, for many policy reasons, only be 
exercised by state- would seriously affect the public order. This may also be regarded as 
an agreement which tends to interfere with the due course of justice' 12 by providing a 
criminal punishment for a merely civil contractual breach which is not normally 
considered as a criminal offence. But where the parties' agreement is only for the 
payment of a certain sum of money or performance of a certain act- which is not within 
the exclusive power of state, it would be difficult to assume a social injury or violation of 
public interests. 
1.36 Public policy, however, might sometimes be referred to as a wide concept that 
includes some internal Policy considerations which are aimed to safeguarding some legal 
principles to ensure fairness in the contracting process. In this sense, it might be possible 
to ground the non-enforcement of penalties on such policy considerations, for penalties 
tend to negate, using the disguised form of agreed remedies, the established principle of 
compensation upon which "a contracting party should only be permitted to recover 
compensation for loss actually suffered through default, such compensation being 
III It 2MUS that LOrd DiPlOck in Bbagwan V. Director of Public Prosecutors 11972] AC 60 considers 
public policy as a means to prevent such social injury: "In past centuries the courts, as expositors of those 
parts of the common law of England in which Parliament bad not yet chosen to intervene, had laid down 
a number of broadly described categories Of purposes which they deemed socially miurious and had. determined what wen the legal consequences of agreements to achieve them Those consequences varied 
with the view which the courts then took of the gravity of the social injury which would be involved if the 
purpose wen achieved. Some purposes attracted no severer consequence than that the agreement to 
achieve them was void in civil law, but others, where the social injury was thought to be greater or other 
means of preventing it inadequate, allractod the penal consequences attaching to a at 
common law. " at pp. 79-W 
112 Such ag==tS an ObWOUSly against pUbliC policy: see, e. g., Chitty on Contracts, (London: Swed maxwell, 1994,27th e&), vol. 1, para. 16-033; MP Furmston, ChesWM Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract, (London: Butterworths, 1996,13th ed. ). p. 372; McKendrick, Contract Law, 2nd edL, para. 15.10 at p. 254; Beale H G, Bishop W D, Furmston M P, Contract, Cam and hbterhtis, (Butterworths, 1995,3rd ed. ), P. 921, and cases cited thereim 
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assessed, broadly speaking, with a view to putting the innocent party into the position he 
would have achieved if the contract had been perforMed"113. put it another Way, 
penalties are against public policy, in the sense just explained, because they undermine the 
compensatory principle by allowing the innocent party to recover a sum as agreed 
damages which is disproportionately high in comparison with the damages caused by the 
breaCh. 114 
Z3. Concem for Future Freedom 
1.37 There have been some attempts to justify the intervention of courts to relieve 
against penalties on the ground that penalties coerce performance of contracts: they, in 
effect, pressurize the promisor to perform his contract, and, in this sense, they, to some 
extent, violate the individual freedom. 1's The central argument runs as follows: penalties 
unduly limit the future freedom of the promisor (and in some cases both contracting 
parties), and thus enforcement of such agreements will prevent the parties from achieving 
well-being. "6 
1.38 There are a few premises for such a conclusion: First, any agreement to do non- 
valuable things should not be supported by the state: a state's role in the society is to help 
individuals to promote good lives, and to achieve well-being. One way of attaining this 
goal is by enforcing contracts which normally help people to achieve valuable things. 
Thus, a contract to promote a non-valuable thing should, and could not be supported by 
the state. 117 
113 Simpson A. W. B., A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, 
1975, p. 123 
114 In this sense, the justification is almost indistinguishable from the explanations based on substantive 
unfairness. see infra., para. 1.46; It may also be argued that the reference to public policy in judicial 
statements just quoted is in this sense. 
115 See COMM H, The LAW (if COntrft'k (Butterworths, 1993,2nd ad. ), p. 345; Kercher B., Noone K, 
Ranxxfies, 2nd ed., p. 239; It is also argued that the compulsory performance of contracts is a remedy 
which should only be reserved for the courts through granting specific performance in cases where the 
courts, considering all relevant cacumstarices, find it appropnate to exercise their jurisdiction. A 
penalty, which directs towards forcing the promisor to perform, should, therefore, not be enforceable. see 
Collins, ibid. 
1 "s Smith S A, Futurc FrOedOln and Freedom Of Contract (1996) 59 NjLR 167, at p. 175 
117 See Smith, loc. cit., no. 116, at pp. 175-176 
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1.39 Second, agreements which unduly limit future freedom are non-valuable, and thus 
should not be enforced by the state-"" There may be two immediate objections to this 
premise: a) how could it be assumed that a volummy agreement can unduly limit future 
freedom? This may be overcome by observing the nature of autonomy: "[t]he essence of 
autonomy ... 
is 'self rule': a person is autonomous if she is able to direct the course of her 
life to a significant extent. "119 Autonomy in a person's life should be both horizontal (i. e. 
being autonomous in significant portion of fife's concerns) and vertical (i. e., autonomy in 
different historical stages of one's fife). The conditions of the vertical autonomy may be 
lost as a result of one's own actions. A person who diminishes his future ability to make 
autonomous choices may unduly harm his vertical autonomy; for instance, a person who 
is fully autonomous until a certain age, and after that, under his voluntary contractual 
obligation, has to do a certain job for a certain company for the rest of his fife, could not 
be regarded as having autonomy. b) Most contracts do somehow limit future freedom, 
for by entering into an agreement, a party may have to do, or refrain from doing, a certain 
act. it should however be observed that being autonomous does not only mean enjoying 
the conditions of autonomy, but to act autonomously. To get a valuable thing through 
entering into an agreement, autonomy will, to some extent, be lost; but the point is the 
existence of a balance between the loss of future autonomy and the valuable things gained 
by that. The concern, therefore, is with losses of future freedom which are unnecessary 
(because they do not serve any purpose), or disproportionate (because they cannot be 
justified by the goal they serve). 1ý0 
1.40 Third, penalty clauses unduly limit the promisor, s future freedom in two ways: a) 
the obligation to pay an extravagantly large sum of money in the event of the promisor's 
default prevents the prospective payee from doing other valuable activities with his 
money; b) such an obligation, by Pressurizing the promisor into performance, makes it 
very difficult for him to quit the contract; for they act in terrorem of the defaulting party. 
It is therefore concluded that penalties do not promote valuable things, and thus state 
"I For detailed analysis see Smith, ibid., at pp. 176-180 
219 Smith, loc. cit., no. 116, at p. 177 
120 Smith S A, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract (1996) 59 NILR 167, at p. 179 
36 
should not lend its support to their enforcement. 
1.41 It cannot be doubted that the agreements which unduly (i e., unnecessarily or 
disproportionately) limit future freedom, may not be enforced; but the mere fact that 
penalties induce performance cannot, it seems, be regarded as an evidence for the view 
that they excessively limit the promisor's future freedom. 121 No doubt that penalties like 
any other obligation limit, to some extent, future freedom but it is to be observed that a) 
they do not prevent the promisor from breaching the contract, they only make it difficult 
for him; b) even in the extreme supposed case that they make the breach impossible, they 
could not, it is suggested, be regarded as an undue limitation of future freedom. '22 This 
point needs some elaboration: A concern for future freedom, as explained above, is a 
sound basis for refusing the enforcement of agreements by which a contracting party 
alienates himself from a certain general right completely; for example, the non- 
enforcement of a contractual undertaking by somebody not to marry to anybody for the 
rest of her life, or not to get any job forever may be justified on this ground. The reason, 
as pointed out by Smith'23, is that such agreements unduly limit the future freedom, for 
they result in the complete deprivation from a certain right. But if somebody agrees not 
to marry to a specific person, or not to get a certain job for the rest of his life (i. e., 
partial deprivation from a certain general right); or agrees not to marry for two years, or 
not to get a job for six months (i. e., deprivation from a general right for a certain period 
of time), the concern for future freedom could not be a ground for not enforcing the 
agreement even though the future freedom is somehow limited. Thus, the non- 
enforcement of self-enslavement contracts, which may result in the complete deprivation 
121 This lies With Much force app , to well. planned commercial contracts. In a large construction project, 
for example, the main contractor may insert a large agreed damages clause in his agreement with the 
sub-contractor for the due completion. This does commercially make sense, for the sub-contractor's 
failure may result in the main contractor's inability to meat the key dates in his agreements with both 
other sub-contractors and also the employer It is difficult to claim that, in such a situation, the sub- 
contrac: tor's future fivedorn has unduly been limited, though the clause may induce him to perforra. See 
Collins H, The Law of Contract, (Butterworths, 1993,2nd ed), p. 345 
122 Speaking of undue limitation. I mean a ground for refusing enforcement. A ground upon which the 
state could and should not mpport such agreementL 
123 See Smith S A, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract (1996) 59 NCLR 167, at pp. 179-180, where 
he concludes that "there is a prima facie case for refusing to enforce agreements that unduly limit 
freedom". 
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from a general right, might be justified on this ground (i. e., a concern for future freedom). 
However, an agreement to pay a disproportionately large sum of money in the event of 
breach, though it induces Performance and creates a limitation upon the individual's 
future fteedom, does not result in the complete alienation from a general right. It is, 
therefore, difficult to justify the non-enforcement of such agreements on this ground. 
1.42 Secondly, as Smith agrees himself24, the scope of undue limitation on future 
freedom- that is, "unnecessary" or "disproportionate' limitation- as a basis for non- 
enforcement of agreements, is very controversial. Unnecessary limitation, in the sense of 
a pointless limitation on future freedom, is, in most cases, extremely difficult to be 
determined: A person who for specific idiosyncratic reasons is eager for an obligation to 
be duly performed, and is prepared to pay twice as much as the normal price for the due 
performance of that obligation, and to secure this performance sets a penalty of a large 
sum of money in case of default, cannot, it seems, be said to have entered into a pointless 
agreement. 125 Neither could it easily be claimed that this limitation is disproportionate: 
Such a disproportion should be determined by considering whether there is a balance 
between the future limitation on freedom and the achievements which results from 
entering into the agreement. The degree by which such a balance should be identified is 
by no means clear, and the mere existence of a disproportion between the agreed sum and 
the actual probable loss should not, it seems, be indicative of a disproportionate limitation 
on future freedom. 
1.43 Tbirdly, a perfectly genuine ex ante pre-estimate of damages may, due to a change 
124 See ibid., p. 179; see also pp. 185-186 where he says: "Determining whether a restraint is unneoessitry 
or disproportionate is difficult and, except in cartel cases, the self-interest of contracting Parties provides 
a strong check against disproportionate or unnecessary restraints. " 
125 it could, basically, be argued that whom damages resulting from breach is difficult to be pre- 
determined at the time when the contract is entered into, an agreed damages clause will be regarded as a 
valid liquidated dama clause evert though it may, to a significant extent, induce performance. It is 
quite a plausible point that the parties agree upon such a clause to remove the uncertainty by estimating 
the extent of their liability and the ndm which they run. see Webster v Bosanquet [1912) AC 394 (PC), 
at p. 398; Philips Hong Kong Ltd v. 77te Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, at p. 55; 
on general incentives of parties to agree upon a stipulated damages clause, see Furmston M P, Contract 
planning: Liquidated Damages, Deposits and the Foresecability Rule (1991) 4 JCL 1, at pp. 1-2; Chitty 
on Contracts, 27th ed., 1994, para. 26-06 1, at pp, 1251-1252; Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 
3 All ER 128, per Diplock LJ at pp. 141-142 
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of circumstances, happen to turn into a disproportionately large sum of money compared 
to the actual loss which may result from breach. Such a clause, upon the basis taken by 
Smith'26, may unduly limit the promisoes future freedom, and should therefore be 
considered as unenforceable, whereas it is unlikely to be regarded as a penalty. 127 
1.44 Fourth, the mere fact that undue limitation on future freedom can justify the 
invalidation of self-enslavement clauses, does not mean that any "autonomy endangering 
agreement", in the sense employed by Smith", could be explained on this basis. As 
emphasised earlier, self-enslavement agreements normally result in the complete 
alienation from a general right, and this is the reason why they are invalid. Penalty 
clauses, however, do not amount to such an alienation. They may only, in some extreme 
cases, induce performance of a certain contractual obligation. '29 
14. Falmess 
fu enf cc 1.45 It appears that the Courts of Equity have historically based their re sal to or 
penalties on the general grounds of fairness and being equitable. The historical analysis of 
the courts' intervention to relieve against penalties and forfeitures revealed the fact that 
they regarded it as inequitable to allow the promisee to recover a sum of money which is 
disproportionately large in comparison with the damages caused by the breach. '30 In the 
words of Lord Diplock in Photo Production Ltd v. Securicor Transport LAt3l, the 
agreement of the parties: 
126 Though Smith claims that "that the penalty clause test is ex ante is condom with this justification 
because the extent to which a stipulated damage clause induces performar= is crucial in assessmg the 
clause's effect on future fivedom. " loc. cit., no. 116, at p. 184 
127 See, e. g., Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co Ltd v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y 
Castaneda [1905] AC 6; The relevant time in the application of the tests distinguishing liquidated 
damages from penalties is the time when the contract is made: see Dunlop Pneumatic Types Co. Ltd v. 
Now Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [19151 AC 79, at p. 96 per Lord Dunedin; Public Works Commissioner 
v. Hills [ 19061 AC 368, at p. 3 76; Webster v. Bosanquet [ 19121 AC 3 94 (PC); Philips Hong Kong Ltd v. 
The A ttorney General ofHong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 4 1, at p. 5 9. see also infra., para. 2.20 
121 See Smith S A, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract (1996) 59 NILR 167, at p, 167 
129 indeed in some cases penalty does not even induce performance, Ww an agreement to pay a certain 
sum upon different breaches of varjing importance. Such a clause is presumably a penalty, but it may 
not induce the performance of all different obligations of the promisor: even the agreed sum may, in 
some cases, be less than damages suffered as a result of the breach. 
130 See supra., paras. 1.13-1.14 
13111980] AC 827, [1980] 1 All ER 556 
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"must not impose upon the breaker of a primary obligation a general 
secondary obligation to pay to the other party a sum of money that is 
manifestly intended to be in excess of the amount which would fiffly 
compensate the other party for the loss sustained by him in consequence 
of the breach of the primary obfigation. "132 
in fact, the imposition of an unreasonably large sum of money as compensation was, in 
the eyes of Equity, unjust, extravagant and unconscionable which justified the court's 
intervention. This may also have been regarded as an indicative of a procedural defect in 
the formation of contract. Holdsworth, describing the historical evolution of the penalty 
doctrine, points out: 
"It was obviously against conscience that a person should recover a sum 
of money wholly in excess of any loss incurred. A person seeking to do so 
might in some circumstances come perilously near to committing a fraud, 
and in other circumstances might be unconscientiously seeking to take 
advantage of an accident. "133 
Though there is an obvious interrelationship between substantive and procedural 
unfairness in this regard, it is nonetheless appropriate to discuss them separately. 
2.4.1. Substantive Unfairness 
1.46 The notion of agreed damages being extravagantly large in comparison with the 
actual expected loss- which is used as the main test to distinguish enforceable liquidated 
damages from unenforceable penalties- invites the idea that penalties are struck down on 
the ground of substantive unfairness. The compensatory principle requires that any loss 
resulting from breach of a contractual obligation should justly be compensated. The 
principle, thus, does not allow a party to a contract to recover a sum of money greatly in 
excess of the amount which may compensate the non-breacher. Applying this principle to 
the agreed damages, clauses providing for damages extravagantly in excess of the actual 
expected loss should be considered as substantively unfair. 134 
1.47 Despite the historical support for this justification, it has not been immune from 
criticism: 
132 Ibid., at pp. 850, -%7 resl=&* 
133 Holdsworth W.. HistorY of English Law, edited by: Goodhart A. L. & Hanbury H. G., 7th ad., vol. 1, 
1956 (Reprinted 1966), vol. 5, p. 293 
134 See, e. g., StOrY, Commentaries On EquitY JurisprudenM (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1992,2nd ed. ) 
pp. 898-899; Collins K The Law of Contract, (Butterworths, 1993,2nd ed. ), p. 346 where he argues: 
excessive compensation, just like excessive priM is an unfair bargain, 
40 
First, courts have never claimed a general jurisdiction over unfair bargains. As it was 
once pointed out by Lord Nottingham, the Chancery mends no man's bargain. Thus, 
even taldng for gmted the substantively unfair consequences arising from an 
unreasonably large agreed damages, the jurisdiction over such an unfair bargain should be 
regarded as an exception. 135 
1.48 Second, it is not, in fact, possible to detect the unfairness of an agreed damages 
clause without taking the consideration into account. 136 Merely being in excess of the 
expected loss could not necessarily indicate a substantively unfair stipulation: the 
promisee may have paid a consideration for such a term. A contract should, as a whole, 
be evaluated to detect any unfairness, and since the courts, in determining the nature of 
an agreed damages clause, do not regard the amount of consideration as a relevant factor, 
they may fail in determining whether the clause is truly unfair. Thus, a substantively fair 
agreement as to damages may be struck out as a penalty upon the mere ground that it 
greatly exceeds the amount of loss expected to result from breach. In fact, this would 
itself result in unfairness, because a party which has paid a price for the penalty (by 
possibly being charged a higher price if the contract contains a penalty) would be 
deprived of its benefits. It should, however, be noted that though taking the 
consideration into account is not specifically a factor in determining the nature of an 
agreed damages clause, the courts, in applying the penalty tests, should take all 
circumstances surrounding the agreement into consideration. 137 Hence, the courts would, 
having regard to all circumstances among which is the probable price paid for the clause, 
135 See Burrows A S, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, (Butterworths, 1994,2nd ad. ), p. 329; 
This has also forcdWly been put in an Scottish case where Lord Weir held: "The fundamental principle 
is that where a bargain is freely entered into, the parties will be held to its terms. ... It may appear that 
the consequences, should they arise, are unfair to one party but for the court to intervene to strike out or 
modiry these consequences would amount to it passing judgment on what is a fair bargain. The only 
exception to the fundamental principle is where there has been a breach of contract and where the 
common law remedy of damages is available as a substitute for the effects of a penalty clause " ETT 
Commercial Ltd v. Security Change Ltd (No 1) [1993] SLT 128, at p. 134 [emphasis added] 
136 Smith S A, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract (1996) 59 NELR 167, at p. 172 
137 As observed by Lord Dunedin, the question of diýshing liquidated damages from penalties is "a 
question of construction to be decided upon the terms and inherent circumstances of each particular 
contract ... " Dunlop 
Pneumatic Twvs Co. Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [ 1915] AC 79, at p. 
87; see also Sainter v. Ferguson (1849) 7 CB 716,137 ER 283 
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try to achieve fairness in individual cases. "" 
1.49 Third, if the concern of the courts in striking out penalties is substantive fairness, 
then the same result should be achieved as to an underliquidated damages clause, while 
such a clause is valid and enforceable. "9 The validity of this criticism should not be 
denied: the approach of English law in distinguishing liquidated damages and 
underliquidated damages, as far as the applicable law is concerned has not been sensible. 
The practical effect of the criticism, however, might be lessened by proposing the 
possibility of the application of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and other restrictive 
regulations'40 to such clauses, which would subject them to the reasonableness tem. 141 
2.4.2. Procedural Unfairness 
1.50 The unreasonable disparity between the agreed damages and the expected actual 
loss has sometimes been taken as indicative of the existence of a procedural defect in the 
bargaining process. Thus, the non-enforcement of penalties has been grounded on 
procedural fairness. 142 
Such a procedural defect may be assumed in two versions: First, a defect which, could it 
be proven independently, would constitute a separate basis for nullity or unenforceability; 
138 Courts normally use the process of construction, interpretation and implication in a way to achieve 
flurness m individual ca . For instance, in the purchase of a second-hand car by an induced buyer for 
an unreasonably high price, the buyer would, at first glance, be unable to upset the agreement or obtain 
any relief, That is for the simple argument that the adequacy of consideration is not material. MW COUM 
however, might use its power to interpret the contract to determine the responsibility of the Seller as to 
the quality and fitness of goods, and thus, using the concept of merchant le quality, try to achieve fair 
consequences in the parties' contractual relations. see Atiyah P S, Contract and Fair Exchange, (Essays 
on C; ontract, Essay 11), (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1990), pp. 337-338; see also Adyah P S, An 
Introduction to the Law of Contract, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995,5th ad. ), pp. 297-298 
139 See infta., para. 3.12; Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd. v. widnes Foun&y (1925), Ltd. [1933] AC 20 
140 E. g., Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994: SI 1994/3159 
141 For a detaffed anabsis see infra., paras. 3.13-3.14 
" Procedural filimess is concerned with the fairness in the contracting process, while ribstantive 
unfairness is concerned with the outcome of this process. These two concepts are strongly interrelated: A 
procedural defect Dormally results in a substantive unfairness which in turn can be used as an evidence 
for the existence of such a procedural defem They are sometimes difficult to be distinguished: it is 
argued that substantive unbirness a reduced to a form of procedural unfairness, for a rational, fully 
informed individual would not have any incentive to agree upon a substantively unfair contract. On the 
other hand, it may be suggested that the concept of procedural unfairness is redundant because the 
outcome of a procedurally defective contract would be shown by substantive unfitimess. For fixther detailed discussion see S. A- Smith, In Defence of substantive Fairness (1996) 112 LQR 138 
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like duress, fraud or undue influence. Thus, some economists have suggested that the 
initial judicial intetference in the area of agreed damages clauses was "to protect against 
fraud and duress in a legal context where alternative, less costly, protections were not 
available'. " Some others believe that the parties' agreement on damages which is ex 
ante unreasonably large can only be reasonably explained on the ground of a procedural 
deficiency, i. e. procedural unconscionability or mistake. In other words, such an 
unreasonable clause should be taken as "evidence of unconscionability or mistake, given 
the difficulty of observing those two problems. "" 
Second, a procedural issue which is unlikely to be independently considered as a ground 
for non-enforcement. Attempts to justify the penalty doctrine on the ground that 
14 
penalties are the result of a defective cognition may fall into this category. 5 
Psychologists, by conducting several empirical researches have shown that a human's 
cognition has specific limits. These limits may, by some force, be applicable to agreed 
damages clauses. It is therefore very unlikely, it is argued, to assume that parties to a 
contract have, at the time when they enter into the contract, intended, with fidl cognition, 
the consequences of a penalty in different breach scenarios. Thus, the underlying premise 
for the principle of freedom of contract- that the parties have, with full cognition, entered 
into the contract to rationally maximize their subjective expected utility- could have no 
application to penalties. I" 
1.51 The economic explanations of the doctrine may also, it seems, end up as such a 
procedural justification. Economists normally use the concept of "economic efficiency" 
to justify the intervention of courts in the parties' bargain as to agreed damages. They 
start with the assumption that agreements which are, voluntarily and with access to full 
143 Goetz C J, Scott R E, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the just Compensation Principle: Some 
Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, (1977) 77 Columbia Law Rev. 554, at 
p. 593 
144 Samuel A Rea, Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages (1984) 13 Journal of 
Legal Studies 147, at pp. 160-161 
145 See Eisenberg Melvin A, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of ContraM (1995) 47 Stanford Law 
Rev. 211 
146 For a datoed dL%mssioii of this view we infra., pam. 1.60 et &eq. 
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information, entered into are presumably efficient. " Therefore, the existence of an 
inefficiency in the parties' agreement will indicate a defect in the bargaining process. '" 
Thus, Goetz and Scott argue that in the absence of any procedural unfaimess49, 
enforcement of an agreed allocation of risk by stipulating for an agreed damages chow 
will enhance economic efficiency. '" In their view, the modem law of contract damages is 
based on the promisor's option to choose between performance and compensatory 
damages: he is not obliged to perform, instead he may choose to breach upon justly 
compensating the innocent party for losses caused by the breach if he finds the breach 
economically efficient. Although the principle of just compensation results in economic 
efficiency"', the parties, by allocation of risks through agreeing upon damages, can 
enhance this effiCienCy. 132 For in the absence of an agreed allocation of risksý the 
147 Thus, the non-enforcement of penalties has sometimes been called "a major unexplained puzzle in the 
economic theory of the common law". Posner R. A., Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law (1979) 
46 University of Chicago L. Rev. 281, at p. 290; It is sometimes claimed that the unenforceability of 
penalty clauses is "an accident of legal history" stentoung from the equitable jurisdiction of the 
Chancellor. (see Ugo blattei, The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts 
(1995) 45 The American Journal of Comparative Law 427, at p. 433); It has also been suggested that the 
reason for the non-enforcement of penalties was a motivation for litigation by judges in the era when they 
used to receive a portion of the litigation fees. (see I and W. K& Posner R. A., Adjudication as a 
Private Good (1979) 8 Journal of Legal Studies 235, at p. 256), see also Rubin P. H., Unenforceable 
Contracts: Penalty Clauses and Specific Performance (1981) 10 Journal of Legal Studies 237, where he 
says: "The general principle of enforcement of contract law is that almost anything which parties agree 
upon will be enforcedL" at p. 242. 
" An economist is interested in defects like information barriers or reduced competitive opportunity 
which, m Goetz & Scott's view, may rebut the presumption of fair exchange. (see Goetz C J, Scott R E, 
Liquidated DamagM Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement 
Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, (1977) 77 Columbia Law Rev. 534, at p. 592) 
149 See Goetz & Scott, loc. cit., no. 143, at pp. 591 et. seq. 
I" See Ibid., pp. 557 at. seq., esp. at p. 578; see also Polinsky A Mitchell, An Introduction to Law and 
Economics (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1989,2nd ad. ), pp. 63-64, where be 
argues that in principle., an agreed damages "would allocate the contract risk optimally because the 
liquidated damage payment would equal the optimal damage payment. "; Ugo Mattei, The Comparative 
Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts (1995) 45 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 427, who concludes that the ban on penalties is difficult to justify on economic terms. In his view 
"no efficiency reasons can be adduced. " at P. 443 
151 See Clarkson K W, Nfiller R L, Muris T J, Liquidated Damages v Penalties: Sense or Nonsense? 
[1978) Wisconsin Law Rev. 351, at pp. 358-360 
132 At first glance, it may seem that, since parties by providing for an agreed damages clause, in fact, set 
the "just compensation" principle aside, efficient results may not be achieved. But, as the example in 
note 154 shows, the "just compensation7 principle is not necessary to achieve efficiency. Therefore, 
though the principle results in efficient consequences, it cannot explain the distinction between penalties 
and liquidated damases. (See Clarkson K W, Nfiller R L, Muris T J, Liquidated Damages v Penalties: 
Sense or Nonsense? [19781 Wisconsin Law Rev. 35 1, at pp. 358-363) 
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53 efficiency gains from an efficient breach go only to the breacherl , while the parties' 
agreement as to damages will distribute these efficiency gains between theM. 154 The 
writers, thus, conclude: 
"... the "just compensation! ' formula hives all of the gains to the breacher. 
Why should this solution be regarded as any "fairer" than one which splits 
the gains fifty-fifly or gives them all to the non-breacher? ... It seems then that the only appropriate fairness inquiry is one concerned solely with 
process fairness, the bargaining conditions, and not examination of end 
results. However, if "partiesP are to be attacked on this basis, the 
affirmative case must be made that penalties are in some way symptomatic 
of those market conditions which characterize process unfairness. ""s 
1.52 This analysis, in addition to the general criticisms against the economic theory", 
may be subject to some fiulher objections: First, it considers the economic efficiency of 
penalties where a change in circumstances makes the breach more efficient for the 
promisor or both parties. Such a change which makes performance more valuable to 
others (who may offer a higher price) than to the promisee, though theoretically possible, 
is, in an economically competitive market, unlikely to happen. Second, the whole theory 
153 CloetZ and SCott regard thiS aS a lilniting reSUlt. (See C loetZ & SCott, IOC. Cit , no. 143, at p. 367) 
Goetz & Scott, loc. cit., no. 143, at pp. 562-568; The following example situa on cl r will make the ti ea . note that in this example, the costs have not been taken into account: S enters into a contract to constriga 
and sell a certain product to BL The contractual price is VOOO. The performance is fairly valued at 
L1300 on the due date (i. e., the amount of damages which may fully compensate Bl, in case of breach, is 
L300). If S gets any offer for the subject-matter from B2 at a price higher than L1300, it is economically 
efficient for him to breach the first contrac4 and enter into a contract with B2. In such a case, if the 
contractual price is L(1300+n the efficiency gains (i. e., M will go only to the breaching party. Now, 
let us introduce a penalty clause into the first agreement: the parties stipulate that upon breach, S shall 
pay L600 to BI. At fiM glance, the enforcement of penalty might be regarded as preventing efficient 
breach, and consequently a hurdle in achieving economic efficiency. But Goetz and Scott argue that it is 
not: First, if the price offlered by B2 is more than L1600, let's say L(1600ý, the breach is still 
economically efficieK and the efficiency Sum will be distributed between the parties as follows: L300 
will go to the non-breacher, aW IX will go to the breacher. Second, if the offered price by B2 is 
L(1300+X) which is less than L1600, then the parties (i. e., S and BI) can renegotiate the penalty clause. 
They economically have enough incentive to do so, because the breach will result in more gains for both 
parties. In the words of Goetz and Scott, the "obstinate insistence on the enforcement of certain penalties 
may result in a failure to exploit potential efficiency gains by inducing the penalized party not to breach" 
(ibid., at pp. 567-568). If, therefore, they set the agreed remedy at a sum which is higher than E1300 (the 
performance value of B I) by LY, and less than the price offered by B2 by a the efficient breach, and 
thus economic efficiency, will be achieved. The distribution of the efficiency gains will be as follows: EY 
will go to the non-breachexý and LZ will go to the breacher. 
'55 Goetz & Scoff, Ibid., at p. 568. TU authors also discuss the possibility of lercompensation for the 
innocent party's non-provable idiosyncratic Iowa in case that penalties are not enforced. In this some 
also they argue that the control Over Penalties will be regarded as inefficient. (see ibid., pp. 569 et. seq. ) 
'-'See Infra, paras. 1.57 et seq. 
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presupposes the ability of the promisor to choose between performance and an efficient 
breach, and considers that efficiency will be enhanced by allowing the parties to agree 
upon damages, because not only will it not prevent efficient breaches, but it will also 
make them more efficient for both parties. The analysis does, however, ignore many 
scenarios where the promisor is, for many reasons, really unable to perform the contract, 
and will have to breach. This may result in the promisee recovering a penal sum which is 
disproportionately high in comparison with the damages. Third, the theory also ignores 
the change of circumstances against the promisor. Suppose that because of such a 
change, the second offer received by the promisor is less in amount than the value of 
performance for the promisee. In such a case, it is economically efficient for the promisor 
to complete the contract. But it for any reason, he committed a breach, he will be 
penalized by having to pay an unreasonably large sum of money. Fourth, it also ignores 
the wasteful costs which may be involved for breach-inducing activities, or costs of any 
precautions taken by the promisor against such activities. This is the most important 
factor which leads other economists to reformulate the rule according to the concept of 
"economic efficiency". 
1.53 Thus, Clarkson, Muris and Miller, trying to justify the penalty doctrine from the 
"economic efficiency" prospective, argue that there are substantial benefits from 
stipulating damages. The parties will have strong incentives to provide for such damages 
where the benefits exceed the costs of negotiation of the stipulated damage clauses which 
enhance the economic efficiency by putting the parties in preferred positions, increasing 
economic activity and producing goods at lower Costs. 157 However, they consider that 
the existence of a penalty clause in the contract may result in some further wastefid costs: 
Where the promisee realises, that he may gain significant economic benefits from breach- 
because either the parties have set the agreed damages to an amount which is higher than 
expected actual loss or, due to a change in circumstances, the actual loss has turned out 
to be less than the agreed sum- he will have an incentive to involve in breach-inducement 
activities which may sometimes be costly. "" In such a situation, the promisor also may 
137 Clarkson K W, Miller R4 Muris T J, Liquidated Damages v Penalties: Sense or Nonsense? [19781 
Wisconsin Law Rev. 35 1, at pp. 367-368 
In a contract for construction of a bridge, for example, with a stipulated damage clause of L5000 per 
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take some precautions against such activities which will impose some wasteful costs upon 
him. To achieve economic efficiency, these wasteful costs should be avoided. Thus, 
Clarkson, Muris and Miller formulated and proposed the following optimal rule for the 
enforcement of some stipulated damage clauses'59: First, where there is a possibility and 
incentive of breach-inducement activities, only "reasonable' stipulated damage clauses 
should be enforced by scrutinizing the relation of the agreed amount to the actual loss 
caused by the breach. Second, if there is no possibility or incentive for breach- 
inducement activities, then the agreed damages clause should be enforced, regardless of 
its reasonableness. 
1.54 Testing their economic theory with different stipulated damage clauses in different 
kinds of contracts, the authors concluded that "underliquidated damage clauses", "accord 
after breach7, "covenants not to compete' and "agreements between lender and 
borrowee' are the sort of agreements where there may not reasonably be an incentive or 
opporhmity to induce breach, while such an incentive may reasonably mist in "agreed 
damages stipulated for delay in construction contracte', "forfeiture of advance payments" 
and "alternative agreements stipulating for damages". '60 Their faW conclusion is that, 
though the distinction between liquidated damages and penalties should be maintained, 
the "recognition of the economic basis for the distinction should reduce the considerable 
confusion surrounding stipulated damagee. 161 
1.55 The analysis of Clarkson, Muris and Miller has been criticised by other 
economists'62 who believe that the parties, agreeing about damages at the time when they 
enter into the contract, will take into account the incentives of each side to induce or 
each day of delay in completion, the employer who- because of either changed circumstances or 
stipulation of ex ante univasonably large sum- sees himself economically better off with breach rather 
than the due performance, may covertly, for instance, by not co-operating or providing wrong information or so, induce breach by the contractor. 
I" See Cladwn K W, Nfiller R L, Muris T J, Liquidated Damages v Penalties: Sense or Nonsense? 
[1978] Wisconsin Law Rev. 35 1, at pp. 375-378 
160 CUrkson, Muris & Miller, ibid., at pp. 383-389 
161 Clarkson, Muris & Miller, ibid., at p. 390 
162 See, e. g., Samuel A Rm Efficiency Implications of penalties and Liquidated Damages (1994) 13 
Journal of Legal Studies 147 
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prevent breach, and will determine the amount of damages accordingly. Thus, if the 
promisee has the possibility of any opportunity or incentive to induce breach, this will be 
taken into account by the parties, and "will lead to a reduction in the predetermined 
damage level below the actual damageC. '" In fact, what Rea is trying to suggest is that, 
in an economically efficient market, there may only be very infrequent situations where 
the parties may ex ante agree on damages which exceed the expected actual loss. " The 
existence of such an ex ante unreasonable determination of damages should indicate 
either a procedural defect in the formation of contract or a mutual mistake. '" He then 
concludes that the e)dsting penalty doctrine is consistent with the doctrines of mistake or 
procedural unconscionability. '" 
1.56 Quite apart from the above criticism, the rule formulated by Clarkson, Muris and 
Mer on the basis of economic theory, may be open to a few observations: 
First, an ex ante reasonable agreed damage clause is normally enforced, regardless of 
whether it is reasonable ex post. 167 The economic theory, however, requires the 
unenforceability of such a clause if it is unreasonable ex post. 
Second, the economic theory is unable to explain the presumption of being a penalty as 
to a clause providing for a single sum to be paid upon different breaches of varying 
importance. Even in such a situation, if the agreed amount is reasonable compared to the 
actual loss resulting from the breach in question, it should be enforced. This is because in 
such a case, no possibility of breach-inducement activities could normally be assurna 
Third, there can be found no such a distinction, in the judgements and judicial opinions, 
between the cases where there is an opportunity or incentive to induce breach, and cans 
where there is no such an opportunity or incentive, though the theorists have attempted 
163 Ptea, Ibid., at p. 155 
164 It is also argued that since parties do not in fad want to stipulate for a penalty which is an undesirable 
supracompensatory remedy, judicial scnmy of agreed damage clauses is unnecessary, and may produce 
mischief see Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer supracompensatory Remedies: An 
Analysis of Contracting for Damage, Measures (1990) 100 Yale LJ 369 
165 p. M loc. ciiL, no. 162, at pp. 159-162 
166 Ibid., at p. 163 
167 See Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co Ltd v. Dan Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda 
[1905] AC 6; This is because the relevant time in deciding whether the clause is a penalty is the time 
when the contract is made: see cases cited in note 127 
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to explain the end reaft of some cases on the basis of their theory. 
1.57 The core concept of the economic justifications of the penalty doctrine normally is 
the "economic efficiency". The attempt of an econoniist is to test the economic efficiency 
of an agreed damages clause according to some "pragmatic and instrumentar"" rules and 
mathematical contingencies of breach. The intervention of courts is only justified where 
the parties' agreement fails to achieve the economic efficiency. The economist's analysis 
presupposes that the parties will enter into a contract with &H information, fiffl analysis of 
all contingencies of breach, and even SA evaluation of all possible breach-inducement 
activities and the precautions against that. It hils to take into consideration the important 
fact that the parties entering into a contract, even as to their primary obligations and 
rights, may not have access to full information, may fail in acquiring all possible 
information, and may not be able to evaluate the misting information in a perfect way. 
The facts of inaccessibility of information and inability to process properly the existing 
data is much relevant as to the secondary rights and obligations which are not readily 
present in the parties mind when they are entering into the agreement. '" in the 
economist's view, a less than perfect access to information and a less than perfect ability 
to evaluate will be considered as a defect in bargaining process which may justify the 
court's intervention. The core of Rea's argument, for example, is that the parties will be 
very unlikely to agree upon damage clause which is in excess of the expected actual loss. 
Thus, the odstence, of an unreasonably large stipulated damage clause will be indicative 
of a mistake or a defect in the bargaining process. However, the analysis normally fails to 
realise that there may be no legal ground jusff*g the intervention of courts for any less 
than perfect access to information, or any less than perfect ability to analyse the data. '70 
161 See Smith S A, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract (1996) 59 NELR 167, at p. 174 
11 7be reason is that such obligations and rights me of secondary importance to the parties. TU parties 
are mom concerned about their primary rights and obligations, and primarily make the contract to set 
then rights. For a detailed discualon on the defects of a human's cognition which aftts contracting, 
especially U to the secondary rights and Obligation$ see: Eisenberg NWIvin A. 7be Limits of Cognition 
and the Limits of Contract, (1995) 47 Stanford Law Rev. 211; b&., paras. 1.61 et seq. 
170 It shotdd also be born in mind that in pnm*co, - in most COMBWZCWV negO&W conUSM like 
construction Projects, the parties art not normally thinking of providing for likely damages resulting 
from a certain breach: what the contractor is concerned about is normally the impact of agreed damages 
on his profits. The contractor thus takes two elements into consideration: 1) VVhether by the probable 
application of the clauscý there Would remain A Profit margin for him. 2) He considers his ability to 
perform (i. e. whether he is confident of performance in a certain date). What is, in reality, not thought 
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1.58 This issue may lead us to a second point in the economic justfficaflons of the 
doctrine: An economist does not normally u&e seriously the judiciary, s own 
understanding and analysis of the legal rules. 171 No attempt has ever, it seems, been made 
to base a judicial decision fbr non-enforcernent of penalties only on economic theory. In 
fkctý it seems to be a legally unacceptable ground to argue against enforcement of the 
parties' bargain on the basis that it results in economically inefficient consequences. 
Despite this, there has been some attempts to explain the end results of some cases on the 
basis of economic theory. 17' This, however, does not make the theory a legally 
acceptable foundation. It is true that an economically inefficient bargain may be 
indicative of some defects in the bargaining process", but- except cases where the 
procedural defect has a legally recognisable sanction, like cases of fraud, undue influence, 
duress- not every bargaining defect could legally be sanctioned. For instance, the mere 
filct of inability to process the existing data, 174 at the time when the contract is made, may 
lead to some economically inefficient consequences. This is not, however, the sort of 
defect against which the law has always recognised a sanction. 
1.59 It may also be added that economic efficiency does not provide a morally attractive 
justification. '" It not only allows, but also encourages a party to breach his contract 
when it is economically efficient to do so. Such an idea, though it may increase social 
weakh and result in economically efficient consequences, does not have a morally 
acceptable basis. 176 
about is the Wcety damages which the employer maY suffer as a result of the breach. In fact, the promisor 
is not very much interested in the promisee's loss; he is interesW in his own profit. 
171 Set Smith S A, FUMM Freedom and Freedom of Contract (1996) 59 NER 167, at p. 174 
172 See, e. g., Clarkson K W, Miller R L, Muris T J, Liquidated Damages v Penalties: Son or Nousense? 
[1978] Wisconsin Law Rev. 35 1, sec. TV 
173 As it has bow argued by Samuel A Rea, Efficienq Implications of penalties and Liquidated Damages 
(1984) 13 Journal c(Logal Studies 147 
174 This is something which most human-beinp MaY unconsciously Am when dw want to make a 
rational choice in an uncertain situation. (see Eisenberg bkmn A, The Limits of Cognition and the 
Limits of Contract, (1995) 47 Stanford L41w Rev. 211) 
17-4 See Dwoddn IL, A Matter of Principle, 1986, Ch. 12 esp. at pp. 242-246; Smith S A, Future Freedoni 
and Freedom of Contract (19%) 59 hILR 167, at p. 174 
11 it may be interesting to note that, in some religious societies, breach of a contract is even regarded as 
a sin. 
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I& PenaNes are the result of limited human cognNon 
1.60 A specific version of procedural justifications of the doctrine is the view that 
grounds the non-enforcement of penalties on the assumption that stipulated damage 
clauses are normally the result of a limited human cognition. According to this view, it is 
argued that the underlying premise of the bargain principle- the principle which requires 
the enforceability of the parties' agreement according to its terms- is that the contracting 
parties "will act with full cognition to rationally maximize [their] subjective expected 
utility"177. Such a premise cannot be relied upon as to stipulated damage clauses: a 
variety of empirical researches, conducted by psychologists, illustrate that human being's 
cognition has specific limits. These limits are specifically relevant and applicable to 
agreed damage clauses. Put another way, it is very unlikely to assume that parties have, 
with full cognition, intended the consequences of an agreed damage clause in different 
breach scenarios. It is therefore concluded that the underlying premise of the bargain 
principle not being applicable to stipulated damages, the principle itself could not also be 
applied. "Rather", as stated by Professor Eisenberg, "special scrutiny of liquidated 
damages provisions is justified because such provisions are subject to the limits of 
cognition in a special way. "172 
1.61 Empirical evidence, on the basis of cognitive psychological rese=hes'79, 
demons=es that an actor, making a decision under uncertainty, will deliberately make a 
less than perfect search for information: a rational actor will, according to Stigler"O, 
search for information until the costs of a Ruther search equals the marginal retums from 
that seuch. Thus, he will act in the state of rational ignorance from some altemative 
data. Moreover, the ability of human-being to process the existing available data is 
limited. Hence, human rationality in making a choice in an uncertain area is bounded by 
both limited information and limited data-processing ability. 
177 EiWrAberg IVIelVin A, 'nje JAMjjtS of CogWtion and the Limits of ContraC4 (1995) 47 Stanford Law 
ftv. 211, at p. 212 
178 Eisenberg, ibid., at p. 230 
179 These have neatly been presented by Prof. Eisenberg in his valuable article: Eisenberg Melvin A, The Limits of Cognition and the I simits of Contract, (1995) 47 Stanford Law Rev. 211; the psychological information in this section is mainly based on his work. 
'so George J Stigler. 1110 Economics Of IMURAtion (1961) 69 Journal, of Pol. Sci. 213 (cited by Eisegberg, ibid, p. 215) 
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1.62 Though this does not necessarily result in making irrational decisions, Awther 
empirical evidence shows that in certain circumstances, actors will often make a 
systematically irrational choice: First, actors are systematically overoptimistic: they are 
normally overconfident of their ability to solve problems resulting from uncertain fictual 
issues. Such an overoptimism has a dispositional character which will lead to an irrational 
decision. Second, actors systematically suffer from defective capabilities which will have 
effect on the way they search for data, analyse them, and make decisions. For instance, 
the way a catain choice is fivned and presented has, according to an empirical research, 
a significant effect on the actor's decision. 121 Further, there are four other systematic 
defects in capability: a) actors, making a decision about the probability of an event, 
decide on the basis of data and scenarios which are rea&ly availabie to their mind. 112 b) 
Actors normally take small samples of present events as representative, and decide on the 
basis of the data which they conclude to be representative. c) Actors have systematically 
limited capability to make a rational comparison between present and future states: they 
give too little weight to future benefits and costs as compared to the present benefits and 
costs. d) Actors are systematically unstable about estimation of risks: they normally 
under-estimate the low-probability risk of economic losses. " 
1.63 The limits of cognition, as briefly listed above, have, with a significant force, a 
special bearing on stipulated damage clauses. The bounded rationality and rational 
ignorance is specificaUy applicable to such provisions: the parties to a contract, stipulating 
for agreed dama^ have great disincentive to search for data, and process them 
properly. A few reasons have been raised to support tWs proposition: a) A party to a 
181 in substantively identical options of a certain choice, fimned in different forms, people have been 
established to be risk-averse when contemplating Sam and risic-preferring when contemplating losses: 
for example, hoed to choose between a swre gain of LSOO and 85 per cot chance to win LIOOO, people 
normally choose the ftst, while in choosing between a am loss of UM and 85 per cent. Chance to lose 
0000, most people will preft the latter. See Eisenberg, ibid., pp. 218-219 
182 -Availability" may lead to certain biases in decision-making: for instance an actor will judge on the 
basis of recent OcCurnum which Am easily retrievable from mind; also the decision will normally be 
based on "instantiated, vivid and concrete data which are more prominent than data and scenarm 
which are "general, pallid and abstrae. See ibid,, pp. 220-221 
183 As Armw olurves: "It is a plausible hypothesis that individuals are unable to rooognise that them will 
be many surprises in the Adure-, in short, as much other evidence tends to confnn, there is a tendency to 
underestimate uncertainties. " Arrow K J, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics (1982) 20 Econ. 
inquiry 1, at 5 (cited by Eisenberg, ibid., p. 223) 
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contactý at the time of entering into the agreement, intends to perform. He is, therefore, 
unlikely to imagine that the clause will ever come into play against him; for he is normally 
determined that he will perform, and also experience will tell him that there is a high rate 
of performance and completion of contracts. b) It is impracticable, if not impossible, to 
imagine all scenarios of breach, and to consider the consequences of the application of the 
clause to all these breach scenarios. No doubt such an investigation is very costly, and 
considering the low probability of the clause actually coming into play, at least in the 
promisor's mind, the benefits resulting from the clause would not explain bearing the 
costs of such an investigation. The parties, therefore, are unlikely even to try to think 
about the clause thoroughly, and it is very likely that they will not even have clearly 
understood the: OA implications of such a provision. 
1.64 Disposition resulting from overoptimism is also significantly relevant here: the 
promisor will unrealistically be overoptimistic about the probability of performance. He 
will therefore think that his performance is very likely, and the probability of breach is 
very low. This will naturally result in giving a further less thought to the clam. 
1.65 Defective capability has also a special bearing in this regard: a) The promisor's 
present intention to perform, which is vivid and concrete, is readily available to his mind 
as compared to the abstract possibility of future breach. He will therefore base his 
decision in agret mig about the clause on then readily available data. b) The anall sample 
of present events which is taken as rep of the future by the promisor is the high 
probability of perftmnce, according to both what is salient in his mind at the time of 
entering into the agreement, and the high probability of performance generally. c) The 
promisor will give too much weight to the short term benefits coming from performance 
as compared to the probable costs of future breach which may normally happen, if at all, 
at the later stages of the contract. d) Since the probability of breach is very low in the 
contracting parties' mind, the promisor will unrealistically underestimate the risk of the 
stipulated damage clause coming into play. 
1.66 It is therefore concluded that the stipulated damage clauses will non-nally be the 
result of a defective human cognition, and thus the bargain principle could and should not 
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be applied to such provisions. A significantly disproportionate agreed damages compared 
to the actual losses will be indicative of the fiwt that the clause is the result of a defective 
cognition: such a clause should not be enforceable unless it is proved that "the parties had 
a specific and well-thought-through intention that the provision apply in a scenario like 
the one that actually occurred". '" 
1.67 The cognitive interpretation of stipulated damage clauses does, it appears, provide a 
sound basis for refusing the enforcement of a disproportionately large agreed damages 
clam in consumer context. b consumer transactions, it is plausible to argue that, due to 
the limits of cognition, the parties are unlikely to have a well-thought-through intention 
that the clause will actually come into play in the real breach scenario. In fact, it is very 
likely that, due to overoptimism and defective capabilities in processing the existing 
information and applying them to all possible breach scenarios, the agreed damage clause 
may not have seriously been intended. It is, however, difficult to extend this to 
commercial contexts where the parties are normally in the business of entering into such 
agreements, have the advantage of utilizing the services of lawyers and legal advisors- 
who, in drafting contracts, are supposed to have regard to all surrounding circurnswces 
and consider all relevant information regarding possible breach scenarios- and are 
consequently supposed to be fully aware of the consequences of any term in their 
agreement. In a large construction project, for instance, it is extremely difficult to assume 
that the main contractor has agreed to the stipulated damages clause as a result of a 
ddbWve cognition. In such agreements, the contractor is normally fully aware of its 
capabilities to complete the project, and will normally take into account the possibilities 
of delay in completion and the amount which is to be paid as a result'"; such a 
computation is normally effective in the price which is offered by the contractor: for 
exarriple, in a contract with a reasonably large amount of agreed damages, the price is 
likely to be higher thazi a contract without such a clause. It would therefore seem that the 
cognitive i on could hardly jus* the non-enforcement of penalties in 
commercial context. 
184 Eisenberg, 10c. cit. no. 179, at p. 235 
185 See supra., note 170 
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1.68 Secondly, the cognitive interpretation is unable to jus* the odsting penalty 
doctrine; instead it formulates an alternative shape that the scrutiny of the stipulated 
damage clauses should take: a) Although the gross disproportion between the agreed sum 
and the actual loss is taken as the indicative of the clause being the result of a limited 
cognition, it nonetheless, it is established that such an unreasonably large surn was 
subject of a well-thought-through intention, it should, according to the cognitive 
justification, be enforeed. 1*6 This is not consistent with the historical evolution of the 
penalty doctrine'": the Courts of Equity intervened, on the ground of fairness, to relieve 
against penalties and forfeitures even where the parties had seriously intended the penalty. 
Neither could it be compatible with the subsequent case law which bases the intervention 
on the ground that the parties have not genuinely pre-estimated the actual probable 
damages, but they have agreed on a penalty intended to act in terrorem of the defaulting 
party. '" 
b) It is argued that, according to the cognitive justification, the disparity between the 
agreed amount and the ac*W loss caused by the breach should be determinative of the 
clause being the result of a limited cognition. '" Upon this basis, even where the parties 
have, at the time when the contract is entered into, seriously pre-estimated the loss which 
might conceivably result from breach, if the agreed sum happened to be much larger than 
the actual loss caused by the breach, it would be presumed that the clause is, for being the 
result of a limited cognition, unenforceable. This again is not in consistency with the case 
law which invariably uses an ex awe test to distinguish liquidated damages from 
penalties. 190 
186 See Eisenba& Old, at p. 235; FurthM am where the dause has been irdended as a peugty, the 
dium would be wft=Wc if the agreed amount is not &mportionat* large in comparison with the 
actual loss caused by the breach. see Eismiber& Mid 
187 See supra., owdon 1, esp. pam 1.28 
I" Sm e. &, Dunlop Pneunwfic Tjmv Co. Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [1915] AC 79, at pp. 
86-87; Philips Hong Kong Ltd v. 77se Attorney General ofHOngjjýong(IM)61 BIR41, at p. 63 
10 See Eisenber& loc. cit., no. 179, at p. 232; This view itself msy be doubte&- the limits of cognition 
may affect the perdu' agmement at the time when they enter into the Agreangnt. The agreenient of 
contracting pasUes who have gk= every possible dwu& to ft agreaddsm-4 clause-byMvingregartl 
to all possible smadoe of breach, and pre-Wimating the anuplut of damages which May result from 
breach- cwW not be considered as being the result of a defictive cognition, for the men reason that the 
actual loss has happened to be much lesser than the pre-estimated sunL 
190 See the can cited in note 127 
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2.0. Conclusion 
1.69 Considering the justifications offered for the penalty doctrine, it is difficult to accept 
a single justification as an absolute and defectless basis for the intervention of courts to 
relieve against penalties. Each of the justifications is, to some extent, subject to criticism, 
Old cannot MY explain all aspects of the doctrine. It does, however, appear that 
fairness, as the basis historically taken by the Courts of Equity and supported by the 
subsequent case law, should be in the front line. "' This includes both substantive and 
procedural fairness, though the economic justifications based on economic efficiency are, 
it appears, not capable of providing a legally acceptable ground for the intervention. 
1.70 A disproportionately large agreed damage clause thus would not be enforced 
because a) the fact of stipulating for an unreasonably large sum of money as damages is 
indicative of a procedural defect in the bargaining process which may result in the clause 
not being the subject of the parties' serious intention"; b) even in the absence of such 
procedural defects, a party to a contract should not be allowed to recover a substantially 
large sum of money as compared to damages resulting from breach, for this, considering 
the compensatory nature of damages, may substantively be regarded as unfair. This 
proposition may gain some support from the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 19941", which, in its Schedule 3, fists a term with the object or effect of 
"requiring any consumer who fiiils to fiffi his obligation to pay a disproportionately high 
sum in compensation! "" as presumably unfair. Obviously the Regulations base the 
intervention of courts to relieve against penalties in consumer transactions on unfairness. 
191 Sm COllins 9 The law Of COntmct, (Bufterworths, 1993,2nd e&), pp. 345-347 
192 See Atiyah P S, An IntrodtWtion to the L41w of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Prow 1995. Sth GO, P. 
299 where he af8M that "Penal and f0rfeifim clauseS are not usually genumc PrOmIM Of Undertakings 
at all ... 
" ; see also Adyah P S, Freedom of Contract and the New Right (Essays on Contract Essay 12), 
(Oxford- Clarendon Press, 1990), at pp. 368-369 observing: wrhey [i. e., penalty clauses] an fakes, 
masquerading as conuactual promises. Any allempt by the Now Right to argue that the non-Wormim 
of penaty ciauses is incousiobw with the ideology of Freedom of Contract would therefore be, in my 
view, erroneous, am simplistic. " 
193 Sl 1994/3159, imPICUIOnting the EC C*unCiI Directive 93113 on UnW Tam in COnsuDa 
Contracts: see [M] OJ L 9&29 
194 Pam I(e) of the Schedtfle 3 which has the same wording as Pam. I(c) of the Directive's Annex 
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Chapter 2 
Distinction between Liquidated Damages And Penalties 
Introductory Remarks 
2.01 The historical analysis of the evolution of the penalty doctrine, and its theoretical 
justifications reveals that the agreement of the parties as to damages would constitute a 
penalty if it is unreasonably large in comparison with the damages which might be 
conceived to result from breach at the time when the contract is entered into. ' Such a 
clause would not be enforced by the courts, and the innocent party would have to prove 
his damages according to the normal rules of contractual damages. I& on the other hand, 
the agreed damages did not amount to a penalty, it would be regarded as a valid 
stipulation, normally referred to as liquidated damages, which would be enforced 
regardless of the actual loss suffered by the innocent party? 
IA clear example of a penalty has been given by Lord Halsbury LC in Clydebank Engineering and 
Shipbuilding Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y castaneda [ 19051 AC 6, where he points out: "If you 
agreed to build a hause in a year, and agreed that if you did not build the house for L50, you were to pay a 
million of money as a penalty, the extravagance of that would be at once apparent. " at p. 10. In order for 
the question of being a penalty to arisc,, the right conferred on the innocent party upon the other party's 
breach should not be the essence of the contract. In Nutting v. Baldwin [1995] 1 WLR 201, for example, 
then was a contract for the pooling of the parties' claims against certain agents, and the pooling of 
expenses- in the form of subscription fees- and also benefits from the proceedings. A committee on 
behaff of the parties, under one of the contractual terms, had been empowered to determine that a 
member who faded to contribute to the pool of expenses by paying his subscription fee, shall cease to 
share in the pool of benefits. The court did not consider such a right as a penalty, even though it arose 
upon breach of the contract by a member In Rattee Ps view, "[t]his [was] not a penalty for breach of 
contract, It [was) an essential part of the pooling arrangement thereby effected" at p. 208 
2 See, e. g., Dunlop Pneumatic 7ýre Co. Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. 11915] AC 79, Gilbert- 
Ash (Northern) Ltd v. Modern Ehgineering (Bristol) Ltd [ 1973] 3 All ER 195, (1973] 3 WU 421,119741 
AC 699; Ariston SRL v. Charly Recordr Ltd (1990) Independent, 13 April; Jobson v. Johnson [ 1989] 1 
All ER 62 1, per Dillon LJ at p. 628; In Nicholls U's view, though in practice a penalty clause is a "dead 
letter", strictly speaking it "remains in the contract and can be sued on, but it will not be enforced by the 
court beyond the sam which represents ... the actual loss of the party seeking payment. " Ibid, at p. 632- 
633; cf. Citicorp Australia Ltdv. Hen&y(1985) 4 NSWLR 1 
3 See, e. g., Kemble v. Farren (1829) 6 Bingham 141,130 ER 1234 per Tindal 0 at p. 148; Howe v. 
Spnith (1884) 27 Ch. D. 89 ; Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. V. Don Jon Ramos [1905) 
AC 6; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [ 1915] AC 79, at p. 97 per 
I. Ord Parkw, BF7 Group v. DCB Integration Systems (1987) C. I. L. L. 348; Philips Hong Kong Lid, V. The 
Attorney General ofHong Kong (1993) 61 B. L. 1L 41 (P. Q. The plaintiff, of course, would be able to 
claim for unliquidated damages for a breach which is not covered by the liquidated damage clam: see 
AkaeselAabet Reldar v. Arcar, Ltd [1927] 1 KB 352, in which the agreed rate of demurrage was not 
considered as covering the consequential loss of freight by the shipowner. Tlius since the charterer had 
failed to provide the full cargo, the shipowner, in addition to the demurrage, succeeded to recover the 
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2.02 In order to distinguish liquidated damages from penalties, several practical rules 
have been developed during decades the chief of which is that an agreed damage clause, 
being recognized as a genuine pre-estimate of damages which might result from breach, 
should be considered as liquidated damages. These rules have neatly been brought 
together by Lord Dunedin in the leading case of Dunlop Pneumatic TyTe Co. Ltd v. New 
Garage andMotor Co. LAt. This chapter will seek to examine these rules analytically, 
after having regard to the essence of penalties and liquidated damages. Considering the 
essence of liquidated damages clause, two important issues will also be dealt with: First, 
in applying the tests to distinguish liquidated damages from penalties, whether a 
subjective or an objective test should be employed. Second, could the parties, in their 
pre-estimation of damages, provide for losses which are not normally recoverable at 
common law? Consideration will also be given to the effect of terminology used by the 
parties to describe the clause, the place of their intention, and also the relevant time for 
the application of the tests distinguishing liquidated damages from penalties. 
1. The Essence of A Penalty and Liquidated Damages 
2.03 "The essence of a penalty is a payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of the 
offending party; the essence of liquidated damages is a genuine covenanted pre-estimate 
of damages. "' 
This maxim of Lord DunedO states the nature of the two kinds of agreed damages and 
has been cited in many of the cases concerning the distinction between penalties and 
liquidated damages. ' According to this phrase, an agreed sum which is stipulated to 
consequential loss of freight see also Richco International Ltd. v. Affivd C Tbepfer International 
G. MB. H. (Ae Bonde) [I"I] I Lloyds Rep. 136, at p. 142 per Potter J. 
4 [1915] AC 79 
5 Dunlop Pýjeumafic 7), re Co. Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [ 1915] AC 79, per Lord Dunedin 
at p. 86 
6 The phrase is a combination of Lord Robertson's speech in Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co 
v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda [ 1905] AC 6, at p. 19, in describing the nature of liquidated 
damages and Lord Halsbuiys phrase in Lard Elphinstone v Monkland Iron & Coal Co. (1886) 11 App. 
Cas. 332, where he identified the nature of penalties. 
7 &x, for cKample, Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co., Ltd [19621 AC 600, [196211 All ER 385; Ariston 
SRL v. Charly Recordr Ltd (1990) Independent, 13 April; Philips Hong Kong Ltd v. The Atiorney 
General of Hong Kong (1"3) 61 B. L. R. 41 (P-Q ;JF Finnegan Ltd. v. Community Housing 
Association (1993) 34 Con L. R. 104, at p. 115 
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pressurise the promisor into carrying out his obligation and punish him in the event of 
breach is a penalty. I& however, the sum showed the genuine attempt of the parties to 
amess any likely damages which might arise from breach, the amount would be regarded 
as liquidated damages. 
I. I. The nature of penalty: the element of terror and fear 
2.04 A serious doubt has been cast upon the description of the essence of penalties as 
being in the nature of a threat "enforced in terrorem" by Lord Radcliffe in BHdge v. 
Cwnpbell Discount Co. Ltd. ': 
N ... i 
do not myself think that it helps to identify a penalty to describe it as 
in the nature of a threat "enforced in terrorem"... I do not find that that 
description adds anything of substance to the idea conveyed by the word 
"penalty* itselt and it obscures the fact that penalties may quite readily be 
undertaken by parties who are not in the least terrorised by the prospect of 
having to pay them and yet are, as I understand it, entitled to claim the 
protection 
9 
of the court when they are called on to make good their 
promises. " 
It is true that the description of penalties as a threat acting in terrorem does not have 
much practical significance. It may, however, convey the real nature of penalties: The 
intervention of courts as to invalidating penalty clauses is a blatant interference with the 
principle of freedom of contract. It can, as it was seenlo, best be justified on the basis of 
fairness, and the obvious example of an unfair stipulation is where the stipulated sum is 
provided to pressurize the promisor to perform his obligation and punish him for 
breach. " The fact that there might be no terror and fear element in some cases- because 
the offending party knows that he can claim for the protection of court to use its power 
to strike down the penal sum- might, with all respect, be justified by emphasizing on the 
point that the specified essence should be regarded as the nature of the agreed sum 
without considering courts' power to strike them out. in other words, if the agreed win, 
without considering courts' power, can reasonably cause a fear and terror in promisor that 
' [1962] 1 Aff ER 385, [19621 AC 600 
'Ibid., p. 395 and p. 622 resWfively 
'o Supra., pams. 1.69-1.70 
11 It has been suggested that the power to strike down a penalty clause has been designed "for the sole 
purpose of providing relief against oppression for the party having to pay the stipulated sum. ft has no 
place when there is no oppression7- Elsley vJG Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd (1979) 93 DLR (3rd) 
1, per Dicicson J at P. 15 
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in the event of non-comphance with the contractual provision, he will be penalized by 
being obliged to pay the agreed amount, the sum will act in tefforem and may be regarded 
as penalty. 
2.05 A review of cases, however, shows that sometimes courts treat an agreed damages 
clause as a penalty, even though there is no fear or threat for the promisor, produced by 
the clause. The most obvious example of this is an agreed damage clause providing for 
losses substantially less than the actual hann which has been held to be penal on the 
ground that it has been provided for to be payable on the occurrence of different breaches 
of Varying importance. 12 
The Law Commission has also noticed this problem and proposed that such description of 
the essence of penalties, "gives little or no guidance in distinguishing between a penalty 
and liquidated damages" and that the ultimate purpose of description should be "to 
provide for reasonable compensation and nothing more. "13 
For these reasons probably, it has been suggested 14 that the phrase of Lord Dunedin, 
which states the nature of penalties, is to be treated as a definition and to identify any 
distinction between liquidated damages and penalties reference should be made to the 
detailed rules produced by a number of leading cases and brought together by Lord 
Dunedin in Dunlop Pmunwhc Tyre Co. Lid v. New Garage andMolor Co. Lid 15. 
1.2. The nature of liquidated damages 
2.06 The nature of liquidated damages was described as a "genuine pre-estimate of likely 
loss". In this phrase, the words "genuine" and "damages" are worthy of a more detailed 
discussion. 16 
12 See Wall v. Rederiabjebolaget Luggude 1191513 KB 66 ; Watts, Watts and Co. Ltd. v. Mitni and Co. 
Ltd. [19171 AC 227. We will discuss this later in detail: see Infra., paras. 2.36 et seq. 
13 Law Commission's Worldng Paper, no. 61, "PenaltY Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid", 1975, 
para. 9 
14 McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 450 
Is [1915] AC 79; See Infra., pam. 2.24 et seq. 
11 In most cases in fact this is the essential question in determining the mum of an agreed damage 
clause: In GlIberf-Ash (Nordiern) Ltd v. Modern Engineering (Briaol) Ltd[ 1973] 3 All ER 195, [1973) 3 
WLR 421, [1974] AC 689, for example, a term providing for the entitlement of the contraMr -to 
waspend or withhold payment of any momes due or becoming due to the sub-contractor" in cast it made 
debult in complying with any of the conditions Of the sub-contract, was held to constitute a penalty. TU 
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1.2.1. Genuine pre-estimate: subjective or objective view 
2.07 Apparently, the word "genuine" has not been construed in any case. It has been 
suggested that probably in this context it means: 
"A serious attempt to estimate loss, one made in good faith, however 
unreasonable it might appear to others. "" 
This opinion suggests a subjecdve view in determining whether or not the attempt to 
estimate the likely actual loss flowing from breach has been genuine. Accordingly if the 
claimant can prove that the parties with good faith made every attempt to estimate the 
actual damage, the sum will be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate in liquidating damages. 
2.08 It might be thought" that the famous phrase of Lopes L. J. 's speech in Law v. 
Red*tch Local Board9 supports this view: 
"The distinction between penalties and liquidated damages depends on the 
intention of the parties to be gathered from the whole of the contract. If 
the intention is to secure performance of the contract by the imposition of 
a fine or penalty, then the sum specified is a penalty; but if, on the other 
hand, the intention is to assess the damages for breach of the contract, it is 
liquidated damages. "20 
Although at first sight, the phrase seems to propose a subjective approach, with more 
attention one can see that what has been emphasised in this phrase is the intention of the 
parties, but it has no reference to the test by which the parties' intention should be 
discovered and interpreted. Since the accepted test in construction of the intention in 
English law is an objective test2l, so inevitably it should be accepted that the phrase refers 
reason, inter afia, was that it entitled die contractor to suspend or withhold payments due or becoming 
due, without any regard to its amount if the sub-contractor made any default, regardless of its magnitude, 
in complying with his contractual ObliPtiOns. Thus, the agreed sum could not be regarded as a "genuine 
pro-estimate of damagoC. 
17 Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed., vol. 1,1994, para. 26-06 1, at p. 1254 
18 Ogus, The Law of Damages, 1973, pp. 41-42 
19 [189211 QB 127 
20 Ibid., p. 132 
21 See Deutsche Genossenchaftsbank v. Burnhope [ 1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 113, at p. 122 per Lord Strx 
First Energy (UK) Ltd v. Hungarian International Bank Ltd [1993) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1%, at p. 201 per 
Steyn LJ; Kingswood Estate co Ltd v. Anderson [196312 QB 169, per Willmer L. J. at P. 181; 770ke v. Maurice [198611 QB 644, where Peter Pain J. at p. 657 stated: *... the test as to what the contract in &ct 
was does not deTend on what the plaintiffs or the defendant thought it meant, but on what the court 
objectively determines that the words used meant. "; Cambridge Nutrition Ltd v. British Broadcasting Corp. [1990] 3 All ER 523, per Ralph Gibson L. J. at p. 542. See also Furmston M P, Cheshire, Fifoot & 
Furmston's Law of Contract, 13th ed., 1996, p. 127; Treitel G. I-L, The Law of Contract, 9th ed., 1995, 
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to the reasonable intention of the parties which should be discovered from the whole of 
the cOntmd. 22 Lord Dunedilys speech in Dunlop Pneuntafic Tyre Co. Lid v. New 
Garage and Motor Co. Lid 23 , which has no express reference to the intention of the 
parties, could be read in this way: 
"The question whether a sum stipulated is penalty or liquidated damages is 
a question of construction to be decided upon the terms and inherent 
circumstances of each particular contract, judged of as at the time of the 
making of the contract, not as at the time of the breach"24 
The genuine pre-estimate of likely loss, therefore, should be construed as a reasonable 
attempt of the parties to determine damages which are likely to flow from breach. Put 
another way, a figure which objectively, and considering the whole terms of the contract 
and inherent circumstances surrounding it, could be regarded as representing the likely 
losses which might result from a breach is a genuine pre-estimate of damages. This seems 
to represent the law and so the courts are unlikely to uphold an agreed sum which is 
disproportionately large in comparison with the objectively computed likely actual loss, 
even if it is discovered from the facts of the case that the parties honestly intended it as 
C , ornVenSation. 
25 
2.09 it might be argued in favour of the subjective view that the essence of a penalty is 
to act in tefforern and where the parties both honestly and with all attempts which are 
reasonable to them, even though it may not be reasonable to others, intended that a 
specific sum of money would be the likely loss which might flow from breach, such a sum 
pp. 1,8; Anne de Mbor, Intention in the Law of Contract (1990) 106 LQR 632; Howarth, The meaning 
of objectivity in contract (1984) 100 LQR 265, especially at p. 280 
22 Furmston M P, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract, 13th ed., p. 635; Surprisingly some 
writers thought of the phrase of this book as stating a subjective view. ( 0gus, loc. cit., note 19, ibid) 
23 [19151 AC 79 
24 Ibid., pp. 86-97 
25 See also Hode J., The Assessment of Damages for Delay in Construction Contracts: Liquidated and 
Unliquidated Damages (1994) 10 Construction Law Journal 214, at p. 221; The objective test has 
apparently been accepted by the Australian courts as wen. In WTMaloufPty Ltd v. Brinds Ltd (1981) 
52 FLR 442, Samuels JA, with whom Hope JA was in agreement, stated: " ... a genuine pre-estimate 
means a pre-estimate which is objectively of that character, that is to say, a figure which may properly be 
so called in the light of contract and the 'inherent circurnstanW... . It will not be enough that the parties honWly belicvW it to be so. " at p. 462, cited also, with apparent approval, in MultVex Conshvictions 
ply Ltd v. A bgww Pty Ltd. [ 199211 APCLR 1, p. 8; see also O'Dea v. A 11states Leasing System (WA) 
pty Ltd (1983) 57 ALJR 172, at p. 189 per Deane J.; The position in Australia will shortly be discussed 
see infriL, paras. 2.51 et seq. 
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would not seem to be regarded as intimidating the promisor into carrying out his 
contractual obligation. Thus it seem hardly justifiable for such a stipulation to be struck 
out as being a penalty. The judgment of Lord Halsbury in Clydebw* Engineeping and 
ShipbuiOng Co. Ltd v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Casianed26 might seem to 
support this view: 
"It seems to me, when one looks to see what was the nature of the 
transaction in this case, it is hopeless to contend that the parties only 
intended this as something in terrorem. Both parties recognized the fact 
of the importance of time: it is a case in which time is of the essence of the 
contract and so regarded by both parties, and the particular sum fixed 
upon as being the agreed amount of damages was suggested by the 
defendants themselves, and to say that that can be unconscionable or 
something which the parties ought not to insist upon, that it was a mere 
holding out something in terrorem, after looking at the correspondence 
between the parties is, to my mind not a very plausible suggestion. ... and I think there is no ground for the contention that this is not pactional 
damage agreed to between the parties- and for very excellent reason 
agreed to between the parties- at the time the contract was entered into. " 
This view, however, cannot be maintained: First, the mere reference to the negotiation 
and correspondence between the parties does not necessarily show the court's attempt to 
discover the subjective intention of the parties. In fact, in order to find out the reasonable 
intention of the parties, the whole terms of the contract and inherent circumstances 
surrounding it should carefully be taken into account. ' Secondly and most importantly, a 
clause may, as it was just discussed, be regarded as a penalty while it has no effect in 
pressurizing the promisor into carrying out his obligation. Therefore, the mere reason 
that a subjectively genuine pre-estimate of damages may not act in terrorem of the 
defaulting party does not necessarily indicate that it could not be regarded as penal in 
nature. 28 
'* [ 1905] AC 6, at p. 13 
27 See the Australian can of Multiplex Constructions Ltd v. 4bgarus Ltd. [ 1992] 1 APCLR 1; see supra, 
para. 2.08 
' it may also be argued that in most contracts, where the parties may provide for an agreed damage 
clause, the parties' knowledge about the assessment of damages which may result from Wmly future breaches is, to a large admit, limited (at least where they do not use services of legal advisors). Granted 
that one of the Purposes of the equitable intervention was to keep the parties, as far as possible, to the 
compensatory principle, it would be against this objective to leave the pre-assessnient of the damages to 
the subjective views of the parties. 
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1.2.2. Damages which are not recoverable at common law 
2.10 The other feature which is worthy of a brief discussion here is how the word 
"damages" should be interpreted in the context of the distinction between penalties and 
liquidated damages. In other words, when the essence of liquidated damages is referred to 
as a genuine pro-estimate of damages, what is meant by the word "damages"? Is it the 
actual loss which is expected to flow from breach or should it be confined to losses 
which are recoverabk at common law under the so-called Hadley v. Boxendale" rule? 
The discussion has an obvious practical significance: Suppose that the parties, in pre- 
estimating damages have not taken into account the issues like the remoteness of 
damages or the promisee's duty to mitigate the loss. They have, thus, provided for losses 
which cannot reasonably be regarded as being within the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties, or can reasonably be mitigated by the possible reasonable steps taken by the 
promisee. Such a pre-estimation- which covers the sort of losses which are not 
recoverable under the ordinary rules of damages- may, according to the latter view 
expressed above, be regarded as a penalty, while it is a valid liquidated damages if the 
duty of the parties in agreeing upon damages is construed as an attempt to pre-estimate 
the actual loss. 
2.11 The law in this area does not seem to be clear. The obiter &cIa in Robophone 
Facilities Ltd v. Blank" supports the view that the agreed damages clause may contain 
compensation for a loss which does not fall within the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale3l since 
it has not been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties. In this case Diplock 
L. J. stated: 
"If the contract contained an express undertaking by the defendant to be 
responsible for all actual loss to the plaintiff occasioned by the defendant's 
breach, whatever that loss might turn out to be, it would not affect the 
defendant's liability for the loss actually sustained by the plaintiff that the 
defendant did not know of the special circumstances which were likely to 
cause any enhancement of the plaintiffs loss. So, if at the time of the 
contract the plaintiff informs the defendant that his loss in the event of a 
particular breach is likely to be IX by describing this sum as liquidated 
29 (1854) 9 Exck 341,156 ER 145 
» [196613 All ER 128, (1966) 1 WLR 1428 
31 (1854) 9 Exch. 341,156 ER 145 
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damages in the terms of his offer to contract, and the defendant expressly 
undertakes to pay IX to the plaintiff in the event of such breach, the 
clause which contains the stipulation is not a "penalty clause" unless LX is 
not a genuine and reasonable estimate by the plaintiff of the loss which he 
will infact be likely to sustain. Such a clause is, in my view, enforceable, 
whether or not the defendant knows what are the special circumstances 
which make the loss likely to be in the ordinaty course of things. "32 
Some commentators suggest, on the basis of this dicta, that damages must mean any 
actual loss which is likely to flow from breach, even though it is not recoverable in an 
33 34 
action for unliquidated damages. It has also been suggested that the dicta should be 
read in and confined to its context and therefore, so far as the question of remoteness of 
damages is concerned, the agreed sum n-dght be in excess of what is recoverable under 
the rule in Hadky v. Baxendale by pre-estimating the losses which neither are the natural 
consequences of the breach, nor have been within the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties (i. e. too remote losses) . 
3' However, damages which could have been avoided by 
taking reasonable steps, as the duty of mitigation, could not be recovered as agreed 
damages, because "to permit these to be taken into account in assessing whether agreed 
damages are a genuine pre-estimate would either encourage wasteful failure to mitigate, 
or would overcompensate the wily party who both claimed the liquidated damages and 
mitigated. "36 
2.12 Attention should also be paid to Lombard North Central p1c. v. Butterworth 37 
which might be thought to suggest a restrictive view: In an agreement to lease a 
computer, it was provided that the punctual payment of each instalment of rent was of 
the essence of the lease, and that in the event of default in due payment, the plaintiffs, i. e., 
the finance house, would have the right to terminate the contract, retake possession of the 
32 Robophone Facilities Ltd. v. Blank [ 196613 AU ER 128, at p. 143; [ 1966] 1 V&R 1428, at pp. 1447-8. 
[emphasis added] 
33 McKendrick E, Contract Law, (2nd ed., 1994), p. 327; Waddams, The Law of Damages, 1983, panL 
943; Lewison K., The Interpretation Of Contracts, para. 15.07 at p. 357; and for the opposite view see: 
Smith J. C., The Law of Contract, 2nd ed., 1993, p. 219 
1 Bole K Remedies for Breach of Contract, p. 57; Burrows A, Remedies for Torts and Breach of 
Contract, (2nd edL, 1994), p. 327 
35 See also Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed., vol. 1,1994, para. 26-061 
36 Beae II, Remedies for Breach of Contract, p. 37 
37 [1987] QB 527; (1987) 1 All ER 267 
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subject matter, and claim for all arrears of the rent, all future rentals, damages for breach 
of the lease and all expenses incurred in retaking possession of goods. Because of the 
defendanVs default, the plaintiffs terminated the contract and claimed the agreed damages. 
The Court of Appeal considered the case from the point of view that the actual loss of 
the plaintiff, in the event of breach, was the loss of his bargain because the stipulation 
which made due payment of the essence promoted a simple term into a condition, any 
breach of which entitled the plaintiff to terminate. 38 Mustill L. J., in his discussion of 
different losses which flow from the breaches of a condition and of a simple term, 
referred to the measures of recovery at common law, and stated: 
" When deciding upon the penal nature of a clause which prescribes a 
measure of recovery for damages resulting from a termination founded 
upon a breach of condition, the comparison should be with the common 
law measures: namely, with the loss to the promisee resulting from the 
loss of his bargain. "39 
This phrase might seem to represent a narrower view in deciding whether the parties can 
validly agree upon damages which are not recoverable at common law. 40 
2.13 It should however be observed that in Lombard v. ButlerworW', the controversial 
point was not the question whether an agreed damages clause might provide for a loss 
which is not normally recoverable as unliquidated damages, but it was the power of the 
parties to promote a simple term into a condition so that breach of that term could be 
regarded as repudiation. In fact, any reference to the common law measures of recovery, 
in deciding about the penal nature of the agreed damages clause, is, it seems, to show the 
amount of damages in repudiatory breach and in breach of simple terms, not to 
demonstrate that the agreement of the parties upon losses which do not normally fall 
within the rule in Ha&ey v. Bemendale' is not valid. It would thus appear that this case 
hardly lends support to the narrow view expressed above. 
" Unlike the case in which failure to punctual payment was the breach of a simple term (i. e. not 
repudiatory) and the likely loss following this breach was losses up to the date of termination which was 
due to the exercise of iessoes own option under the contract. This case will be considered in more detail later: see infra., paras. 5.059 et seq. 
[1987] QB 527, at p. 537 
Beale, Bishop & Furmston's Contract, Cases and Materials, (3rd ad., 1995, Butterworths), pp. 601-602 
411198711 QB 527,11987] 1 All ER 267 
42 (Igs4) 9 Exch. 341,156 ER 145 
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2.14 it would appear that, if unfairness is to be accepted as the basis for the intervention 
of courts to relieve against penalties43' it would scarcely seem likely that the agreement of 
parties in pre-estimating the anticipated actual loss, and not only the legally recoverable 
loss, could be regarded as unfair. Such an agreement could not, it seems, be indicative of 
a procedural defect in the bargaining process; on the contrary, it shows that the parties 
have given cuefid thought to the clause, and, with serious intention, pre-estimated the 
amount of likely actual loss. Neither could it substantively be regarded as unfair, because 
what parties have agreed upon, though it covers some losses which are not legally 
recoverable, is, in any event, an element of damages which are conceived to result from 
breach. Furthermore, it is hard to assume that such an agreement has the nature of 
penalties acting in terrarem of the defaulting party; for it does not result in intimidation of 
the promisor into carrying out his promise, and punishing him in case of breach. It is 
therefore suggested that the comparison between the agreed amount and the actual loss, 
not legally recoverable loss, should be the basis for determining the nature of the parties' 
agreement as to damages. " 
2.15 It has been suggested that the enforcement of such a clause may, in some cases, 
result in overcompensation. 43 It would however seem that if overcompensation is 
assumed to occur in relation to the recovery of any loss which does not fall within the 
common law measures of recovery, 46 any agreement of the parties as to losses which are 
not legally recoverable will result in overcompensation, irrespective of the fact whether 
43 See SUpra., paraS. 1.69-1.70 
44 See Citicorp Australia Ltd v. Hen&y (1985) 4 NSWLR 1, where, though the legally recoverable loss 
was recognised as the basis of a comparison between the agreed sum and the anticipated actual harm, the 
language, employed by Mahoney JA demonstrated the unsatisfactory nature of this principle: -There is no doubt that the law regards some provisions relating to the recovery of damages as unenforceable for 
reasons which are comprehended by the term penalty. But the rationale of these rules, and the rules by 
which the unacceptable provisions are to be separated from the acceptable, are hardly safisfiwtory. 
Provisions such as the present [providing for the actual loss, though not legally recoverable, as claimed 
by the, Plaintiffl- in reality, not intended to be "in terrOrem" but to provide for the recovery of money in 
the case of a breach. ... However, I do not think this Court should adopt the principles advanced by the 
plaindff. ... 
" at pp. 29-30; In the United States, at least as to the successful partys attorney sfwc ' bes hi h 
are not OrdWal* recoverable as damages, the agreed damage clause covering such a loss has, in the 
majority oflurisdictions. been upheld- see Calamari, John D. & Perillo, Joseph M., The Law of Contracts (2nd ed., 1977, West Publishing Co. ), p. 569 
45 Beale H, Remedies for Breach of Contract p. 57 
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the agreed damages clause covers too remote losses or the losses which could be avoided 
by taking reasonable steps as mitigation. Despite this fact, however, the dicta in 
Robophwe Facififies Ltd v. B14YO confirmed the agreement of the parties as to losses 
which could not be recovered in an action for unliquidated damages since they were too 
remote to be considered within the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale"; in other words, the 
decision of the Court of Appeal allowed the parties to a contract to agree upon the 
recovery of losses which the innocent party is likely to sustain in consequence of the 
breach, notwithstanding the fact that such a recovery might be regarded as 
overcompensation. 
it is hence fitting to conclude that the reasonable pre-estimate of the parties of likely 
actual loss flowing from breach, should be enforced, even if it does not fall within the 
common law measures of recovery. 
2. Terminology Used by the Parties 
2.1. Wording of the clause Is not conclusive 
2.16 A less controversial point is that the wording used by the parties to describe the 
nature of agreed damages clause is not conclusive. The Court must find the reasonable 
intention of the parties at the time the contract was made by the construction of the whole 
contract and all circumstances in which the contract has been entered into. In doing so, 
therefore, the words "penalty" or "liquidated damages" used by the parties do not 
necessarily indicate the nature of the clause. 49 As Lord Dunedin expressed in Dunlop 
46 Probably because the rules of common law provide for such measures that fully compensate the injured 
party 
47 [1966] 3 All ER 128, at p. 143 ; [1966] 1 WLR 1429, at pp. 1447-1448 
48 (1854) 9 Exch. 341,136 ER 145 
' It was, it appears, In the early n1netanth century that the court refused, for the first titne, to grve effba 
to the wording used by the parties: see Kemble Y. Farren (1829) 6 Bingham 141,130 ER 1234. Before 
this decision the terminology employed by the parties had a great importance: see, e. g., cases cited in 
note 82, chapter 1. qf deposit rule; in deciding whether the sum of money paid before breach is a deposit" or a "part payment*, the words used by the parties to call the advance payment is of great 
importance and can normally determine the nature of payment. See Howe v. &nIth (1894) 27 Ch. D. 89, 
per Bowen Ij at p. 97 ; Harrison v. Holland 11927] 1 KB 211 ; see also Cheshfiv, - Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract, 13th edL, 1996, p. 640; Chitty on Contracts, 27th ad., vol. 1,1994, para. 29-041; see 
also Infra., para. 6.40 
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Pneumadc Tyre Co. Ltd v. Alew Garage andMotor Co. Ltd. 5' 
"Though the parties to a contract who use the words "penalty" or 
"liquidated damages" may prima facie be supposed to mean what they 
say, yet the expression used is not conclusive. The court must find out 
whether the payment stipulated is in truth a penalty or liquidated 
damages. "51 
The reason for this rule seems to be that the intervention of courts to relieve against 
penalties is operated against what the parties agreed upon, namely the express intention 
of the parties; therefore, the form of the words used by them could not conclude the 
Matter. 52 
2.17 According to this rule, although the parties commonly described the clause as 
"liquidated and ascertained damages", courts, after the construction of the contract and 
finding the reasonable intention of the parties, held the sum to be a penalty. 53 Conversely, 
in some caseS54 the agreement of the parties, describing the agreed sum as "penalty", has 
30 [1915] AC 79 
31 Ibid., at p. 86 ; see also Clydebank Engineering and shipbuilding Co. Ltd. v. Don Jose Ramos 
Yzquierdo [1905] AC 6, where Lord F[alsbury at p. 9 pointed out: wit cannot, I thirk be denied ... that not 
much reliance can be placed upon the mere use of certain words. Both in England and Soodand it has 
been pointed out that the court must proceed according to what is the real nature of the transaction, and 
that the mere use of the word "penalty" on the one side, or "damages" on the other, would not be 
conclusive as to the rights of the parties. " ; Wallis v. &nith (1982) 21 Ch. D. 243 at pp. 249-230 per Fry J: 
"... it is quite plain that the words "liquidated damages" describing the nature of the payment ue by no 
means conclusive. "; Cellulose Acetate Silk Co Ltdv. Widnes Foun&Y (1925), Ltd. [1933] AC 20, at p. 25 
per Lord Atkin; Pagnan & F. 111 Y. Coprosal M 119811 1 Lloyd's R 283, when Adkma LJ, giving the 
judgment of the Court, said: "To describe such a claim as a "penalty" could well be because it was so 
described in the contract But, if there were such a clause, it could be a wholly legifnuft clause 
providing for the payment of liquidated damages in the event of late shipment. We do not know the true 
position. The mere use of the word "penalty" is not in itself decisive. - at p. 287; Ariston SRL v. Charly 
Records Ltd. (1990) Independent 13 April, where little reliance was placed on the description of the 
clause as a "Penalty". 
52 Waddams, The Law of Damagm 1983, para. 922; As stated by Deane J. in O'Dea v. Allstates Leasing 
s)vstem (WA) Pty Ltd (1983) 57 AUR 172, "[w1hether or not a provision of a contract imposes a penalty 
must be determined by reference to the true operation of that provision. " at p. 189 
53 Kemble v. Farren (1929) 6 Bingham 141,130 ER 1234; Magee v. Lavell (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 107; Re 
Newman (1976) 4 Ch. D. 724; Bradley v. Walsh (1903) 88 LT 737; public Works Commissioner v. Hills 
[1906] AC 368; Lock v. Bell [1931] 1 Ch. 35; TU minimum payment clause in hire-purchase cases, 
which provides for agreed damages *by way of agreed compensation for depreciation" has mostly been 
held to be a penalty: see. e. g., Cooden Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Stanford [1953] 1 QB 86; Lamdon V. 
Hurrell [195511 All ER 839; Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. Ltd. [1962] AC 600 
54 Ranger v. G. W. Railway (1854) 5 H. L. C. 72; Crux v. Aldred (1866) 14 WAL 656; Re K%ife (1901) 17 
TLR 461; Clydebank Engineering andShipbuilding Co. Ltd. v. Don jose Ramos [1905] AC 6; Diestal v. 
Stevenson [1906] 2 KB 345; Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd. v. Widnes Foun&y (1925). Ltd. [1933] AC 
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been ignored and the sum has been treated as liquidated damages and held to be 
recoverable. In Alder v. Mooress, clause 8 of the contract imposed on the defendant an 
obligation to sign a declaration not to play professional football in the future in lieu of the 
sum of money which he was about to receive from the plaintiff; and also to repay the 
received sum as a penalty if he infiinged his declaration. In the plaintifPs action for the 
recovery of the stipulated penalty, Sellers L. J. held that the sum claimed was an agreed 
and fair pre-estimate of the loss which the plaintiffis had suffered and not a penalty. 
2.1 Presumption raised by the terms used 
2.18 It has been suggestedm that the wording used by the parties not only is not 
conclusive but is also of no use in deciding whether the agreed amount is a genuine pre- 
estimate of damages, and therefore the less cautious phrases, such as "the names, the 
parties give the money, penalty or liquidated damages, are immaterial "57 or "[t]he 
question does not depend in such cases on the words used"58, have been preferred. It 
can, however, be inferred from some judgments that the terminology used by the parties 
raises a presumption in favour of the term which has been expressed. The well-known 
phrase of Lord Dunedin, referred to above'9, shows such an inference. 
2.19 Although the discussion, as it has been stated6o, might have little practical effect and 
there is apparently a rare case in which the terminology used by the parties has turned the 
scales, it would seem that the terminology chosen by the parties, ppimafacie, shows their 
real intention and at least in procedure, so far as "the burden of proof" is concerned, it 
might give rise to an inference in favour of the word used. This inference, however, 
could be rebutted by the party who claims against it. In Willson v. Love", the parties had 
20; Alder v. Moore [1%1] 2 QB 57; Robert Stewart & So=, Ltd. v. CarapaniTra & Co., Ltd [196211 
All ER 418,11962] 1 WLR 34 
55 [1961] 2 QB 57; See also Megarry, IL E. (1961) 77 LQR 300; Goff (1%1) 24 N%R "0 
56 Mc()regor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 451 
57 Sparrow V. Paris (1862) 7 IL& N. 594,158 ER 608, per Bramwell B. at pp. 599,610 respecdvely 
59 magee v. Lavell (1874) UL 9 C. P. 107, per Coleridge C. j. at pp. 114-115 
59 supra., para. 2.16 
60 mcGregor, Ibid -, Ogus, The Law of Damages, 1973, p. 43 
61 [lg96] I QB 628 
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themselves called the agreed sum a penalty. In his judgment Lord Esher M. R. stated: 
"A succession of judges have held that the use of the term 11penalty" or 
"liquidated damages" is not conclusive; but no case, I think, decides that 
the term used by the parties themselves is to be altogether disregarded, 
and I should say that, where the parties themselves call the sum made 
payable a "penalty", the onus lies on those who seek to show that it is to 
be payable as liquidated damages. "62 
This view has been confirmed in a recent decision of the Privy Council in Philips Hong 
Kong Ltd v. Yhe Attorney General of Hong Kongo where Lord Woolf, delivering the 
judgment of the Board observed: 
" In seeking to establish that the sum described in the Philips contract as 
liquidated damages was in fact a penalty, Philips has to surmount the 
strong infbrence to the contrary resulting from its agreement to make the 
payments as liquidated damages ... I'" it may, therefore, well be concluded that the terminology used is not totally irrelevant: it 
gives rise to a presumption in fkvour of the expressed term, but it may be shown by the 
plaintiff that, owing to special circumstances, the first inference has not been true. 
3. Time for the Application of the Test to Distinguish Liquidated 
Damages from Penalties 
3.1. Time of making the contract not breach 
2.20 In deciding whether a stipulated sum is liquidated damages or a penalty, as it was 
stated, the whole contract and its surrounding circumstances should thoroughly be 
examined to find out whether the agreed sum reasonably represents the intention of the 
parties to pre-estimate the likely damages flowing from breach. Since the parties! attempt 
to assess the probable loss occurs at the time when the contract is made, this time, 
therefore, is the most proper time for such an examination. This has been stated by Lord 
Dunedin as the third rule in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. New Garage and Motor 
62 Ibid, p. 629-630; we also Alder v. Moore [196112 QB 57 at 75 per Devlin L. J.; Diestal v. Stevenson 
[1906] 2 KB 345, at p. 350 
63 (1993) 61 B. L. R. 41 
64 ibid., at p. 59; see also Robophone Facilities Ltd. v. Blank [ 196611 WLR 1428, [1966) 3 All ER 128, 
where as to a clause described by the parties as "liquidated or agreed damages", Diplock U said: "The 




"The question whether a sum stipulated is penalty or liquidated damages is 
a question of construction to be decided upon the terms and the inherent 
circumstances of each particular contract, judged of as at the time of the 
maldng of the contract, not as at the time of the breach. "66 
This rule in English law 67 has never, apparently, been doubted and its application can be 
seen in numerous cases. " 
3.1 Subsequent events 
2.21 The important point is whether, by regarding the time of making the contract as the 
time for its construction in order to distinguish liquidated damages from penalties, the 
subsequent events should be ignored. The rule stated above, prima facie, suggests that 
any factual event after entering into the contract should be disregarded. Some cases also 
1 [1915] AC 79; see also Public Works Commissioner v. Hills 11906] AC 368, at p. 376; Webster V. 
Bosanquet [1912] AC 394, at p. 398 
1 Ibid., at p. 86-87 
67 The position is apparently the same in Australia: see, e. g., Lax v. Glenmore Ply Lid (1969) 90 W. N. 
(Pt 1) (NSW) 703, at 705-706 per Herron CJ. In the United States, the traditional approach is the same: 
see, e. g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (1907) 205 U. S. 105, at pp. 119-12 1, where a contractual 
provision stipulating damages for the late delivery of guns, which was a reasonable pre-estimate of actual 
losses at the time when the contract had been made, was held to be liquidated damages, am though the 
end of the war before the contractual date for delivery had in W eliminated the possibility of actual 
losses. see also Southwest Engineering Co. v. United States (8th Cir. 1965) 341 F. 2nd 999, at p. 1003; 
however the present position appears to be controversial: some authorities may suggest a comparison 
between the agreed sum and the actual loss resulted from breach: see sec. 2-718(l) UCC which provides: 
" Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is 
reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of 
loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing 
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty. " (emphasis added) see the interpretation of 
this section in Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Development Corp. (1976) 38 MY 2nd 516, whom it 
was stated: "section 2-718 does, in some measure, signal a departure from prior law which considered 
only the anticipated harm at the time of contracting since that section expressly contemplates that a court 
may examine the "actual haM7 sustained in a4judicating the validity of a liquidated damages provision. 
Thus, decisions which have restricted their analysis of the validity of liquidated damages clauses solely 
to the anticipated harm at the time of contracting have, to this exunt, been abrogated by the Uniform 
Commercial Code in cases involving transactions in goods. "; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
sec. 356, comment b which provides: "The amount fixed is reasonable to the extent that it approximates 
the actual loss that has resulted from the particular breach, even though it may not approximate the loss 
that might have been anticipated under other possible breaches. ... 
"; The cases also have taken different 
approaches: see, e. g., Colonial at Lynnfleld, Inc. v. Sloan (Ist Cir. 1989) 870 F. 2nd 761, at p. 765, 
where an agreed damages clause, which was a reasonable pre-estimate of damages at the time of 
contracting, was held to be a penalty on the ground that no actual loss had been sustained. see, on the 
other hand, California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. Sun Ship, Inc. (9th Cir. 1986) 794 F. 2nd 1433, at pp. 
1435-1437, where the agreed damages were allowed to stand, even though the plaintiff had suffered 
minimal actual loss. 
68 See, e. g., Philipw Hong Kong Ltd. v. 77'eAtt'Ir"eY General OfHong Kong (1993)61 B. L. R. 41 
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support this view: In Clydebank Engineefing and Shipbujl&ng Co. Ltd v. Dan Jose 
Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda", the defendants agreed to build four torpedo-boats for 
the plaintiffs to be used in the war between Spain and the United States. The parties 
stipulated for a payment of L500 for every week of delay in delivery of each boat. In fact, 
the defendants were late in delivering the boats. In an action for the recovery of the 
agreed sum the court held that the subsequent fact, which shows that in the event of the 
punctual delivery all the boats would have been sunk together with the Spanish fleet, was 
irrelevant and the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the agreed sum as liquidated 
damages. 
2.22 it has, however, been suggested that subsequent events might often be used to 
determine the scope of the parties' agreement and therefore if due to the occurrence of 
any unforeseen event, the specific breach turned out to be harmless, it might well be 
argued that the stipulated sum was not payable in those circumstances. " This view, with 
respect, seems to be subject to an objection: Granted that the essence of liquidated 
damages is a genuine pre-estimate of likely loss and that the parties at the time of entering 
into the contract have reasonably made every attempt to assess the losses which are 
probable to flow from the breach, it would be difficult to argue that the reasonable 
assessment of the parties of the likely loss would be invalidated as being a penalty, even if 
in fact the amount of actual loss, because of any subsequent event turns to be less than 
the agreed sum. 71 
2.23 It would, however, seem that subsequent events cannot be regarded as totally 
irrelevant. These events might be used to see what could reasonably be expected to be 
the likely loss when the contract was made. This was expressed by the Privy Council in 
69 [19051 AC 6; see also the American case Of United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (1907) 205 U. S. 105: 
supra., note 67 
70 Waddams, Tim Law of Damps, 1983, para. 936 
71 Also, where ft agreed damages is a reasonable Pre-eStimate of actual loss, it is the only recoverable 
sum, even if the plaintiffs actual loss, because of any subsequent circumstances, um out to be much 
greaW dM the agreed damages: see CellulOm Acetate Silk Co., Ltd. v. Widnes Foun&y (1925), Ltd 
[1933] AC 20; Law Commission's Working Paper, no. 61, "Perailty Clauses and Forfeiture of Wnies 
Paid7,1975, p. 30; see infira., par& 3.12 
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Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Yhe Anorney General of Hong Kone where Lord Woolf 
stated: 
"The fact that the issue has to be determined objectively, judged at the 
date the contract was made, does not mean what actually happens 
subsequently is irrelevant. On the contrary it can provide valuable 
evidence as to what could reasonably be expected to be the loss at the 
time the contract was made. " 
A line, therefore, it seems, should be drawn between events which could be expected to 
be within the reasonable contemplation of parties when the contract is made, and those 
that are not of this character: The latter is presumably of no effect; the former, however, 
should be taken into account by the parties when they are pre-estimating the future 
probable loss. 
4. Rules for Distinguishing Liquidated Damages from Penalties 
2.24 Although the nature of penalties and liquidated damages, as stated in the judgment 
of Lord Dunedin" can offer guidance to distinguish liquidated damages from penalties, 
courts, during many decades, have developed more practical rules which stem from the 
very nature described above. These rules have appeared in some leading cases, and then 
have well been brought together in the well-known judgment of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop 
Pneumatic T)re Co. Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd 74 which even now is the 
most important leading case in this context: In this case, the respondents bought some 
tyre-covers, tyres and tubes from the appellants who were the manufacturer of these 
goods. The contract provided, inter afia, that the buyers should neither tamper with the 
appellant's markings on the tyres, nor sell them or offer them for sale below the listed 
price, nor sell them to people whom the manufacturer had decided not to supply, and not 
to exhibit or export them without the appellant's consent. The amount of 15 was also 
stipulated to be paid by the respondents for any tyre to be sold in breach of this term. 
The buyers defaulted and were sued by the appellants for losses under the agreed 
damages clause. The House of Lords held the agreed sum to be a genuine pre-estimate 
of likely damages and not a penalty. The rules, which will be considered below, were 
72 (1993) 61 B. L. P- 4 1, at p. 59 
73 Dunlop Pneumatic 7), re Co. Ltd. v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [ 19 15] AC 79, we supra., pam 
2.03 
74 Jbid, pp. 87-88 
74 
stated by Lord Dunedin in the course of his judgment. 
4.1. Unconscionable or Extravagant Sum 
4.1.1. General principle 
2.25 The first rule was introduced by Lord Dunedin as follows: 
"It will be held to be a penalty if the sum stipulated for is extravagant and 
unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could 
conceivably be proved to have followed ftom. the breach. "75 
This rule, which is perhaps the most important means to find out whether the agreed 
damages clause is a pre-estimate of probable loss to be sustained from breach, was first 
introduced in Wallis v. Smith7". In this case the possibility of the application of the 
penalty doctrine as to sums agreed to be paid upon breaches of contract was considered. 
Then the House of Lords in its two important decisions in Clydebank Engineering and 
Shipbuilft Co. v. Don Jose Ramos" and Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage 
and Motor Co-71 confirmed the idea that the agreed sum being "extravagant", 
"exorbitant" and "unconscionable" in comparison with the greatest loss which might 
conceivably be expected to flow from breach would be regarded as a penalty. 
2.26 As it appears, these concepts represent a clear disproportion between the agreed 
sum and the likely actual loss, and therefore the agreed amount merely being in excess of 
the anticipated actual loss should not be regarded as penal. Despite this point, in some 
cases, perhaps in the interest of greater certainty, the agreed sum has been held to be 
penal merely because it was in excess of the likely actual loss which might have been 
expected to flow from breach at the time when the contract was entered into. in Cooden 
Engineering Co. Ltd v. Stanford", although the operation of the agreed damages clause 
in one case would have resulted in the recovery of less amount than the actual loss, the 
75 jbid, at p. 97, see also Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. v. Don Jose Ramos [19051 
AC 6, at P. 10 per Lord Halsbý 
76 (1882) 21 Ch. D. 243 
77 [1905] AC 6 
78 [1915] AC 79 
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clause was held to be a penalty because, inter alia, in most circumstances it amounted to 
a sum in excess of the actual damage. In the course of his judgement, Somervell L. J. 
stated: 
"Although it cannot be said that the [agreed] amount exceeds the greatest 
loss that could possibly follow on the breach,... it will exceed it in all, 
except the exceptional case where the car has become of no value. "80 
on the other hand, in some cases, the mere possibility of the agreed sum being in excess 
of the likely loss at the time of contracting, has not prevented the court from holding that 
the sum is a valid liquidated damages clause. In Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Mani? % 
Diplock L. J., emphasising on the necessity and advantages of giving the parties to a 
contract greater latitude to agree upon future damages in advance, recognized that the 
agreed figure which was reasonably close to the likely actual loss, as far as the prediction 
was possible, was a valid estimation of loss. 82 In this case, in a contract to hire a 
telephone answering machine, it was provided that in case of termination of the contract 
for any reason, the hirer would be liable to pay, in addition to the rentals which had 
already accrued due, a sum equal to fifty per cent. of the rents for the unexpired period of 
the contract. Diplock LJ observed that the actual loss resulting from breach in different 
breach scenarios would fluctuate within the range of forty-seven to fifty-eight per cent., 
the percentage decreasing progressively as the contract was brought to an end at earlier 
stages of its life. Thus, although the clause would result in the recovery of a sum in 
excess of the actual loss in some scenarios, the learned Lord Justice upheld the clause as 
being liquidated damages. He based his decision, inter alia, on the ground that "it would 
seem to be sound business sense, for parties entering into such a contract and envisaging 
the possibility of its determination on the hirer's breach, to take steps to avoid the 
uncertainty, the difficulty and the expense of proving in a court of law the actual loss 
sustained in that event by agreeing in advance on an easily ascertainable sum to be paid by 
the hirer which represents a reasonable estimate of the probable loss which the other 
79 [1953] 1 QB 87, per Somervell IJ at p. 98; On the general tendemy to move away ftm pwal 
daniages, and U) inSW On cOmPensating the innocent party only for his actual loss, see Atiyah P. S., The 
Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, p. 677 
"0 Aid, at p. 98 
81 [ 196613 All ER 128 
82 Ibid, at pp. 143-144 ; see also the judgement of ]Hkrman U. at p. 137 
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party would sustain. ""' 
2.27 The intervention of courts to invalidate penalties, as it was seen", is best justified 
on the basis of fitimess. However, since it is a clear interference with the principle of 
freedom of contractý it should, it seems, be limited to cases where the unfair 
consequences resulting from the parties' agreement is evident. The mere fact that the 
agreed sum is in excess of the actual loss would not necessarily indicate that there might 
have been some procedural defects in the bargaining process. Nor could it be taken as 
the evidence of substantive unfairness: the parties are normally the best judges of their 
own interest. They may have different reasons- such as the difficulty and expense of an 
accurate pre-estimation, idiosyncratic values which the promisee put on the performance 
which leads him to pay a sum in excess of the normal price for the performance, and in 
order to secure that performance, stipulates for a sum apparently in excess of the 
probable likely loss to be paid upon breach- to provide for agreed damages in excess of 
the probable actual loss. The courts therefore should not normally take a very searching 
look at such provisionO', and invalidate them on the mere ground that they exceed the 
probable actual loss. The unfairness, justifying the court's intervention, may exist where, 
as stated in the leading authorities", the stipulated sum is "extravaganf', "exorbitant" or 
"unconscionable" in comparison with the anticipated actual loss. In other words, the 
courts should, it may be suggested, interfere and grant relief against penalties only where 
there is a clear and "gross disproportion"87 between the stipulated amount and the likely 
"I Ibid., at p. 141 
84 See supra., paras. 1.69-1.70 
8s As pointed out by Diplock LJ: "The courts should not be astute to descry a "penalty clause* in every 
provision of a contract which stipulates a sum to be payable by one party to the other in the event of a 
breach by the former. * see RObOPhOw Facilities Ltd. v. Blank [196613 All ER 128, at p. 142; see also J 
F Finnegan Ltd v. Community Housing Association Ltd 0 993) 34 Con. L. P, 104, at pp. 116,119 ; ne 
Angelic Star [1989] 1 Lloyd! s L. R. 122, per Gibson LI at pp. 126-127 ; Philips Hong Kong Ltd v. 27se 
Attorney General ofHang Kong (1993) 61 B. L. R 41, at pp. 58-59 
" Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. JVew Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [1915] AC 79; Clydebank 
Engineering & Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda [ 1905] AC 6 
87 Furmston M P, Contract Planning: Liquidated Damages, Deposits and the Foresocability Rule (1991) 4 
JCL 1, at p. 5 
77 
loss which may be caused by breach. " 
4.1.2. Where pre-estimate is difficult or impossible 
2.28 The application of the rule, apparently requires that the likely loss resulting from 
breach could reasonably be calculable at the time of contracting, so that the parties can 
properly make their pre-estimation of likely damages. Otherwise, i. e. where the 
assessment of probable loss, because of the special circumstances of the case or the 
consequences of breach was difficult or impossible, the sum agreed to be paid in the event 
of breach would be likely to be regarded as liquidated damages, provided that the pre- 
estimation of likely loss was the true bargain between the parties. In the words of Lord 
Dunedin "[i]t is no obstacle to the sum stipulated being a genuine pre-estimate of 
damages, that the consequences of the breach are such as to make precise pre-estimation 
almost an impossibility. On the contrary that is just the situation when it is probable that 
pre-estimated damage was the true bargain between the parties. "89 Basically it might be 
said that one of the most important incentives of the parties to provide for an agreed 
damages clause, as stated by Lord Halsbury LC90, is the difficulty, complexity and high 
litigation expenses of proving actual damages; hence, if the agreed damages are decided 
not to be recoverable where the likely loss is difficult or impossible to be assessed at the 
time of contractin& this clause will lose one of its important utilities. 
" This is supported by the "Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1994" upon which a term 
which have the object or effect of "requiring any consumer who fails to AM his obligation to pay a 
disproportionately high sum in compensation" has printafacte been regarded as unfair. (See Schedule 3, 
pan. l(e) [emphasis added]) The Scope of the Regulations, of course, is much narrower than the common 
law rules on penaltim stnce it only whes to standard term contracts for the supply of goods and 
services, made between commercial sellers of goods or suppliers of services and consumers. An unfai 
term, according to the sec. 5(l) of the Regulations is not -binding on the consumer". 
89 Dunlop Pneumatic 7), 7v Co. Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [1915] AC 79, at p. 87-N; see 
also Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v.. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda [19051 
AC 6, at p. II per Lord Halsbury, Webster v. Bosanquet [ 1912) AC 394, at p. 398. This principle has 
been reaffirmed in Philips Hong Kong Ltd. v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 B. L. R. 41, 
p. 60: in this case the agreed damages which was calculated with some especial formulas has been 
referred to as *a perfwdy sensible approach in a situation such as this where it would be obvious that 
substantial loss would be suffered in the event of delay but that what that loss would be, would be 
virtually impossible to calculate in advance. " at p. 60; For the Australian approach see Waterside 
Workers'Federation ofA ustralia v. Stewart 0 919) 27 CLR 119 
go Clydebank Engineermg 4 5hipbudding CO V. Don Jose RamO$ YzquierdO y Caslaneda [ 19051 AC 6, at 
p. 11, where he said: "The very reason why the parties do in fact agm to such a stipulation is that 
someumes, although undoubtedly there is damage and undoubtedly damages ought to be recovered, the 
nature of the damage is such that proof of it is extremely complex, difficult, and expensive. - 
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2.29 This seems to be the case irrespective of whether the agreed sum is made payable 
upon breach of a single obligation or anyone of several promises. In the latter case, of 
course, the loss following from the breaches of all obligations must be difficult or 
impossible to be pre-assessed. 91 
4.1.3. Where the loss is calculable at the relevant time: agreed damages for non- 
payment of a debt 
2.30 The clear application of the rule is where the loss flowing from breach is reasonably 
calculable at the time when the contract is made. In such a case, if parties provide for an 
agreed sum which is considerably larger than the likely loss, the sum will be struck out as 
being disproportionate to the actual damages. The obvious example of this is where the 
obligation upon breach of which the agreed sum has been stipulated to be payable, is the 
payment of a sum of money; in other words, "It will be held to be a penalty if the breach 
consists only in not paying a sum of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater than 
the sum which ought to have been paid. "' The reason for this, it has been suggested, is 
that the loss which is sustained from non-payment of a sum of money is capable of being 
determined, therefore, fixing a larger sum can not be a genuine pre-estimate of the likely 
IOSS. 93 
it is true that the probable damages following from non-payment of a specified sum of 
money can normally be calculated at the time of contracting; with all respect, however, it 
does not follow that the stipulation of any larger sum could not be regarded as a genuine 
assessment of actual damages. As Jessel, M. R. stated in Wallis v. SmiA": 
"It has always appeared to me that the doctrine of the English law as to 
non-payment of money- the general rule being that you cannot recover 
damages because it is not paid by a certain day, is not quite consistent with 
reason. A man may be utterly ruined by the non-payment of a sum of 
money on a given day, the damages may be enormous, and the other party 
may be wealthy. " 
The parties to a contract should therefore, it seems, be able to stipulate for the likely loss 
91 The other aspects of a single sum payable upon different breaches will be discussed later in this 
chapter, infra paras. 2.36 et seq. 
92 Dunlop Pneumatic 7ý7-e Co. Ltd, v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. 119151 AC 79, at p. 87 
93 Furmston M P, Cheshire, Fifoot & Funnston's Law of Contract 13th ad., 1996, p. 636 
1 (1882) 21 Ch. D. 243, at p. 257 
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which in special circumstances might be in excess of the sum which ought to have been 
paid. I& however, the agreed sum exceeds the likely loss, and not only the sum of the 
primary obligation itsel& it may be regarded as extravagant and unconscionable amount 
and struck out as being a penalty. 
2.31 It might be argued that according to the common law rule, substantial damage is 
not normally recoverable in the event of faure to pay a debt. 93 This rule, however, had 
been subject to some doubts in rather recent cases" and finally in President of InWa v. 
Lips Mwitime Corporation", the House of Lords restricted it only to claims for the 
recovery of interest for late payment. " As to other losses which might flow from non- 
payment or late payment of a debt, however, the House recognized "special damages" 
which are recoverable according to the general rules about damages. 99 Thus, damages 
which have been held recoverable in cases like Wadsworth v. Lydall'00 because of being 
" The only loss recoverable consisted of the debt itself: see for example Fletcher v. Tayleur (1955) 17 
C. B. 21, at p. 29; Williams v. Reynolds (1865) 6B&S 495,122 ER 1278; British Columbia Saw-Mill 
Co. Ltd v. Nettleship (1868) L. P, 3 C. P. 499, at p. 506. There is also a secondary common law rule 
upon which "debts do not carry interest". see London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co v. South Eastern 
Railway Co. [1893] AC 429, where it was held that as a common law rule, interest could not be awarded 
for the late payment of a debL 
96 MuhammadIssael Sheikh Ahmad v. All 11947] AC 414, Trans Trust &P. R. L. v. Danubian Trading Co. 
[1952] 2 QB 297 
91 [1988] 1 AC 395 
96 See ibid., per Lord Brandon of Oakbrook at p. 424. Before that, in Nesident ofInd(a v. La Pinlada 
Compania Navigacion SA [1984] 2 All ER 773, [1985] AC 104, the House had restricted the common 
law rule as to non-rcooverability of interest for late payment of a debt to interest as general damage under 
the first part of the rule in Hadley v. Bazendale 9 Exch. 341,156 ER 145. The rule however was held as 
not being applicable to claim for recovery of interest as special damage under the second limb of the rule 
in Hadley v Baxendale. However, the house thought it inappropriate to depart from the traditional 
common law rule, referred to above, mainly on the ground that this departure would create a conflict 
between the statutory discretion Of the courts to award interest on unpaid debts and the creditor's right to 
recover interest at common law. 
" As to currency exchange lossM for example, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook (with whom the other 
members of the House concurred) stated: "... it appears to me that claims to recover currency exchange 
losses as damages for breach of contract, whether the breach relied on is late payment of a debt or any 
other breach, are subject to the same rules as apply to claims for damages for breach of contract 
generally. " at p. 424; Lord Mackay of Clashfern also held: "The reasoning of this House in President of 
India v. La Pintada Compania Navigacion SA [1984) 2 All ER 773, [1985] AC 104 makes it clear that 
damages other than Interest may be recovered for breach by late payment. " at p. 429; see also Treitel 
G. H., The Law of Contract, 9th cd-, 1995, pp. 895-897 
100 [19811 1 WLR 598, approved by the House of Lords in President of India v. La Pintada Compania 
Navigacion SA [199412 All ER 773, [19851 AC 104, per Brightman L. J. at p. 602. In this caw a 
purchaser of land who had to pay L10,000 by a certain date, and knew that the vendor intended to use it 
so 
late in making the payment of a certain sum of money are justifiable as "special damages". 
Taking this into account, the common law rule should not, it appears, prevent the parties 
from agreeing in advance upon the losses which might flow from the late payment of a 
debt. Furthermore, as it was argued before'01, the parties to a contract should be able to 
cover by the agreed damages clause the losses which may reasonably flow from breach 
even though they may not be recoverable at common law. Hence, though there are many 
obiter &eta supporting the idea that a stipulation for payment of a larger sum made 
payable upon non-payment of that sum should be regarded as a penalty'02, it is, with all 
respect, suggested that where the agreed damages clause, in such cases, shows the 
reasonable attempt of the parties to provide for the likely loss which flows from breach, 
the clause should be upheld as a valid liquidated damages. 103 
4.1.4. Where the obliption to pay a specirled sum of money is one of different 
obligations 
2.32 Where there are several obligations upon breach of anyone of them the agreed sum 
has been made payable and one of these obligations is the payment of a specific sum of 
money, again an agreed damages clause providing for a larger sum than the amount which 
ought to have been paid, might be held to be a penalty'04. That is because in case of 
several obligations, if the probable loss flowing from any one of breaches could 
reasonably be pre-estimated at the time of contracting an agreed damages clause 
providing for a sum in excess of this calculable loss might be regarded as a penalty; and 
the loss resulting from the breach of an undertaldng to pay a sum of money, as stated 
as a down payment on another piece of land, failed to pay L2,800 of the debt The vendor, as a result 
h&I to borrow that amount m order to make the down payment. The Court of Appeal held that the 
intercst payable on the L2,8W by the creditor was recoverable as damages from the defaulting purchaser. 
101 Supra, para. 2.14 
102 See, e. g., Astley v. Weldon (1801) 2 Bos. & Pul. 346,126 ER 1318, per Chambre I at pp. 334,1323 
respectively; 77sompson v. Hudson (1869) L. R. 4 FLL. 1, per Lord Westbury at 30; Law v. Reddlich Local 
Board [1892) 1 QB 127, per Lord Esher M. R. at p. 130 
103 See Burrows A, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, (2nd ed., 1994), p. 323; Ogus, The Law 
of Damages, 1973, p. 45; McGregor on Damages, 15th ad., 1998, panL 458; It has also been MMUPSW 
that the second rule, stated by Lord Dunedin, *serves no useful purpose and should be abandoned*: 
Treitel G. R, The Law of Contract, 9th ed., 1995, p. 900 
104 Astley v. Weldon (1801) 2 Bos. & Pul. 346,126 ER 13 18; Kembk v. Farren (1829) 6 Bingham 141, 
130 ER 1234; Re Newman (1976) 4 Ch. D. 724; Wallis v. &nith (1882) 21 Ch. D. 243, at pp. 236-257 
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above, is normally considered as calculable. In Kembk v. Farren'05, the defendant, an 
actor, contracted with the plaintiff to act at Covent Garden Theatre as a comedian for 
four seasons in consideration of 13 6s. 8d. per night. The contract provided, inter alia, 
for the payment of 11000 by either party who refused to fulfil the agreement, or any part 
of it. The defendant being in default, the plaintiff brought an action to recover the agreed 
damages. It was held that the stipulated sum was a penalty, for it had been provided to 
be paid upon any breach of different obligations one of which was the payment of a 
considerably small sum of money: the plaintiffs failure to pay 13 6s. 8d. might have 
resulted in his liability to pay the agreed sum, i. e. V 000. 
Having regard to what was stated above'06, it could again be suggested that merely 
providing for a larger sum than what ought to have been paid, should not turn the nature 
of an agreed sum to a penalty. If the agreed sum is not disproportionately in excess of 
the likely damages which might reasonably flow from the non-payment of a certain sum, 
it should, it seems, be regarded as a valid liquidated damages clause. 
4.1.5. Bargaining power of the parties: is it a material point? 
2.33 In considering whether or not the agreed sum is extravagant or unconscionable in 
comparison with the probable damages resulting from breach, the unequal financial 
position of the parties which might result in an "unequal bargaining power" has been 
subn-dtted to be irrelevant. 107 Consequently the court should, determining the nature of 
the clause, consider the proportion between the agreed sum and the likely damages which 
might reasonably be expected to flow from breach at the time of contracting, without 
having regard to any probable unequal bargaining power of the parties. 
This seemed to be the case until the recent decision of the Privy Council in Philips Hong 
"" (1829) 6 Bing. 141,130 ER 1234 
'w See supra, paras. 2.30-2.31 
107 May, Sir Anthony. Keating On Building Contracts (London: Sweet & hftcwell, 5th ad., 1991), p. 
226, citing Imperial TObaccO CO. v. Perslay [1936] 2 All ER 515, where Lord wright IVLP, at p. 512 
pointed out: "The word unconscionable ... does not bring in at all the idea of an bargain. it is merely a synonym fbr something which is extravagant and exorbitant. "; Robert Stewart & saw Ltd 
v. Carapana , wfi 
[1962] 1 WLR 34,40; Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. Ltd. [1962] AC 600,626 per 
Lord Radcliffe 
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Kong Ltd v. The Attorney General of Hong Konglol. In this case, the appellant, Philips, 
entered into a contract with respondent, the government of Hong Kong, in relation to the 
construction of a specified part of a highway. The contract provided for the payment of 
an agreed sum as "liquidated damages" in the event of delay by the contractor. Philips 
failed to meet the key dates of completion and sought a declaration that there was no 
liability to pay the agreed sum because it amounted to a penalty. The Court of Appeal of 
Hong Kong allowed an appeal from the decision of the court in the first instance which 
upheld Philip's claim. Philips appealed. The Privy Council held the clause to be a valid 
liquidated damages clause on the ground that to identify the true nature of an agreed 
damages clause, it is not enough to identify hypothetical situations in which the probable 
actual loss would be greater than the agreed sum. 
2.34 The decision of the Privy Council, reviewing the law on penalties and confirniing 
the basic principle that a genuine pre-estimate of the likely loss can constitute a valid 
liquidated damages clause, represented a little change in relation to the practical rules 
used to distinguish liquidated damages from penalties. Lord Wool& delivering the 
judgment of the Board, stated: 
"Except possibly in the case of situations where one of the parties to the 
contract is able to dominate the other as to the choice of the terms of a 
contract, it will normally be insufficient to establish that a provision is 
ob ectionably penal to identify situations where the application of the 
provision could result in a larger sum being recovered by the injured party 
than his actual loss. Even in such situations so long as the sum payable in 
the event of non-compliance with the contract is not extravagant, having 
regard to the range of losses that it could reasonably be anticipated it 
would have to cover at the time the contract was made, it can still be a 
genuine pre-estimate of the loss that would be suffered and so a perfectly 
valid liquidated damage provision. "'09 
Thus, in deciding upon the penal nature of a clause, the unequal bargaining power of the 
parties which may result in domination, should not be disregarded: where there is such an 
inequality, the penal nature of an agreed damages clause might easily be established by 
showinj Wer afid, that in some hypothetical situations, the application of the clause 
could result ýM' the recovery of greater sum than the actual loss. It could basically be 
log (1993) 61 B. L. R. 41 
'09 Jbid, at p. 59-59 
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argued that the relationship between the parties and the bargaining power of them is one 
of the circumstances which is to be considered to find out the reasonable intention of the 
parties in pre-estimating the likely actual loss. As stated before"O, in deciding whether 
the agreed sum is a genuine pre-estimate of the likely actual loss, the reasonable intention 
of the parties, having regard to the terms of the contract and the whole "inherent 
circumstances" surrounding it, should be discovered. The bargaining power of the parties 
is one of these circumstances which may affect the parties' agreement as to pre-assessing 
damages: There seems to be a difference between a clause in a contract freely negotiated 
between the parties who are in a position to receive legal advice about different aspects of 
the contract and sign it with complete understanding of its terms on the one hand, and a 
clause in an adhesion contract between a business firm and a party who signs a pre- 
prepared contract without even reading it. It does not obviously follow that the agreed 
damages clause in the latter case should always be regarded as of penal nature; but it 
emphasizes the point that in considering the circumstances in which the contract has been 
entered into, in order to find out the reasonable intention of the parties, their bargaining 
position should be regarded as an important factor. Thus, in the cases of the inequality of 
the bargaining power of the parties, the courts might be more willing to find out the 
requisite degree of disproportion between the agreed sum and the likely actual loss, and 
to hold the clause as being penal in nature. 
2.35 It appears from the passagejust quoted"' that where the parties to a contract are of 
equal bargaining power, e. g. in most commercial contracts especially in international 
relations, to prove the penal nature of a clause, it would not be enough to show that in 
some circumstances which might happer4 the agreed damages would be in excess of the 
probable loss. ' 12 The attention, however, should be paid to the range of losses that could 
reasonably be anticipated at the time of contracting, and unless the agreed sum was 
extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with these losses, it would not be 
regarded as in the nature of penalty. 
110 See supra., paras. 2.07-2.09 
111 supra., pam 2.34 
112 See alsoJFFinnegan Ltd v. COmmunitY Housing Association (1993)34 Con L. F, 104, p. 119 
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4.1 Single Sum Payable upon Different Breaches 
4.2.1. General points: Application of the general test 
2.36 The parties to a contract may provide for a sum of money to be payable by the 
defaulting party in the event of any one of different breaches. To distinguish whether this 
sum is liquidated damages or penalty, the main test specified before is still applicable: i. e. 
if the agreed sum is extravagant or unconscionable in comparison with the probable loss 
which might flow from any one of the breaches, the sum will be held to be a penalty. It 
should, however, be noted that the comparison, in such a case, should be made between 
the agreed sum and the losses which result from a breach causing the lowest loss (i. e. the 
less significant breach)' 13 and if the agreed sum was disproportionately larger than the 
lower end of losses resulting ftom different breaches, it would, primafade, be regarded 
as a penal sum. 114 
4.2.2. Presumption in favour of penalty 
2.37 In addition to the general rule, where failure to perform Merent obligations, upon 
breach of any one of them the agreed sum has been stipulated to be payable, occasions 
damages of varying importance, there will be a presumption to the effect that the parties 
have not stipulated for a genuine pre-estimate of likely loss. It was thought that the 
inevitable result of providing for a single large sum to be paid upon breach of any one of 
different obligations was that the agreed sum had to be held penal in nature. 115 This 
16 "dogmatic" rule of law' , 
however, was stated in a more fle)dble way in Dunlop 
III Dunlop Pneumatic TXv co Ltd. v. New Garage and Motor co Ltd. [ 1915) AC 79, per Lord Dunedin at 
p. 89, where he pointed out that in such a case, "the strength of the chain must be taken at its weakest 
link. " 
"" See Ariston SRL v. Charly Records Ltd. (1990) Independent, 13 April, where a single fixed sum of 
f" per day was made payable upon the wrongful detention of n=rftg items made available to the 
other party for the contractual purposes, regardless of the number of items detained. The anticipated loss 
resulting from detention of each item was different. Since the agreed sum was clearly disproportionate to 
the loss which may have been adkred by Charly as a result of Ariston's failure to return "only a few of 
the comparatively unimportant items", the clause was regarded as a "Penalty". 
I's Astley v. Wel&n (1801) 2 Bos. & Pul. 346,126 ER 1318; see also Sandeman v. Bedwell (1879) 2 
SCR (NS) (NSW) 145 
116 Ogus. The Law of Damages, 1973, p. 43 
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Pheumatic Tyre Co. Lid v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd 117 where Lord Dunedin 
observed: 
"There is a presumption (but no more) that it is penalty where a single 
lump sum is made payable by way of compensation, on the occurrence of 
one or more or all of several events, some of which may occasion serious 
and others but trifling damage. ""$ 
It accordingly, a single sum is stipulated to be paid in the event of breach of more than 
one obligation resulting in varying amount of losses, it will be a presumption'19, not rule 
of law, that the agreed sum is a penalty. 
4.2.3. Displacement of the presumption 
2.38 The effect of holding the principle to be a presumption is that it may be rebutted in 
certain circumstances. In other words, the promisee can show that owing to the special 
circumstances of the case, the agreed sum has been the genuine pre-estimate of the likely 
loss. It is to be noted that the burden of proving that the agreed sum has not been a 
penalty fies upon the promisee who claims the sum to be a valid liquidated damages 
clause. Furthermore, a survey of cases shows that the courts are also willing to construe 
the contract in a way to enable them to hold the sum as liquidated damages. The 
circumstances in which the presumption could be rebutted seem to relate to the nature of 
losses, the conduct of the parties in making the contract, and the attitude of the courts 
towards such clauses. These three issues should in turn be dealt with here. 
4.13. L 77se nature of lossesfloWngfrom afferent breaches: uncertain damages 
2.39 In some cases, although a single sum is provided to be paid upon breach of any one 
of different obligations of varying importance, the nature of losses flowing from the non. 
compliance with any one of these obligations, having regard to the special circumstances 
of cases, is so uncertain that reasonably makes any pre-assessment impossible or difficult. 
"7 [1915] AC 79; sw also Lamson &ore Service Co. v. Weidenbach and Co's Trustees (1904) 7 WALR 
166 
"'ibid., at 87, we also Lord Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron and Coal Co. (1886) 11 App. Cas. 332, at p. 
324 per Lord Watson; Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v.. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y 
Castaneda [1905] AC 6, at p. 15 per Lord Davey; FordMotor co (&gland) Ltd v. Armshwng (1915) 31 
ILR 267; Lock v. Bell 1193 1] 1 Ch 35, at pp. 45-46 
119 See also the speech of Lord Parker of Wacidington in Dunlop Pneumatic 7), re co Ltd v. New Garage 
andmotor co Ltd [1915] AC 79, at pp. 98-99 
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In such a case, the agreed damages, provided to be a reasonable one, would be held to be 
liquidated damages. This principle has well been stated in the judgment of Lord Atkinson 
in Dunlop Pýwunuzfic Tyre Co. Ltd v. New Garage andMolor Co. Ltd'20: 
"... although it may be true... that a presumption is raised in favour of a 
penalty ..., 
it seems to me that that presumption is rebutted by the very 
fact that the damage caused by each and every one of those events, 
however varying in importance, may be of such an uncertain nature that it 
can not be accurately ascertained. " 
t12 Furthermore, as Lord Mersey pointed out in Webster v. Bosanque 1, "the very 
uncertainty of the loss likely to arise made it most reasonable for the parties to agree 
beforehand as to what the damages should be" 122 ; therefore, having regard to this and the 
difficulties and expenses of proving the actual loss'23, if the courts do not uphold the 
speculation of the parties to agree beforehand upon payable sum in the event of breach, 
the most important utility of agreed damages may be evaded. It is perhaps for this reason 
that the speculation of the parties to provide for a reasonable sum to be payable in the 
event of a breach which results in an uncertain loss was referred to as "a perfectly sensible 
approach" in Philips Hong Kong Ltd v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong'24. 
4.23-2. Conduct of the Parties in Making Contract 
2.40 The parties to a contract, stipulating for an agreed sum to be payable in the event of 
any one of different breaches of varying importance, may use various methods so that the 
presumption could be displaced. These methods seem to merit mention: 
4.2.3.2.1. Averaging out probable losses flowing from different breaches 
120 Md., at pp. 95-96; see also Gahworthy v. S&Wt (1848) 1 Ex. 659,154 ER 280, where Parke B. Said: 
"Now it is perfectly competent to parties to make a stipulation to pay a fixed sam for the breach of a 
covenant, the damage arising from which it is extremely difficult to ascertain; and I think that it is not an 
Unreasonable stipulation which the defendant has made, that he should pay L1,000 upon the event of 
either of the matters mentioned in this agreement. " at pp. 663-664,282 respectively; see also per 
Alderson B. at pp. 666-667,283 respectively 
121 [1912] AC 394 
122 Ibid., p. 398; See also Kembk v. Farren (1829) 6 Bingham 141,130 ER 1234, pre Tindal C. J. at p. 
148 
123 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co Ltd, v Don Jose Ramos [19051 AC 6, per Lord 
HaWury L. C. at p. 11 
124 (1993) 61 B-L-K 41, at p. 60 
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2.41 The parties may wish to agree upon the average amount of likely losses which 
might arise from any one of different breaches, as agreed damages to be paid upon 
breach. The clause providing for such an agreement, provided that there is no great 
difference between the largest and the smallest probable loss, might be regarded as a valid 
liquidated damages clause. The illustration of this principle, was given by Lord Parker of 
Waddington in Dunlop Neumatic 7ýre Co. Lid v. New Garage and Motor Co. Lid 123 
where he stated: 
"Supposing it were recited in the agreement that the parties had estimated 
the probable damage from a breach of one stipulation at from 15 to f 15, 
and the probable damage from a breach of another stipulation at from 12 
to 112, and had agreed on a sum of 18 as a reasonable sum to be paid on 
the breach of either stipulation, I cannot think that the Court would refuse 
to give effect to the bargain between the parties. " 126 
The illustration of Lord Parker implicitly identifies the circumstances in which averaging 
out might be regarded as an effective method to displace the presumption: first, the likely 
loss flowing from any one of breaches should not accurately and reasonably be capable of 
being calculated at the time of contracting; and secondly, there should not be a great 
disparity between different losses which flow from the breaches. 27 In Ariston SRL v. 
Charly Records Ld2z, for example, it was argued that the losses resulting from the 
detention of each item would vary, and "it was" therefore "exceptionally difficult to make 
a genuine pre-estimate of the damages", and the only way to agree upon damages, at the 
time when the contract was made, "was to fix on a figure which would represent an 
average of the daily loss likely to be suffered". Beldam IJ129, however, preferred the 
conclusion of the judge at the first instance, and rejected this argument on the following 
two grounds: First, averaging out would constitute a reasonable pre-estimate where the 
sum payable for the breach or breaches for which it was provided could be regarded as 
6(proportionate to the extent of those breaches". Thus he was prepared to accept the 
agreed sum as a valid stipulation if it had been made payable "should the respondents fail 
115 [ 1915] AC 79 
126 Ibid., at p. 99 
127 See Ops, The Law of Damages, 1973, p. 44 
128 (1990) Independent, 13 April, Crhe uanscript of the case is als() available tllrough Lods). For the 
facts of the case see note 114 
129 With whom Leggatt and Mustill LJJ agreed. 
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to return all or a substandal part of the production parts provided by the appellanti". 130 
Second, the difficulty of making a pre-estimate for each loss resulting from probable 
breaches was not clear: In the learned Lord Justice's view "[i]t would have not been 
difficult to have made the daffy sum proportionate to what was detained, or per title for 
each day on which such tide could not be manufactured for sale by reason of retention of 
one or more items". 
It could thus be concluded that, where the accurate loss flowing from any one of breaches 
is identifiable, and also where the loss resulting from a breach is for example 12-LIO and 
from another 180-1100, agreeing on an average amount as an stipulated damages would 
not be effective to displace the presumption. "' 
4.2.3.2.2. Delimitating the field of agreed damages 
2.42 The parties might determine carefully the field in which the agreed damages clause 
would be applicable; therefore, although they might refer to the dfferent breaches of the 
contract and deal with them while agreeing upon the terms of the contract, it could, from 
the construction of the whole agreement and circumstances in which the contract has 
been made, be understood that the agreed damages clause will operate in the event of a 
certain breach, or even certain aspects of a breach. In such a case, though it might, prima 
facie, be thought that a single sum has been made payable upon different breaches, 
nonetheless, with more attention, the presumption of being a penalty could be rebutted by 
the fitct that the agreed damages clause has been intended to operate in the event of a 
single breach. 132 In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Lid v. New Garage and Motor Co. 
Ltd "', for example, though, at first glance, it was thought that the agreed sum of 0 had 
been made payable upon breach of any one of many obligations of the defendant, Lord 
Atkinson, in holding the sum to be a valid liquidated damages, rested his judgment, inter 
afid, on the fact that, on the true construction of the contract, the clause had been 
130 Emphasis added 
131 The possibility of avem&g out damages of same kind but difficult to exact assessment was also 
pointed out by Scrutton L. J. in English Hop Growers v. Dering [192812 KB 174, at pp. 181-192. The 
case itself seems to deal, inter alia, with a single sum which has been stipulated to be payable in the 
event of a single breach. - 
" See the judgment of Lord HersclICH in Lord Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron and Coal Co. (1986) 11 App. Cas. 332, at p. 345 
133 [1915] AC 79 
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intended to operate in the event of a single breach, namely, to sell and endeavour to sell 
the goods for less than the fisted price. 134 
2.43 This was one of the points on which the Dunlop case 135 was distinguished from a 
similar case, namely Ford Motor Company (Engkmd) Ltd v. Armstrong 136 : In the latter 
case, the plaintiffs agreed to sell motor-cars to the defendant to be sold by him in a 
certain district. It was provided that the defendant should not sell the motor-cars below 
the listed price and the sum of 1250 was agreed to be payable in the event of breach. 
This sum was also made payable for other breaches varying in importance. The 
defendant sold five cars below the fixed price. The Court of Appeal held that, unlike the 
Co in Dunj NG 137, ntract Op V. ew arage the agreed sum here was intended to operate in the 
event of any one of different breaches of varying importance, and therefore, it cannot be 
regarded as a genuine pre-estimate of likely loss. 
4.2.3. Z3. Pmviding for Different Agreed Damages 
2.44 The parties might stipulate for different sums of money to be payable in the event of 
138 different breaches . In other words, they may assess in advance the likely losses flowing 
from non-performance of any one of many obligations, and provide for specified sums to 
be paid in the event of specific breaches. In such a case, every agreed sum is regarded as 
a single sum which has been made payable on a single breach. In Philips Hong Kong Ltd 
Ge I of H v. Yhe Attorney nera Ong K gJ39, on two different liquidated damages had been 
agreed to be payable in the event of two breaches: first, failure to meet the key dates on 
which the work had to be taken over by other contractors, and secondly, failure to 
complete the work within the contractual time limits. The possibility of such a provision 
was recognised by the Privy Council and the appellant's argument that this might result in 
134 Ibid., pp. 92-93 
135 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [ 1915] AC 79 
136 (1915) 31 TLR 267 
137 [1915) AC 79 
138 McGrCgOr on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 462 
1" (1993) 61 B. L. IL 41 
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double compensation was rejected. " 
423. Z4. Graduated Damages 
1. General points 
2.45 A contractual obligation upon breach of which an agreed sum has been made 
payable, might have such a nature that it could be broken more than once or in more than 
one way. For example, delay in performance, especially in building contracts and 
charterparties, is a breach that occurs continuously from the time that completion has 
fallen due. Another example is a breach which can happen by doing a specific act or 
omission: whenever the act or omission happens, the contractual obligation is broken. 
The contractual undertakings in Ford v. Armstrong"' and Dunlop v. New Garage'42 are 
clear examples of this kind of obligations: In both cases, the defendants had, inter afia, 
undertaken not to sell the items below the fixed price. Every time an item were 
undersold, a breach would occur. Also, in Diestal v. Slevenson'43, in a contract for the 
sale of coal, it was provided that a shilling for every ton should be paid if the contractual 
obligation of the seller to deliver the goods, or of the buyer to accept them were not duly 
performed. Similarly, in this case failure to deliver by the seller or accept by the buyer 
happens for every unperformed part of the agreement. 
2.46 Obligations with this nature are similar to different obligations in the fact that the 
failure to perform both of them results in different breaches. Therefore, if a single sum is 
agreed to be paid upon breach of obligations which can be broken more than once or in 
more than one way, there may arise a presumption that the parties' agreement cannot be a 
genuine pre-estimate of actual damages. This is for the simple reason that such a 
provision will operate in the event of breaches of varying importance. Thus, in a 
construction contract, if a fixed sum is made payable for delay in completion, it is likely to 
be struck down as being a penalty. 
140 jbid, p. 62 
141 (1915) 31 TLR 267 
142 [1915] AC 79 
143 [190612 KB 345 
91 
U. Agreed damages subject to fluctuation 
2.47 To avoid this problem and to displace the presumption, the parties to a contract 
may agree on a system of agreed damages which is graduated in proportion to the extent 
of the breach; for example in case of delay in performance, it might be stipulated that a 
specified sum of money should be paid for every week of delay. '44 
The stipulation for graduated sum is very common in building contracts for delay in 
completion and in charterparties for delay by the charterer in loading or unloading the 
ship"', and if the amount of the agreed sum and its fluctuation is in proportion to the 
losses resulting from breach, it is very likely to be upheld as a genuine pre-estimate of 
probable loss. In Philips Hong Kong Lid v. 7he A tiorney General of Hong Kong'46, the 
construction contract between the parties had provided for a graduated sum , to be 
calculated in a specific formula, in the event of delay. This clause was upheld by the 
Privy Council as a genuine attempt to assess the likely loss. 
iii. The necessity of fluctuation in a right direction 
2.48 The graduated sum must fluctuate in the right direction; i. e. it must increase, if the 
amount of loss resulting from breach is subject to increase and vice versa. Thus, 
depreciation clauses in hire-purchase contracts which provide for an agreed sum as 
compensation for depreciation of the subject-matter, to be paid upon breach, have 
normally been held to be penal in nature. That is because the agreed sum in such 
provisions, together with the payments already made or those which are due, normally 
amount to a certain proportion of the hire-purchase price. Though during the time 
depreciation of the subject- matter, and consequently the losses caused by the breach as a 
result, increases, nonetheless the amount which becomes payable, under the provision, 
decreases. This, in fact, using the language of Lord Radcliffe in Bridge v. Cwnpbefl 
Discount Co. Ltd '47, "is a sliding scale of compensation, but a scale that slides in the 
wrong direction. " 
144 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v. Don Jose Ramos [1905] AC 6; Law v. Redditch 
Local Board [1829] 1 QB 127; Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd. v. Widnes Foun&y (1925), Ltd [1933] 
AC 20 
143 Demurrage clause 
146 (1993) 61 B. L. I; L 41 
147 11962] AC 600, at 623 
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4.13.3. Aftitude of the courts 
2.49 So far as the obligations which can be broken more than once and in more than one 
way are concerned, the courts tend to interpret such undertakings as a single obligation; 
in other words, they mainly look at the objective of the parties and avoid the literal 
construction of such stipulations which might result in holding the single sum made 
payable upon breach of these undertakings as prima facie a penalty. In construction 
contracts, for v=ple, delay in completion upon which an agreed sum is normally 
stipulated to be payable, could result from different ways; but the courts almost always 
have treated delay as a single breach. In Law v. Red*Ich Local Board" Kay L. J., 
holding the agreed sum which had been stipulated to be paid upon non-completion of a 
construction contract as being a valid liquidated damages, stated: 
"I cannot agree with the ingenious argument that because there may be 
many matters, some very small, which would constitute non-completion, 
these sums may be regarded as payable on several events. According to 
that argument, there must be considered to be several different non- 
completion of the works. There may be different causes of non- 
completion; but non-completion is only one single event. " 149 
In Philips Hong Kong Co. v. Yhe A tiorney General of Hong Kong'", the argument of the 
appellant, that delay might be caused by a number of different events and so the agreed 
sum has been made payable on the occurrence of different breaches and is primafacie a 
penalty, was rejected by the Privy Council. Lord Woolf, citing the judgment of Kay U. 
in Law v. Red&tch Local Board5l, said: "In this case the only event giving rise to the 
liability to pay liquidated damages is delay. Although delay may be caused by any number 
of different circumstances, this is not a case of different causes of loss being compensated 
by the same figure of liquidated damages. " 152 
141 [189211 QB 127 
149 Ibid, P. 136 
'-' (1993) 61 B. L. IL 49 
13' [1892] 1 QB 127, at p. 136 
152 Philips Hong Kong Ltd v. 77se Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 B. L. IL 49, at p. 62; See 
also Diestal v. Stevenson [1906] 2 KB 345 in which despite the parties had provided for a certain sum to 
be paid in the event of "non-execution of the contract", the court construed the clause as providing for the 
sum to be payable on only "one kind of breack namely the non-delivery of the coal [the su*ct-malterj 
by the seller or the non-acceptance by the buyer". p. 350 
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2.50 This has also well been illustrated in cases of covenants in restraint of trade. These 
covenants are of a nature that can normally be broken more than once and in more than 
one way; for example an obligadon not to do business within a certain area or "not to 
solicit the customers of a firm" 153 can be broken in a number of different ways. The 
courts, however, generally treat the sum payable in the event of breach of such 
stipulations as an agreed damages clause covenanted to be payable upon breach of a 
single obligation. "4 
S. Australian Law 
5.1. Rules for Distinction 
2.51 The rules stated by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v. New 
Garage and Motor Co. Ltd 155 have been applied by the Australian courts to distinguish 
penalties from liquidated damages. In Australia, as in some English courts1m, to 
determine the nature of an agreed damages clause, it was sufficient to show that it was 
not a genuine pro-eýtimate of damages and the "extravagance" and "unconscionability" 
concepts, which has been set out by Lord Dunedin, were sometimes overlooked'37. Put it 
another way, to establish the penal nature of an agreed damages clause, there was no 
need to show that the sum agreed upon was extravagant or unconscionable in comparison 
with the greatest loss which might be conceived to flow from the breach at the time when 
153 The example has been taken from the speech of Lord Parker in Dunlop Pneumatic Twe Co Ltd v. 
New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [ 1915] AC 79, at p. 98 
154 See, for example, Crisdee v. Bolton (1827) 3 Car. & P. 240,172 ER 403 at pp. 243,405 respective1r, 
price V. Green (1847) 16 K&W. 346,153 ER 1222 per Patteson J. at pp. 354,1225 respectively ("Here 
... there is but one thing to which the L5000 relates, viz. the restriction of trade though extended to two different districts; and it is plain that the parties intended, that if the restriction was violated in either 
district, the sum should be paid, and not that inquuy should be made as to the actual damage and loss 
sustained. "); Sainter v. Ferguson (1849) 7 C. B. 716,137 ER 283 per Wilde C. J. at pp. 727,289 
respectiv*, Reynolds v. Bridge (1836) 6 El. & Bl. 528,119 ER 961 at pp. 541-542,966-967 
respectivelY 
[1915] AC 79 
See supra., pam 2.26 
157 See in general: Greig & Davis, The Law of Contract, 1978, pp. 1448-1449 (with the Fourth 
cumulative Supplement, 1992); Starke, J. G., Seddon, N. C., Ellinghaus, M. P., Cheshire & F(foot's Law 
of Contract, Fifth Australian Edition, paras. 2420-2421; Lindgren K. E., Carter J. W., Harland D. L, 
Contrad Law in Australia, paras. 2207 et seq.; Kercher, B. & Noone, M., Remedies, 2nd ad., pp. 240 et 
seq. 
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the contract was entered into. Instead, it was enough merely to prove that the agreed 
amount was in excess of the likely actual loss. This was stated by Mason J in Forestry 
Commission of New South Wales v. Sfefanetto"' and has been emphasized in Malouf 
(W. T) Pty Ltd v. Brinds Lid'59. In the latter case, the majority of the New South Wales 
court of Appeal held the agreed sum to be penal merely because it was greater than the 
greatest loss which might be proved to have resulted from breach at the time of making 
the contract. 
2.52 This was the case until the recent decision of the High Court of Australia in AA&V- 
UDC Finance Lid v. Austin 160. In this case, Mason and Wilson JJ, admirably reviewing 
the law on penalties, illustrated the diversion of the courts, both in England and Australia, 
from the principal tests of "extravagance" and "unconscionability", by considering cases 
where the penal nature of an agreed damages clause had merely been determined on the 
ground that the agreed sum was in excess of the greatest probable loss which might be 
conceived to flow from breach. They, then, stated: 
"... However, there is much to be said for the view that the courts should 
return to the Clydebank and Dunlop concept, thereby allowing parties to a 
contract greater latitude in determining what their rights and liabilities will 
be, so that an agreed sum is only characterized as a penalty if it is out of 
all proportions to damage likely to be suffered as a result of breach. "61 
The learned judges- considering the advantages of giving greater latitude to parties in 
terms of agreed compensation, such as "greater certainty by allowing the parties to 
determine more precisely their rights and liabilities", "providing for compensation in 
situations where loss may be difficult or impossible to quantify or if quantifiable may not 
be recoverable at common law" and "avoiding costly and time consuming litigation" as to 
determining the amount of actual damages, and emphasising the "supervisory jurisdiction" 
of equity and the common law to relieve against provisions which are penal in nature 
rather than compensatory- proposed a test as to determining the extravagance and 
unconscionability of an agreed damages clause: 
"The test to be applied in drawing that distinction is one of degree and wiH 
(1976) 133 CLR 307, at p. 519 
(1981) 52 FL. IL 442 
(1986) 162 CLR 170 
161 Ibid., at P. 190 
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depend on a number of circumstances, including (1) the degree of 
disproportion between the stipulated sum and the loss likely to be suffered 
by the plainfifý a factor relevant to the oppressiveness of the term to the 
defendant, and (2) the nature of the relationship between the contracting 
parties, a factor relevant to the unconscionability of the plaintiffs conduct 
in seeking to enforce the term. Ae courts should not, however, be too 
ready to find the requisite degree of disproportion lest they impinge on 
the parties' freedom to settle for themselves the rights and liabilities 
following a breach of ContraCt. "162 
2.53 The dicta of Mason & Wilson JJ in drawing a distinction between penalties and 
liquidated damages was applied in Rwvda Finance Corporation L&L v. Plewnig'63 . in 
this cue a term in a hire-purchase agreement made the hirer liable to pay an amount equal 
to the total rent and all other moneys payable for the full period of hire less deposit, 
rentals already paid, the wholesale value of the goods and a rebate of terms charges, in 
case he made a default in the punctual payment of any instalment. The breach also 
entitled the owner to terminate the contract and retake possession of the goods. It was 
held that such a stipulated damage clause did not amount to a penalty. The members of 
the Ifigh Court of Australia confirming the dicta in AAIEV-UDC Finance Co. Lid v 
Ausfin'"rejected the argument of the defendant that there might be some circumstances 
in which the owner might be able to recover a greater sum than his actual loss. It was, 
thus, emphasized that the mere possibility of an excess is not enough to render the agreed 
damages clause unenforceable as a penalty. 
The position in Australia, therefore, seems to be slightly Merent from England. In 
Australia, the courts have rightly returned to the tests drawn by Lord Halsbury in 
Clydebank and Lord Dunedin in Dunlop: They regard the agreed sum as of penal nature 
only where it is "out of all proportions"165 to the likely loss which might be conceived to 
result from breach at the time when the contract was made. In doing so, they not only 
look at any great disparity between the agreed damages and the likely actual loss which 
11 Ibid, pp. 193-194 [emphasis added) 
10 (19WI989) 166 CLA 131 
164 (1986) 162 CLR 170 
165 See also the application of this tea in MultiPlex Constructions Pty Ltd. v. Abgarus Pty Ltd. [1992] 1 
APCLR I 
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could conceivably be proved to result from breach at the time when the contract is made, 
but do also consider the terms of the agreement and the whole circumstances surrounding 
it, to see whether the enforcement of the agreed darnages clause is unconscionable. 
2.54 it seems that the treatment of Australian courts is much more consistent with the 
very reason for the intervention of courts to relieve against penalties which was the basis 
for the true tests drawn by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Lid v. New 
Garage and Motor Co. Ltd". Relieving a party to a contract against harshness and 
oppression of the agreed damages clause which has been designed to intimidate him to 
perform his contractual obligation and punish him in the event of default, as something 
unfair and inequitable", was the origin of the jurisdiction of courts to intervene in the 
parties' bargain and to declare the clause unenforceable as being penal. As this 
jurisdiction is a blatant interference with the principle of freedom of contract, it should be 
limited to cases where the unfairness is clear. This is so where the agreed sum is 
extravagantly large in comparison with the anticipated actual harm. Thus, where there is 
no oppression and unconscionability by providing for an "extravagant" sum to be paid by 
the defaulting party in the event of breach, there should be no place for the application of 
the jurisdiction. 168 
5.2. The Place of the Pailles' Intention In Determining the Nature of the 
clause 
2.55 In Austr" to determine the intention of the parties, in order to decide upon the 
nature of an agreed damages clause, an objective test is employed; i. e. like English law, 
having regard to the whole terms of the contract and inherent circumstances surrounding 
it, the reasonable intention of the parties, namely what reasonably could have been agreed 
upon as the likely actual damages resulting from breach, should be discovered. The 
166 119151 AC 79 
161 And in some cases, as an indicative of a Procedural defect in the bargaining process: see suma., paras. 
1.50,1.70 
'" This view has also been accepted in the Canadian case of EWey v J. G. Collins Insurance Agencies 
Ltd (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 1, at p. 15, where Dickson J delivering the judg=ent of the Suprme Court of 
Canada stated: Olt is now evident that the power to strike down a penalty clause is a blatant interference 
with fivedom of contract and is designed for the sole purpose of providing relief against oppression for 
the Party having to PAY the stipulated sum. It has no Place where there is no oppression. 0 
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statement of Samuels I A. in Malouf (W. T) Pty Lid v. Brinds Ltd 169 Confirms this view: 
"... a genuine pre-estimate means a pre-estimate which is objectively of 
that character, that is to say a figure which may properly be so called in 
the light of the contract and the inherent circumstances ... 
it will not be 
enough that the partie3 honestly believed it to be so. " 
This has also been confirmed in other cases"' where the (subjective) intention of the 
parties has not been regarded as sufficiently indicating the nature of the clause: the task of 
the courts, it has been stated, is to look at the substance of the transaction and to find out 
whether the clause can reasonably reflect a genuine pre-estimate of damages. In this 
respect, the speech of Deane J in O'Dea v. A 11states Leasing System (W. A) Ply Lid 171 
merits mention: 
M... whether or not a provision of a contract imposes a penalty must be 
determined by reference to the true operation of that provision. That 
question must however be determined as a question of substance which 
cannot be foreclosed by statements of the parties in their agreement, no 
matter how genuine they may be, as to their intention in stipulating the 
sum. The parties to an agreement may have subjectively intended to make 
a pre-estimate of damages in the event of breach. If, however, that pre- 
estimate is either extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison 
with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed 
from the breach or, judged as at the time of making the contract, is 
unreasonable in the burden which it imposes in the circumstances which 
have arisen, it is a penalty regardless of the intention of the parties in 
making it. " 
it might, therefore, be concluded that the subjective intention of the parties in agreeing 
upon the nature of the clause is of little importance, and even showing that the parties 
honestly and with all attempts have intended the sum to be a pre-estimate of the likely 
loss would not conclude the matter. Having regard to the terms of the contract and the 
whole circumstances of the case at the time when the contract was made, what 
reasonably could have been agreed upon would, however, seem to be determinative. 
169 (1981) 52 ELK 442 
170.4bMV UDC Finance Ltd v. Artes Studio- 7710r0ugh breds Pty Ltd. (1999) 15 NSWLR 564 , O'Dea v. Allstates Leasing System (WA. ) Ply. Ltd. (1983) 57 A. L. J. I; L 172 ; Multiplex Constructions Ply Ltd v. 
A bgarus, pty Ltd [ 199211 APCLR 1 
171 (1983) 57 A. L. J. R. 172, at p. 189 
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2.56 It might be thought'72 that, by accepting an objective test in assessing the intention 
of the parties and placing little importance on their subjective intention, any negotiations 
and discussions between the parties resulting in the agreed damages clause and the 
genesis of that should be disregarded. This may be because such issues could prove the 
true intention of the parties and what they have honestly intended, which has no place in 
determining the nature of the clause. Such a view is, however, erroneous, and was 
clearly rejected by the High Court of New South Wales in Multiplex Constructions Ltd v. 
Abgw-us Dd73: To discover the reasonable intention of the parties at the time of making 
the contract, the whole circumsimces of the case should be examined. Negotiations 
relating to the clause is obviously one of these circumstances which should be borne in 
mind. It should, in other words, be determined that in the special circumstances created 
by the parties' negotiations and the terms agreed by them, what could reasonably have 
been agreed upon as agreed damages. 
2.57 The question which may arise here is which circumstances, other than the 
negotiations relating to the clause, are relevant to be examined to find out what 
reasonably could have been agreed upon as liquidated damages. The authorities refer to 
the "inherent circumstances of each particular contract" at the time when the parties enter 
into it. 74 It could simply be said that all issues which could be of any weight in 
determining objectively the reasonable intention of the parties should not be disreWded: 
Among them, "the relationship between parties""', "the genesis of', "understanding of", 
and "advice received regarding the clause" could be material'" and the courts should 
consider all these points in deciding the nature of the clause. 
172 AS Contended by the plaintiff in MUltipleX ConStrUCtionS pty Ltd. v. Agana Pty Ltd. [1"2] 1 
APCLR 1, at p. 7 
173 [1992] 1 ApCLR 1, at p. 14 
174 EWMIop pneUMatiC 7* CO Ltd v. New Garage and Motor co Ltd. [ 19 151 AC 79, at pp. 96-97 per 
L4Drd Dunedin; malouf (W. T) Pty Ltd v. Brinds Ltd (1981) 52 F. L. R. 442, at p. 462 
175 Sm also Infra., pam 2.58 
176 MUllipleXConstructions Pty Ltd. v. A hgarus ply Ltd. [ 199211 APCLR I 
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&3. Inequality of Bargaining Power 
2.58 As stated above'77, the test to distinguish liquidated damages from penalties in 
Australia is a little different from what is applied in England. A return to "extravagance" 
and "unconscionability" concepts was started in Australia by the decision of the 11igh 
Court in AAEV-UDC Finance Lid V. '4USjjn178 and has been applied in the latter cases. 
The test proposed by Mason and Wilson JJ in that case to draw a distinction between 
penalties and liquidated damages takes into account the relationship between the parties 
as a relevant factor to decide about the unconscionability of the agreed damages clause: 
"The test to be applied in drawing that distinction is one of degree and will 
depend on a number of circumstances, including ... (2) the nature of 
relationship between the contracting parties, a factor relevant to the 
unconscionability of the plaintiffs conduct in seeking to enforce the term 179 
The relevance of the bargaining position of the parties seems to be implicit in this passage 
as one of the important features of "the relationship between the parties". Accordingly, in 
the case of inequality of the bargaining power of the parties, "quite apart from whether 
the [agreed damages] clause fails because it lacks a compensatory character, it may also 
fail as being penalty imposed in circumstances rendering enforcement of the clause 
unconscionable. "130 
177 
supra, pm. 2.53 
178 (1986) 162 MR 170 
179 Jbid, at p. 193 
180 Multiplex Constrwaions Pty Ltd v. Abgarus Pty Ltd. [ 1992] 1 APCLR 1, at p. 13 
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Chapter 3 
The Relationship between Penalties and Similar 
Contractual Provisions 
Introductory Remarks 
3.01 The concept of a "penalty clause is normally associated with an stipulation for the 
payment of an extravagantly large sum of money upon breach. A number of other 
contractual provisions, however, may also resemble to penalties in their fimction. A 
clause providing for the forfeiture of moneys already paid by the promisor, or of 
proprietary or possessory interests held by him is a clear ecample of such provisions with 
which the second part of this thesis is concerned. 1 Also stipulations for the payment of a 
certain sum of money upon the occurrence of events other than breach may sometimes 
act as a penalty, though the doctrine has no application to such provisions. 2 Related to 
this ocample is a clause providing for a bonus payment in case of early completion: 
instead of providing for IX to be paid upon failure by the promisor to meet a certain 
target date, the parties might agree on a lesser contractual price, and for a bonus payment 
if the promisor could meet the target date. 3 
3.02 Them are two provisions which give rise to a considerable debate and controversy 
in this regard: Fhvt an agreed damage clause, in certain circumstances, may act as 
liniting the liability of the promisor. Since limitation clauses are subject to some 
restrictive provisions, it should be seen whether these provisions can have any application 
to such agreed damage clauses. Further, the effect of a penalty clause which, in effect, 
limits the promisor's liability should be determined: is it simply a void penal stipulation 
which has no effect in limiting the promisor's liability, or can it, at least in certain 
situations, be considered as an effective restrictive stipulation? Second, clauses which 
I Sm infi-a., pp. 256 et seq. 
2 See infi-a., chapW 4 
3 such a clause is also w apparently subject to ft penalty doctrim. TM use of these provisions, ilmftd 
of agreed danup clausM has been recommended in building contracts: see Rq*rt of the Counitta an 
Placing and hUnagament of Contracts for Building and Civil EnguwxnnS work 
9.22 , 
HhM, 1964. pam, 
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acoelerate the unaccrued liability of the promisor upon breach are usually found in credit 
agreements, and may sometimes act as a penalty. The extent to which these provisions 
can be subject to the penalty doctrine is, especially in lease agreements, controversial: it 
is, on the one hand, awed that such provisions do not increase the liability of the 
defitulting party, and thus they should not be subject to the penalty doctrine. On the 
other hand, the difference in value between the early payment and the payment by 
instalments leads some commentators to suggest that acceleration clauses, like agreed 
damages, should be scrutinized to see if they are penal in nature. 
This chapter will therefore seek to wamfine in detail these two contractual provisions, in 
order to illuminate the possible interrelationships between stipulated damage clauses and 
limitation clauses (sec. 1), and penalties and acceleration clauses (sec. 2). 
1. Relationship between an "Agreed Damage Clause" and a 
"Limitation Clause"' 
1.1. Introductfon 
3.03 A contractual clause which excludes or restricts the liability of the defaulting party 
for losses resulting from breach of a contractual obligation is called an "exemption 
clause". These clauses, like agreed damages clause, are commonly found in commercial 
contracts and are subject to judicial and legislative control. The Unfair Contract Tam 
Act 19774 includes the most important features of this control and has imposed some 
restrictions on the validity of exemption clauses. ' Since there are some similarities 
between these clauses and agreed damages clauses, and in some cases the latter may 
function as limiting the amount of the liability of the party who is in breach, it is, 
therefore, necessary to distinguish these two clauses and to discuss the possible 
applicability of the restrictive provisions concerning exemption clauses to agreed damages 
clauses. 
4 And in conmw= contexý the Unhir Tb= in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/3159) 
implementing the EC Directive on Unfair Tam in Conamer Contracts: 93/13/EEC 
5 See Lawson R., Exclusion Clauses, 4th ed., 1995, pp. 44-45; Yates D., Exclusion Clauses in Conbacts, 
2nd e&, 1982, chaP- I 
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I. Z Distinguishing Agreed Damages Clause from an Exemption Clauso 
3.04 Unlike, the agreed damages clause which is normally a fixed amount provided to be 
paid by the defindting party to the other, an exemption clause fixes a maximum limit to 
the amount of damages which the aggrieved party is entitled to receive if he can prove his 
loss resulting from breach. 6 IC therefore, a contract contains a valid exemption clause, 
the maximum amount of recovery for the proved damages will be restricted to the sum 
had down by the clause. However, where there is a valid agreed damages clause, the 
aggrieved party will be entitled to receive that amount for his loss without any need to 
prove it. 
3.05 Where the amount of agreed damages turns out to be less than the actual loss 
suffered by the innocent party (as the result of breach), the agreed damages clause win, in 
effect, function as an exemption clausie which, though not fixing a limit to the maximum 
recoverable loss, fixes an exact amount which is intended to be recoverable as the loss 
resulting from breach. The effect of such an agreed damages clause will depend on 
whether the parties, on agreeing upon future damages, have covenanted for liquidated 
damages or a penalty. Each of these situations should, and will, be given separate 
consideration. ' 
3.06 As it was discussed before, the distinction between liquidated damages and 
penalties depends on whether there is a gross disproportion between the agreed sum and 
the likely actual loss which could conceivably be wqxcted to flow from breach at the time 
when the contract was entered into. Normally when the agreed sum is disproportionately 
large in comparison with the likely actual loss, the courts have held the sum to be a 
penalty and unenforceable. However, the situation where there was a great disparity 
between a small agreed sum and the likely actual loss seemed not to be clear. It was 
6 Yates D., Exdusion dam in CODUW% 2nd ad., p. 38; TiUotson L, OmUld JAw in Paqmcft 2nd 
a&, p. 226 
7 Diestal v. Sevenm [190612 KB 345 ; Skijw Atlandque Societe Damement Marlilmo &A. v. XV 
Rotterdamsdie "en Conowk 119671 AC 361 ; Cellulose Acetate MR Co. Ltd Y. 07how Foun&y 
(1925), Ltd [1933] AC 20 
8 See Infra., parm 3.10 et seq. 
See supra., paw. 2.25-2.27 
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suggested that such a small sum could not be a genuine pre-estimate of future damages 
resulting from breach and although "it cannot realistically be called a penalty in the 
conventional sense of an octravagant and unconscionable sum fixed in terrorem", it might 
be said that "a sum substantially smaller than the probable loss could be a penalty in 
relation not to the party paying but to the party to be paid the sum: he has agreed to 
accept as compensation for breach a completely inadequate amount, which is thus fixed in 
terrorern of him and penalises him. "10 This view wa3 rejected by the House of Lords in 
the Suism Atkoffique case" where Lord Upjohn refused to accept the argument that the 
agreed damages were too small to be regarded as a pre-estimate of future losses, and thus 
should be of a penal nature. His lordship argued: 
"It is quite clear on the authorities that the parties need not agree on a true 
estimate of damage. They are perfectly entitled to agree on a low rate. "12 
Therefore, the agreement of the parties on a lower rate than the likely actual loss, though 
it might limit the liability of the defaulting party, could not be regarded as a penalty 
merely because it is too small to be a genuine pre-estimate of damages which could flow 
from breach. 
3.07 It has been suggested that the law on penalties does not apply to a situation in 
which the parties have agreed upon damages on a lower rate than the anticipated actual 
loss, with the object of limiting dw recoverabk amount: such a clause "is to be classed as 
a form of exception clause, and its validity is therefore dependent on the law governing 
such contractual terms". " According to this view, if parties covenant for a sum smaller 
than the likely actual loss to be paid upon breach, the contractual provision will lose its 
10 Wrimpr on DamaM 15th ed., 1988, para. 498 
II Sulm A dandque Societe D'annement Maritimes &A. v. N. V Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrule [ 1967] 
AC 361; See also Robophone Facilities, Ltd v. Blank [196613 All ER 129, at p. 137 where Hannan L. J. 
in considering a situation in which the actual damage amounted to more than the agreed damages, stated: 
in such a can *no question of penalty arose, for it is only when the agreed damage is disproportionately 
more than the actual damage suffered on any breach that the queWon of penalty anses 0, Celfulaw 
Acetate SlIk Co. Ltd v. WlaWes Fount*y (1925), Ltd [19331 AC 20 ; Francis Fuel Ltd v. Taggart [19761 
72 DLR 3rd, 22 at p. 28 
12 1bg at p. 42 1; Sao dw Chandris v. Isbrandben Moller Co. Inc. [ 195 1] 1 KB 240, in which Devlin J. 
at p. 249 stated that- "a demurrage clause is merely a clause providing foe liquidated damages for a 
certain type of bvewL.. - Even though its amount is less than actual loss, it is not diffaft in its nature from an ordinary liquidated damages da ." 
13 Ogo AL Ilic IAW of DamagM 1973, ]; L 31 
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nature as an agreed damages clause, and is to be classified as an exception clause. Thus, 
the phantiff will have to prove his actual loss, and the exception clause will debar him 
from the recovery of more than the stipulated sum. 14 This view, 'with all respect, would 
seem to be doubtful and no support among authorities could be found for it. Conversely, 
though the authorities" reftise to regard such a clause as being a penalty merely because 
it is too low to be a genuine pre-estimate of likely actual damages, they do apply the law 
on penalties to such dauses6, and consider the agreed sum as being penal, inter alia, On 
what has sometimes been called "technical grounds""'. Put another way, where the 
agreed sum has been provided to be paid upon different breaches of varying importance, 
they might regard it as a penalty. 11 
3.08 The distinction between an agreed damages clause which is less than the actual loss 
and an exemption clause has well been drawn in the Suisse Atlanfique'9 case. in this 
case, a charterparty contract provided for the fixed periods of laytime for loading and 
discharging the vessel and also for the payment of a demurrage at a rate of $1000 US a 
day. On a consultative question put by the arbitrators as to whether the owners are 
entitled to recover any actual damage suffered by them by reason of the charterers having 
failed to load and discharge the vasel within the laytime, the House of Lords 
unanimously held that the demurrage clause is a valid liquidated damages and no loss 
more than this agreed sum could be recovered. Lord Upjohn in discussing whether the 
demurrage clause is a clause of exception or limitation, confined the exemption clauses to 
"clauses essentially inserted for the purpose only of protecting one contracting pany 
from the legal consequences of other express terms of the contract or from terms which 
14 Ibld 
15 sm supm, Dw II 
16 in Cellulose Acetate SM Co Ltd v. MIdnes FOun&Y (1925). Ltd [1933] AC 20, for emunpK the 
clause providing for an agreed damages which was clearly less than anticipated actual harm was 
regarded as "liquidated damagd". Even the Possibility of the clam being regarded as a penalty and its 
possible cffcd WBS raised, but the House found it unnecessary to decide on this point. see at pp. 25-26 
per Lord Addn with whom the other members of the House concurre& 
Treitel G. H., IU Law of Contract 9th ed., M, p. 902 
See hr example: Wall V. RederfalWobolaget Luggudr [1915] 3 KB 66 ; Watts, Watts and Co.. Ltd v. 
Afiuui and Co., Ltd [1917] AC 227 
19 SWIsse A ilantique Societe Damement Marifims V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [ 1967) AC 361 at 
pp. 420-421; See also Chwuftv. Isbrandben Mailer Co. Inc. [195111 KB 240, perDevUnJ. atp. 249 
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would otherwise be implied by law or from the terms of the contract regarded as a 
whole" and added: 
*An agreed damages clause is for the benefit of both; the party 
establishing breach by the other need prove no damage in fitct; the other 
must pay that, no less but no more. But where liability for damage is 
limited by a clause, then the person seeking to claim damages must prove 
them at least up to the limit laid down by the clause; the other party, 
whatever may be the damage in fact, can refuse to pay more if he can rely 
on the clause. "20 
Thus, where the agreed sum, in effect, limits the liability of the defaulting party to the 
fixed sum, if it was insetted for the benefit of both parties, then it would be necessary to 
be distinguished from a limitation clause which is normally stipulated for the purpose of 
protecting only the debtor. It should, however, be noted that it might be entirely a matter 
of chance which party will, in fact, be benefited by an agreed damages clause', for 
instance, in a building construction contract, the agreed damages for delay in completion 
might benefit the owner if in a case of due completion, he was not in fact able to have the 
building sold or let or use it properly as it had been intended before; and it could be to the 
advantage of the contractor if the owner loses more than the stipulated sum as a result of 
the delay. Where, however, in the rare case, the clause benefits only the promisor and 
there is no possibility or a remote possibility of assuming that the promisee can take 
advantage of that, it is likely that the clause will be construed as an agreed limitation. 
3.09 As a result of this distinction, where the clause is regarded as a limitation clause, it 
will be necessary for the promisee to establish his actual loss, though he is restricted to 
the limit set out by the clause. While if the clause is an agreed damages clause which is 
less than the actual loss and, in effect, limits the liability of the defaulting party, there will 
be no need for the actual loss to be proved and the innocent party will be entitled to 
recover the agreed sum even when there is in fact no loss sustained as a result of the 
20 ibid. p. 420-421 lemphasis added]; See 81SO the judgments of Viscount Dilhorne at P. 395 and Lord 
Reid at p. 407 where he stated: "Even if one assumes that the $1000 per day was inadequate and was 
known to both parties to be inadequate when the contract was made, I do not think that it can be said that 
giving to the dam its natural meatung could lead to an absurdity or could defeat the main otdact of the 
contract or could for any other reason in$* cuWng down its scope. * and parucularly Lord Wfterforce 
at pp. 435-436. 
21 Tmitek Remadiag fw Bvwch of CQnUTA (A Compamfive Acmunt). 1988, p. 234 
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1.3. The Effect of Agreed Damages Less than Actual Loss 
3.10 An agreed damage which is less than actual loss, though it could not be regarded as 
penal merely because it is too sMalP, might be considered as having a penal nature in one 
of the following situatione4: 
(i) Where the agreed sum has been made payable on the occurrence of different breaches 
of varying importance. the clause might be held to be penal under one of the practical 
rules laid down by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop v. New Garage4 regardless of the fitet that it 
is less than the actual loss which has in reality been resulted from breach. 26 
(H) If the agreed sum which was disproportionately large at the time of contracting turns 
out to be inadequate to cover the actual loss sustained due to a change in circumstances, 
then the agreed sum may be held to be of penal nature? 7. This is because the time for the 
application of any test to distinguish penalties from liquidated damages is the time when 
the contract was made, and any disparity between the agreed sum and the actual loss at 
the time of breach is of little importance. " 
3.11 The main issue is whether an agreed sum which is less than the actual low could 
effectively limit the liability of the defaulting party to the fixed amount or the promisft 
would be entitled to ignore the agreed sum and sue for his actual loss. The answer mainly 
depends on the construction of the clause to see whether the agreed sum is a penalty or 
fiquidated damages. 
22YAW D., ExrAusion Claus= in amtracts, 2nd ad., 1982, p. 39 
" See supra pam 3.06 
24 The question wbether such a Pend sum could limit the liability of the defaulting party, or the promisee 
can igam this pod suin and sue for his actual loss, will be discussed later, hou, paras. 3.15 et nq. 
25 Dunlop Pneumadc 47v COMPa"Y LAI V. New GOWe and Motor Co., Ltd. 119151 AC 79 at p. 97 
(see supra., paras. 2.36 et seq. ) 
26 See Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude [1915] 3 KB 66 ; Watts, Watts and Co., Ltd. v. Afitwi and 
co., Ltd [1917] AC 227 ; Burrows A, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contrac4 (2nd ad., 1994), p. 
327; Treitel G. H., The Law of Cagract, 9th ed., 1995, p. 902; Barton (1976) 92 LQFý p. 25 ; Hudson 
(1974) 90 LQR, p. 81 
27 Tratel GIL, The Law of Contract, 9th e&, 1995, p. 902 
21 See supra., para. 2.20 
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1.3.1. Where the agreed sum is a liquidated damages clause 
3.12 The agreed sum less than actual loss would normally be construed to be liquidated 
damages where it is not penal. Such a clause is obviously valid and enforceable, and will 
effectively limit the entitlement of the promisee to the stipulated sum. 29 In Cellulaw 
Acetate Silk Ca Ltd v. WIWI= Foun&y (1925), LIWý a contract for delivery and 
erection of an acetone recovery plant provided for the payment of a sum of f2O per week 
by way of penalty if the work were not completed in the contractual stipulated time. In 
fact, the completion was delayed for thirty weeks. In an action for the price by the 
contractor, the purchasers counterclaimed L5850 as the actual loss suffered as a result of 
delay. It was held by the House of Lords that the agreed sum was a valid and enforceable 
liquidated damages clause. It was thus the only sum which the purchasers were entitled 
to recover as damages. In the course of his judgement, Lord Atkin stated: 
"Except that it is Called a penalty, which on the case is far from conclusive, 
it appears to be an amount of compensation measured by the period of 
delay. I agree that it is not a pre-estimate of actual damage. I think it 
must have been obvious to both the parties that the actual damage would 
be much more than L20 a week, but it is intended to go towards the 
damage, and it was all that the sellers were prepared to pay. "" 
Therefore, where the agreed amount is liquidated damages, it will remain valid, 
enforceable and the only recoverable sum, even where it turns out to be less than the 
actual loss. 
3.13 The controversial point is whether in such a situation- where liquidated damages 
clause, in effect, functions like a limitation clauw the agreed damages clause is subject to 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 or any other statutory restrictions relating limitation 
29 Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Caitract, 1989, p. 233; Treitel G. H., IU Law of Contract, 9th ed., 
1995. p. 902; b1dKendrIck E., C; onUW Law, (2nd ed., 1994), pp. 329-330; Chitty on Conbuts, 27th ed., 
vol. 1, IM, para. 26-067 at p. 1260; Barton (1976) 92 LQR 20 at p. 24 ; You D., Exclusion Clauses in 
Conuacts, 2nd edL, 1982, p. 39; Law Commission's working PaW, no. 61, "penalty Clauggs OW 
Foribiture of Monies ftid", 1975, para. 46 
30 [19331 AC 20 
31 ibid. at pp. 25-26 ; Set also Chan&Is v. Mranduen Moller Co. Ina [1951] 1 KB 240 ; suftv 
A ilantique Societe D'armement Maritimes v. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [ 1%7] AC 361 in which the 
sum provided to be paid as demurrage was held to be liquidated damages and the only rewmable sum: 
especiany at pp. 389 & 395 per Viscount Dilhorne and at p. 414 per Lord Hudson; Temloc Ltd v. ErIll 
properties Ltd (1987) 39 Build. L. R. 30 
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clauses. 
32 Them is, apparently, no clear authority on the point. It has been suggested 
that where an agreed damages clause is held to "restrict or exclude" the liability of the 
33 
party who is in breach, it may W subject to s. 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
Thus, such an agreed damages clause which, in effect, limits the liability for breach 
should sati* the requirement of reasonableness. 34 On the other hand, considering the 
fiwt that an agreed damages clause is normally capable of benefiting both contracting 
parties, even where the parties intended to agree on a sum below the estimated loss, it has 
been suggested that such a clam is probably not subject to the Unfair Contract TenAs 
Act 1977.35 Where, however, the true nature of the clause is to limit the liability and the 
oss p 'bifity of the clause benefitin& the plaintiff is "nothing more than a remote and 
theoretical one", the application of the statutory, as well as the common law, restrictions 
has been stated to be probable. 6 
3.14 The agreed damages clause which fixes a sum less than the actual probable low to 
be payable in the event of breach seem to be different in nature from a limitation clause 
which fixes a ceiling for the recoverable damages. That is because, though at first sight 
such a clause is inserted for the benefit of the defendant, it might also benefit the plaintiff 
where he has suffered no loss as a result of the breach. This might seem to support the 
proposition that a liquidated damages clause which is less than the actual loss should not 
be subject to the statutory, as well as the common law, restrictions; because, unlike a 
limitation clause, it does not ad as only restricting or excluding the liability of the 
defaulting party. In some cases, in fact, it might extend the liability, i. e. where the 
plaintiff has sustained no damages. In most cases, however, the possibility of such a 
clause benefiting the creditor is only a theoretical, rather than a practical one. It should 
32 such as UnWr Tomas in Comma Conuuu Resdadons 1994 wbem it is amiiad* 
33 McKendrick E., Contract LEW, (22d 0C 1994), P, 330; TIbe Law Commission has suggested that any 
legislation relating to exemption clauses should be applicable to an agreed damages clause which, in 
drect, compt the party from his fail liability (Law Commission's Worldng Paper, no. 61, "Penalty 
Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies PaW, 1975, pam 47 at p. 35) 
34 See UnW Contract Tam Act 1977, ss. 11(l), 11(2) and schedule 2 
35 Treitel GJL, TU Law of Contract, 9th e&. 1995, p. 902; though it may, in certain circumstances, be 
subject to the Unfair Terms in Conan= CoWnkcts Regulations 1994. 
36 TWtd, Rtnlcdics for bfcwh Of c0utmctý 1998, p. 234 
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also be noted that the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 applies to all clauses which are 
37 inserted for the pwpose qJr resbicting or exclu&ng the liability. Where the parties, at 
the time of making the contract, could reasonably foresee that the actual probable loss is 
greater than the agreed suni, their objecdw mtenfion to restrict the liability for the breach 
of contract seems to be apparent. The clause, therefore, it is suggested, might be subject 
38 to the Unfair Contract Terms Ad 1977 . 
in some cases, however, the objective intention of *restricting or excluding" the liability 
of the defitulting party, by agreeing on a fixed sum as liquidated damages, may not be 
attributable to the parties. In such a case, if the agreed ram, because of a change in 
circumstances or any other reason, turned out to be less than the actual loss, the 
applicability of the restrictive provisions, inter alid, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
to such a clause-which, in effect, limits the liability of the party who is in breach- seems to 
be dootfui. 39 
1.3.2. Where the agreed sum is a penalty 
3.15 In a normal situation, where the agreed sum has been held to be of a penal nature, it 
is considered as unenforceable. Thus, the Promisee would have to prove his actual loss 
resulting from breach, and would be entitled to recover it regardless of the penal sum. IX 
however, the amount of the penalty is less than the actual loss, the law does not seem to 
be clear: The controversial point is whether the promisee, in an action for damages 
resulting from breach, would be limited to the penal sum and can only recover his proved 
loss up to the stipulated amount Or he can waive the penalty as an unenforceable clause 
and sue for his acttW loss without any limit. 
3.16 It could be argued that if it is correct to be said that a Penalty clause is void and 
unedorceable, then how could it be assumed that such a void clause turns out to be valid 
37 a. 2,3,6,7 Unfair C*nUvd Tenns Act 1977 
38 See BenjaMin! S Sale of GOOdSo 4th Cd., 1992, pam 16-032; Chitty on Contracts, 27th cd., vol. 1,1994, 
pam 26-ov, note 62; Harris D., Rznwdies in Contract and Tort, Iggg, p. I 11; Bede It Renudies for 
Breach of Contractý pp. 53-54 
" See Bcq*min! s Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, para. 13-033 ; Chitty on contracts, 26th ed., pam 995. 
in any event the Unfair TOM ilk Consumer Contracts Regulations 19% would, in certain circumstances, 
be applic". 
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merely because the amount of actual loss has turned out to be greater than the penal sum. 
it would follow that the promisee can sue for his actual low and the penal sum has no 
limiting effect. The well-known charterparty cases'O support this proposition: In then 
cases the agreement of the parties as to damages resulting from breach, "penalty for non- 
performance of this agreement proved damages, not exceeft estimated amount of 
freight", was held to be penal, and the action of the charterer for the recovery of his 
actual loss which was greater than the stipulated amount was upheld. 
In Wall V. RederjaMebojeVt LUSSU&41, for eXaMple, in the Course of his jUdgeMent 'I 
BaiUmcbe, J, citing sonic old authoritiee, discussed the position of a co=W which 
contains an indisputable penalty clause and concluded that if promisee sued for the penal 
amount, then he would be able to recover his proved damages, but not more than the 
penal sum fixed; however, he has the tight to disregard the penalty and sue for damages 
which has actually been suffered by him. ' This case was upheld by the House of Lords 
in Waus, Watts and Co. Ltd v. Mitsui and Co., LWý and this approval seemed to make 
the position clear and stronger as to charterparty cases. It has been suggested" that then 
cases might require reconsideration in the fight of the Suisse Allandque case; but, with 
all respect, the latter case does not seem to discuss the situation in which a penal sum has 
been argued to act as a limitation of liability. In this case the demurrage clause was held 
to be not more than a liquidated damages clause which surely limits the liability of the 
defiwlting party to the stipulated sum. ' 
3.17 The important issue which is raised in this relation is whether the nde laid down by 
40 Stronu B? wb Akfie BOkg V. HutchisOn [ 19051 AC 515 '. Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude [ 1915] 3 
KB 66; Wa" Watts and Co., Ltd v. Miawt and Co., Ltd, 119171 AC 227 
41 [1915] 3 KB 66 
I inter alia, Low v. Peers (1768) 4 Buff. 2225 at p. 2229 , 98 ER 160 at p. 162 per Lord bfansfidd; Howson v. Wright (1811) 13 East 343,104ER402; see alm Winter v. Mmmer(1762) 1 WnL Bl. 395, 
69 ER 225, per lAxd blandidd C. L; Maylon v. Nomis (1845) 14 JJCp 95 
43 Jbid pp. 72-73 
44 [19171 AC 227 
45 Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed., vol. 1.1994, para. 26-067, note 65 
46 [1967] AC 361 
47 See jbid at p. 421 per Lord Upjohn; at pp. 389,395 per Vismunt Dilhome; See also npra., pam 3.12 
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the charterparty cases, particularly Wall v. Redefiakfiebolaget Luggifideo, can be applied 
as to other contracts In other words, can any general rule be derived from the decisions 
in the charterparty cases as to nullity and unenforceability of penalties where they are less 
than actual loss so that the promisee could waive the penalty clause and sue for his actual 
loss? The question was raised in the House of Lords in Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd v. 
Wkbws Foun&Y (1925) Dd", but the House left it open, stating: 
"I desire to leave open the question whether, where a penalty is plainly 
less in amount than the prospective damages, there is any legal objection 
to suing on it, or in a suitable case ignoring it and suing for Jamages. "30 
Also, in Robophone Facilities, Ltd v. BIxW1, Diplock L. J. stated that "it [was] by no 
means clear that penalty clauses (were] simply void... " and they could not limit the 
liability of the deWting party where they were less than actual loss-52 
53 3.18 Most writers and commentators , citing mainly the chafterparty cases, have 
suggested that generally the penal sum could be ignored, and the promisee would be able 
to sue for his actual loss. 54 This view has been doubted" arguing that the charterparty 
cases have a very special character and it might be hazardous to attempt to derive any 
'a [191313 KB 66 
49 [19331 AC 20 
" Ibid, at p. 26 per Lord Addn with whom other members of the House agree& 
511196611 VJLR 1429; [1966) 3 All ER 128 
52 Ibid. at pp. 1446,142 respecdvely 
53 Ckshire, Fifoot & Furmston, Ilie Law of Contract, 13th e&, p. 635; Yates D., Exclusion Clauses in 
Conbuts, 2nd ed., p. 38; McGregor on Damages, 15th a&, 1988, para. 501; Treitel G. R, Ilia Law of 
Conuact, 9th e&, 1995, p. 902; Anson! s Law of Contract, 26th ecL, 1984, p. 5 11; Ops, The Law of 
Damages, 1973, pp. 30,5 1; Upex X, Davies on Contract, 6th edL, p. 292; Barton (1976) 92 LQR 20, at p. 
25 
m See also Gordon, OR (1974) 90 LQR 2%, pp. 296-297, citing the Scottish cast of DingwaU v. 
Bumett [1912] S. C. 1097 in which a clause in a contract for the lean of a hotel pmviding for *the 
pevalty of IM to be paid by tbe party hill" to the party performing or willing to perform over and above a was hold to be pend and the claim of the owner jor damages of j300 for brcach of contract 
(mom than penal sum) was upheld. The authority of this can might be weakened by paying attention to 
the wording of the dam which provides for the pend sum wover and above perfmmancen and it might 
be said that the claim purports that the parties neither intend to pre-estimate the likely low nor to limit it 
to the stipulated son (See Hudson. (1975) 91 LQR 25) IC howem, the plainfiff sues in dd)t fbr the 
penalty, the amount of proved damages may be limited to his claim, i. e. the pod sum: we Wall v. 
Rederjakfiebokget Lanude [1915] 3 KB 66, at p. 72 per Bailbache J. 
" See Burrows A, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, (2nd e&, 1994), p. 327; Hudson & R, 
Penalties Limiting Damages (1974) 90 LQR 31, at pp. 32-33 & (1975) 91 LQR 25 & (1985) 101 LQR 
480 
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general rule from than. Moreover, a general reliance on the charterparty cases would 
merely strengthen the position of the party taking advantage from the penalty clause: A 
party who stipulates for a penal sum to intimidate the other party to perform his 
obligation, in addition to benefiting from this, ignores it, and recovers his actual damage 
where the actual loss turns out to be more than the penal sum. Furthermore, the 
application of the nde set out in the charterparty cases to other contracts would result in 
a parado)dcal situation in which a person breaking the law by stipulating for a penalty 
would be in a better position than a person who acts in conformity with the lawý6; 
because if he had stipulated for liquidated damages instead of a penal sum, he would have 
been limited to the contractual fixed amount. Such a treatment, therefore, would 
encourage the inclusion of penalties which is the infringement of the law. Thus, it has 
been submitted that the promisee can only recover his proved damages up to the 
stipulated penal sutriý and no loss more than penal amount is recoverable. 
3.19 These lines of reasoning seem to be forceful. The special character and unique 
quality of charterparty clauses should be paid more attention. As Bailhache J. stated in 
Waff v. Re&riakfiebokWet Luggu&57, such a clause had a historical background in 
charterparty contracts and originally provided thus: " Penalty for non-performance of this 
agreement estimated amount of freight". In holding the clause to be of a penal nature, 
Bailhache I had much reliance on this backgrounds" and was of the opinion that the 
addition of a few words to the original form, which was undoubtedly penal, did not 
change the nature of the clause. The importance of the historical background of the 
clause in determining its nature was also pointed out in Watts v. Mitsui" by Lord Finlay 
L. C.: 
"I agree with the construction put in the courts below on clause 13 - the 
penalty clause. If this clause had appeared for the first time I think it 
might have been construed as imposing a limitation on the damages to be 
recovered, but the penalty clause is an old one with a settled meaning, and 
the intention, if it wdsted, to make so fundamental change in its effect as is 
M See Law COmmissim's Working PAM, no. 61, "Penalty Claum and Foddture of Monies Paw, 
1975, pam 46,48 at pp. 34-35 
[1915] 3 KB 66 
On this point we NkOrqW on Dam^ 15th cdL, 1988, panL 300 
[19171 AC 227 
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suggested ought to have been more clearly shown in order to bind the 
other party to the contract. "60 
On this basis, the clause has been suggested to be an exceptionat' one and the case itself 
a "rather weak authority"Q. Whatever it may be, it could be suggested that it does not 
seem to be correct to try to derive a general rule from the charterparty cases and the 
authority of the case, therefore, should be confined to the charterparty clauses. 
3.20 There are also some dicta" suggesting that the recoverable sum is limited to the 
amount stipulated by the penalty clause. In Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron and Coal 
Co. 6ý Lord Fitzgerald, pointing out the right and power of the parties to stipulate for 
liquidated damages or penalty under the Law of Scotland, stated: 
"... In the other (i. e. where the parties have provided for a penalty), the 
penalty is to cover all the damages actually sustained, but it does not 
estimate them, and the amount of loss (not, however, exceeding the 
penalty) is to be ascertained in the ordinary way. "65 
Moreover, in the rather recent Canadian case of Elsley v. CoffinsO Dickson I delivering 
the judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada, held that the clause providing for the 
payment of $ 1000 was and for liquidated damages" in the event of breach by the employee 
of the covenant not to compete after leaving his employees employment did effectively 
limit the liability of the defitulting party. The learned judge, then, citing Story, Equity 
Jurisprudence to show that the foundation of the court's intervention against penalties 
was relief against oppression and so there is no place to intervene where there is no 
oppression, pointed out: 
If the actual Ion turns out to exceed the penalty, the normal rules of 
cement of contract should apply to allow recovery of only the agreed 
' Aid, p. 235 
61 McGregor, loc. cit. , pam 
500 
62 Burrows A, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, (2nd ed., 1994), p. 327 
63 Wilbeam v. A*tbn (1807) 1 Camp. 78; 170 ER 883 whm Lord Ellenborough stated: "Beyond the 
penalty you shall not ID; within it you an to give the party aW compeniation which be can prove himsel 
entitled to. 0; E4Akwone v. MoWand Iron and Coal Co. (1886) 11 App. Cas 332; Public Worla 
commissiomrs v. Hilk 11906] AC 369, per LAW Dunedin at 375: a penalty which covers the damage 
if proved, but does not assess it.. " 
64 (1896) 11 App. Cu. 332 
65 Did, p. 346 
" ElsleY v- J G. COllins InMrance Agencies Ltd 0 978) 83 DLA (3rd) 1 
67 14th a&, s. 1728 
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sum. The Party imposing the penalty should not be able to obtain the 
benefit of whatever intimidating force the penalty clause may have in 
inducing Performance, and then ignore the clause when it turns out to be 
to his advantage to do so. A penalty clause should function as a limitation 
on the damages recoverable, while still being ineffective to increase 
damages above the actual loss sustained when such loss is less than the 
stipulated amount. "" 
3.21 It would seem that in determining the limitative, effect of a penalty where it is less 
than the actual loss, attention should be paid to the construction of the contract to find 
out whether an intention to limit the liability to the stipulated sum could be attributed to 
the contracting parties. On this basis two different possibilities of the penal sum being 
less than actual damage should be given separate consideration. 
3.22 Fint where the parties, at the time of contracting, have stipulated for an 
extravagant sum to be paid in the event of breach, and then due to a change in 
circumstances, it has turned out to be less than the actual loss, there is no justification to 
suggest that the parties have intended the exorbitant penal sum to act as limiting the 
liability of the defaulting party where it turns out to be less than actual loss. Furthermore, 
as it has been proposed by the Law Commission, such a view would lead to "odd 
consequences": (a) "the party said to be "terrorized" by the clause benefits from and 
seeks to uphold it", and (b) "striking down the clause because it appeared to penalise the 
party in breach at the earlier time will be to his disadvantage at the later time because 
instead of only having to pay the agreed sum, he will be liable for the full amount of 
damage suffered by the party who sought to impose the invalid penalty. "70 It may, 
therefore, be suggested that in such a case the penalty clause has no effect, for no 
I Did, at p. 15 ; For the opposite view we the dictum of Lee J. in W& JInveshnents v. Bunting [198411 
NSWLR 331 at pp. 335-336, when hik relying on the charterparty cases discussed, said: *71ke condusion 
that a penalty clause a unenforceable does no more than deny [the innocent party] the right to recover 
damages in terms of that clause, and that is because the amount provided for in the clause is not in the 
contexi and circumstances of the Agreement to be regarded as a genuine pre-estimiate; of the damagn 
which flow from a breach of the agreement But this conclusion does not ban the consequence that a 
breach of [the agreement] will not give rise to a right in damagM nor that ... on repudiation of the 
agreement rooovay of an amount equal to or greaw than the amount referred to in the dam cannot 
necessarily be bad. " 
60 Sm supm., WL 3.10 
70 Law Commission's Wod&g P&W, no. 61, "Penalty Clauses and Forfeitum of Monies PAW, 1975, 
parg, 48 at p. 35 
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intention to limit the liability could be attributed to the parties. The result is that the penal 
sum could be ignored, and the actual loss would be recoverable. 
3.23 Second, where., however, the stipulated sum is regarded as penal on the technical 
grounds, i. e. where a single sum is made payable on the occurrence of different breaches 
of varying importance, though the parties have not presumably, covenanted for a genuine 
pre-estimate of likely actual damages- and in fact this might be the reason for striking 
down such a sum as not being liquidated damages- it could well be assumed that at least 
the parties have had the intention of setting a limit for the recoverable damage upon the 
occurrence of anyone of then breaches. As to breaches resulting in losses amounting to 
LIO, no and 1250, for waimple, the parties provide for the agreed sum of 1100 to be 
paid upon anyone of these breaches. Such an agreW sum is not liquidated damages, for 
mainly it could not be regarded as a genuine pro-estimate of damages. However, it has 
been intended by the parties to be paid upon any one of breaches, and as to a breach 
resulting in losses larger than the agreed amount, the intention of limiting the liability, it 
seems, could be attributed to the contracting parties. Moreover, the stipulated sum in 
such a case is not exorbitant, extravagant or unconscionable and strictly speaking, it 
could not ad as intimidafing to promisor into peforming his obligation ad penalizing 
him in the event of breach. Therefore, though such an amount is not presumably a 
genuine per-estimate of the likely actual loss and it could not be regarded as the 
recoverable sum in the event of a breach losses resulting from which are less than the 
stipulated sum, it would seem that it would limit the liability of the defaulting party in 
71 
respect of a breach losses resulting from that are greater than the covenanted amount. 
2. Acceleration Clauses 
2.1. Introductfon 
3.24 The parties to a contract may provide for a clause by which the whole outstanding 
balance of the contractual consideration might be called upon by the creditor in the event 
of the occurrence of a designated event. Such a clause, which is called an acceleration 
clause, is commonly found in credit agreements, e. g. loan, conditional sale, hire-purchase 
71 GJN= the coffectness cf Ws view, the limlitathro effixg of the clause should, it appears, be subject to fts 
under the reMctft Provisions- such as UnWr Cmuw Tam Act 1977. where they are 
aWncaue. no mpv., paras. 3.13-3.14 
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and lease contracts. For instance, it is a common provision in lease agreements that if the 
lessee made default in the payment of an instalment of the rent, then the whole rental for 
the remaining contractual period would immediately become due and payable. 
3.25 Since, at &A glance, an acceleration clause does not increase the liability of the 
defaulting party and only accelerate the payment which should have been paid by 
instalments, it might be assumed that there is no room for the application of the rules 
win penalties as to such a clause. On the other hand, it is thought that acceleration 
clauses should be subject to the penalty doctrine, because in fact early payment is more 
expensive than payment by instalments, and therefore the situation is like the one in which 
it has been provided that in the event of a default in the payment of a debt, a larger sum 
should be paid to the creditor, which is obviously subject to the penalty doctrine. 
3.26 The acceleration of instalments night be provided for upon the contractual right of 
the creditor to terminate the contract. In other words, it might be stipulated that in the 
event of a default in the punctual payment of any instalment, the creditor would be 
entitled to terminate the contract, and upon termination, the whole unpaid instalments or 
a specified portion of that would immediately become due and payable. Much confitsion 
might arise if mere acceleration clauses on the one hand and termination clauses which 
might result m the acceleration on the other, are not distinguished. Accordingly, this 
section, first and foremost, will be devoted to distinguishing acceleration and termination 
clauses, then acceleration clauses in some important credit agreements will separately be 
ZZ Distinguishing Termination Clause from Acceleration Clause 
3.27 If a contract contained the acceleration of the whole or a portion of the unaccrued 
instalments upon termination of the contract by the creditor for the other partys default, 
the clause then would be subject to the penalty doctrine. 72 This clause should be 
distinguished from a clause providing merely for the acceleration of future instalments in 
72 Such a claum is called "tomlination clam" or omildmum paymmt clumm, wd is VM colmmoWy fixod in hire-pmhm conhim It will be discusud in &uft later. See InfriL, chapter 5 
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the event of the debtoes defitult in the punctual payment of an instalment. n in the latter, 
despite the activation of the clause, the contract remains on foot for the 
contractual period, and the defaulting party, in spite of his liability to pay the whole 
outstanding balance promptly. has the right to benefit from the subject-matter of the 
contract in the contractual time. While by the activation of a termination clause, the 
contract ceases to be of any effect, and the defaulting party loses his contractual right for 
the remaining period. The effect of this distinction lies on the point that in case of 
termination of the contract, the liability of the defaulting party to pay the accelerated 
amount of the whole or a portion of future payments ceases to be in the nature of a 
contractual corWderation, and obtains the character of dwwges which has been agreed 
in advance to be equal in amount to the accelerated amount of future payments. In other 
words, the sum provided to be paid upon terinination of the contnict in the event of the 
debtor's defiwk whatever it is, is an agreed damages, and is obviously Subject to the 
rules concerning distinction between liquidated damages and penalties. However, the 
effect of an acceleration clause is not to convert the nature of payment, but only to 
advance the deWting partys primary payment obligation. Putting it another way, by the 
activation of an acceleration clause in a lease, fbr cKample, the lessee has to pay the same 
rent, but instead of paying by instalments, he has to advance the whole rent promptly. 
3.28 The important issue which is raised and needs more discussion is whether an 
acceleration clause- by which it has been provided that upon the debtor's default the 
whole unaccrued instalments would become due- is subject to the penalty doctrine. The 
obvious examples of these clauses are accelerations provided for in loan agreements. The 
position in these contracts, therefore, will first be considered, then some import= credit 
agreements, e. g. hire-purchase., conditional sale and lease, will be dealt with. 
2.3. Acceleragon Claus" In Loan Agreements 
3.29 In a contract for loan, the parties may provide for the acceleration of the principal in 
the event of the debtor's default in punctual payment. In such a case, since the liability of 
the debtor has not been increased and only the way of payment has changed, the 
" Goode P, bE, Acoelemdon Cbnuu [1"21 jBL 148, pp. 149-149 ; Goode, PaywAw obligadons in 
Com=%CW Wkd FbancW TmmzctiOns, P. 52 
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acceleration clause will not be subject to the penalty doctrine. 74 Putting it another way, 
there is an existing debt which the agreement of the parties has been provided for its 
repayment by instalments provided that the instalments are paid punctually. In the event 
of default, in fact, the right given to the debtor to repay the debt by instalment3 is 
withdrawn, and he is therefore obliged to pay his existing debt without any excess, 
immediately. lberefore, there seems no compelling reason for the application of the 
penalty doctrine! " In 77w Protector Endowment Loan Co. v. Grice", the plaintiffi had 
lent LSO to the debtor who covenanted to repay it together with interest, negotiation 
expenses and a premium for the insurance of the debtoes life. The defendant was the 
guarantor of the debtoes bond which provided that the total amount repayable, namely 
VO, would become due if a default in the payment of a single instalment happened. 
Default having been made, the plaintiff claimed the whole unpaid instalments, relying on 
the acceleration clause. The Court of Appeal, reversing the judgement of Bowen J. at 
first instance, unanimously held that the amount claimed was not a penalty and could be 
recovered. It seems that the point underlying the decision of the Court of Appeal was 
that upon the bond, there was an existing debt of E70 which had been agreed to be paid 
by instalments, and a covenant requiring its acceleration in the event of default should not 
be penal. This point could be inferred from the judgement of Brett LJ where he stated: 
"The contract is that the borrower shall repay 170, there is no other debt, 
and no other sum is mentioned. It is an agreement to repay by quarterly 
instalments; but if default should be made, then the whole sum of L70 was 
74 7he fttecw FAdowment Loan wd Annul& Compwy v Grice (1880) 5 QBD 592 ; &erne v. BW* I 
De. 0. J. & S. 595,46 ER 236; 7hompson v. Hudson (1869) Law Rep. 4 ILL. (English and Irish Appeal 
Cases) I when Lord Hatherley L. C. at pp. 15-16 stated: "... where there is a debt due, and an agreement 
is entered into at the Ume of that debt having become due and not being paid in regard to farther 
indulgence to be conceded to ft debtor, or farther time to be accorded to him for the payment of the 
debt, or in regard to his paying it inunediately, if that be a portion of the stipulations of the agreanent, or 
at some further tim which may be named, and the creditor is willing to allow him certain advantages 
and deductions from that debt, as well as to extend the Ume for its payment, if sidequa and propes 
security in the mind of the creditor be afforded him as his part of the bargain in respect of which he is to 
mab then concessions, then it is perfectly competent to the creditor to say: U the payment be not made 
modo etforna as I ban sdpubt4 then forthwith the fight to the original debt rvm% and it is to be 
open to me to Proceed with referesm to the original debt, and to worcise all those powers which I 
posses for compelling Payment of the original debt; in other words I am entitled to be replaced in the 
position in. which I was when this agr==M which has been now broken, was entered into. m 
75 See Ww Chitty on C; ontracts, 27th ed., v*L 1,1994, para. 26-065; McGregor on Damam 15th ed., 
1988, pam 523 note 44; MdKendrick E., Contract Law, (2nd ed., 1994), p. 330; Treitel GH, The Law 
Of Contram 9th ed., 1995, P. 900 
715 (isW) 5 QBD 592 
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to become payable at once. In my opinion the stipulation to pay 
immediately is not to be treated as a penalty; but a stipulation to pay a 
large sum upon default would be a penalty, and could not be recovered. "77 
A clear application of this principle can be found in the decision of the House of Lords in 
Waffinglord v. Mutual Sbciee in which Lord Selborne L. C., dealing, inter afid, with a 
mortgage bond, given to secure the due payment by instalments of a sum due, containing 
an acceleration clause in the event of default, stated: 
"I cannot think that such an acceleration of payments has anything 
common with a penalty. It was a contract for certain payments which 
were debUd in presend although solwnda infifuro; and, being such, it is 
consistent both with principle and with authority to hold, that if the party 
who ought to have paid them, or any of them, at the proper time failed to 
do so, the default was his own, and the time night lawfUy be accelerated 
for the other payments which were originally defeffed. "79 
3.30 If the contract of the parties, besides the acceleration of the principal, provided that 
upon defitult, the whole unaccrued interest for the remaining period of the loan would 
become accelerated and payable immediately, the position then would seem to be 
different. This normally happens when the parties have pre-calculated and integrated the 
interest with the principal and provided for the payment of the integrated amount of the 
principal and interest by instalments, and that on default, the whole unaccrued instalments 
would become due. Suppose that L lends 15000 to B with the interest of 11000 to be 
repaid in the period of five years by the yearly instalments, of F. 1200. If the contract 
contained an acceleration clause, then upon a default for emple in the payment of the 
third instalment, the whole unpaid balance, i. e. 0600, would become due and payable 
immediately. In such a case, despite B is not entitled to use the remaining period of 2 
years to repay his debt by instalments, he must pay the interest of 1400 for that period. 
put another way, B has to pay a large sum of 12400 for the remaining amount of his debt 
which is L2000. This would seem to fall within the rules distinguishing liquidated 
77 Aid, at p. 596 
" (18N) 5 App Cas 695; See also *%ite and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor [1962] AC 413 in 
which the House of Lords seemed to have presupposed the validity of the swjcradon clum.; 
(a * Oresundwarvet Akfiebolag v. Marcos Diamands Lemos e Angelic Star") [1988) 1 Lloyds L. P, 122, 
at p. 125 per Donaldson NEP, mid at P. 126 per Neill LJ 
79 Ibid. at p. 696, see am at p. 702 per Lord Hatherley, pp. 705-706 per Lord Blackburn and p. 710 per 
Lord Watson 
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damages from petWties. 
3.31 It might be thought that Me Protector Endowment Loan Co. v. Grice" can be used 
to show that the acceleration of interest, as well as principal, is not susceptible to be 
subject to the penalty doctrine. Support for this view might be lent by the facts of the 
case where the sum of DO, being "the principal of the loan, interest thereon, the ex: penses 
of negotiating it, and a margin representing a premium for the insurance of the debtoes 
fife" was provided to be repaid in five yearly instalments. It is however to be noted that, 
as pointed out by Professor Goode', what was under discussion in this case was a bond 
of L70 which was the abstract payment obligation of the defendant. This amount was as 
an existing debt which had been provided to be paid by instalments, and upon failure, the 
amount of that present debt Le. VO, had been stipulated to be accelerated. "The sum of 
VON, therefore, "was what had been bargained for at the outset; no greater sum was 
claimed in the event of default. "" The judgement of Brett LJ, referred to above13, clearly 
shows the correctness of this infbrence. Thus, Yhe Protector Endowment Loan Co. v. 
Grice" could not be used as an authority to show that a clause providing for the 
acceleration of principal and interest is not subject to the penalty doctrine. Conversely, 
according to the general rules, laid down by Lord Dunedin! 3 to distinguish liquidated 
damages from penalties, providing for the payment of a larger sum in the event of a 
failure to pay a stipulated sum should be considered as having a penal nature. The 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Yhe "Angelic Stw"" supports this view: In this case, a 
contract for building, selling and delivering a vessel provided for the payment of 800/a of 
the price by "delivery credit" which, in fact, was a loan equal to the remainder of the price 
with 8.5 per cent annual interest. Part 13 of Article 7 of the agreement provided that in 
the event of a de&Wt in the punctual payment of an instalment, "the loan together with all 
80 (1880) 5 QBD 592 
W Cloode IL NE, Accelmdon Clauses [1982] JBL 148, pp. 150-151 
82 Ibid. 
83 supra., pam 3.29 
64 (IsW) 5 QBD 592 
85 Dunlop Phewnadc Tpv CO. Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [1915] AC 79 
86 7, he mAngelic &wN 11988] 1 UcyCs LK 122 
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other monies due to the lenders by the owners" should immediately become payable. 
Default having been made, the plaintiffs brought an action, applying for a summary 
judgement against the defendants. The Court of Appeal, holding that a clause which 
provided for the acceleration of the principal and interest for the full term of a loan would 
constitute a penalty, unanimously did not interpret Article 7 as imposing on the defendant 
the liability to pay the unaccrued interest for the remaining period of the contract, and 
thus recognized it as a valid stipulation. In the course of his judgement, Sir John 
Donaldson, MYL stated: 
" Clearly a clause which provided that in the event of any breach of 
contract a long term loan would immediately become repayable and that 
interest thereon for the full term would not only be still payable but would 
be payable at once would constitute a penalty as being "a payment of 
money stipulated as in terrorem of the offending party. 07 
3.32 It should by now be apparent that in loan agreements, the acceleration of the 
principal is not subject to the rules against penalties. However, a clause providing for the 
acceleration of the unaccrued interest, as well as principal, in the event of default, without 
stipulating for a reasonable discount given on the basis of, inter afid, remaining period of 
the agreement is vulnerable as a penalty. 
2.4. Acceleration Clauses In Conditional Sale and Hire-purchase 
Agreements 
3.33 A conditional Sale agreement, in addition to providing for a termination clause and 
a minimum payment upon termination, might contain an acceleration clause by which 
upon a default in punctual payment of an instalment, the whole instalments of price would 
immediately become payable . Since the instalments. of the price in conditional side 
agreements normally have an element of finance charge which is a component like interest 
in loan agreements, in principle there seems no reason to differentiate them from a loan 
agreement by which the repayment of the integrated amount of the principal and interest 
has been stipulated to be made by instalments. Accordingly, the acceleration clause in a 
conditional sale agreement would be subject to the rules distinguishing liquidated 
damages from penalties. Thus, in normal cases, if the clause has not provided for a 
reasonable rebate to be calculated on the basis, inter afta, of the finance charge for the 
87 Ibid., at p. 125 ; see also the judgement of Gibson LJ at p. 126 
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unexpired period after the activation of the acceleration clause, it might be held to be of a 
penal nature. " This view is supported by the judgement of Woolf J in Waffl= Sidnger 
Finawe Ltd v. Meane)i": In a conditional sale agreement in respect of a motor car, in 
which the payment had been provided to be made by a deposit and consecutive monthly 
instalments, it was stipulated that in the event of a default in the punctual payment of any 
instalment, the whole unpaid instalments, would be accelerated. Upon the occurrence of 
the default, it was held that as the right to call for the accelerated payment would only 
arise upon breach (i. e., failure to make a punctual payment), the rules as to penalties 
would be applicable to the seller's right to recover the accelerated payments? O, although 
upon the actual application of the rules, the clause in question was recognized as a 
genuine pre-estimate of the seller's loss. That was mainly because the clause had 
provided for an allowano? ' that by taldng it into account the buyer was only to pay a 
specified proportion of the charges which could not be of a penal nature-92 
3.34 There seems to be no direct English authority as to the validity and effect of an 
acceleration clause in hire-purchase contracts. However, the situation in this respect 
appears to be the same as conditional sale agreements. 93 Put another way, the clause 
providing for the acceleration of the whole future rentals, upon the occurrence of a 
default, in hire-purchase contracts, is normally subject to the penalty doctrine. That is 
GoodO K NE, AccdcradOn ClausCS 11982] JBL 148, p. 151 
[198111 WLR 39 
go In the course Of his judgement Woolf J stated: ". .. it is clear that the, seller's right to servo a wfice 
under clause II arises because of the buyer's breach of the agreement in failing to pay instalments and as 
the right to call for accelerated payment only arises upon such a breach, I would apply the principles as to 
penalties to the seller's right to roomer accelerated payments under a conditional sale agreement in the 
same way as they apply to hire-purchase agreements. " see ibid., at p. 48 
91 Ilk clause 11(a) had Provided that upon the service of a notice by the seller to call upon the buyer to 
pay the accelerated PaYments, the latter had to pay "any unpaid deposit and/or acceptance fee and such 
percentage of the charges specified in the schedule as will accrue down to a date three months aft the 
date of the instAlumd which would next have followed the date of notice... " see ibid., at pp. 42-43 
92in considering whether the clause was a penalty or liquidated damages, the learned judge, in addition 
to having regard to the flict that by the activation of the clause the title in goods vested in the buyer, put 
emphasis on the allowance given by the acceleration clause under which, in the words of Woolf J, "the 
obligation of the buyer [was] only to pay a proportion of the charges calculated at a date three months 
after the date. of the instalment which would next have followed the date of notice". In his view, owh a 
stipulation could not: amount to a penalty. see Ibid., at p. 48 
93 Goode R. M., Acocleration Claum [1982] JBL 148, p. 152 
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because, like conditional sale agreements, the rentals in hire-purchase contracts have a 
component of a finance charge which is mainly computed on the basis of the length of the 
period for which the credit is given, and if the acceleration clause does not provide for a 
provision as to a reasonable rebate of the unaccrued finance charges upon acceleration, it 
will, in effect, act as a term providing for the payment of a large sum in the event of a 
default in the punctual payment of a smaller amount which is subject to the rules against 
penalties. 
3.35 Since the statutory right of the hirer in hire-purchase agreements to terminate the 
contract could only be exercised where the termination notice is given by the hirer before 
the final payment faUs due, the effect of the acceleration clause would be to extinguish 
the hirees right to terminate the agreement. " The hirer therefore would be obliged to pay 
the full price, and the contract would be converted to a conditional sale agreement. " 
2.5. Acceleration Clauses In Commercial Leases 
3.36 In commercial leases, the parties to the contract, normally provide for an 
acceleration clause by which it is intended that, upon default, the whole unpaid balance of 
rentals becomes due and payable immediately. In the meantime, it is very common in 
such an agreement to provide for a clause conferring on the lessor, upon the lessee's 
failure, the right to terminate the contract and claim for the whole or a proportion of the 
unpaid balance of the rents upon termination. It is to be observed again that the 
payments under an acceleration clause and those under a termination clause, though they 
might be equal in amount, are different in nature. The former is claimed as rentals for the 
whole period of lease and do not prevent the lessee to use the subject-matter of the lease 
for the remaining period of the contract, while in the latter, the right of the lessee to 
utilise the subject-matter of the lease is terminated and the sum, normally described as a 
" Sec 27(l) of the hire-purchase Act 1965 provides: "At any time before the final payment under a hire- 
purchase agreement or ... 
falls due, the hirer or ... shall be entitled to terminate the agreement by giving 
notice of termination in writing to any person entitled or authorised to receive the sums payable under the 
agreement. " 
" See Waa%am Stringer Finance Ltd v. Meaney [1981] 1 WLR 39 where such a clause was not 
considered void as being against the statutory right of the hirer to terminate the agreement. 
96 Coode p, M., Acceleration Clauses [19821 JBL 149, p. 152 
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"minimum payment", is claimed as damages resulting from breach. 97 The effect of this 
distinction Res on the point that the latter is undoubtedly subject to the penalty doctrine, 
and may be held to be penal in nature if there is a gross disproportion between that sum 
and the likely actual damages which might conceivably be proved to result from breach at 
the time when the contract is made.. 
3.37 In relation to the validity of acceleration clauses in lease agreements, at first sight, 
there might seem no substantial difference between such a clause in lease and hire- 
purchase agreements; and therefore it might be suggested that the acceleration clause in 
lease would be subject to the penalty doctrine. On the other hand, with finther 
consideration, it might be argued that in any agreement for lease there is a possibility of 
providing for the whole rent to be due in advance, i. e. at the time when the contract is 
made, and then stipulating that it should be paid by instalments if certain conditions, inter 
afid, punctual payment, are met. It may therefore be open to the lessor to argue that, as a 
result of this possibility, the situation is the same as a present debt which has been agreed 
to be paid by instalments, and so there should be no objection to a clause providing for 
the acceleration of the whole unpaid balance of the rentals upon default, particularly 
because, unlike hire-purchase agreements, there might be no identified finance charge in a 
lease. " The effect of this argument is that providing merely for the acceleration of 
rentals, in the event of default, without bringing the contract to an end should not be 
subject to the rules against penalties. 
3.38 Again, there seems to be no English authority on the point, and the reason appears 
to be that in almost all litigated cases, the lessor has taken advantage of his right to 
terminate the contract and therefore the effect of the minimum payment upon termination 
has been discussed. In principle, it is difficult to treat the following two cases as similar: 
(1) A case in which the lessor is entitled to the whole rentals at the time when the contract 
is made, but, due to indulgence or any other reason, has agreed to accept its payment by 
instalments; and, 
(H) A case, like most lease contracts, in which the creditor has no right to claim for the 
91 The same distinction is also applicable in relation to hire-purchase and conditional sale agmnents. 
see also supra., paras. 3.27,3.33 
98 Goode, Ibid., p. 152 
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whole debt at the time of contracting, and is obliged by the contract to receive it by 
instalments, unless a default in the punctual payment occurs. 
As to the former, the situation seems to be indistinguishable from a present debt which is 
agreed to be repaid by instalments, and providing for its acceleration upon default, as it 
was pointed out", should not be subject to the penalty doctrine. In the latter case, 
however, there is no compelling reason to differentiate the situation from an acceleration 
clause in a hire-purchase agreement'00: in both obviously an element of firiance charge, or 
interest is involved01 and the instalments of the rent or hire are the integrated amount of 
the principal and finance charge or interest. "' The mere fact that "a lease does not 
103 provide for an identified credit charge" , would not, with all respect, seem to provide a 
convincing reason for treating an acceleration clause in a lease in a Merent way from 
that clause in a hire-purchase agreement. '04 It does, therefore, seem that in such a case, 
the acceleration clause should be subject to the rules against penalties and if the clause 
does not provide for a reasonable allowance to be made for the accelerated payment, it 
I See supra., para. 3.29 
100 As to whether draffing should have such a large consequence see below, para. 3.39 
"' It is upon this basis that it has been suggested that *at times of high interest rates em the 
acceleration (without repossession of soods) of periodic payments will confer a marked benefit on the 
recipient which might, in some cases be sufficient to invite judicial intervention. " see Waddanis SK 
The Law of Damages, 1983, p. 529, pars. 930 
102 There is of == no doubt that the economic purpose and objectives of these two contracts, i. e. lease 
and hire-purchase, are to a large extend different. Hire-purchase is normally used as a means to finance 
a certain transaction. Therefore, in computing the instalments of hire, the cash price of the subject- 
matter and the finance charge are two crucial elements. In fact the instalments of hire in a hire-purchase 
agreement has less relation to the real hiring value of the subject-matter. Thus, the instalments of hire 
would be much less if the whole rentals are to be paid within two years, for example, instead of being 
paid in one year. In a lease, on the other hand, the rent is normally calculated according to the real 
hiring value of the subject-matter. It does however appear thaý even in the latter, an element of interest 
may be involved: for instance, a real hiring value of a television for a year may be LIOO if it is to be paid 
in advance, but when it is agreed to be spread over the contractual period and is paid by monthly 
instalments, then, due to the element of interest or "time charges", it is increased to a higher amount, say 
L120. As far as our discussion is concerned, therefore, the "real hiring value for the whole contiwtual 
period" and "interest or time charges" may respectively be equated to "cash price" and "finance charger 
in hire-purchase agreements. It is however not to be denied that determining the amount of interest or 
time charge in a lease, in order to decide upon the nature of the acceleration clause, is not as Casy as 
finding out the amount of the finance charge in a hire-purchase agreement. 
103 Goode K M., Acceleration Clauses [1982] JBL 149, p. 152 [emphasis added] 
104 It should also be noted that in some cases, some lease agreements, which are very similar in effid to 
hire-purchase contracts, Provide for a certain finance charge: for instance, in a lease of a photocopier for 
a period of time which at the end of that period the subject-matter is almost of no value. in calctilating 
the inm1ments of the rent, the cash price of the photocopier and an element of finance charge may 
normally be involved. 
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might be held to be of a penal nature and unenforceable. 103 
3.39 A crucial comment should be made on this conclusion. In determining whether a 
lease has provided for the all rent to be due in advance at the time when the contract is 
made, the whole terms of the contract and all circumstances surrounding it should be 
considered to decide whether the parties have truly intended that the whole rent should 
become immediately payable at that time. That the lease contains a clause providing for 
the rent to be due in advance should not therefore be, by any means, conclusive, though it 
might be considered as an important element in this relation. This is because in general, 
as it has been pointed out by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop pneumatic 23w Co. Ltd v. New 
Cgrage and Motor Co. Lid'06, "[t]he question whether a sum stipulated is penalty or 
liquidated damages is a question of construction to be decided upon the terms and 
inherent circumstances of each particular contract, judged of as at the time of the maldng 
of the contract", and in the words of Lord Radcliffe in Bridge v. Campbell Discount 
Co. 107, citing Lord Davey in the Clydebank Engineering'" case, "[t]he court's jurisdiction 
to relieve against penalties depends on a 'question not of words or of forms of speech, but 
of substance and of things"'. Therefore in deciding whether the rules against penalties 
should be applied to a specific clause, the whole contractual terms and inherent 
circumstances surrounding the contract should carefully be considered. 109 Upon this 
consideration, if it was concluded that the contract had truly provided for a present 
obligation of the lessee to pay the entire rent at the time when the contract had been 
105 in calculating the element of interest or time charges, the current interest rate at the fitne when the 
contract is made may, it is suggest4 be taken into account. 
106 [1915] AC 79, at pp. 86-87 
10'7 [1962] AC 600, at p. 624 
101 CWebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] 
AC 6 at 15 
119 Thus, in the Australian caw of O'Dea v. Allstates Leasing System (W-4. ) Pty. Ltd (1983) 57 AUR 
172, although the lease agreement contained a clause providing for the whole rentals to be due in 
advance, i. e. clause I(A), the High Court of Australia. unanimously held that the clause accelerating the 
unpaid balance of instalments upon dehult was subject to the penalty doctrine, and in fact was a penalty. 
The reason, inter alia, was that taking the contract as a whole and considering all the terms, specially 
the clause providing for termination and retaking possession of the subject-matter, there could not be 
assumed to be a present obligation for the whole rental to be payable at the time of making the contract. 
See particularly the judgement of Gibbs CI at p. 175; This case and the position in Australia will be 
fully considered: see infra., paras. 3.41 et seq. 
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entered into, then as to the clause providing for the acceleration of the whole balance of 
unpaid rentals upon default, the question of being a penalty would not arise. 
3.40 There is another important issue which should be considered here. Suppose that in 
a contract providing for the vitire rentals to be due in advance and then payable by 
instalments, the parties have provided for an acceleration clause and also a clause 
conferring on the lessor the right of termination and claiming for the whole balance of the 
unpaid rentals as "minimum payment" in the event of default. What would be the 
situation if the lessor, upon the occurrence of a default, claimed for the accelerated 
amount of rentals and then because of the non-payment of the accelerated sum, exercised 
his right to terminate the contract? It might seem that in this case, the lessor has no claim 
for the minimum payment, and has only exercised his right to terminate the contract upon 
the non-payment of the entire balance of the unpaid rentals which has already become due 
under the acceleration clause. Thus, since there was an obligation to pay the whole 
rentals in advance, the question of penalty would not arise, While, if the lessor had first 
exercised his right to terminate and claimed for the minimum payment, the situation 
would have been different, and the rules against penalties would have been applicable. 
Put another way, the same financial results would have been achieved with different legal 
consequences. To avoid this unfortunate situation and to resolve the problem it had been 
suggested that in the case of the activation of the acceleration clause before termination, 
the court could exercise its equitable power to grant relief against forfeiture "to adjust the 
monetary liability in the light of the effect of an order for redelivery"110, but with fUrther 
consideration, the writer later suggested that relief against forfeiture "which in any event 
might not be appropriate as to moneys not yet paid to the creditor" is not the correct 
solution. "' Instead the right of the lessor to elect between two remedies was suggested 
to be the correct analysis of the situation: 
"Enforcement of the acceleration clause in effect compels the debtor to 
complete the contract and thus debars termination of the contract and a 
consequential claim for damages for loss of future profits. Alternatively 
the creditor can exercise a right to terminate the contract, in which case he 
gives up his right to sue for the accelerated payment .... and is restricted to 
110 Goode R. M, Acceleration Clauscs [19821 JBL 14g, pp. 152-153 
111 Goode, Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial Transactions, p. 52, note 72 
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a claim in dama8es. "112 
This view could be reinforced by paying attention to the different characters of the 
payments under the acceleration and termination clauses. Although both sums might be 
equal in amount, payment of the whole balance of the unpaid rentals under the 
acceleration clause is rent in character, for the lessee is entitled to use the subject-matter 
of the contract for the remaining period of the contractual time. After the lessor 
exercising his right to terminate the contract, however, the amount payable loses its 
nature as rent and becomes payable as donages resulting from breach. 
Therefore, if the lessor terminates the contract because of the non-payment of the 
accelerated amount of the future rentals, the accelerated amount ceases to be payable as 
rent and becomes due as damages which seems to be subject to the penalty doctrine. 
Z& Australian Law 
3.41 In Australia, as to contracts which create a present debt and provide for its 
repayment by instalments, the validity of a clause stipulating for the acceleration of the 
whole balance of the unpaid instalments in the event of default in punctual payment has 
not been doubted. 113 The Australian courts, following the authority of the decision of the 
court of Appeal in 7he Protector Endowment Loan v. Grice'14 have held that where 
there is an existing debt which has been agreed to be paid by instalments, an acceleration 
clause which requires the whole balance of the unpaid instalments to become due and 
payable immediately will not be subject to the rules distinguishing liquidated damages 
from penalties. The reason for this has well been stated in the judgement of Gibbs C. J. in 
112 CMde' Ibid., p. 52 
113 See for example: O'Dea Y. Allstates Leasing SYstem(W. A. ) Pty. Ltd. (1983) 57 AUR 172; Acron 
Pacific Ltd v. Offshore Oil N-L (1985) 157 CIX 514 where Mason A. C. J., Wilson, Brennan and 
Dawson Jj., applying the decision in Wallingford v. Mutual Society (1880) App Cas; 685, at p. 702 and 
0 'Dea (ibid. ) at pp. 366-367,392,386 stated that *Of course, there is no penalty if the provision of the 
moratorium deed [the agreement] simply grant an indulgence for the payment of a debt that is due and 
prAle. " at p. 5 18 ; Lamson Sfore Service Co. Ltd v. Russell Wilkins and Sons Ltd. (1906) 4 C. L. P, 672 
; Western Electric Co. (Australia) Ltd v. Ward (1933) 51 W. N. (N. S. W) 19 ; Re Mutual Qld) Knifing 
Mills pty Ltd [1959] Qd R 357 ; I. A. C. (Leasing) Ltd v. Humphrey (1972) 126 C. L. P, 131 . see also Greig D. W. & Davis J. L. R., The Law of Contrac4 1987, pp. 1454-1455 ; Barnes T, Agreed Damages 
Clauses in Financing Contracts (1986) 14 ABLR 63, at p. 68 ; Muir 0 A, Stipulation for the Payment of 
Agreed Sums (1985) 10 Sydney L. Rev. 503, at pp. 522,524 ; Meagher, Penalties in Chattel Lease, 
(Essays in Equity, edited by Finn P D), 1985,46, at pp. 48-49 
114 (Igso) QBD 592 
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O'Dea v. Allstates Leasing Systemff. A) Pty. Ltd' 15: 
"In all the cases of this kind there is a present debt, which, by reason of an 
indulgence given by the creditor, is payable either in the future, or in a 
lesser amount, provided that certain conditions are met. The failure of the 
conditions does not mean that the creditor becomes entitled to damages; 
the consequence is that the sum which was always owed, but which the 
debtor was allowed to pay by instalments or in a smaller amount, becomes 
recoverable at once or in full. " 
Where, however, the acceleration clause provided for an additional obligation for the 
debtor, e. g. to pay the unaccrued interest for the remaining period of the agreement, the 
clause would be regarded as being subject to the rules against penalties. Thus, in Wanwr 
v. Ccowanal 16 in a contract for the mortgage of land, a clause providing that in the event 
of any failure in the punctual payment of instalments, the whole unpaid balance of 
principal and interests thereon for the unexpired period of the agreement would become 
immediately payable, was struck down as being a penalty. 
3.42 As a matter of construction, there has been a discussion in the Australian authorities 
as to how in a lease providing for the periodic payment of rentals, an existing debt of the 
entire rent at the time of contracting could be assumed so that the acceleration clauK 
providing for the whole balance of the unpaid instalments to be due upon defaWt, coWd 
be regarded outside the ambit of the law relating to penalties. The settled point is that 
where such an assumption is possible, i. e. where the parties have agreed that the whole 
rent become due in advance at the time when the contract was entered into, the 
acceleration clause would not be subject to the rules against penalties. 
3.43 The most controversial case in this regard is the decision of the High Court in 
Lamson Store Serwee Co Lid v. Russell Wilkins and Sons Ltd 117 In this Case in an 
agreement for the leasing of a patented cable system, which was installed by the appellant 
in the respondent's shop, for the period of 10 years, the lessees agreed to pay the rent 
annually in advance, and to operate the system continuously in their shop. It was also 
provided that in the event of any breach of the agreed conditions, or upon the lessee 
115 O'Dea v. Allstates Leasing System(W. A) Pty. Ltd. (1983) 57 A. L. JJL 172, at p. 174 
116 [1974) 2 NSVAA 301 
117 (1906) 4 C. L. R. 672 
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bankruptcy, the whole instalments of rent for the remaining period of the contract would 
immediately become due. Two months after the installation of the system, the respondent 
company was ordered to be wound up, and the appellant claimed to prove the whole 
balance of the ten years' rent in the liquidation. The majority of the High Court upheld 
the claim. Griffith C. J., delivering the main judgment of the Court, construed the 
agreement as one in which the parties had agreed that the entire rental should become due 
and payable in advance at the time of contracting subject to a stipulation giving the lessee 
the right to pay the rent by yearly instalments: 
"In my opinion the agreement now in question expresses a dear intention 
that a sum equal to the rent for ten years shall be paid by the lessees in any 
event. ""' 
Upon this construction, the Chief Justice found the case indistinguishable from The 
protector Endowment Loan Co. v. Grice'19. The dissenting judgment of the court was 
delivered by O'Connor I who considering the terms of the contract, decided that in this 
case the whole amount of the rent had not been due in advance and no more than annual 
instalments could become due every year. He, therefore, concluded: 
"... under these circumstances the facts necessary to make the principle of 
Ae Protector Loan Co. v. Grice applicable do not exist. " 120 
This conclusion led O'Connor J. to consider whether the immediate payment as stipulated 
by the acceleration clause was a genuine pre-estimate of the lessoes probable loss, and he 
finally decided that the clause was no more than a penal stipulation. It should be pointed 
out that the commercial importance of the continued use of the system throughout the 
contractual period was emphasized by the majority of the courtý and in considering the 
case, this aspect of the case has always been highlighted by other courts. 
3.44 This case was referred to with apparent approval in LA-C (Leasing) Ltd v. 
Humphrey 121 . In the 
latter case, an agreement for the lease of a certain equipment 
provided that the lessee should pay the entire rent subject to adjustment of rent as 
provided in clause 4. That clause provided that if during the lease the lessee should 
default in the payment of any rent instalment, then the entire balance of unpaid rents 
I's Ibid., at p. 684 
119 (1880) 5 QBD 592 
120 Ibid., at p. 692 
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would become due, "rebated to reflect their then value, ascertained by applying an 
interest rate of ten per cent per annum to each such instalment over the period by which 
the date for payment thereof is by virtue of this clause brought forward. " Walsh I 
delivering the main judgment of the court, considering the circumstances of the case, 
concluded that the acceleration as provided in cl. 4 was not subject to the rules against 
penalties, and even if it was, the provision of the clause would not constitute a penalty. 
Then he added: 
"That conclusion would be required if the agreement ought to be 
construed in the way in which the majority of this court construed the 
agreement under consideration in Lamson Store Service Co. Ltd v. 
Russell Wilkins & Sons Ltd., that is, as an agreement to pay a total rent, 
being the sum of the monthly instalments, subject only to such adjustments 
as were specified in the agreement. " 122 
Even if the case did not fall within the principles laid down by the Lamson Store case, cl. 
4, in Walsh J's view, would not be a penalty because "the agreement provided its own 
limitation upon the Uability of the lessor to gain a large profit by reason of the equipment 
being repossessed after a relatively short period. "" 
The notable point was that the issue of the correctness of the Lamson Store case was not 
raised in the argument'24 and it might be suggested that its apparent approval in this can 
was mainly because in any event the clause in question did not constitute a penalty. 
3.45 In O'Dea v. Alklates Leasing System(W. A) Pty. Ltd. 125, however, the correctness 
of the Lamson Store case was questioned: In an agreement for the lease of a motor car, it 
was provided that the entire rent of $39,550.32 should be due upon the signing of the 
agreement; however, the lessor was not entitled to enforce the payment of the rent 
otherwise than by the instalments if the lessee performed all his contractual obligations, 
inter alia, punctual payment of instalments. The contract also provided for a termination 
clause by which in the event of the lessee's default in performing any contractual 
obligation, the lessor was entitled to retake possession of the vehicle and terminate the 
121 (1972) 126 C. L. K 131 
122 Aid., at p. 141 
123 Ibid. 
121 See Greig DW& Davis J. L. PL, The Law of Contn4 1987, p. 1456 
175 (1983) 57 AUR 172 
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contract, and upon termination, "all moneys due for unexpired terms would become 
immediately due and payable, plus reasonable costs of repossession". The lessee having 
failed in the payment of the rent, the lessor repossessed the vehicle and sued the lessm 
for the sum of the total rent outstanding. The High Court unanimously held that the 
lessor's contractual right to recover the entire amount of unpaid instalments did constitute 
a penalty. The majority of the court presupposed the correctness -of the principle by 
which if, at the time of contracting, there was an existing debt which, due to the 
indulgence given by the creditor, was payable by instalments, then a clause providing for 
its acceleration in the event of default in punctual payment would not be subject to the 
rules against penalties. However, they held that as a matter of construction this principle 
did not apply to the facts of the case. In other wor4 c; onsidering the whole terms of the 
contract, it could not be concluded that the entire rent was due and payable in advance 
when the contract was made. 126 In considering the Lamson Store'27 case, Gibbs C. J., 
completely reviewing the case, stated 128: 
"In my opinion the principle of cases such as The Protector Loan Co. v. 
GriCeI29 applies where there is a present debt, that is, a debt actually due 
before the breach which accelerated the payment, and with all respect I 
would prefer the reasoning of O'Connor J. to that of Griffith C. J. and 
would hold that in that case there was no present debt for the entire 
amount ... - 
If Lamson Store Service Co. Ltd v. Russell Wilkins & Sons 
Ltd. '" cannot be confined to its own special facts I would decline to 
follow it. " 
Although the Chief Justice paid attention to the special circumstances of the case and the 
commercial importance of the continued use of the subject-matter in the Lamson Store 
case, he found it difficult to see how it could be relevant to the question whether the 
whole rent was due in advance. The other members of the court also cast doubt on the 
correctness of the decision in the Lamson Store case, and Murphy J. emphatically 
suggested that this case should be overruled. 131 On this basis, it has been suggested that 
126 See ibid., at p. 175 per Gibbs CJ, at p. 181 per Wilson J, at p. 185 per Brennan J, and at pp. 198, Igg 
per Deane J. 
127 Lanison Store Service Co. Ltd v. Russell Wilkins & Sons Ltd. (1906) 4 C. L. P, 672 
12BODeav. AlWates Leasing Systent(WA)PIY. Ltd (1983) 57A. L. J. P, 172, at pp. 177-178 
129 (18W) 5 QBD 592 
130 (1906) 4 CLAL 672 
131 0 -Dea V. A IlStateS Leasing SysteM (W, 4) pty. Ltd. (1983) 57 A. L. J. P, 172, at p. 178 
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"the Lmnson Store case is no longer good law" 132 or "one should be cautious before 
attempting to apply such a decision to other cases even if the contract is similar or 
identical. " 133 
3.46 it should be noted that in all these cases the principle by which an acceleration 
clause would not be subject to the penalty doctrine if there was an existing debt- e. g. 
where the whole rent was due in advance at the time of signing the agreement and was 
agreed to be paid by instalments- has not been in doubt. The whole question is, in an 
agreement for lease, how and when, as a matter of construction, it could be said that the 
entire rent is due and payable at the time of contracting, but the agreement of the parties 
has provided for its payment by instalments. The decision of the 11igh Court in O'Dea v. 
AlIstates Leasing Syslem(W. A. ) Ply. Ltd. 134 showed that considering the whole terms of 
the contract and inherent circumstances surrounding it, if the intendon of providing for 
the whole rent to be due in advance at the time of contracting could be attributed to the 
parties, then a clause providing for the acceleration of the entire balance of unpaid rents 
in the event of default would not be subject to the penalty doctrine. 
3.47 Two important issues could be inferred from the O'Dea 135 case. First, in 
determining whether the parties have agreed for the entire rent to be due in advance when 
the contract was made, the mere existence of a provision in the contract stipulating for 
that result should not be regarded as conclusive. As Gibbs C. I. pointed out: 
"If cl. I (a) [the clause providing for the whole rent to be due in advance] 
were read in isolation, it might create a present debt for the entire rental, 
although it would allow the lessee the indulgence of paying the sum due 
by instalments, provided the payments were duly and punctually made .... But the contract must be viewed as a whole, and not In fragments. When 
cII. I(a), 6(a) and 12 [i. e. the termination clause] are read together, it 
becomes apparent that at the date of the contract there was no presently 
e)iisting obligation to pay the instalments, and if there were a default in 
payment of the instalments the whole became payable. " 136 
132 Meagher, Penalties in Chattel Lem, (Essays in Equity, edited by Finn P D), 1985, p. 46 at p. 30 
133 BaMeS, 4 . greed Da=geS ClaUses in FinanCing C4)ntMCtS (I 9S6) 14 ABLR 63, at p. 69 
134 (1983) 57 ALJR 172 
135 O'Dea v. Allstates Leasing System(W. A. ) Pty. Ltd. (1983) 57 A. L. J. P, 172 
136 ibid., at P. 175 [emphasis added] 
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3.48 Secondly, iý in addition to the acceleration clause, the parties provided for a clause 
conferring the Tight of termination and claiming for a "minimum payment", which might 
be equal in amount to the whole balance of the unpaid instalments of the rent, the nature 
of payments under each of these clauses is Merent. In the latter case, the payment is 
characterized as "damages" resulting from breach, while in the former what the lessee has 
to pay is "rent" which, due to his default, has become payable immediately. Therefore, ic 
upon default, the lessor claimed for the accelerated amount of rentals, and then because 
of the lessee's default in paying the accelerated sum terminated the contract, the sum 
claimed would cease to be characterized as rent, and become payable as dwnages which 
is undoubtedly subject to the law relating penalties. In other words, as Deane J., in the 
course of his judgement stated: 
"Once Allstates [the lessor] elected to terminate the hiring and retake 
possession of the machine pursuant to the provision of cl. 12 [i. e. the 
termination clause], its rights against the lessees in respect of moneys 
attributable to the unexpired term of the hiring which it had terminated 
were the rights conferred by cl. 12. The amount payable under that clause 
was not the balance of the agreed payment for thirty-six months! hiring. It 
was not a payment for hire at all: it became payable as a consequence of 
the lessees! breach when Allstates elected under cl. 12 to terminate the 
hiring by depriving the lessees of possession and use of the machine which 
Was the subject of the hiring. "137 
137 Ibid., at p. 188 
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Chapter 4 
Breach, a Prerequisite for the Application of the 
Penalty Doctrine 
Introduction 
4.01 The rules relating to the distinction between penalties and liquidated damages are 
applicable where there is a breach of contractual undertakings between the contracting 
parties. ' K therefore, A breached his contract with B, and a sum had been stipulated to 
be payable upon his breach, then the question of that sum being a penalty or liquidated 
damages would arise. This is considered as a settled principle in the English law and 
during decades cases, though discussing the different aspects of this principle and 
sometimes criticizing it, have always applied it to factual scenarios. 
The principle however brings about some anomalies, speciaUy where it is applied to 
agreed sums provided to be paid upon termination of the contract. Termination may, 
according to the terms of the contrack be triggered off by the promisor's breach, 
happening of some events other than breach, or exercise of an option by the promisor to 
bring the contract to an end. The issue of the applicability of the penalty doctrine, in this 
regard, may raise some important questions: Whether the doctrine could have any 
application at all to a sum of money provided to be paid upon termination? in case of 
applicability, should the cam where termination is based upon breach be tt-eated 
differently from cases when the contract is brought to an end for the happening of some 
events other than breach? And in any event, could such a treatment be regarded as 
satisfactory? These are the sort of questions which the first section of this chapter will 
deal with, after elaborating the conventional approach towards the role of breach in the 
I FUmd= M P, Cheshire, MOO &- Fufmftu's L41W of Cmnt=4 13th ed., 1996, p. 638; Chitty on Cmtracu6 27th 0&, V& 1,19%, Form, 26-064 at p. 1257; 7hitel OR, The Law of Contract, 9th ed, Iggs, p. 930; Ogus, The Law of DamMM 1973, pp. 56-57; Bunm A, Rented' forTamaWBreach 
Of CA)nuag, (2nd e&, 1994), p. 331; Flunnston M P, Conuig Ph=irjV L4qujdMW Damages, Deposits 
aW the Foresocability Rule (1991) 4 JCL 1, at p. 8; Fridum 0H1, Hirepurchase: Estoppelpogties 
(1961) 24 NILR 302, at pp. 307-508 ; Waklerbum YLW., Hire-purchase, pmdties, Freedotnof CAN%Md 
[19611 CLJ 156; Mu*w, Pwdties iU ChOd LAGN (Chapter 3 of Tos" in Equity" by Finn, P D), 
1985,46, at pp. 50-51 
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application of the penalty doctrine. In the second section, the possibility of the 
application of the penalty doctrine to alternative promises will be considered. Such 
promises are normally of a character that by performing either of the alternatives, the 
promisor is discharged from his contractual obligations. The question of the applicability 
of the doctrine normally arises where one of these alternatives is the payment of a certain 
sum of money. Acccqfting breach as a prerequisite for the application of the penalty 
doctrine, when and how could the application of the doctrine to such a promise, fiwied 
as in alternative., be justified? This is the main issue which we will attempt to analyse in 
the second section. 
1. The applicability of the doctrine where there Is a breach 
I. I. The Conventfonal Approach 
4.02 The quation of an agreed sum being a penalty or liquidated diumages doM as it 
was refwed to, arise where it has been provided to be paid upon breach. The main effect 
of this principle is that where a sum of money was stipulated to be payable on the 
occurrence of some events other than breach, it would be recoverable without any penalty 
analysis. In Alder v. Moore, the defendant, a professional footballer, was paid 1500 by 
the plaintiff under an insurance policy after his injury and providing a certificate which 
showed that he was no longer able to play professional football. The payment was 
subject to his declaration not to play professional football again: 
0 In consideration of the above payment I hereby declare and agree that I 
will take no part as a playing member of any form of professional football 
and that in the event of hiffingement of this condition I will be subject to a 
penalty of the amount stated above. " 
After a few months, the plaintiff recovered and entered into professional football 
As to the plaintiffs action to claim OW under the declaration, the majority of the Court 
of Appeal construed the declaration as not imposing the plaintiff a promise not to play 
professional football again, and so his starting to play professional football was not 
recognised as a breach of an undertaking. The only effect was that by entering into 
professional football, the plaintiff had agreed to repay 1500, and since there was no 
breach of a contractual promise, the plaintiffs contention that the stipulated sum was a 
1196112 QB 57,11961] 2 WLR 426.1196111 AH ER 1; for a cridW conWdmdm of the cm we Go 
(1961) 24 bff. R 637 
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pe, Wty and not recoverable was rejected. The majority of the court believed that, them 
being no breach of contract, the question of a penalty did not arise, and the stipulated 
3 
amountý as a sum provided to be paid on the happening of an event, could be recovered . 
4.03 This principle has been emphasized in numerous cases, although some dissenting 
judgements have criticized its application in relation to hire-purchase contracts. 5 In its 
rather recent judgernent, Export Credts Guarantee Department (ECGD) v Universal 
Oil Products Co-6, the House of Lords implicitly approved the previous cases and 
confirmed the view that the question of the application of the penalty doctrine would not 
3 Similarly, a clause providinS for the buyer's option to extend the date for taldng delivery upon Payment 
of a "carrying charW bas ban regarded as outside the scope of the rules against penalties, because the 
delay cannot be categorized as breech. sM e. g., 7U& A Gonzalez Corp. v. F. R Waring (International) 
(Pty) Ltd. [198012 Lkrj& Rep. 160, where, as to the Vuyees argument to the effect that the stipulation 
ft)r payment of the canymg charge amounted to a penalty, Megaw Li (with whom Shaw and Waller LJJ 
agreed) held: "... this contrad was indeed a contract in which there was Provision for an extension, so 
that the provWon of a ship during that extended period would not constitute a breach of contract. ... Accordingly, I think that, on the penalty pom the lkwmed judge was right (at p. 163) Adwer J, at 
the first instance, had rejected the buyers' argument on the ground, inter alla, that the charges did not 
amount to a spocifibed sum of money Provided lo be paid upon a breach of the contract. see also Richoo 
International Ltd v. APvd C. Toepfer International G. M. B. H. (A* Bondq) [1"1] 1 Lloyds Rep. 136, 
where Potter L said: 4since Me buyer has a right to extend the shipmet period on Shing proper notice, it 
seems to me that the obligation to pay carrying charges as provided is better regarded as the price to be 
paid for that extension than as a liquidated damage provision in respect of a breach. " at p. 143 
4 Olester & Cole v. Wright (1930) UnMOA4 see infra, note 17; Re Apex &pply Co. [194211 Ch. 109; 
AmodatedDistributors v. Hall [1938] 2 KB 83, [1938] 1 All ER 511 ; Bridge v. Campbell Dwount Co. 
Ltd 11962] AC 600; &erfing Industrial Facilities Ltd v. Lydiate TexUles Ltd (1962) 106 SY 669, where 
Diplock LJ has been reported as having said: "A Penalty was a sum agreed to be paid in the event of non- 
performance of a contractual obligation. Hem these was no question of any breach of obligation, but the 
defendants were sued in respect of sums payable in a specified eventuality. ... This might have been an 
improvident bargain but the law did no relieve ageing improvident bargains where the parties wen at 
arm Is length ... 
"; Eqwf Credits Guanwlee Department (ECGD) v. Universal Oil Prodkets Co. IIM]I 
WLR 399, [1"3] 2 All ER 203; Trw&sag Haukige Ltd v. Leykad DAFRnance Pie. [199412 BCLC U, 
at p. 98 per Knox L; set also the Australian can o(I. A. C, (LeasirW Ltd v. Humphrey (1972) 126 CLR 
13 1. It could basically be argued that the rules against Penalties- as stated by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop 
Neumadc 7)OFT CO. Ltd v. New GaNge and Motor Ca. Ltd [1915] AC 79, and Lord HalArmy LC in 
Cl-w*bw* FAgineering and AiPbuilding Co. v. Dan Jose Pm= Yzquier& y Cotaneda [ 19051 AC 6. 
have been gated in the context of a breach of contract. 
see, for example, Judgements of Lmds Denning and Devlin in Bridge v. Campbell Dwount Co. Ltd 
11962] AC 600 -, Again Judgment of Iord Denning in United Dwninions Trum Ommvicial) Ltd v. 
F, mds [196811 QB 34,11967] 3 WLR 1.11967] 2 Ali ER 345 
6 [193311 WLR 399. [199312 All ER 205 ; at dw the deddon of visomm simonda in Tool Afetal 
Manufactwing Co. Ltd v. 7kngslen ElecWc Co. Ltd [195511 WLR 761 at p. 767; also in the recent 
Scottish cast of EFT Conmercial Ltd v. Security Change Ltd (No 1) [ IMI SLT 128, it wa emphatically 
held that, both in EnghW arid Scod" the penalty doctrine could have no application in a can which 
is not a cm of breach of contract: See at p. 131,133 per I-Ord Hope, at p. 134 per IA)rd Weir, and at p. 
135 per Iord Cýapliuk; see dso CvwwRnance Ltd v. Liquidator ofEastore LtA 119741 SLT 296 
133 
arise where there was no breach between the two contracting parties. The facts of this 
can were complex: Under a series of contracts, A engaged in the building of an oil 
refinery. The financing of the project was promised by a consortium of Bankers, B, who 
undertook to pay the defendants as work proceeded, in consideration of the receipt of 
some promissory notes from k The payment of the promissory notes, issued by A to B, 
was guaranteed by the plaintiffs who did this in consideration of a premium paid to them 
by the defendants under a contract between them, a clause of which provided for the 
reimbursement of the plaintiffs by the defendants where A dishonoured any promissory 
notes if defendants were in breach of the construction contract. Some promissory notes 
being dishonoured by A, the phLintiffs paid a sum of L39 million to B and claimed it from 
the defendants under the reimbursement clause, contending that the defendants were in 
breach of the construction contract when A dishonoured the promissory notes. The 
defendants argued that the reimbursement clause was a penalty since it imposed on the 
defendant an undertaking to reimburse the plaintiffs irrespective of the loss caused by the 
breach and seriousness or triviality of the breach. This argument was r0ected by the 
House of Lords emphasizing the fact that the clause had only provided for the 
reimbursement of a sum which in fad the plaintiffs had lost; and even if the penalty 
doctrine had applied to the cue, the stipulated sum would have never constituted a 
penalty. However. the House held that the penalty doctrine was not applicable hem 
since the payment had been Stipulated on the happening of an event which was not a 
breach of the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants. Lord Roskill, delivering 
the main judgment of the House, held: 
"The clause was not a penalty clause because it provided for payment of 
money on the happening of a specified event other than a breach of a 
contractual duty owed by the contemplated payer to the contemplated 
pay -0 
4.04 The position of the common law, therefore, can be summed up by saying that the 
distinction between penalties and liquidated damages is only relevant if there is a breach 
of a contractual promise between the contracting parties. The reason for this limited 
approach on the scope of the doctrine, it has been suggested, is that "it has never been the 
function of the courts to relieve a party from a contract on the mere ground that it proves 
INd.. at p. 4M (WI» md p. 2U (AU M 
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to be onerous or imprudent"'. The scope of any interference on the equitable grounds is 
well established and if the courts relieve a party on the mere: ground of harshness or 
oppression, then as stated by Holroyd Pearce LJ in Campbell Discount Co. Ltd v. 
Bridge'9, "it would be a novel extension for the law ... 0. Such an extension, considering 
the fitet that equity would not interfem with freely negotiated conuwts, even if it turns 
out to be harsh or disadvantageous to One Of the parties unless there was a fiwd, sharp 
practice, mistake or any other improper or unconscionable conductlo, and paying 
attention to the fitmous principle that "the Chancery mends no mans bargain"" would not 
bejustifiable. 
1.1 Confusion on the application of the pdnciple to termination clauses 
4.05 Some difficulties might arise where the principle, discussed above, is applied to 
termination clausm especially in hireý-purchase contracts. in then contractk it is 
normally provided that on the occurrence of some specific events, like death 12 , or 
bankruptcy of the him, as well as the breach of contrika by him, the owner has the right 
to terminate the contract. Moreover, the hirer usually has the option to terminate the 
agreement by returning the goods. Upon termination, it is normally provided that the 
hirer would be liable to pay a specific sum of money, normally up to a specified portion of 
the hire-purchase price. taldng into account all the previous payments. When dimming 
the applicability of the penalty doctrine to such a payment, it might first appear that this 
payment- normally called as a "minimum payment"- has been stipulated upon termination, 
and once termination is naturally different from breach, so the question of the 
I AW7-UDC Finww Ltd v. Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, per Mwn & Wilson Jj at p. 194, cifmg 
ECGD, ibid, at pp. 402-403 (223-224) 
[1961] 2 WLR 596, at p. 604 
I* See Kilfnl v. firliLlh COlumbla 00chwd bwds, Ltd [ 1913] AC 3 19; &eedman v. Drinkl# [ 19 1611 
AC 275 ; Musun v. Van Diemen's Land Co. 119381 CIL 253; and especiWly Stwnawr v. johnson [1954] 
1 QB 476; see Also Fridman, GJLL. (1961) 24 WR 502, at p. 509; Wedderburn KW. [1%11 C. L. J. 
156, at p. 158 
11 Harman LJ, firmly adhering to this Principle, disapproved the efforts of those who try to invent new 
equities, saying: *1 think LAW Denning is one of them-, CbmAell Diwount Co. Ltd v. Bridge 1196112 
WLR 596, at p. 605 ; nevedwWo, both Hamum and pe&m Ljj. regmtted the unnds&ctay remft 
which in some cum the principle might cause. See Infra, Pam 4.29 
12 Under as. 86 and 87 of the Censumer Craft Act 1974, wheM the Provisions of the Act is appHcWft a 
clause pmviding for the determination an the hirees death is either indWdve or eurcissWe by the order 
of the coum 
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applicability of the penalty doctrine would not arise. With some more attention, however, 
it would seem necessary to distinguish terminations based on breach of the contract and 
those which are triggered off by some events other than breach. It is, therefore, 
appropriate to diwuss the subject in separate divisions. Moreover, under the provisions 
of the Hire-Purchase Act 1%5, replaced now by the Consumer Credit Act 197413, the 
legislature took a hartrionized approach towards both terminations based on breach and 
those which are not triggered off by the breach of contract. Thus, where these provisions 
operate, the above distinction, based on the developments of caw law during yaus, will 
have no application. Thus, the relevant provisions of these Acts me also worthy of a 
rather detailed discussion. 
1.2.1. Termination based on breach 
4.06 Over many years, case law has had so many developments regarding the application 
of the penalty doctrine to cases where a sum of money has been stipulated to be paid 
upon terminations which are based on breach of the contract. At &s; t, it was thought 14 
that the rules distinguishing liqWdated damages from penalties had no application when 
the money had been provided to be payable upon termination, regardless of the fact 
whether termination had been based on breach of a contractual undertaking or other 
events like the hirees death or bankruptcy or his option to exercise his right to terminate 
the contract. 
4.07 The reason for this, it was supposed, was that firstly the operation of the penalty 
doctrine is where the stipulated sum had been provided to be paid as damages upon 
breach of contract. Here the amount was stipulated to be paid upon termination, and 
therefore if there was any damage to the owner, it was the result of his own act in 
determining the agreement, not because ot for tKample, the hirer being in arrears; and 
any interference as to such damages was regarded as being outside the scope of the 
13 it diould be =*d dw tM PwWom of the Hire-P=hase Act 1965 an am applicable to the contracts 
made before May 19,1985. 
14 ELmy & Co. Ltd v. H>*. only reported, apparently, in jones and proudfooes Notes on Ifire Purchase 
Law, 2nd ed., 1926, p. 107, and rderred to in Re Apex &pply Co. (19421 1 Ch. 108 and in Cooden 
Engineering Co. v. SYanford [1953] 1 QB 96 ; Also dicta inRe Apex Supply Co., ibid. 
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penalty doctrine. The reasoning of Salter I in Mmy v. H . ), 
*is supported this argumet: 
*The Ria that the hirer is in arrear with his payments win not entitle the 
owner to any damages for depreciation of these things. The reason that 
they have suffered is that they have second-hand goods put on their hands 
before they have received very much money in respect of them. That is 
not the result of the hirees breach of contract, in being late in his 
payments, it is the result of their own election to determine the hiring, and 
there is no question whether the sum paid shall be regarded as liquidated 
damages or penalty. " 
Secondly, it was difficult to accept that providing for a sum of money to be paid upon 
termination should be regarded as a valid stipulation when termination had been based 
upon events other than breach and the same sum might be considered as a penalty where 
the owner had determined the contract fbr the hirees breach. As Salter J. in another part 
of his judgment argued: 6 
"It appears to me that no question of penalty could arise in such a case, 
and if this sum is not a penalty where it is payable on the determination of 
the hiring by the owner, by reason of the levy execution, it seems to me it 
would be a strange result if it were to be held a penalty where it is payable 
on the termination of the hiring by the owner on the ground of non- 
payment of rent by the hirer. " 
17 4.09 This view, which had been approved in some cases . was the law until the decision 
of the Court of Appeal in Cooden Engineering Co. v. StWord' where in a hire-purchase 
of a motorcar, the defendants, the hirer, fell into arm and the plaintift retaking the 
possession of the sutiect-matter and terminating the agreement claimed to recover from 
the defendants- under the minimum payment clause. the balance of the instalments. ne 
n*ority of the Court of Appeal (Jenkins LJ dissenting) held that the sum claimed was a 
penalty and not recoverable. Jenkins LJ, delivering the dissenting judgement and applying 
15 Aid, at P. III 
16 Ibld 
17 Re Apex Supply Co. Ltd [194211 Ch. log ; Chemer & Cole, Ltd v. Wright (Unreported) its U=Mcript 
can be ftmd in Jones &W Proudiboes Notes on Him Purchase Law, 2nd ed., p. 124, and it was referred 
to in Re Apex Supply Co. Ltd, Ibid. and Cooden Fn9ineering Co. v. Stanford 11953] 1 QB 86-, in this 
caM Greer LJ (at p. 130) pointed out "... it may vvy wdl be that the view which is, I thirjk, the viewof 
Salter J., in ELW & Co. Ltd v. H)4e, which was cited before ur,,, is the right way to look at this CIUM 
namely, that is not either liquidated damages or a penalty, but it is a sum payable in respect of one event, 
namely, the determination and end of the hiring agreement, whether that end of hiring agreemm juises 
from the hirer delimmag the car back again, or whether it mum from the owner Wjdn it out of the 
possession of the hirer in the events in which be is entitled to take it out. * 
1# [195311 QB 36 
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the decision of Salter J in Ersey v. H)&*19,, held: 
"In order to be such [the stipulated sum to be payable upon determination 
of the hiring to be a penalty in the relevant sense at all], the sum in 
question must ... be ... a sum which the hirer undertakes to pay to the 
owners in the event ot and in respect oC some breach by the hirer of the 
tam of the hire-purchase agreement. " 
Then his lordship- describing the facts of the case, particularly the termination clause- 
added: 
"[In this case] it is not payable because the hirer has committed a breach of 
contract (which he need not necessarily have done) but because the hiring 
has been detennined. "20 
Moreover, he based his judgement on the point that it seemed impossible for the 
covenanted sum to be a valid stipulation where determination had been based upon some 
events like death of the hirer or presentation of a winding-up petition against the hirer 
(being a company) and the same sum to be regarded as having a penal character "where 
the determination by reason of which it becomes payable happens to be brought about by 
notice founded on or autornitically by some breach of contract on the pan of the hirer. "" 
4.09 The majority did not accept these arguments d ISey ý&22 an implicitly held that E v. H, 
had wrongly been decided. Hodson Ii stated that he found it difficult "to see the validity 
of the distinction between a claim to receive payment of a sum of money because of a 
right to determine arising from breach of contract and a claim to receive payment of the 
same sum by reason of breach of contract giving a right to determine. "23 Also Somervell 
LJ, declaring his explicit disagreement with the suggestion of Salter I on the point that if 
a sum is payable on the occurrence of some events, "if it is not a penalty in one case, it 
cannot be in the other*, held: 
"The events may in fact be so similar that a conclusion on one decides the 
other. ... But it cannot, I think, Mow as a matter of law that a sum 
exigible for a breach cannot in law be a penalty because it is made payable in the happening of some other event which is not a breach. "24 
19 Supa., note 14 
20 COO&n Engineering Co. v. SUmford 11953] 1 QB 86, at p. 110 
21 Ibid., at P. I 11 
22 ssfpra., note 14 
23 Cooden Engineering Co. Ltd v. Stanford [195311 QB 86, at p. 116 
24 Ibid., at P. 96 
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4.10 The majoritys view, insist: ing on the substance and not merely the form of the 
agreement seems to be preferable, though to some extent it interferes with the sanctity of 
contracts. 25 it is because that in deciding upon the nature of an agreed sum, the 
substance of the clause, and not its form, should be considered. As stated by Lord 
Radcliffe in BHdge v. Campbell Discount Co. Ltd 2ý citing Lord Davey in the Qw*bank 
E*ineeying2' case, "the coures jurisdiction to relieve against penalties depends on a 
-question not of words or of form of speech, but of substance and of things"" . 
28 
It should also be noted that deciding upon the application of the penalty doctrine merely 
according to the form of the clause would have the undesirable consequence that the law 
on penalties could, by skdfW draftsman hip, easily be evaded. Put another way, by 
drafting the hiring agreement in a way that the contract could be terminated on the 
happening of some other events, as well as breach, and by stipulating the ii 
payment upon termination, the applicability of the law relating penalties- and therefore 
the interference of the courts to protect the weaker contracting party- would be negated. 
4.11 Thus, where termination of the contract is based upon breach of a contractual 
undertaking, the sum provided to be paid upon termination would clearly be subject to 
the penalty doctrine-29' Such a nun, if it could not be considered as a genuine pre- 
estimate of the anticipated damages which could conceivably flow from 
breach/termination3 , might be struck out as being a penalty. Thi has be 
10 s principle en 
applied in numerous cases: 31 In Lamdm Trust Ltd V. HUrreII32, for exatnple, in a hire- 
25 See G. W. Cheyne (1933) 11 C. LJ. 439, pp. 439-M 
26 [1962] AC 600, at p. 624 
27 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [19051 
AC 6, at p. 15 
28 Set also the speech of Mason & Wilson JJ. in the Australian case of Ak*EV-UDCRn4n" Ltd. V. 
Austin (1986) 162 MR 170, at pp. 184-195 
29 McOW on Damages, 15th e&, IM, para. 514 ; Burrows A, RemWies for Torts Ng Breachof 
Ca*vct, Ond a&, 1994). p. 332; Ogus, TI)e Law of Damages, 1973, pp. 59-59; Treitel G. J-L, The Law of Conumt, 9th e&, 1"5, p. 904; Chqync (1953) 11 C. L. L 439, pp. 439-W; Meagher, Penalties in ChgW 
Lem (Chapter 3 of "Essays in Equity' by Finn, P D), 1985,46, at p. 51 
30 Where the breach is a breach of confton or a fWxIamental or rtpullatogy, breach. This situationwill 
shortly be discussed. See infra., chapter 5, section 4 
31 See, for example, the decmon of the House of Lords m &Itke v. Ctmpbel, Dinount Co. Ltd [1962] 
AC 600 ; Lamdon Trust Ltd v. Hurrell [195511 WLR 391 ; United Dominion 7)w& (Commercial) Ltd v. 
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purchase agreement the defendant, the hirer, failed to pay the fifth instalment of the price. 
The plaintiffis terminated the contract, retook the possession of the subject matter, resold 
it and claimed from the defendant, under the "minimum payment" clause, a sum of money 
to bring up the hires payment up to the approximately three-quarters of the purchase 
price. The court, applying the decision of the Court of Appeal in Cooden Engineefing 
Co. Ltd v. StwforiP, held that the stipulated sum could not be regarded as a genuine 
pre-estimate of damages, but was an extravagant and extortionate sum held in tefforem. 
It was therefore a penalty and not recoverable. Denning LJ, in the course of his 
judgement, stated: 
"At one time it was thougbi that the courts of this country were powerless 
to interfere with clauses such as this, but I am glad to say that in Cooden 
Engimering Co. Ltd v. Stmford", the Court of Appeal held that if the 
clause imposes a penalty (as opposed to liquidated damages) it is invalid 
and Unenforceable. "33 
1.2.2. Termination not based upon breach 
4.12 From the conventional approach, that the penalty doctrine is only applicable where 
there is a breach of contract, it follows that where termination is not based upon breach 
of contract, the rules distinguishing liquidated damages from penalties would have no 
application. m It should, therefore, be noted that the treatment of the termination based 
upon breach of a contractual promise in the same way as the breach itself has no extended 
application in the context of determining whether the penalty doctrine is applicable. The 
reason for this seems to be that in case of termination based on breach, though the 
promisee! s contractual right to claim the minimum payment results from termination, 
Ennis [1969] 1 QB 54, at pp. 65,68,69 ; Amcing Ltd v. Ilaidock [1963] 2 QB 104 ; Mw position in 
AusaWia is apparen* the =me: see O'Dea v. Allmates Leasing System (WA) Pty. Ltd (1993) 57 
A. L. LR. 172 ; AA&V-UDC Rnance Ltd Y. Austin (1986) 162 CLR 170, at pp. 184-185 per Maeon & 
Wilson JJ. and at pp. 210-211 per Dawson L; Le&ws (Aust. ) Pty. Ltd v. Westley 11964-65] N. S. W. R. 
2091 
32 Aid 
33 [1953] 1 QB 86 
34 Ibid 
35 Lamdon Trust Ltd v. Burrell [1955] 1 WLR 391, at pp. 393-394 
36 FWT=M M P, Contma PlxuirAV UquWated Damages, Deposits and the Formability Rule (1991) 4 
jCL 1, at p. a; McGrW an Damem 15th e&, 1938, pm& 515 ; 71, eitel G. IL, The L&W of ConUj(j, 
gth a&, 1995, p. 904; Burmws A, Remedies for Torts wxl Brach of Contrect, (2nd ed., 1994), p. 332; OSA The Law of Dama^ 1973, pp. 58-59 ; Meagher, Peraddes m Chad Lem (Ch"r 3 of *EWwp 
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there is also a breach of contract upon which the termination is based . 
37 ]3ut When 
termination is grounded on some events other than breach, there is no breach of the 
contract to be the ban for the application of the penalty doctrine. 
4.13 The application of this principle can clearly be seen in a number of cases: In 
Chester & Cole v. Wilgh?, in a hire-purchase agreement, the owner, because of the 
hirees death, determined the contract. The Divisional Court came to the conclusion that 
the stipulated sum to be paid on the occurrence of some events- inter afia, the hirees 
death- was recoverable. Greer LJ, in considering the application of the penalty doctrine 
to the case, held that the stipulated sum was neither a penalty nor liquidated damages, "it 
was a sum payable in respect of one event, namely, the determination and end of the 
hiring agreement... ". Ifis lordship argued: 
"There is no reason in law why, for a sufficient consideration, there should 
not be in the same document two contracts, one a contract to hire the 
motor-car on the terms of the agreement, and another, a contract that if 
that agreement comes to an end, then a certain sum will be payable by the 
hirer. " 
4.14 In Re Apex Supply Co. 3ý upon the hirer's company going into liquidation, the 
owner, under a contractual right, determined the hiring agreement. On a summons taken 
out by the owner company, claiming to prove the stipulated sum under the minimum 
payment clause, Simonds I held that in this case no question of penalty arose and the 
liquidators of the hiring company had to admit the proof of the stipulated amount. 
4.15 Also in AuocWed Diswbutors v. HaIPO, in a hire-purchase agreement, the 
defendant, the hirer, exercised his option to terminate the contract. As to the plaintiffs 
in EqWty* by Finn P D), p. 51 
37 McGmgDr, loc. cit., pam 515 
38 Uhmported, the ti=sctipt can be found in Jones and Proudibot's Notes on Hire-Pwrchase Law, 2nd ad., 
p. 124 ; it bas also bm refuted to in Re APa SkP* CO. [194211 Cb. 108 and Cooden Engineering 
CO. Ltd v. Sanford 11953) 1 QB 86 
39 [1942] 1 Ch. log-, we also the Scottish case of EFT Connercial Ltd v. Security Change Ltd (No 1) 
119931 SLT 128 (Termination by the lessor of a lease upon the appointment of a nxeiver to the leaff. 
the lesm's claim to recaw the sum of money payable upon tam-duation was riot regaded as subject to 
the law apinst penalties) 
40 [1938] 2 KB 93 
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claim to recover the arrears, of the rent and some fin-ther sums under the ** 
payment clmLse, it was held that no question as to the stipulated sum being liquidated 
damages or penalty arose, and therefore the amount for which the hirer had made himself 
liable could be recovered. In the course of his judgement, Slesser LJ, indicating that the 
payment of the stipulated amount is a condition for exercising the hirer's option to 
terminate the agreement, pointed out: 
"He (the hirer] has exercised an option and the terms on which he may 
exercise the option are those set out in cl. 7. The question therefore 
whether these payments constitute liquidated damages or a penalty in the 
instances mentioned does not arise in the present case. "41 
4.16 This principle, however, has been criticized in some cases: In Bridge v. Campbell 
Discount Co. LW2, a hire-purchase agreement was entered into by the parties. The hirer 
after having paid an initial payment and one monthly instalment of the purchase price 
wrote to the finance company saying: "I am very sorry but I will not be able to pay any 
more payments on the Bedford Dormobile. " A clause of the agreement gave the right of 
termination to the hirer if he wanted to exercise his option and to the owner on the 
happening of some events, inter afta, the hirees breach. Upon termination, it was 
provided that the hirer should pay to the owners by way of agreed compensation for 
depreciation of the subject-matter such fiuther sums to make the rentals paid and payable 
equal to two-thirds of the hire-purchase price. Receiving the hirees letter, the finance 
company claimed for a sum of money under the minimum payment clause. The Court of 
Appealo construed the letter as an exercise of the contractual right to terminate by the 
hirer, and therefore, applying the decision in Associated Distributors v. Hall", held that 
no question of penalty arose since the hirer had exercised his option and the ii 
41 JbId., at p. 83 ; OW 9W the decidon of the Court of Appeal in GouWan Diwount Co. Ltd v. Harnm 
(1962) 106 SJ 369, in which the am (Willmer IJ dissenting) held that the hirer bad warcised his 
option to terminate the agreement and upon this umnination, the minimum payment dm mme to 
operation. Although the stipulated sum would have constituted a penalty, had the owner oonqwW 
determined won the hhes browh. no question of penalty arose hem, bemuse the termhudon had been 
bmd upon the awrcise by the hirer of his option to determine and the stipulated amount was 
fewverabje. 11bg stipuWW sum was tins held to be recoverable. 
42 [1962] AC 600 
43 The decision of the Court of Appeal IMLB been reported in: [1961] 1 QB 445 ; 11961] 2 WLR 596 
[196112 All ER 97 
44 [193812 XB 93 
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payment was a consideration for the exercise of the option. On appeal, the House of 
Lords treated the letter as indicating the hirees willingness to break the contract and i 
the tennination of the hiring had happened upon breach, the House held the penalty 
doctrine to be applicable and in fita the stipulated sum to be a penalty. 
4.17 Although the House, by treating the agreement as a contract terminated upon 
breach and therefore the position as in Cooden Engineering Co. Ltd v. Simfords, 
side-stepped the important question whether the Court of Appeal was right in holding that 
the question of the applicability of the penalty doctrine did not arise where the hirer had 
exercised his option to terminate the agreeznentý the members of the House, nonetheless, 
except Lord Radcliffe who reserved his judicial opinion, expressed their view on the 
issue. Viscount Simonds and Lord Morton adhered to the conventional approach, while 
Lord Denning and on a narrower ground Lord Devlin cast a serious doubt on its 
correctness. Viscount Simonds thought that the hirer had agreed to pay a price to be able 
to exercise his option: 
"It [clause 61 confers on the hirer a right for which he agrees to pay a 
price. He need not exercise it if he does not want to. "46 
Lord Morton, emphasizing on the point that *the person to whom the option is given is 
free to exercise it or to disregard it, as he thinks fit*47agreed holding that the provision 
conferring an option to determine an agreement cannot be a penalty. Lord Dennin& 
having declared that As=iated Disftlbutdrs v. Hall" has wrongly been decided, was of 
the idea that "the courts have power to grant relief against the penal sum contained in this 
minimum payment" clause no matter for what reason the hiring is terminated. "" His 
lordship also pointed out: 
"The "minimum payment" clause is single and indivisible, and no just 
distinction can be drawn between the cases where the hirer is in breach 
and where he is not. "so 
43 [195311 QB 86 
46 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. Ltd [ 19621 AC 600, at p. 613 
47 jbid, at pp. 616-617 
48 [1938] 2 KB 93 
49 Bridge v. CwnpbeU Discount C% Ltd [ 1962] AC 600, at p. 63 1 
So Md 
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Finally, Lord Devlin, indicating also that the decision in the Hall caseý' was wr; OMý 
agreed with the conclusion reached by Lord Denning, but based his argument on a rather 
narrower ground and said: 
*I do not sm how an agreement can be genuine for one purpose and a 
sham for another. If it is a sham, it means that it was never made and does 
not exist; if it does not exist, it must be ignored altogether: it cannot be a 
part of clause 9 when that clause is applied by virtue of clause 6 or clause 
8 and a part of it when it is applied by virtue of clause 7. "52 
As it appears from the passage quoted above, Lord Morton emphasized the indivisibility 
of the minimum payment clause and that it cannot be a valid stipulation where the 
contmct is terminated by virtue of the exercise of the hirers option or because of the 
happening of some events other than breach as provided for in the contract, and a void 
and unenforceable provision where terniination is based upon the breach of the contract 
by the hirer. 
4.19 Since on this point the opinions in the House of Lords were equally divided, so it 
appears that the decision of the Court of Appeal on this issue remains on foot and 
therefore the conventional approach that the courts have no power to interfere where 
termination has been based upon some events other than breach still seem to represent 
the law. Accordingly if the agreement was terminated by the hirer because of the exercise 
of his option under the contract or by the owner on the occurrence of the stipulated 
events other than breach, as to the sum provided to be paid upon termination, the 
question of being a penalty or liquidated damages would not arise. 
4.19 Another case of this type is United Dominions Yhw (Commercial) Ltd V. FMdSS3 
in which the scenario was very similar to that of BHdge v. Cwnpbell Discount Co. W 54. 
The Court of Appeal there was careU to hold that the hirees letter had not been an 
exercise by him Of the Option tO determine. " but the finance company had to be taken to 
Associated DWIbufbmv. Hall[19318) 2 KB 83 
32 Bridge v. Cmpbell Discmt Co. Ltd. [ 19621 AC 600, at P. 634 
53 [1969] 1 QB 54 
34 [1962] AC 600 
55 The court 41id not achieve this result in a similar can: GOMIMon Discomt Co. Ltd v. Hamm (1962) 
106 s. j. 369, in this cm tbough the hivers had declared their inability to go on with the conusa in a 
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have tenninated the agreement for the hirees breach in non-payment of the monthly 
instahnents. Tbus, the penalty doctrine was held to be applicable to the stipulated amount 
to be paid upon termination, and in fitct the sum, not being a genuine pre-estimate of the 
likely actual losses, was held to constitute a penalty. Again, two members of the court56 
were equally divided on the point whether the penalty doctrine would have been 
applicable if the agreement had been determined by the exercise of the hirees option. 
t7 Lord Denning M. R. empha&ed his previous view that Ammiated DisMbutors v. Hal 
was wrongly decided, and it was open to the court to reconsider this decision. 38 Hammn 
however, thought that to apply the penalty doctrine, there had to be a breach, stating: 
"I do not think you can have a penalty without a breach of contract.. . "59 
Critical Ana"Is of the Principle 
1.3.1. Anomalies ResuNng Mrm the Pdnciplo 
4.20 The principle that a breach of contractual undertaking is a prerequisite to the 
application of the penalty doctrine, particularly in relation to its application to termination 
clauses, raises some unsatisfactory anomalies. First, the principle makes it easy for the 
application of the penalty doctrine to be avoided by skffW drafting. Second, it gives rise 
to clearly unjust consequences in relation to hire-purchase and other similar contracts. 
LILL AvelAffnee of the applicadon of the docbine byski&Idrqfdxg 
4.21 The distinction between the situation where there is a breach and where there is not 
can easily be avoided by skilffil draftsmanship. " A clever and e)Tefienced draftsman 
could draw the contract in a way that the specified money would be payable on an event 
which could not be considered as a breach of contract, and would therefore avoid the 
IcW, the COUrt COnStrUW the lcW as CXCICising an option to terminate by the hirer. Willma Ij, the dissenting judr, thought that the IMN Should be Construed as a plain brewh of contram lUvk his 
lordship, applying the law against penalties, held that the agreed sum to be paid upon termination 
constituted a penalty. 
% Salmon IJ did riot express his opinion on the 
57 [1938] 2 KB 83 
58 United Dominidw Trust (Cononercial) Ltd v. Ennis f 1968] 1 QB 54, at p. 64 
" Aid, at p. 67 
60 Funns" M P, CoýmtW Planning: Liquidated DMAM Dqxxits and the Foresecability Rule (1991) 4 
JCL 1, at P. 8 
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application of the rules relating to penalties to the case. In this regard, the comments of 
Sir Anthony Mason on an essay written about the Australian case of 0 Dea v. AlZstwes 
Leasing System (W. A) Pty. Lid 61 deserve mention: 
*There are many situations in which a contract can be so drawn that an 
amount ordinuily payable as damages for breach of contract c4m be 
expressed in the form of an obligation to pay a specific sum of money on a 
contingency unrelated to a breach of contract. Take, for vaimple, an 
agistment contract. If it contains a promise that the owner of cattle shall 
not depasture more than a specified number of cattle on the land and that 
he shall pay a nominated rate per head for cattle depastured in breach of 
that promise the doctrine may apply. But if the contract is so drawn that 
there is no promise to restrict the number of cattle depastured and there is 
merely an agreement to pay the nominated rate per head in respect of 
cattle over and above the stipulated number, the doctrine will not apply. "62 
It is obvious that such a distinction, considering the possibility of the avoidance of the 
application of the penalty doctrine with AM drafting, facilitates the evasion of the law 
of penalties. 
L3-1.2 Unit"' consequence in relation to hire-purchase agreements 
4.22 More importantly, in practice, in relation to termination clauses in hire-purchase 
agreementdo, a hirer who wants to return the goods and put an end to the agreement, 
would be better off if he defimh in payment and breaks the contract than if he exercises 
his contractual option to terminate the agreement. This is because detamining the 
contract by the hirer under the omcise of his contractual right, makes him liable to pay 
the stipulated amount upon termination without being able to invoke the law on penalties, 
while had he broken the agreement and had, therefore, the contract been determined by 
the owner, as to the amounts payable on termination, the penalty doctrine would have 
been applicable. The result would be that by being honest and terminating the agreement 
in a right and lawful manner, the hirer makes himself liable to pay a large amount 
whereas if he had defaulted in the payment, the stipulated amount inight have been 
regarded as a penalty and a reasonable sum as the owne? s actual loss would have been 
61 (1983) 57 A. L. JIL 172 
62 Sir Anthony Mam's Commentary upon the soninar vetsion of -poaltics in Chattel Imser by RP 
NjcagW (Chapter 3 of "EsMs in Equity" edited by PD Finn), 1985,46, at pp. 51-52 
63 And by analogy, as to termination dau in other contmm like chattel lease 
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payable. " This situation would lead, as sWed by Lord Denning in his forcefid judgement 
in Bridge v. Campbeff LXwowst Co. Ltd", to an "absurd paradox" : 
"It means that equity commits itself to this absurd paradox: it will grant 
relief to a man who breaks his contract but will penalize the man who 
keeps it. " 
Obviously, this is another unsatisfactory result of the principle which considers the breach 
as a prerequisite to the application of the penalty doctrine. 
U. 2. IMe Reasons Supporting the Non-interference of the Courts 
4.23 The reason for these anomalies, it has been Suggested, is that the equitable 
principles are well-establMee and as to relieve against penalties, their operation is 
where the promisor is in breach of a contractual undertaldng. Extending the application 
of the penalty doctrine to situations where a large sum has been stipulated to be paid 
upon the occurrence of sonic events other than breach, requires invention of some new 
general equitable remedies. '" Since the rules as to penalties and the court's jurisdiction to 
relieve a party from the payment of a penal, sum is a clear intrusion into the old principle 
of freedom of contract", it should be confined as much as possible and therefore any 
extension in the application of the doctrine by creating new equitable remedies would not 
be possible. The unwillingness of the courts to interfere in freely contracted agreements 
over the limits well drawn in the past, and their reluctance therefore to extend the scope 
of the equitable principles relating to penalties has well been shown in some judicial 
statements. Among them the well-summed up statement of Diplock IJ in &erfing 
Indusuld Facilities, Lid v. L*ate T=dks, Ltd 69, cited by Lord Ro" in ECGDM, 
64 This anomalous result has also been acknowledged in EFT Commercial Ltd v. Security Change Ltd 
(No 1) [1993) SLT 128, at p. 134 Per Lord Weir and at p. 136 per Lord Caplan: "... it has to be 
acknowledged that in practice the differcace between the rights available on a breach of contract and the 
rights which may be available by agreenmmt in other circumstances can sive rise to anomalies. " see also 
Fridman GHL, Hire-purchase: Estoppel-Penalties (1961) 24 UM 502, at p. 509; Wedduburn &W., 
Hire-purciume, Penalties, Freedom of Contract [1961] CLJ 156, at p. 158 
63 [19621 AC 600, at p. 629 
66 Fridman (1961) 24 bfLR M at p. 509 
67 Waddarburn [196 1] CIJ. 1. * at p. 158 
68 WeddedRum, Old ; Fridman, ibid, at p. 509 
0 Shortly reported in: (1962) 106 SJ 669 
70 Rvport Cret&s GualION160 DeP4rbwnt v. Universal Oil Ph)dwts Co. 1199312 All ER 205, [198312 
Iloyds Law Rep. 152, at pp. 224,155 respectively 
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deserves mention: 
"L for my part, am not prepared to odend the law by relieving against an 
obligation in a contract entered into between two parties which does not 
fall within the well-defined limits in which the Court has in the past shown 
itself willing to interfere. * 
jEs lordship emphasized that such clauses might be as improvident bargains, but the law 
did not relieve against improvident bargains where the parties were at arm's length. 
4.24 Moreover, it has not been the function of the courts to upset fively negotiated 
71 
contracts without proving some improper conduct, sharp practice or fraud , therefore 
merely being oppressive or imprudent72 should not be considered sufficient to relieve a 
party from a contractual promise. Unless an improper or unconscionable conduct, or 
something in the nature of fiaud or sharp practice is proved, equity would not interfere 
with freely entered into agreements, however they turned out to be harsh or 
disadvantageous to one of the parties. 73 Thus, although, as to the payments stipulated to 
be paid upon the terniination of contract on the happening of some events other than 
breach, non-interference of the courts might result in some unpleasant and hard 
consequences, it is nonetheless outside of the scope of the well-established equitable rules 
relating to penalties and therefore of the courts jurisdiction to interfere in such fiedy 
negotiated contracts. 
4.25 It has also been suggested" that the intervention of the courts in case of termination 
clauses where termination is triggered off by some events other than breach, migM re&* 
in deprivation of the owner of all remedies, although the parties themselves, by stipulating 
71 See Fridman (1961) 24 bffA 502, at p. 5M 156, at p. 158 , Wcddmbum [19611 C. U. 
72 See thojudgemot of Mmu & WHwn JJ. WAMEKUDC Finance Ltd v. Austin (1996) 162 CLR 170, 
at p. 184 
73 Ibld 
74 See, for example, the judgement of Curran LJ in the Northern Ireland case of Lombank; Ltd v. 
Kewwdy and nitelaw. L4wbank Ltd v. Ckmm [19611 XMIL 192, where he pointed out: "In my 
opinion, it is important to dnerve that hm applying the doctrine, equity has never intervened to deprive 
the plaintiff of a remedy-, be could always recover what he was justly entitled to by way of dam for 
breach of contrea In the ptiont case, if MY foregoing opinion is right, if it be declared that the aniount 
in question is irrecoverable on the ground that it is a penalty, the plaintiff would have no remedy for any 
km due to depreciation, although it was clearly the Intention of the parties to the hiring that the hirer 
dm)Wd be liable therefore. * at p. 218 ; Also see Burrows A, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Cont=4 
(2nd C&, 1994), p. 332 
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for a payment to be made upon termination, have clearly expressed their intention that in 
case of termination, a sum of money, as compensation for depreciation of goocls, would 
be paid to the owner. The reason for this is that by holding the stipulated sum to be a 
penalty and unenforceable, there would be no liability to pay unliquidated damages for 
some events which could not be considered as breach. " 
1.3.3. The Reasons for the Possibility of the Application of the Penalty Doctrine 
4.26 On the other hand, it has been argued that in either case whether the owner 
determines the contract on the basis of a default in the payment of instalments or the hirer 
terminates it because of the exercise of his option under the agreement, there is the same 
non-performance and the same provision to pay the stipulated amount as compensation 
for depreciation by the him". Therefore, there should logically be no difference as to the 
application of the penalty doctrine with regard to both situations. Furthermore, a review 
of the history of the intervention of the courts to relieve a party ftorn penalty clearly 
shows that the prerequisite to relief is not breach itsel& but it is the legal liability which is 
the essential requirement to grant relief against payment of a Pew SM. 77 Heneck if the 
les* liability could be accepted as the basis for the application of the penalty doctrine, the 
doctrine, therefore, should be applicable irrespective of whether the stipulated sum had 
become payable on the determination upon breach or any other event. 
4.27 It should also be noted that in the application of the penalty doctrine as to cases 
where the agreement has been determined upon some events other than breach, no 
question of a new break with the old principle of freedom of contract or extending the 
scope Of the equitable rules relating to penalties would arise; for, as argued by Lord 
NiacDermott L. C. J. in the Northern Ireland case of Lombank Ltd v. Kemwie, "... 
As Lord Caplan argued in the room Scottish case of EFT Commercial Ltd v. Security CAange Ltd (No 
[19931 SLT 128, "... upon termination of a contract on the occurrence of an event not sunounting to breach no provision for compensation exists other than that agreed by the Imies themsehu. " at p, 135 
76 See N&mGrcW on Damages. 15th ed., 1988, para. 516 at p. 324 ; The argument was originally put by J, ord MacDernm* C1 in Lambank Ltd V. Kennedy [19611 N. I. LIL 192, at p. 206 
77 Chaim, Mr Justice KLIL, Commentary on Praftsw ftmxuon's aWcle wfided. "Contzaa Planning:. 
L*wded DamNM Deposits and the Formeaffity Rule (1991) 4 ICL 11, at p. 12, citing the judgemew of Dome L in the Australian can of AAIEV-UDC FInance Ltd v. Austin (IM) 162 CLR 170, at P. 199 
78 [19611 N. I. LR. 192 
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equitable principles which aim at the promotion of fair dealing have a way of outlasting 
the particular flamis of conduct that [beget] them, and the question here, as I see it, is not 
one of extending the principles of the rule but of applying them to a modem form of 
contract dealing with a modem form of transaction. "" The point has also been made by 
Deane J, in the Australian case of AAHV-UDC Finance Ltd v. Ausfin", who- 
emphasizing that the common law rules relating to penalties have derived from equitable 
principles determining the availability of relief in Chancery, and pointing out that the rules 
with true equitable foundation are concerned with substance rather than form- argued: 
"it would ... 
have been out of accord with equit)es concern with substance 
for the availability of equitable relief against the enforcement of a 
performance bond ... to have depended upon whether it was possible to identify some implied contractual warranty of which the failure to perform 
or pay constituted a technical breach of contract on the part of the 
plaintiff. In fact, of course, equity observed no such limitation upon its 
jurisdiction to grant relief ... I 
it follows from this argument that the equitable rules relating to relief against penalties 
were applicable where there was a legal liability, notwithstanding the fact that that liability 
had raised from breach or any other event. Thus, no question of extension of the law 
relating to penalties or a new break with the principle of fi-eedom of contract would 
alise. 91 
4.28 It has also been pointed out that the application of the penalty doctrine to the 
clauses providing for the payment of a sum of money in the event of termination upon 
events other than breach of contract would not inevitably result in the deprivation of the 
plainff of all remedies. '2 B: luity, as a matter of fairness, after intervention and dedafing 
the clause void as a penalty would COmPenSate the owner for the actual losses he might 
be suffered as a result of termination. As it has been stated by Lord MacDemott L. C. J., 
" Aid, at p. 208 
10 (1986) 162 CLR 170, at P. 197 
81 It has, moreover, been stiggested that basically Vic PrOmPts of *fivdy" negotiated contracts are [riot] 
appropriate to deal with a society in which finance compames [for example] dictate terms of 
"agreemente to cOnSUMeM standard CxCMPfiOnS and all, to the um of a total hire-purchase debt of some 
1900 miUiotL* ( Weddaburn YW., Hire-purchase, Penalties, Freedom of CDnUT& [1%1] CLJ 156, at 
Pp. 158-159) 
82 ]mcGfW on Dauuypm, 15th ad., 1988, pam 517 at p. 325 
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in the course of his judgement, in Lopxbank Ltd v. Kennee: 
*In the can of the breach or non-petformance which is actionable what 
equity says to the parties is, in effect this- "You have agreed that a 
measured sum for c; ompensation will be payable. That is really a penalty 
to secure performance and will not be enforced. But notwithstanding what 
you have agreed, the Ion actually suffered will, as a matter of fiurness, be 
recoverable instead. " There seems to be no good reason why equity 
should not speak in the same terms where the non-performance is not 
actionable, and all the more so where the difference between what is 
actionable and what is not depends on a provision which does not really 
affect the equities of the situation. * 
4.29 The oddity and anomalous results of the distinction between situations where 
termination is based Upon breach and where it is grounded on events other than breach, 
with regard to the application of the penalty doctrine, has been noticed in some judicial 
statements, even by judges who believe in this distinction. In Campbell &wowtt Co. 
Ltd v. Bfidv", for example, Holroyd Pearce LJ, holding that the rules distinguishing 
liquidated damages from penalties have no application where the hirer, by the exercise of 
his contractual option, has terminated the contract, regretted the result of the caseP, and 
Harman LJ, having agreed with the decWon of Holroyd Pearce LJ, expressed his "uneasy 
feeling" on the point that "the position of the law as it stands is not safisfitctory"". The 
court, however, suggested in effect that if relief in such cases is preferable it should be 
achieved by legislation and it is not the job of the courts, but of the, legislature to create 
such underlying and essential changes as to the law relating to penalties. " This position 
has rightly been questioned by some writers why, if such changes seem to be necessary, 
the courts themselves should not create new prmciples or apply the existing rules by 
analogy to allow the relief to be granted against penalties in proper cases. " 
83 11961] N. LLPL 192, at p. 208 
" [196111 QB 445 
as Aid, at p. 438 
86 lbid, at p. 458; see &W EFT CWxnerdal Ltd v. &cudty Change Ltd (No 1) [1993] SLT 128, at p. 
136 per Lad Cophw, and at p. 134 per Lord Weir 
67 See Weddeftm [196 11 C. LJ. 136, at p. 159 ; Fridman (1961) 24 MR 502, st p. 509 
18 Fridnun, lbid 
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IJ. 4. The Effect of the Hire-Purchase Act 1965 and the Consumer Credit Act 1974 
4.30 It is fitting here to refer to the Acts of Parliament relating to the subject and the way 
they dealt with the problem. The Ifire-Purchase Act 1965, which continues to apply to 
the hire-purchase agreements entered into before May 19,19851ý is concerned with 
agreements made betwem the parties where the hirer is an individual and the total 
purchase price does not exceed the amount of 15000. " The Consumer Credit Act 1974 
applies to hire-purchase agreement? ' made by an individual as a hirer and has the ceiling 
of 115000 which is calculated by the total purchase price less the deposit and any finance 
chargeS. 92 
4.31 In the can of agreements within the scope of the Hire-Purchase Act 1965, any 
Provision in the agreement whereby the hirer [or the buyer] after the termination in any 
manner whatsoever Of a hire-Purchase agreement [or conditional sale agreement] is 
subject to a liability to pay an eanount which exceeds whichever is the lesser of (i) the 
amount by which one-half of the hire-purchase price exceeds the total of the sums paid 
and the sums due in respect of the hire-purchase price immediately before the termination 
and (H) an amount equal to the loss sustained by the owner or seller in consequence of the 
termination of the agreement, has been considered as void and unenforceable. " By 
section 173(l) read in coqjunction with sections 100(l) and 100(3) of the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974, the same provisions as the ffire-Purchase Act 1965 has been repeated 
with a little diffierence that its application has been confined to termination by the hirer 
under his statutory right. " 
4.32 It is, therefore, obvious that where a hire-purchaw or conditional sale agreement 
met the requirements of the Act and became a regulated hire-purchase or conditional sale 
89 S. I. 1983/1551, arts. 2,6 
90 a. 2(2) (with reference to Sl 1978/461), s. 4 
91 Swh an agreement widun the saVe of the Act, has ban caUed a regulated agreement: & 8(3) 
92 sL 8(2), 8(3), 9(3) [and Sl 1983/18791 
93 s. 29(2Xc), with regard to s. 28(lXa) 
94 UUdCr L 99 of the Act; The position of the Act in t1kis rmq)ea has been criticized by some writers: wk 
c. &, McGregor on Damages, 15th edL, IM. ParL 520 at p. 327 
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agreement, the unsatisfikctory position of the common law and equity and the 
resulting from them as to termination clauses, with regard to the application 
of the penalty doctrine, would not arise. In other words, a hirer or buyer who lawffilly 
terminates a regulated hire-p urchase, or conditional sale agreement would not be worse 
off than he would be if he had broken the agreement. " 
4.33 The policy taken by the legislature as to the hire-purchase agreements would seem 
to be safisfitctory and solve the unpleasant and unjust results of the application of the 
common law n; des as to the application of the penalty doctrine to termination clauses. it 
should, however, be noted that the Acts only apply to the regulated hire-purchase 
agreements and allied contrwts like conditional sale, and have no application u to the 
termination clauses in both hire-purchaw or allied agreements which fall outside of the 
scope of the Acts, and also contracts other than hire-purchase. As to the latter kinds of 
contracts, the equity and common law rules would continue to apply. Therefore, 
proposing measures like raising the figure below which the Consumer Credit Act 1974 
applies, though they could be considered as useful steps in relation to hire-purchase and 
allied agreements, would not solve the problem completely. 
4.33* The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 is also worthy of a 
reference here. These Regulations, implementing the EC Council Directive 93/13 on 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, expressly provide that, in contracts made between 
a consumer and a seller or supplier, any term which has "not individually been 
negotiated", and "contrary to the requirement of good faith causes a significant imbalance 
in the parties' rights and obligations to the detriment of the consurnee' should be 
regarded as "unfair", and would not be binding on the consumer. In its "indicative and 
non-exhaustiveP list of tam which may pnma facie be regarded as "unfair", the 
Regulations refer to a term which has the object or effect of "requiring any consumer who 
fidls to fiffil his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum in compensatioe. (para. 
I(e), Schedule 3) The fist, however, is not exhaustive; and the Regulations, it may be 
suggested, cover also a situation where a disproportionately high sum of money has been 
" See Treitel OIL, The Law of Contmcf, gth UL, 1"5, p. 9()4 
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provided to be paid upon the occurrence of events other than breach. Such a term, being 
regarded as unfair, would fall within the scope of the RegWations, and, would not be 
binding on the consumer. 
1.3.5. Concluding Discussion 
4.34 It seems clear enough that the common law rules relating to the penalty doctrine as 
to its application to the amounts payable upon the termination of contract need some 
review and reconsideration. The improper and sometimes unjust consequences which 
result from the application of the common law rules in this regard emphasize the need for 
this revision. One solution is the suggestion, put by Jenkins LT in Cooden Engineering 
Co. Lid v. SimfortP, that the penalty doctrine has no application to amounts which are 
payable upon termination of the contritctý whether the termination is based upon breach 
or it is grounded on events other than that. Having suggested this, his lordship expressed 
his opinion that there might be some kind of equitable relief available to the hirer if the 
stipulated sum was so oppressive and unconscionable: 
"Although in the view I take the sum payable under clause II is not a 
penalty in the sense contended for in the present appeal ri. e. penalty in the DwW sensel, it might I suppose conceivably have bow argued that the 
provision in question is a penal provision in the sense that it is so 
oppressive and unconscionable that equity should grant relief ftom it upon 
equitable terms. "98 
it is followed from the phrase just quoted that according to Jenkins LJs view, two 
separate doctrines are available to grant relief against penalties: first, the penalty doctrine 
in the sense of the "Dunlop" case which has no application to the sums payable upon 
terniination of contract, and second, the doctrine by which equity grants relief against 
unconscionable and oppressive bargains upon which the stipulated sum to be paid upon 
termination might be regarded as a penalty and unenforceable. 
This view has been criticized by some writers saying;: , Given that both [doctrines, 
descended from fairly ancient equitable principles the question may be asked "why should 
this be so? " and "why should the distinction be perpetuated? """ 
96 [195311 QB 86 
97 Dunlo 
,p 
pneumac 7ýre Co. Ltd v. New Gave and Motor Co. Ltd [ 19151 AC 79 
96 Cooden Fnginecring Co. Ltd v. Stanford [1953] 1 QB 86, at P. 112 
99 Cjarkcý W Justice MIX, Commentary on Profeaw Furmston's article entitled "Conuact Planniur. 
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4.35 The alternative solution is the view expressed by Lord Denning in Bri4p v. 
Cwnpbell Discowit Co. Lid' that the courts have power to grant relief against a pow 
sum stipulated to be paid upon termination, whether the termination is based upon breach 
or it is grounded on any other event. 2 Accordingly, if a contract was terminateid by the 
hirer for the exercise of his option under the contract or by the owner because, of the 
hirees default in payment or any other event as provided in the agreement, the stipulated 
sum to be payable upon termination by the hirer would be subject to the penalty doctrine, 
and if it was extravagant or unconscionable in comparison with the ownees anticipated 
actual loss, it would be a penalty and unenforceable. 
4.36 Although them two solutions, at first glance, look very different, they have a 
common feature and that is the emphasis on the coures power to grant relief against a 
penal sum stipulated to be paid upon termination. According to the first view, however, 
in determining the penal nature of the sum, to allow the court to interfere upon equitable 
rules, attention should be paid to the unconscionability and oppressiveness of the 
stipulated rim; while the second view permits the courts to relieve against a penalty, in 
the sense expressed in the "Dunlqp' case, stipulated to be paid upon termhuWon. Since 
the distinction between a penalty in "Dwdop" sense and an equitable penalty, considering 
that both have their roots in equitable rules, might result in unpleasant and 
add to the uncertainty of the law in this area, it would seem that Lord Dennings view 
should prevail. Hence, the provisional proposal of the Law Commission3 on the subject 
seems to be acceptable: 
N... Our proposal is that the rules as to penalty should be applied wherem 
the object of the disputed contractual oblisation is to secure the act or 
result which is the true purpose of the contract. " 
4.37 in support of Lord Dennit4s view, it could be added that the purpose of a sum 
LiqWdaW Dam"m Depwits and ft FOMSOMMity Rule (1" 1) 4 JCL 11, at p. 14 
1 [1962] AC 600, agreeing with the fomW dimentinSjudgeomw of LAnd WhdDernma in Lmbask Ltd 
v. Kennedy [1961] MIX 192 ; Alm sm the judgenmt of Do= L in AAJEV. UDC Flnaw# Ltd v. 
Awan (1986) 162 CLR 170, at pp. 197-1" 
bid, at p. 631 
3 Iaw Commission's Work4 Pop", no. 61. -P"ty aauses aW Forfeiture of MaWes Paid", 1975, 
pam 26 
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stipulated to be paid upon termination is mostly either to asses the promisee! s likely actual 
loss as a result of termiination, or to punish the promisor for, and prevent him from non- 
4 
performance of the agreement . In other words, almost always it is provided to secure 
the performance of the agreement and therefore, it should be subject to the penalty 
doctrine whether the termination is triggered off by the breach of contract or events other 
than that. 
4.39 It should also be noted that if the true basis for the intervention of courts to relieve 
against penalty is, as it has been suggested by some leading academic lawyerss, 
unfairness, the prerequisite to the intervention, logically, exists in the case of any 
extravagant and unconscionable legal liability, even that liability has not been caused, 
directly or indirectly, by the breach of a contractual undertaking. It might be said that 
extending the application of the penalty doctrine to any legal liability, even where it is not 
caused by breach, is a clear interference with the principle of fivedom of contract and 
should, therefore, be avoided. The point, however, is that the whole doctrine is an 
interference with the old principle of freedom of contmct: If such an intrusion is 
acceptable on the ground of unfairness with regard to any liability- direct or indirect. 
arising from breach, it should also be justifiable in relation to any legal liability, as far as it 
is provided to secure the performance of the agreement. It does not seem to be a proper 
treatment that in the same situations with the existence of the same grounds, two differat 
attitudes are applied. 
4.39 Furthermore, as it appears from the history of the intervention of the cowu of 
equity to grant refiet the purpose of such equitable rules was to prevent a party to a 
Contract to take an unfair advantage of his legal rights for the purpose of injustice, or 
fraud, or oppression, or harsh and vindictive injury. 6 It seems to be inconsistent with this 
purpose, if equity has made the breach a prerequisite to grant relief with repW to 
4 See Burrows A, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, (2nd ed., 1994), p. 332 
Furmston M P, Contract Plannin : Liquidated Damages, Deposits and the Foreseeability Rule (1991) 4 
jCL 1, at p. 8; sac Wso ppre, paras. 1.69-1.70 
6 See Hokbworth, History of Euldish Law, 7th ed.. vol. 5, p. 330; Stor/s Commentaries on Equity 
jurispnKlence (1839) voL 14 p. MS (cited by L4xd Denning in Bridge v. CWnpbell Dixmt Co. Ltd 
[1962] AC 600, at p. 629); see also supra.. paras. 1.13-1.14 
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termination clauses, and prevents relief where termination is band upon events other then 
breach. It would, as pointed out by Lord Dennini, mean that "equity commits itself to 
an absurd paradox" which in some cases might result in injustice. In the words of Dom 
J., in the course of his judgement in the Australian case of AA&V-LIDC Fftvwe Ltd v. 
Ausfii?, the prerequisite to relief- considering the underlying purpose of equity- could not 
be only the breach, as distinct from legal liability: 
"It would have been contrary to the underlying theses of the equitable 
jurisdiction to prevent unconscionable advantage being taken of the 
harshness of the common law to have made the existence of legal fitult in 
the plaintiff, as distinct from legal liability, a prerequisite of entitlement to 
relief or to have made the contumacy of the plaintiffs conduct givig rise 
to legal liability a ground for equitable relief against the fiability. "9 
4.40 For the reasons referred to above, it is submitted that the courts should grant relief 
against a penal sum provided to be paid in the event of termination, irrespective of 
whether the agreement has been terminated by the hirer on the exercise of his option or 
by the owner on the occurrence of events stipulated in the contract. The important point 
is that the courts, as stated by Lord Denninglo, have power to do so. 
2. Moneys Payable as Alternative Promises 
2.1. Introductory Remarks 
4.41 Alternative obligations are promises in a contract under which the promisor has the 
option of performing one of the alternatives; and having performed one of them, he 
would be discharged from his contractual promise. For example, in a contract for the sale 
of 200 tons of specific goods, with tolerance of 5 per cent. more or less, the seller will be 
discharged if he delivers each one of 190-2 10 tons and he has the option to choose either 
of the alternatives that he thinks fit. The settled principle as to the alternative obligations 
is that if the promisor failed to perform the agreement, then damages for nol*. 
performance would be computed according to the alternative that is most beneficial to the 
7 bid, at p. 629 
l (1986) 162 CLR 170 
9 Aid, at P. 198 
10 Bridge V. Camp"ll Discount Co. Ltd [19621 AC 600, at p. 631 
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promisor, not the one which is the most profitable alternative to the promisee. That is 
why that in the above example, as to the buyers action for non-delivery, the sellers were 
held to be liable up to only 190 tons". It should be noted that the principle is applicable 
as to the true alternative promises, not the obligations which are only fiwned in the 
alternative way. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish true alternative obligations from 
the undertalcings merely fi-amed in the alternative. 
IL Tme aftemative promis" 
4.42 The true alternative contract is one under which in any event regardless of which 
alternative is chosen to be performed by the promisor, the promisee will get the 
peiformance for which he has bargained. On the other hand, if the contract has only been 
flumed in the alternative, the promisee will get the bargained performance merely in the 
case that the promisor performs a specific alternative and the other choice is not, in fact, 
what he has bargained for. 12 This is normally the case when one of the alternatives is 
doing a specific act which is the main purpose of making the contract and the other 
choice is the payment of a specific sum of money. The second alternative, in such cases 
is not normally what the promisee pays the consideration for, and therefore performing 
this choice, though it will normally discharge the promisor from his contractual duty, win 
not result in the promisee getting what he has bargained for. As to this kind of alternative 
obligations, the principle stated above", has no application. Put another way, if the 
contract was not performed by the promisor, the court would not assess damages on the 
basis of the alternative which is most beneficial to the promisor, but upon the non- 
performance of the promise which is the main purpose of the agreement, the promisor 
would be held liable to perform the other alternative, i. e. to pay the monetary sum as 
specified by the parties in the second choice. 
it Re Thomett &Fehr [1921] 1 KB 219; see Ww Robinson V. Robinson (ISSI) 1 De Cj. K & G. 247,21 
Li Ch. 111,42 ER 547 ; Rdim v. Gfneral 771caft Corpn Ltd [1933) All ER Rep 385 ; Johmm 
Matthey Bank'"g '- 77e 9at'O Trading COrP"OOH Of India [ 198411 Ucyd! S Rep. 427 ;f br mom cam 
On tbc Subjcd Sw bLO'egOr On Dam&904 15th cd., 1988, Pam. 366,367 at pp. 228-230 
12 hLC jMor, loc. cit, pam 522 at pp. 329-329 
13 SkIpra, pam 4.41 
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4.43 This proposition is supported by the case of DeveriM v. Bwnefi" in which the 
plaintiff, having shipped certain goods to a place, drew some drafts and entrusted them to 
the defendant to present them for acceptance on the condition that the defendant should 
return the draft if not paid after acceptance, to plaintiff or pay the plaintiff the amount of 
the bills. Upon non-payment of the drafts after acceptance, the defendant neither 
returned the bills nor paid the amount of them to the plaintiffl. In an action by the 
plaintiff, it was held that the defendant by not returyAng the drafts, was liable to pay the 
amount of them. The majority of the court, Bovill CJ dissenting, construed the 
agreement as not a pure alternative obligation, but as promises merely fiwned in the 
alternative. On the true interpretation of the agreement, the contractual duty of the 
defendant, first and foremost, was to return the bills and if he did not, then he would be 
under the liability to pay the amount of the drafts as the second choice. UnMw pure 
alternative agreements, the defendant had no option to choose one of the promises, but 
his first liability was to return the drafts as the main purpose of the agreement. Therefore, 
damages for non-performance should not, it was held, be computed upon the obligation 
which is most beneficial to the defendant, i. e. the value of the bills which was nil. 
2.3. ApplicaUbn of the Penafty doctdno to promises framed In the 
altemauve 
4.44 Having discussed briefly the pure alternative obligations and promises which am 
merely fiwned in the alternative, we should now turn to an important question which 
anses in relation to the latter alternative agreements. As to these contracts, what the 
situation would be if the amount provided to be paid as an alternative was extravagant or 
unconscionable in comparison with the likely actual losses which might result from the 
non-performance of the other alternative? Is the stipulation for payment of a specified 
sum as an alternative obligation subject to the penalty doctrine? Apparently, there is no 
authority on the point. It has been suggested that "in such circumstances the second 
alternative takes on the characteristics of a penalty"15. However, the technical question 
remains that the sum stipulated in the second alternative has not been provided to be paid 
in the event of breach, and where there is no breach of contract, in principle no question 
14 (1873) LA 8 C. P. 475,42 U. C. P. 214,28 L. T. 974 
15 McGregor, loc. cit, Pam 523 at P. 329 
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of the application of the rules relating to penalties would arise. 
4.45 It would seem that the answer to the problem lies on the construction of the 
agreement. If an agreement which has been merely fi-amed as an alternative obligation 
was construed as a true alternative contract, then the question of breach being a 
prerequisite for the application of the doctrine, as an obstacle for its application, might 
arise. But as it was referred to16, the true construction of the agreement is that such a 
contract could not be a pure alternative obligation in which the promisor has the option of 
choosing one of the alternatives to perform. Such an agreement should be construed as a 
contract under which the first duty of the promisor is to perfbm the choice which is the 
main purpose of making the contract, and if he fails to perform this alternative, then he 
would inevitably have to perform the second option. ff the substance of such an 
agreement is observed, it will be apparent that there is no difference between this 
agreement and a contract upon which the parties have agreed that in the event of defitult 
in the performance of the promise, the promisor would have to pay a stipulated amount 
as losses resulting from breach. The rnýoritys view in Deverill v. Burnelt', supports this 
argument: In that cam Grove I in the course of his judgement stated: 
"It seems to me we must construe a promise relating to a matter of 
business as persons would in the ordinary affairs of life construe itý and no 
particular technical construction is to be put on it, and in ordinary case ..., "I will return you your horse by such a day, or pay you a day's WW, if I 
do not return the animal, I must pay a day`s hire. Here it seems to me the 
reasonable construction is that, ..., by the agreement the plaintiff has W44 "I do not estimate the value of what I may lose at the actual time of the 
breach, but I choose to say if you do not return the bills, I will take as my 
damages the amount of the value. " ... What do these words in ordinary 
parlance mean? They surely mean, "If the bills are not returned, I am 
willing that the amount shall be the amount of the loss. """ 
If such a construction is put on the agreements which are only framed in the alternative, 
then the non-performance of the main choice would be equivalent to the breach of 
contract, and the sum payable upon the second option would be like an amount sdpuhdW 
to be paid upon breach. 
16 SUPM, pam 4.42 
17 (1973) L. PL 9 C. P. 475,42 L. LC. P. 214,29 L. T. 874 
18 jbij, at p. 875 femphads added] 
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4.46 it should be added, in the support of this argument, that, firstly. as it has been 
emphasized in numerous cases, the question of the applicability of the penalty doctrine, is 
a question of substance, not of formI9. and in substance there seems to be no substantial 
difference between the agreement of the parties on the amount of damages, whether it is 
drafted as a clause providing for the payment upon the occurrence of breach or as an 
alternative obligation in the event of non-performance of the main option. Secondly, if 
the law relating to penalties was not applicable to the obligations fi-amed in the alternative 
where the second alterna: tive is the payment of an v=vagant sum, by the argument that 
there is no breach to be considered as the prerequisite to the application of the doctrine, 
then the whole penalty doctrine could easily be evaded by drafting the stipulated sum as 
an altemtive obliption. 
4.47 For the whole reasons referred to above, it could well be concluded that the 
obligations which are merelyframed as alternatives are subject to the penalty doctrine 
and the technical question of breach as a prerequisite to the application of the doctrine 
would not also prevent the doctrine from being applied here. This is becaum upon the 
true construction of such agreements, a breach of the contractual undertaking could well 
be assumed. It should however not be denied that a court, considering the terms of the 
contract and the whole m=undins circumstances, may conclude that the parties have 
rally intended to enter into a pure alternative contract. The true construction in such a 
cam it seems, is that the promisor has the option of not performing upon the psynxw of 
the price, provided for as an alternative pron-Ase, fbr the exercise of this option. In such a 
cue, obviously, under the law as it studs, the penalty doctrine will have no application. 
19 E. g., M the speech Of L(wd Radcliffe in Mdge v. Campbell DI&vmt Co. Ltd 119621 AC 6W, whac 
he Pointed Out: "The cwrýs jurisdictiOn tO Itlic" ABA! = Penalties depends on 'a question ra of Wook 
of of Awins of speecJý but of sdstance NO of things. '" p. 624 
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Chapter 5 
Termination Clauses: Application of the Penalty 
Doctrine to Minimum Payment Clauses 
1. Introductory Remarks 
5.001 In commercial contracts, especially financing transactions, it is conmonly provided 
" on the occurrence of specific events, the agreement, either automatically or by the 
exercise of the contractual power to terminate by one of the parties, would be brought to 
an end. Upon termination, there might be a provision requinng one of the parties, 
normally the debtor, to pay a specified sum of money to the other, commonly called as a 
*minimum, payment clause". For instance, in hire-purchase agreements, it is the universal 
practice of the finance companies to provide for a termination clause, in the event of the 
happening of specific events, inter afta death or bmakruptcy of the hirer and any breach of 
the contract by him; and upon termination, the hirer is contractually required, under the 
ranumum. payment claum to bring his payments up to a specified portion of the purchase 
price. 
5.002 It was discussed in the previous chapter that if termination was triggered off by the 
promisoes breach of his contractual obligation, the minimum payment clause would 
undoubtedly be subject to the rules against penalties. K therefore, the stipulated payrnent 
could not be considered as a genuine pro-estimate of the promiseds actual loss resulting 
from breach, the minimum payment clause would be struck out as being a penalty and the 
promisee would be compensated for his losses under the common law rules. Whether the 
penalty doctrine has any application in relation to the sums payable upon termination 
band on events other than breach has not been, as it was My considered', completely 
seWed yet. However, the law as it stands now, though to some extent unsafisfitctory, 
does not recognize the application of the rules against penalties as to amounts provided 
to be paid on the occun*ence of events other than breach. 2 Hence, the discussion here 
I See supra., pam. 4.12 et xq. 
2 sm mpra., parm 4.02-4.04 
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will be confined to the application of the penalty doctrine to the tninimm parunt 
clauses which operate in the event of tennination band upon breach of a contract by the 
Promisor. 
5.003 Providing for a termination clause is also a common practice in construction 
contracts. The Standard Form of Civil Engineering Contract- which is commonly known 
as the I. C. E. conditions of contract3 and extensively used in various types of enginming 
work4- in clause 63, empowers the employer to terminate the contractor's employment 
upon the happening of spedfic events and to enter upon the site and expel the contractor, 
after giving seven-day notice in writing, without releasing him from his contractual 
liabilities under the agreement. This obviously, in effect, brings the contract to an end 
and upon that, by clause 63(4), the contractor is made liable for any excess by which "the 
costs of completion, damages for delay in completion (if any) and other expenses incurred 
by the employer" exceed the amount which would have been due to the contractor had he 
completed the work. In fact, this provision is a minimilm payment which the contractor is 
provided to be liable for, in the event ot inter afta, the breach of the construction 
contract and termination of the agreement by the employer. Nevertheless, the rules and 
principles in this area as to the application of the penalty doctrine to such a payment, have 
mostly been developed in litigations relating to minimum payment clauses in instalment 
payment contracts, e. g. hire-purchase contracts, conditional sale agreements and chattel 
lemes. This is thought to be due to the practical importance of such clauses in these 
contracts and various litigation which wise on the point of the application of the penalty 
doctrine to them. Furthermore, having regard to the true nature of financing transactions 
could justify the constant stipulation of the minimum payment clauses- which have been 
the real source of litigations in this relation- in these contracts. It should, however, be 
noted that the minimum payment clauses in other commercial contracts are, primafacie, 
governed by these principles. 
5. o04 It is prelimhw* to be pointed out that to determine whether a nuinimum payment 
3 6th C&, 1991 
4 SM Mq, Sir Anthony, Kcaftg On EWdh* Contrwu (Londm- Sv,, W & WkvweA Sth cd., 1"IX p. 
810 
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provided to be paid upon breach (or termination based on breach) constitutes a penalty, 
the general rules and principles laid down by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pnewnade 7)re 
Co. Ltd v. New Gerage and Molar Co. Ltd 5 would be applied. Some special aspects of 
them rules in relation to their application to minimum payment clams me, however, 
worthy of a detailed discussion here. 6 Furthermore, termination of the contract might be 
based on either a repudiatory or a non-repudiatory breach. This basis for termination 
results in important principles in relation to the assessment of loss and the application of 
the penalty doctrine to the minitnum payment clauses. Then rules should also be given a 
rather detailed consideration. 7 It is also appropriate to consider, in some detail, the 
&ctors which should be taken into account in order to draw up a valid minimum payment 
clause. ' Before considering the main subjects as listed above, however, there is a 
necessity of having a close look at the nature of financing transactions; for their true 
nature, as distinct from pure hiring agreements, would justify both the insextion of the 
minimum payment clauses in such agreements and the importance of upholding these 
clauses if they have been drafted carefidly, considering all aspects of the contract. 
2. The True Nature of Financing Transactions 
2.1. Financing and Security Funcdons 
5.005 As the litigated cam show, the minimum payment clauses am nornially seen in 
hire-purchase agreements and chattel leases. Emm*bg the true nature of these 
agreements, one can easily recognize that they are not normally a pure conti-act of hire 
and therefore they should be dealt with rather differently from pure hiring agreements. 
The nature of pure hiring agreements is creating a bailment under which the hirer has the 
right to use the subject-matter in the specified period, in return for the payment of a real 
hiring charge-9 In these agreements, the rentals provided to be paid by the Wrer am 
directly related to the hiring value of the subject-matter in the stipulated period of time. 
5 [1915] AC 79 
6 See infia., mcdco 3, pam 5.012 et seq. 
See infra., sacdw 4, pmL 5.048 et seq. 
See infra., sadon 5, Pam 5A7 et wq. 
9 Sm lWdxny's LAws of Enabod voL 2 (4th ed., 1991): "It is a antad by which the him Obtaim the 
d& u) uw the clued W4 in mum ft dw primew to dw Owna of tM priag of tM hifte pUL 
1850 at P. M8 
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5.006 Considering carefully the nature of hire-purchase agreements, however, "WS the 
they are not a pure bailment with an option to purchase, 10; th& object is normally to 
pmvide finance to the Wrer to acquim the equipment, and to secum the return of the 
provided finance with interest by creating a proprietary right over the subjea-riuaw. " 
Put anotha way, a customer, who needs finance to get a certain piece of equipment, 
enters into a hire-purchase agreement with either the dealer, if the dealer himself wishes 
to provide finance, or a finance company, who becomes the owner of the subject-matter 
by payment of the cash price to the dealer. In the former the real nature of the agreement 
is a "credit sale": the dealer provides finance to the customer to acquire the subjea- 
matta and keeps for himself a proprietary right over that to secure the retum of the 
finance plus a proper interest. By doing so, in fact, he sells the goods to the customer 
with two conditions: a) to get the price by instalments over a specified period of time, and 
b) to keep the title of the goods for himself until he gets the last instalment. 
5.007 in the latter case, i. e. entering into a hire-purchase agreement with a finance 
company which is a normal practice in England, the true nature of the agreement seenn 
"Secured loan". 12 In other Words, the f to be a inance COMPVIYP Which has not probably 
even seen the subject-matter, only provides finance to the customer for the purpose of 
acquiring the subject-matter. T'his process is, in practice, done through acquiring the 
goods by the finance company with the payment of a cash price to the dealer and letting 
them to the customer in the form of a hire-purchase agreement. AD the finance company 
is concerned about, therefore, is the receipt of the capital (i. e. the finance provided to 
acquire the subject-matter with all expenses incurred in this relation) plus a reasonable 
interest which in fild constitutes the purchase price provided to be paid by the hirer over 
a period of time in the fonn of temdy instalments in the hire-purchase agrement. no 
14ý See Zind, JacOb S., 111C Minimum PwImeW Clam Muddle [19641 C. L. L 108, at p. 108 
"In fhcý tb=tlw3swfiOnSlkrCvluYsimil8r, in dfaCk to contzactsibir the pwrchmofland by the aid aft 
mortpp, as it was pointed out by IA)rd DennlW. "Just as a man wbo buys IWW may adse pa of the 
price by a mor4W Of it, M &Is% A U180 WbO bwjs 8006 may mAse pwrt of 60 Fice by Wm"rchm of 
tbem" (Bridge v. CampbeU Mwowrt Co. UA [1962] 1 All Mt 383, at p. 398) Note dds dmilw*, 
dm two situattions hm been haded difftendr. the protection dbded to a nwrtp4pr [C. S, WS d& of 
miamption, mbd resuicting the mortppe's riSM only to pfWp@l and interml is not alwW smdbW to 
a bWa by the aid of hire-purchase. 
12 zjeA Did; see also Furmston M P, Tamination of Eampurdum c4onUub: Mjnimum p1trMUM 
and penaties (1964) 15 N. LLQ. 235, at p. 236 
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remm of the purchase price is secured by a real ri& which the finance coupW 
nuftitains for itself ui eqwpment. 
5.008 Equally, chattel leases are normally made in the form of finance leases as distinct 
from operating leases (or pure leases). The finance lease has, in fact, financing and 
security functions. 13 To put it somewhat differently, the lessor provides fina= to 
acquire the equipment to use as capital goods. He, then, leases the equipment to the 
lesm for the period of normally the useM economic life of the goods, so that at the end 
of the agreement, the subject-matter is either abandoned or sold to the lessee for a very 
insignificant price. In fact, the real nature of the agreement, as it has been suggested". is 
"leasing finance" and in result it is very similar to a "conditional contract of sale". in 
order to secure the return of the capital plus interest in the form of instalments of the 
lease, the lessor maintains fbr itself a real right in the subject-matter. Thus, a finance 
lease, in truth, acts as a means to provide finance and to secure the receipt of the capital 
plus interest by the lessor as instalments of the leasing agreement. Just like hire-purchase 
agreemen% the lessor is concerned about the receipt of the finance provided with a 
proper interest which constitutes the purchase price. The payment of this price is spread 
over the leasing period and is expected to be paid by the lessee in the form of hwaalments. 
2.2. The Jusdflcatfon for the Insertion of "Minimum Payment Claus"O 
5. oog As it appears from the above analysis, the true nature of financing transactions- 
like. hire-purchase and most chattel leases- are, not a pure bailment/bailment with the 
option to purchase. Both agreements, however, are mostly used as a means to provide 
finance, and also as a security device to ensure the repayment of capital (Le. finance 
provided with all other expenses) and a fkir interest. 15 Paying enough attention to this 
nature could justify the insertion of the minimum payment clause in these agreements: the 
creditor expects to receive his capital and interest in any event, even where the contract- 
because of any reason, automaticaUy or by the exercise of the contracttud power of one of 
13 Chin, Nyuk Y, Finsmot I Am wd IA)ss of BarzWn: JudicW Impubm in the High Court (IM) 23 
Western AwUSU JAw Rev. 279, at W 2W281 
14 Cbin, loc. ciL, at pp. 291-282 
is Sm gm ZiVd J S, Hirelmuchm Agreemew: A Plea for Gtoder Realism (1960) 104 SI 996; 4f 
otwwvadons of Lad Doming in Bridge v. Campbell Dlscmt Co. Ltd [1962] AC 600, at pp. 626-627 w 
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the parties- is terminated. To achieve this vq>ectation, the finance company or the kaw 
stipulates for a clause providing that in case the contract is prematurely brought to an 
end, the hirer/lessee (i. e. the debtor) will be liable to pay the arrears of rat, any 
outstanding rentals at the date of termination duly discounted to show its then value, and 
any difference between the realisable value and the residual value of the equipuma, if the 
mlisable value is not enough to cover the residual value, giving credit for any excess 
resulting from the repossession and resale of the subject-matter. This stipulation is, in 
flict, a minimum payment clause and since it reflects the real otpectations of the creditor 
who extends finance, it is befieved16 that it should, as far as possible, be upheld unless it 
imposes an extra or a different liability upon the debtor. It is submitted that even in this 
case, as long as the disparity between the stipulated amount and the expectancy value of 
the transaction is not "extravagant" or "unconscionable*, there should be no SmW for 
refusing to uphold the validity of the clause as a genuine pro-estimate of the creditoes 
actual loss. 
5.010 The necessity of allowing the lessor to recover the wq)ectancy value of the 
agreement has also been considered in the Unidroit Convention On Financial Leasing". 
Art 13(3) of the convention provides that the contractual provision for the 
of the amount to be paid upon termination of the agreement by the lessor should be 
enforceable between the parties unless it is "substantially in exceW of damages fixed by 
Art 13(2)(b), viz. "such damages as will place the lessor in the position in which it would 
have, been had the lessee paformed the leasing agreement in accordance with its termC. 11 
obviously, if the contract was not breached by the lessee and if he puformed all his 
contractual obligations, the lessor would be able to gain the purchase price and repossen 
to ft true nature of hire-purdbase asreemeatL 
16 Goode RK Penalties in Finance I casts (1998) 104 L. Q. P, 25, at p. 29; Ziegd, Jwob S., Mie 
Minimum Payment Clause Muddle [19641 C. U. 108, at p. 109; Clkin. Nyuk y, Fhu= Tma andjAm 
of Bargain- Judicial Impulm in the High Court (1993) 23 Western Australia Law Rev. 279, at p. 286 
17 Collclu&d on 28 May 1988 at Ottawa 
is -nm Carjention in its Artide 13(2) speaks of the right of tenninatim by the lessor arising out of the 
lessee's substantial deftdt, and then respects, under ArWe 13(3), the dgk of parties to provide for the 
numur in whkh the dwages won twnination would be rcooverable unless it is PbstardaUy in msss 
of tm lessor's Ion of bargain. It is however silent about the lessor's conbuud rigbt to twninate, and 
the Consequences provided for upon swh a terniulation by the parties. 
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the equipment, which is normally worth its residual value., at the end of the conuutual 
period. if, therefore, the lease was prematurely terminated upon the lessee's breach, the 
lessor, under the provisions of the convention, should be able to recover any difference 
between the purchase price and the rents previously paid by the lessee, taking into 
account the accelerated receipt of future rentals by giving a proper allowance as to that 
and the difference between the realisable value and the residual value of the equipment, as 
far as he has taken reasonable steps to mitigate his loss. Thus, a contractual clause 
providing for the payment of a minimum payment upon termination should not be struck 
out as being a penalty in so far as it takes into account the above considerations in 
computing the recoverable amount. 
5.011 Despite the above observations which show the legitimaq of allowing the 
creditor, in financing transactions, to recover the expectancy value of the agreement- and 
so regarding the minimum payment clause, drafted with taking the expectancy value into 
account, as a genuine pre-estimate of the creditor's actual loss- cases, during decades, 
have treated the subject in a somewhat different manner. The true nature of such 
agreements has normally been overlooked, and the courts have usually stereotyped 
financing transactions as a pure contracts of hire. 17his fact has caused some problems, 
uncertainties and sometimes unjust results in this am of the law. 19 
3. Application of the General Rules 
3.1. General Consideradons 
5.012 As it was pointed out, where the minkinum payment stipulated to be paid upon 
termination is subject to the rules against penalty, in order to determine the nature of the 
clause, the general rules distinguishing liquidated damages ftom penaltido, as laid down 
by Lord Dunedin in the leading case of Dunlqp Pnewnadc 7ým Co. Lid v. New GwvV 
21 
and Motor Co. Ltd , would be applied. Thus, the basic rule is that if the stipulated 
minimum payment is "ortravagant" or "unconscionable" in comparison with the likely 
19 JU cam in this relation and the present legal Position Will shortly be discussed: see Infm, pan 
5.053 et seq. 
20 Supra, paras. 2.24 et seq. 
21119151 AC 79 
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actual loss resulting from breach, the minkmim psynumt clause win be struck out as being 
a penalty. It should, however, be bome in mind that since the likely actual Ion in case of 
financing umnsactions, is nonnally readily calculable at the time when the contract is 
entered into, to be a genuine pre-estimte of actual loss, the stipulated amount, as far as 
the pm-tstimation is possible, slxndd not be disproportionate to the likely Ion resulting 
from breach. 
5.013 Because of technical points which are applied in case of the application of the 
penalty doctrine to termination clauses, some particular aspects of the general principles 
as to the distinction between penalties and liquidated damages are worthy of a detailed 
discussion here. These aspects are as follows: first, how far is the express or imputed 
intention of the parties material? and second, is the description which the parties give to 
the mimmum payment in their agreement conclusive? it would also seem necessary the, 
in discussing the application of the general rules to determine the nature of the ii 
payment clause, the effect of fixing the minimum payment in an arbitrary way by the 
contracting parties, as shown in cases, should analytically be discussed. 
3. L Intention of the Contracting Parties 
3.2.1. Materiality of the Intention as to Determining the Kind of Loss against 
which the Minimum Payment is Provided for 
5.014 The ge=d rule as to the intention of parties, as we have seený2, is the application 
of an objective test, rather than a subjective one. Put another way, iý considering the 
terms of the contract and all surrounding circumstances, the parties have reasonably 
attempted to pre-calculate the likely actual loss which might conceivably flow from 
breach, the clause will be very likely to be upheld as a genuine pre. -estimate of damages. 
Thus, generally spealdng, the subjective intention of the parties as to assessing in advance 
the future likely losses would be less likely to be material. 
In the context of termination clauses, however. the intention of the parties might be 
material as to determining the kind of loss against which the contract is going to provide 
22 supu, pam. 2.07-2.09 
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for the minimum payment clause. To put it somewhat differently, in order to determine 
whether the minunum payment is a genuine preýýate of actual lossý it uk as the first 
step, necessary to find out what actual loss the parties is seeldng to guard against: Is that 
the loss resulting directly from breach or is it the loss which flows ftom, termination of the 
contract based upon breach? 
5.015 It has been suggested that the intention of the parties is material as to determining 
this fitctor. 23 Therefore, if the parties! express or imputed intention is to provide the 
minimum payment to guard the promisee against the loss resulting from termination, i. e. 
loss of bargain, this element should be taken into account in determining the nature of the 
mbumurn payment clause. On this basis, it has been submitted that in hire-purchim 
agree: ments, the minimum payment clause "which is designed to ensure that the hirees 
liability will not exceed the ownees loss as represented by a deficiency in the dWounted 
hire-purchase price should be taken as reasonable and enforceable even if it is not a km 
which directly flows from the breach for the purpose of rules as to remotene"01. 
Accordingly the minimum payment clause which provides for the liability of the promisor 
to pay the arrears of rents, duly discounted future rentals and the difference between the 
residual value and the realisable value of the subject-matter, giving credit for any 
increased value to the creditor resulting from repossession and resale of the equipmew, 
should normally have a chance of being upheld as a genuine pro-estimate of actual Ion. 
3.2.2. Actual Lou or LegaUy Recoverable Lou? 
5.016 It might be objected that the intention of the panies could not be determhwtive, as 
to the Idnd of loss against which the minimum payment has bm provided to guard the 
promisee. For, what the actual recoverable loss is, would normally be determined by the 
common law rules and the parties can not go beyond these rules and provide for a lot% in 
the form of agreed damages, which is not recoverable at common law. In other words, 
afthough the parties may intend that the loss resulting ftom termination, instead of loss 
which directly results fiom breach, would be the km ageing which the MIMIWIUM payment 
has been provided for. Yd, considerim the seriousness or triviality of breach, this might 
23 So GOO& PLK, Mlv-P=hm Law and PfwUcto 2nd ed., 1970, p. 393 
24 Goode, loc. cit, p. 395 
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not be the legally recoverable loss and so the parties! pro4msessment might not be 
regarded as a genume pre-estimate of actual loss. In sunimary, the only loss against 
which the parties can provide for the minimum payment clause, is the legally recoverable 
loss. Although some cases2' might seem to support this view, it is, nonetheless, 
suggested that this is not the right approach to the subject and the parties can provide for 
the actual loss [even not recoverable at common law] to be recovered in the event of 
termination. The following reasons may support the suggestion: 
5.017 First, as it was argued in detailP6, the low against wfdch the parties can provide for 
the agreed damages clause, is not restricted to the legally recoverable loss, but it can 
include the actual loss which is not recoverable at common law. The dicta of Diplock Lj 
in Robophone Facififies, Ltd v. BkvLe, clearly supports this view. 23 
5.018 Second, it is clear that if the promisor voluntarily, on the basis of his contractual 
right, terminated the contract, then the minimum payment provided to be paid upon 
termination would be recoverable. and no question of the application of the penalty 
doctrine would arise, because, as it was discussed", the rules against penalty is applicable 
only where there is a breach of a contractual obligation by the promisor, and the. exercise 
of a contractual right to terminate the agreement cannot be regarded as a breach. Now, if 
the contract can provide for do promisoes contractual right to be exercised without any 
loss to the promisee, why should the parties not be able to provide for such a result in the 
c; ase of the exercise of a contracliW rigbt to terminate the agreement by the promisee on 
the basis of the promisoes breach? Put it somewhat differently, if the agreement can 
provide for the right of the promisee to terminate the contract upon the promisor's 
breach, why not be able to provide for itwithout any loss to the promisee? 
5.019 Third, as to financing transactions, which are the main source of litigation 
25 Thm cam will be shordy db=ed: see lnfi%L, pam 5.053 et seq. 
26 supra., pam 2.14 
27 [1966) 3 AR ER 128, at p. 143 
28 Sm ft rc=nWg of Diplock LJ OW the Comments on that in: supm, pam. 2.11 
29 supra, pam 4.12 
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regarding the application of the penalty doctrine to minimum payment clauses, the view 
expressed is in conformity with the true nature of these transactions; for the red dwacter 
of such agreements requires the legitimacy of allowing the creditor to recover his actual 
loss resulting from termination, i. e. the loss of profit, since it is the sensible expectation of 
the creditor who extends finance and maintains a real right in the subject-nutter for 
himself to secum the repayment of the capital and a proper interest. 
5.020 Fourth, the observations of Lord Devlin, in the course of his judgement, in Bri4p 
v. Cwnpbell Discount Co. Ltd 3ý could be read in a way to support this view: 
"If a hire-purchase agreement is terminated before its natural and and the 
car is returned to or retaken by the owner, it will usually have depreciated 
in value and be worth less than the cash price paid fbr it. This will cause 
loss to the owner if the depreciation exceeds in value that part of any 
instalkwu paid as is to be counted as return of capital. The possibility of 
such an excess is a contingency against which the owner is entitled to 
protect himself If the sum payable on termination under cl. 9(b) "by way 
of agreed compensation for depreciation of the vehicle" could be justified 
as a genuine pre-estimate of that excess, it would, I think, be recoverable 
under the agreement, whether the termination was the result of a breach, 
or of the exercise of the option, or of some other event. " 
From the words quoted above, it appears that the creditor is entitled to provide for an 
agreed damages to guard himself against loss of bargain, since providing for the 
difference between the depreciated value and the capital received as a part of instdmem 
paid at the date of termination will, in effect, cause the pron-Asee to acquire the rental paid 
and the future rentals duly discounted to show the cash price (viz., future rwtals without 
finance charge element) less the realisable value of the subject-matter. The loss proposed 
by Lord Devlin is obviously equal to loss of bargain. " Thus, if the minimum payment 
" [IM] AC 600, [196211 All ER 385, at pp. 633,402 respecdv* 
31 To clarify the issue, if we use the following abbreviations, then it can easily be conqx4ed that the loss 
against which, in the words of Lmd Devlin, the owner is entitled to protect himself is, in fW4 I= of 
barVin: 
C. P.: cash price, which includes (CJ?. )l [the cash Price dement in the rentals paid) and (C. P. )2 [the cash 
price element in the future rentals] 
I: interest or finance chur which includes 11 [finance charge element in the rental paid] and 12 [finance 
chmse in the fiftre rentals) 
L. B.: LAW of barVAn ;X LASS PWPOIMd bY L4xd DVdW 
D. V.: Depreciated value Of the subJ*d'ma*lr 
p_V.: Realisable value of the subject-matter 
Now, we can amen loss of bargain as follows: 
L. B. - (RentalS Paid + Duly discounted fiftre MUWS) - Reatisable value 
L. B. -([(C. P. )l + II) + [(C. P. )211 - ILV. 
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could be regarded as the pardee genuine pre-estitnate of the prornisees actual los4 as 
shown above, then it should normally be upheld as being a valid liquidated damages. 
5.021 Fifth, referring to the judgement of Lord Radcliffe in Bridge v. CampbeU 
Dbcowtt Co. Ltd32' dearly shows that his lordship, after having discussed the Uw 
purpose of the minimum payment clause and the possibility of the clause being subject to 
the penalty doctrine where termination is triggered off by the hirees breach and at the 
same time, not being subjea to timm rules if the contraa is tmniwed by the exacise of 
the hires option or on the happening of some events which do not involve any brewh of 
agreement, observes two main defects in the stipuhited minitmun payment. Ms Lordslip 
states: 
"The total hire-purchase price is called up to the extent of two-thirds, 
regardless of two considerations essential to any measurement of the 
ownees loss: the price includes a considerable interest element which the 
owner does not in result forgo so far as the compensation is paid 
immediately, and the vehicle comes back into the ownee's possession with 
a realisable value that, in many circumstances, may exceed the one-third 
balance of the price which the owner has not got in. In my ophidion, a 
clause of this kind, when founded on in consequences of a contractual 
breach, comes within the range of the coures jurisdiction to relieve against 
penaities,... "33 
Then, the learned judge recognizes the necessity that, in this Idnd of transaction, the 
owner should have a Idnd of protection against the loss which results from the premature 
termination of the agreement. He, however, doubts whether the owner can have such a 
protection "without much more elaborate provisions for adjustment according to the 
circumstances in which the claim Ws due *34 . 
in &I, in a normal market, realisable value is affosed to be the diftence between the cash price and 
the depreciated value of the sutiect-mattw, i. e. PLV. - C. P. - D. V. 
Therefore, we will have: 
L. B. - (C. P. )l + Il + (C. P. )2 - C. P. + D. V. 
L. B. - C. P. + 11 - C. P. + D. V. 
L. B. - 11 + D. V. 
F4uWly, the loss proposed by Lord Devlin can be computed as follova: 
X- Rentals paid + (Difibrence between the depreciated value and cash price dement in the rentals p" 
X. F(C. P. )I + II] + P. V. - (C. P. 11 
X- II + D. V. 
As it is dear, the pimposed ku by Lgxd Devlin is equal to km of barSain. 
32 [1962] AC 600, [1962] 1 All ER 335 
33 Jbid, at pp. 625,396-397 raspactiv* 
"Ibid, at pp. 625,397 respectively 
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ft appears from the words quoted above that if the parties provide in detail fix the 
owner's Ion resulting from termination of the agreement. taldng the interest element And 
the realisable, value of the repossessed goods into consideration in formulating the 
mmimum payment clause, by giving credit to the realisable value of the subject-matter 
and also allowing a proper rebate for the accelerated receipt of the future rentals- then 
there should be no objection to the pre-assessment of the parties as providing for a 
genuine pre-estimate of the ownees loss resulting from termination, i. e. his loss of 
bargain. Thus, it could be suggested that the observations of Lord Radcliffe is in line 
with the expressed view and supports that. 
5.022 The argument so far could be munmed up as follows: The loss against which the 
parties can provide for an agreed damages clause is not just the legally recoverable losk 
but it could include the creditoes actual loss, even though it might not be recoverable at 
common law. The important point in this relation is that the kind of loss against which 
the creditor intends to protect himselt would depend on the Wren or implied intention 
of the parties. Determining this loss which is the first step in deciding whether a 
minimum payment clause is a genuine pre-estimate of that loss, should practically be done 
by a reference to the terms of the contract and all inherent circumstances surrounding it 
to find out the true intention of the parties. 
5. o23 it should still be borne in mind that the treatment of some casm which will shortly 
be discussed, is based on the idea of the legally recoverable loss. Then casM in 
determining the nature of the agreed damages clause, have turned to a simple comparison 
between the stipulated amount as the minimum payment and the low which is normally 
recoverable in an action for unliquidated damages at common law. This consideration 
has led them to take the nature of the breach into account: whedwr the breach is a breach 
of a ftulamental term, a fundamental breach of the agreement or a repudiation or it is a 
breach of a minor term which does not amount to a repu"On. As we shall me, the 
treatment of the issue in this way might lead to a considerable amount of uncertainty and 
in some cases, it might work substantial i*stice. 
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3.3. Descdptfon of Payment 
3J. 1. Different Descriptions of the Minimum Payment Clause 
5.024 The minimum PaYment clause may be described by the parties to a contract in 
various wayP: It might be described as "agreed damages for depreciation of goods" or 
as wagreed damages for "loss of profit" or just for "lossr", or it might be silent as to the 
description of the stipulated payment. The apparent diffierence between these 
descriptions is that in describing the payment as depreciation of goods, the loss against 
which the parties have provided for the clause would be limited to only the depreciation 
fictor, and so the factors like drop in the market value of the goods would apparently be 
excluded. While where the minimum payment is characterized as an agreed damages for 
loss of profit or imply loss, all the elements which might produce loss have been takm 
into account. In other words, in the latter case, the minimum payment "will cover the 
whole of the deficiency"36. Furthermore, in a case where the nature of the ii 
payment has not been defined by the parties, the stipulated sum, it is believedý should be 
taken as providing for the creditor's actual loss resulting from termination, i. e. the loss of 
profit. 
37 
3J. 2. Is the Description Of Payment Conclusive? 
5.025 Despite the apparent d6similarity between the different descriptions of the dau 
the real and important queStiOn is whether the parties! characterisation is conclusive. In 
other words, if the parties descnl)ed the nature of payment in a specific way, should the 
labelling of the clause deter the creditor from the recovery of the actual loss adfind as a 
result of terzninatiorý considering the fitct that if the clause had been zed in 
another way, the actual loss would have been recoverable? For instance, the parties 
defm the mmuntim payment as agreed damages for depreciation and in fornsulating the 
payment take into account the whole loss-producing elements, even drop in the nuutet 
value. Now, assuming that the clause would have been valid had it been labelled as the 
loss of profit, could the damages agreed by the parties be struck out as being a penalty on 
35 See Goode PLINE, HIM-Pwchm Law lud Pnwft 2ad ad., 1970, p. 395 
36 Goode, Jbitt 
37 Anglo Auto FInave Co. Ltd v. Jams [1963) 1 WLA 1042, in which the butment of the CoM of 
Appeal showed that the I Ot the minimum PRYWAnt should nonnally be rqpt6d a 
covering the whole Ion of bargain by the stiplated paymenL See also Goode, ibid, p. 397 
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the mere ground that it covers the whole deficiency which the parties had not intended it 
to be regarded as the agreed loss by describing the payment as "loss for depreciadW of 
goods? 
5.026 The point seem to be controversial. It has been suggested that the creditor 
should be held to the description of the minimum payment which has been given by 
himselfs. This is because to determine the nature of the minimum payment clause when 
applying the penalty doctrine to the clause, as it was emphasized, the nature of the low 
against which the agreement is seeking to protectý as the first step, should be ascertained, 
and this issue could be concluded by a refirence to the description given to the dw, by 
the parties. Furthermore, ignoring the description of payment and extending the loss, 
against which the minimum payment should be compared, to the low of profit in every 
case would "involve the rewriting of the contract to extend the nature of the loss to be 
covered beyond which that the parties have chosen"39 . On the other 
hand, considering 
the general test in assessing the weight which is to be given to the description of an 
agreed damages clause as liquidated damages or a penale, it has been submitted that 
the characterization ofthe minimum payment clause is not conclusive': AD the ii 
payment clauses, regardless of the description of payment, have the same basic Ainction 
and that is to provide for the creditoes actual loss resulting from termination of the 
contract. The main reasoning behind this view is tha4 as pointed out by Lord RadcM in 
BrjdV v. Cwnpbell Disomw Co. W42, the jurisdiction of courts to relim again 
penalty is "a question not of words or of forms of speech, but of substance and of 
things*'. Thus, having regard to the substance of the agmnm#, the true intention of the 
parties has been submitted to be to provide for the loss of profit resulting from 
termination of the contract by the creditor upon the promisor's breach. The form of 
drafting of the minimum payment clause, especially the description given to the paymna, 
36 Goode, ibid, p. 396 
" jbid, p. 396 
40 It " dimund befm dma swh a descdpdon is not condhIM at all: we sm^, para. 2.16 
41 Zftd, Jacob S., Ilie hfinimum PaYwAnt am, Muddle [19641 C. LL 109, at p. 126 
42 [1962] AC 600, [1962] 1 AH ER 385 
43 jbid, at pp. 624,396 reqmcdv* (citing Lmd Dwey in CI)k*bm* EjqpWpjnS d Ski 
v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquien* Y Castmeda [ 19051 AC 6, at 1). 15) 
an pbuMne C& 
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should not therefore divert attention from the real substance of the asnmnent. 
5.027 It seems to be true that in the application of the penalty doctrine, as the first step, 
the nature of the loss against which the agreement is attempting to guard should be 
&watained; but it, with an respecý does not Mow that the description given to the 
payment by the parties could inevitably show the true character of damages against which 
the minimum payment should be compared. T'he true nature of such a loss should be 
determined by a reference to the substance of the agreement, and not only the fonn; for, 
as it has been emphasized, the jurisdiction to relieve against penalties is a question of 
substance, and the form of the agreement is only important to the extent the it reffects 
the substance of the conumd. 
it could accordingly be submitted that fint, where, considering the terms of the contract 
and aU surrounding circumstances, the description of the payment shows the true 
intention of the parties as to determining the nature of the loss against which the promisee 
is attempting to protect himselt then in order to ascertain the nature of the ii 
payment clause, the stipulated sum should be compared with the Ion descrOW by the 
parties. Thus, if the parties define the minkinum payment as for 
depreciation of goods and this description shows their true intention and reffects the 
sibstance of the agreenma, then providing for a fbrmula. which covers the whole 
deficiency, even the drop in the market value, might result in the clause being a penalty. 
Second, if, however, the characterization of payment does not reffect the substance of the 
agreement, and the real intention of the parties is discovered to be to provide for the Ion 
of profit, then the description given to the payment will not be important. K thwefbM 
regardless of this description, the minimum payment could show a genuine pro-admate 
of the promisees actual loss resulting from termination, the clam might be upheld ua 
valid liquidated damages clause. 
However, the descripfion of the payment in general, should, it seems, give rise to a 
presumption in favour of that description. Such a presumption could, of omm be 
rebutted by a party who claims to the contrary. it is howem to be noted that whom the 
contract is drafted by one of he parties, like contracts drafted by banks or finance houses 
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in loan or hire-purchase agreements, the rebuttal of the presumption, pending randerinS 
enough evidence showing the true intention of the parties, should readily be attahm"s by 
a party who has not drafted the contract. 
3.3.3. The Presumption as to the Effect of the Description of Payment In Rnancing 
Transactions 
5.028 The important point is that in financing transactions like hire-purchase agreementg 
and finance leases, the characterization of payment does not normally reffect the 
substance of the agreement; and the real intention of the parties, regardless of the 
description given to the payment, seems to be to provide for loss of bargain. The 
following reasons support this proposition: 
3.029 First, having regard to the true nature of these transactions, providing for a 
payment clause is normally for the purpose of acquhing the expectancy value of 
the agreement; i. e., the creditor who extends finance and maintains a real right for himser 
in the subject-matter to secure the repayment of the capital plus a proper interest, 
normally wishes to provide for the minimum payment clause to flicilitate and simplify the 
obtaining of the attended firAance and interest (viz. the expectancy value). Therefom the 
real nature of financing transactions clearly indicates the true character of the low against 
which the agreement is seeldng to guard, namely loss of bargain which covers the whole 
deficiency. 
5.030 Second, drafting the minimum payment Ciguse in different ways in various 
financing transactions, inter alid, giving diffbrent descriptions to the payment, seems to 
be for the purpose of avoiding the courts to hold the clause as being a penalty. in so 
many casee, the nimmum payment has been described as "agreed compensation for 
depreciation of the goods". Considering the policy of the courts as regard$ such C181, SM 
especially regarding the clause as a sliding scale of compensation, which slides in a wrong 
44E. X, Msey & Co., Ltd v. HYde OWY rePorted in Jwes and Proudfixes Notes an Hhj PurdhM JA% 
2nd a&, P. 107, mid referred to in Re APOX Supply Co. 1194211 Ch. Joe and in Cw&n FA-SLqewft Co. 
v. Stanford.; C60*n EngimeMng CO. Ltd V. Stanford [ 1953] 1 QB 36; ZW4* v. Ownpbell Di&vuw Co. 
Ltd. [1962] AC 600, [1962) 1 All ER 385 
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directiozes, the clause was drafted in a somewhat different manner to inspire the 
indication that the scale of compensation slides in a right direction. 46 Afterwards in sotne 
casm the minimum payment clause was drafted without 91VIng any description to the 
payment. 47 On the whole, resorting to the different draftsmanships, and 
the payment in the various manners seems to have been done with the aim of abling the 
promisee to acquire the expectancy value, i. e. the loss of profit. TherefbM the 
chmicterization of payment in different manners should not divert attention ftom the true 
purpose of the minitnum payment clause in financing transactions. 
5.031 Third, a brief survey of cases involving the mmiimum payment clause in flimuming 
transactions shows that the courts, regardless of the description given to the payment, 
have treated the stipulated amount as the sum provided to compensate the creditor as to 
any deficiency in the purchase price. In Cooden Engineering Co. Ltd v. Skv#brd", the 
basis for the majoritys judgement in determining the nature of the minimum payment 
clause and holding it as a penalty, was to accept the stipulated payment as, provided to 
compensate the owner for his loss of bargain, despite the fitct that the parties had 
described the payment as compensation for depreciation of goods. " 
Bridge v. Campbell Diwount Co. DO, the parties alpved on a Minimum payment 
45 Bridge v. Cmoell Diswunt Co. Ltd. lbid, per Und RadcUf b at pp. 623,396 respecdv* 
46 See cases MW PkOnOS? Whic EPIPMent (1958) Ltd v. Mudu [196111 WLR 1379; Lombw* Led v. 
F, =eII [196411 QB 415 
' E. g., Anglo Auto Rnance Co. Ltd. v. James [196311 WLR 1042 
4' [195311 QB 86 
49 For example, Somervell U [with whom Hodson U agreed on this point), W%ning to ft bijWs 
argument that Upon termination the owner could get back his car plus the agreed porchm p** Igo a 
nominal value [for the exercise of the option to pwdim), pointed out: -Although it can" bg aid do 
the amount exceeds the greatest 1018 that could possibly follow an tM breach, .... it Will Oxmd it ja an 
except the exoeptional case wbere the car has become of no value. " (Ibld, at p. 98) Bvu Jagchn Lj 
(dissentiag on the issue Of the applicability of the doctrine). assuining the applicdft, wn of a@ Mag 4inion; he observed: "... apart ftom that exceptiond case jwhW the value Of the Car Md been redmd 
to nothing before repossession by the owner], it mFP- Ij that the on pq*W under chm II on dw 
owners' determination of the hiring must always exceed ... any damage to the owimn which oouW flow ftom any breach of contract on the part of the hirer on which a determination by the owms under clause 
II might be founded. " (Mid., at p. 109) It is clear that the judgments did not compm tM stipulated 
amount with the owner's loss resulting ftom, only depreciation of the vAodmstter, but with WS OVMH 
joss resulting ftom termination based upon breWL 
-" [19621 AC 600, [196211 All ER 383 
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and defined it as "agreed compensation for depreciation of the vehicle". In the course of 
his judgement, Lord Radcliffe, having considered the fact that if the basis for the agreed 
compensation was supposed to be the measure of depreciation, then the provided 
measure would be a sliding scale of compensation which slides in a wrong direction, 
added: 
PThe fitct that this anomalous result is deliberately produced by the 
formula employed suggests, I think, that the real purpose of this clause is 
not to provide compensation for depreciation at all but to afford the 
owners a substantial guarantee against the loss of their hiring contract. "" 
Flis Lordship, then, considered the real nature of the transaction saying: 
,, The purpose of an owner entering into a hire-purchase transaction is to 
turn goods into cash; as a moneylender, which is what he is in all but form, 
his purpose is to recover with interest the amount of his advance. This 
clause (i. e. the minimum payment clause] is designed to provide him with 
a guarantee at the expenses of the hirer that, come what may, he will set 
out of the deal in money at any rate two-thirds of the total hire-purchase, 
which is defined as being cash price plus hiring charges and option fee. "$2 
At the end, the learned judge concluded that on this basis, the clause constituted a 
penalty, since it had failed to take into account two important elements, i. e. the 
considerable interest element in the purchase price, and the realisable value of the 
repossessed subject-matter. Also Lord Denning, revealing the true nature of the 
transaction at the beginning of his judgement, regarded the mhumum, payment clauq% 
despite the description given to it by the parties, as " on for loss of the fliture 
instalments which the respondents (i. e. the owners) expected to rw"$3 vid argued for 
the penal nature of such an amount on other grounds. 1, ord DevIK having ogwessed the 
settled principle of going beyond the form and giving effect to the real substance of the 
qpment, where the words used by the parties have not been deigned to represent the 
true nature of the transaction, treated the agreement of the parties as to the minimum 
payment clause "a fictitious agreement to treat the sum as compensation for 
depreciation*54 and stated: 
"As I understand itý none of your Lordships believe that the sum was 
51 ibid., at pp. 623,396 mpecdv* 
52 Aid 
53 Ibid, at pp. 6n, 3" mVecdvely 
54 Jbid, at pp. 634.402 
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arrived at in that way. Oss 
it appears from the words quoted above that the court has given effect to the real 
characteristic of the minimum payment clause in financing transactions and traded it as a 
sum stipulated to compensate the creditor for his loss of bargain, irrespective of any 
description which the parties had given to the payment. 
5.032 Fourth, it might be argued that basically damages resulting from depreciation of 
the subject-matter do not &rise from the hirer/lessees breach. The natural depreciation of 
the subject-matter is not itself a breach of contract and the WrerAessees dehult of a 
contractual obligation, like punctual payment of rents, does not cause any damages to the 
owner/lessor for depreciation. As it has been stated by Salter L in the important cm of 
Elsey & Co., Ltd v. Hyde36: 
"The fitct that the hirer is in arrear with his payments will not entitle the 
owner to any damages for depreciation of these things. The reason that 
they have suffered is that they have second-hand goods put on their hands 
before they have received very much money in respect of them The is 
not the result of the hirees breach of contractý In being lee in his 
payments, it is the result of their own election to determine the We& aW it appears to me, even in this case, them is no question of penalty at all ... " AMough the learned judge has concluded the matter with the non-application of the 
penalty doctrine to the subject, the law, as it stands now, is that in such a case the ndes 
against penalty am applicable. 57 The reasoning of the learned judge, howem, might 
seem to remain on foot. The point has also been referred to by Lord Raddiffe in Bhvp 
v. Campbell Discount Co. Ltd $1. Now, assuming the force of this reasoning, it could be 
contended that essentially the labelling of the minimum payment clause as agreed 
compensation for depreciation could not indicate the true nature of the putW 
agreement; for, the loss resulting ftom the natural depreciation of the subject-nwtw 
Ibid 
EJwy & Co.. LAd v. Hy& only reported in Jones and ProudAxWs Notes on Ifin Pwvhm Uwý 2nd mL. p. 107, and rdbrred to in Re Apa Skpply Co. [1942] 1 Ch. log and in Cooden Lqghwwft C& 
SMnfwd [195311 QB 36 
See sarm, pam. 4.08,4.11 
[1962] AC 6W, [196211 All ER 385, whom he add: "... rich loan J=dft ftm dqwxi@dm a@ 
selers to the ka of value in the vddcle, and even, with I= Socurla use of hWSW4pj do ka of 
=Wmt value due to the unpredictable movenmts of the second-band car madmt) do not aria ftm my defimIt of the birw. ... if ore redly tied oneself to this idea of compensation Aw depeciatim the case 9br 
uwftg the den as a genuine pre-estimte of the da=W suffered by dqxsciatift w&M be jd=* 
unarguable. " at pp. 623,395 req)wdvdy 
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could not be attributed to the hirerfiessee's breach. Thereibre, turning to the true nature 
of the clause, it should be an agreed sum to compensate the ownerfiessor for the loss of 
profit. 
it should, however, be mentioned that this fine of reasoning might be disposed of by the 
argument that it is true that the loss resulting from depreciation does not arise dbwdly 
firom, the hirerfiessees breach, but it is in fact the breach and the termination of the 
agr PPIX -it by the ownerfiessor upon that breach that leaves the repossessed depreciated 
subject-matter in the ownerfiemor's hands; and, but for the hirer/lessees defitult and the 
owner/lessoes termination and repossession upon that, the ownerfiessor would not have 
to bear the loss flowing from termination. 
5.033 Quite apart from the last argument, in view of the above observations, it may, as a 
conclusion, be submitted that in financing transactions, the prima jbck rule is that the 
description of the minunurn payment does not normally indicate the parties! true k"ntion, 
and the is that the stipulated sum haa been provided to compensatg the 
creditor for his loss of profit. Thus, to determine the nature of the minimm paymeo 
clause, when applying the Penalty doctrine, the loss against which the stipulated sum 
should be compared should, in principle, be the loss of profit, though in practice, some 
cases have limited this principle to a situation where the loss of profit is the legally 
recoverable loss in an action at common law, i. e. where the breach of the Agreenna is a 
breach or a breach of a fundamental term or a repudiation. 
3.4. FbcIng the Minimum Payment In an Arbftrasy Way. - A Review of Cww 
3.4.1. The Penal Nature of a Minimum Payment Fixed in an Arbitrary Way 
5.034 As pointed out before, applying the rules against penalties to a zninj=un psynVa 
clause to detemine the nature of the stipulated payment, the general rules jPdOW 08 
liquidated dAmna from Penalties would be applied. In most cases the minknum 
payment clause which provides, in effect, that a spedfic portion of the total purchase 
price should be paid by the promisor, taking into account the payments made by him 
before termination, in the event of a default by him of contractual promises- hop aft to 
Pay the stipulated instalments on time- would be hold to be a penalty. This is because the 
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stipulated sum has been made payable irrespective of whether the da&wt occurs in the 
payment of the first or IM instalment. " Since the likely actual loss resulting ftm breach 
in the can of default in payment of each instalment is likely to be different, the stipulation 
of a specific portion of the total purchase price to be paid on the happening of every 
deflault, whether trivial or serious and whether in the payment of the ft or Inst 
instahnent, can not be considered as a genuine pre-estimate of the likely actual km of the 
promisee at the time when the contract is made. More intportantly, the stipulated sum is 
normally made Payable irrespective of the nature of goods, whether they are used or now 
and the different makes of the same categories of goods. The stipulation is dw unway 
related to the total purchase price rather than the cash price of the goods, it thwdom 
ignores the substantial finance charge element which is not due at the tim of 
determination. 60 Furthermore, it ignores the fitct that upon termination, the adject- 
matter of the agreement is normally repossessed and resold by the promisee, and this 
leaves the realisable value of the equipment in his hands. Considering all these elemorts, 
a minimum payment providing. in an arbitrary way, for the liability of the promisor to 
bring his payments up to a specific portion of the purchase price. whether 75%, 50% or 
two-thirds, might compensate the promisee more excessively than his actual Ion r=*Ing 
fi-om termination and therefore, it could not beconsidered as a genuine pre-ostimau of 
likely actual damages. 
5.035 In Lamdon Dust Ltd v. Hwrelfl, in a hire-purchase agreement, it was provided 
that in the event of a default in payment of each instahnent the owner had the d& to 
.ý1 11 te the agreement. Upon termination, under the "minimum paymift" dmin the 
him had to pay a sum sufficient to bring up his total payments to 1pi-ý01 2-. tIIrW 
quarters Of the Purchase Price. On the hirees de&ult in the payment of the fifth 
the owner company terminated the agreement, retook possession of the 
subject-matter, resold it, and claimed for the specified am under the minimum paymew 
clause It was held that since, inter alla, this sum was payable whether the dehuk 
" Chitty on CooftcK 27th et, vol. 1,19%, pam 26-061 at p. 1255; T=iW OIL, 7% Law of Combat. 9th a&, 1995, p. 905; MIcGrW om DWUMM 15th ed., IM, pam 481 at pp. 30). 301; ZIqd' Jacob 
iu minimum Pqmcw aw MQUe [19641 C. U. 109, at p. 117 
60 ZIWL JbId 
19 11955] 1 WLR 391 
in 
occurred in the payment of the first or last instalment it could not be a genuine pre. 
estimate of the owner's likely actual loss, and so it was a penalty. Denning L. J., in the 
course of his judgment, having observed the usual practice of hire-purchase finance 
companies to stipulate for compensation for depreciation at the rate of 75 per cent. of the 
price, pointed out: 
"This means, therefore, that, if the hirer should fail to pay the first 
instalment or any later instalment, the owners can not only retake the car 
and resell it for their own benefit, but also compel the hirer to pay three. 
quarters of the price. This seems to me to be altogether exorbitant. *' 
it appears from the whole judgement that the fitct that the nU'nU'n= payment provision 
had failed to take into account the value of the repossessed car was the chief reason why 
the stipulation was held to be a penalty. 
3.4.2. Drafting the Clause Using the Principle of Graduated Damages 
3.4.2 L DesmOing the Payment as "'Compensation for Deprecladox IP 
5.036 Some attempts have been made to use the principle of "graduated damagWI to 
support the nuinanum payment clause. It was stated above that the presumption of being 
a penalty, raised by stipulating for a single surn to be paid upon diftrent brewim of 
varying importance, could be rebutted by providing for graduated damages which are 
proportioned to the seriousness of the breach. " One of then attempts wu to describe 
the stipulated payment as compensation for depreciation. In BHdV v. C4=&vkll 
Discount Co. IJd", it was provided that the "minimum payment* up to the two-d&& of 
the purchase privý as "agreed compensadon for depreckftn" of goods woudd be 
payable in the event of termination for, inter afta, a defimk in punctual payment by the 
him. The nudority of the House of Lords, holding that the hiring agreement had been 
terminated by the owner upon the hirees breach in the payment of instalments, held dul 
the nuinkinum payment clam amounted to a penalty. The reason was, hwr afta, that the 
10 md, at p. 393 ; see also An, & Auto PInamm Co. Ltd v. Jams [1963) 1 WLR 1042 ; Unload 
Dominions 7hW (Commercial) Ltd v. EmIs [ 196811 QB 54 ; CWdan EVIntaft CA Ltd v. SkPbW 
(195311 QB 86 
So supm, pan. 2.47-2.48 
For comple, in can of stipulation of damagm for delay in COVIction in COSIbuctIOR COMMM 
providing fbr a sum to be paid for rivy week of dft is a Smduated damep and it is Vvy 111* to be 
upheld a being a Senuins pie-eldnWe of damaget 
65 [19621 AC 600 
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stipulated payment decreased by each payment made by the hirer, while the depnxiation 
obviously increased the longer the hirer had the car in his possession. Lord Monon, in 
the course of his judgement, stated: 
01 find it impossible to regard the sum stipulated in clause 9 [the 
payment clause] as a genuine pro-estimate of the low which would be 
suffered by the respondents in the events specified in the same dam. ... This was a second-hand car when the appellant took it over on him 
purchase. The depreciation in its value would naturally become grMw 
the longer it remained in the appellanVs hands. Yet the sum to be paid 
under clause 9(b) is largest when, as in the present case, the car is returned 
aft it has been in the hirer's possession for a very short time, and gets 
progressively smaller as time goes on. "66 
And in the words of Lord Radcliffe, "It is a sliding scale of compensation, but a scale that 
slides in the wrong direction,... "67. Such a minimum psyment, therefore, acts in inverse 
proportion to the depreciation and cannot be a genuine pre-estimate of the likely actual 
damages. 
5.037 It has been submitted the "depreciation*, in termination clauses, is used in an 
elliptical sense to mean "excess depreciation""; in other words, it is only intended to 
cover the amount by which depreciation exceeds payments that am being ma&. 0 Since 
the goods are likely to depreciate far more rapidly in the early months of the ggresnwt, 
especially when they am now. so the excess depreciation is likely to be high in the early 
months of the contract than later on and it is also likely to become smaller. 
it follows that the compensation provided is a scale which slides in a right directiom put 
another way, the excess of depreciation over the sums already paid seem to bwome 
progressively smaller, the longer the equipment remains in the hirees possession. It is, 
therefore, apparent that, regarding the *depredation" as excess depreciation of the 
subject-matter, the scale of compensation would slide in a d& dhwdon. On this basis, 
the argument of Loord Morton and the observations of Lord RxkM should be 
. mayreted as not assuming the depreciation as any excess in depreciation over dw 
amounts already Paid, but u the depreciation of the goods kseK as it is the apparat 
0 Aid, at p. 616 
67 Jbid, at P. 623 
ZiOPL 1000b S-- 114 Mlnimum PaYMMA Clam MUMO 119641 CXJ. 108, at p. 119 
GOOde R-K. Hir*4tfchm IAW Wd PmcdM 2nd ed., 1970, P. 396 
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of the words used by the panies. 70 
3.4.22 FmWAS the Ckwe as a Sfiding Scale of Compensadon in a Fdght Dkwdm 
5.038 The possibility of the argument of "a sliding scale of compensation, but in a wrong 
direction" seemed to have led some draftsman to draw the minkinum payment do, in 
another way to show that the scale of compensation slides in a right direction. In 
Phonographic Equipment (1958) Lid v. MusWl, the parties entered into a hire-purchase 
agreement for a jukebox. The contract provided, inter afta, that in the event of 
determination of the agreement- because of any reason, inter alia, the hirees defoult in 
the payment of instalments- the hirer should pay all arrears of rent, the cost of all repair& 
necessary to put the machine in good order and "by way of agreed depreciation of the 
goods a sum equal to ... 50 per cent. of the total hire-purchase price payable under this 
agreement ... plus ... a further 5 per cent. of such total hire-purchase price for ewJi mouth 
which has elapsed between the date of the agreement and the receipt of the goods by the 
owners up to 75 per cent. of the said total price, Im ... the total of the sum already paid 
and the moneys due to the owners for hire rentals at the date of the receipt of the goods 
by them. " The Court of Appeal held such a clause to be enforceable as not being a 
penalty. Donovan L. J., delivering the main judgement of the court. thought tb&t 
considering the contract as a whole, the fitet that the stipulated sum begins to abate afkw 
the sixth month and disappears at the I Sth, looks more like an attempt to pre-estimate the 
70 It is however to be noted that, as argued before, the description at the minimum pqzmw dam dwWd 
not divert attention ftom the true putpose of the minimum pamM clsask apecially in the finocigg 
uansections. In these coubuts, the Mma fact# intention of the parties is to provide Ibr Me 
r-M E-11 of the owner Aw his Ion of pmfit, whatever the minimum pqment clwm Is dseatnt 
This is what lAnd P4dclM recognized as the true purpose of the stipulation in Or*# v. CAW6*11 
DhomW Co. Ltd 1196211 All ER 385, saying- -... the real pwpon of this dam is not to pwA& 
COMPOO ft depreciation at all but to afford the owners a substantial suannue against the km at 
their hiring agireement. 0 (at p. 396) Considaing the minimum payment dam as pmvlding ft the 
ownees last of pmfit, the clause, fidling to tab into account the raffisslAe value at the reponiessid 
subject-matter which comes bad to the ownees possession and the interest (Le. the flunce dwp) 
element in the At= instOlluents, was held to be a penalty. As Imd Pjdcft pointed out Mw wN 
hire-Putchaw Prim is called up to the extent of twothiu* reSudless of two coadderatim sweaW a 
any measurement of the owners ion; the price includes a considerable interest dement whkh the owner does not in the result forgo so far as the compemdon is paid immediately. and the vichide ODOM buk into the ownees possession with a realinNe value that, in many cixamstanom may mom as an. *W balance of the prim Which the owner has no got in. * (Md.. at pp. 39&397) It mey tbwdbn be 
co"Ir I that. inths&Wsawk had the minimum payvAWcIýprovW@dfbra peopm Abow hr 
the Accelamd VOCCIPtOtthe Adore instsIments and telmn into account the realis*b vaW of the s*jo* 
matter it would have been likely to be upheld as a valid liquidated dam-an regardless of do 4escripdas 
Sim to it by the partieL 
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loss resulting from depreciation rather than the fixing of a penalty to ad in terrorm of 
the offending party-72 This decision was cited in the arguments in Bridp Y. CA=9*11 
Diwwwd Co. Ltd 73 but it was not discussed in the judgements delivered in that case. In 
considering the relation between these two cases and whether they can be reconciled, it 
was pointed oui74 that the form of the depreciation clauses in these two cam vme 
different, for the clause in the Muslu case, unlike. the one in Bridp v. CA=Vkfl 
DiSCO, w co. ijd76 , provided for a compensation "a which slid in the right way, since 
as depreciation increased, the stipulated amount also grow at the rate of 5 per cent. per 
month. Accordingly, it has been proposed that if the depreciation clam provided for an 
amount which slid in the right direction, it might be upheld as not being a penalty. 77 
Leaving aside the description of the minianurn payment as depreciation of the subject- 
matter, the decision of the Court of Appeal in this case seem to crams some difficulty in 
the application of the penalty doctrine to the minimum payment clauses in financiM 
transactions, for, in this case, like the Bridp's case, the parties had failed to take into 
amount the realisable value of the equipment and the substantial interest element in the 
finure instalmentS which had been provided to be received by the ownw irnmedistely 
upon termination. Despite these facts, the Court of Appeal recognized the clause ua 
valid liquidated damages. 
5.039 It does, however, smn that the Muslu cue wu contrary to the decision of the 
House of Lords in Brid8v v, Cmpbell Diwmt Co. Ltd". Although the appar" form 
71 [1961] 1 VAR 1379 
72 Aid, at P. 1386 
73 tigm Ac 6w 
7'Upjohn U. in Lmbw* Ltd v. EweU [196411 QB 415, wbore he stood (at pý 426): wilme appan 
hen on the fim of it to be a Perfectly proper clause of depreciation, for dam 60 [the dopimciadon 
clause) is dealing v#th the calculation of depreciation on a perfixtly simple matbomatical lbnnub v&icb 
slides. and slides the ftk way, for depreciation incream at ft mfm of 5 per conL per nwn&o 
73 phMograpWC EpIpWnt (1958) Ltd. v. Musim [196111 WLR 1379 
7' [19621 AC 600 
77 Tr" OIL, 7U Law of Cowact. 9th e&, 1995, p. 905 
" Ph*"W*6k F4"'Pmmt (1 -958) Ltd- V- Musliv [ 196 111 WLA 13 79 
"[19621 AC 6W, R9621 I All ER 385 
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of the depreciation clauses in these two cases was different, in flict, with a carefW analysis 
they led to a same point. The alleged reconciliation, with all respect, seems to be subject 
to a serious objection. It is true that in the early months of the agreement, i. e. until the 
monthly increase of the stipulated compensation reached to the amount of 75 per omit of 
the purchase price, the scale of compensation slid in a right direction; but after that point, 
the increments of five per cent. stopped though the depreciation increased the longer the 
subject matter remained in the possession of the hirer. Therefore, the situation humed to 
be like that in Bridge v. Conpbell Discount Co. Lid" and the previous ce so that if 
the agreement was determined and the possession of the goods was retaken in the ikth 
month of the contract, the situation would exactly be the same as that in Landm ftst 
Lid v. Hurrelf' in which the contract was terminated after six months and 75 per cent. of 
the total hire-purchase price had been stipulated to be payable upon termination. '* It is, 
, apparent that m only am these two cam not recondlable, but the decision in 
the Br*Vs case3 is in contradiction with the Mudu case. " Henc4, it migbt be 
suggested that the Mushes case has implicitly been overruled by the judgement of the 
House of Lords in Bridge v. Conpbell Discount Co. Ltd". In fact, in KP. Fkxvw Co. 
Ltd v. DooleýP, Veale L in the course of his judgement, as to a clause sim" to the 
depreciation clam in the Muslu case, emphasized the penal nature of the term and 
pointed out: 
"I think that although in BMWs case the speeches did not rater to 
Mudses case with disapproval- they did not indeed refer to it at all- the 
whole ratio decidendi was contrary to that in Mushes case and accordingly 
I hold that I am not bound to follow Mushes can. On the contrary, I hold 
that clause 6 in the present case is a penal 
Nevertheless, Winn J. in Lornbank Ltd v. 
=V 
and Ashworth J. in Lowbank W v. 
so Aid 
[193511 WLR 391 
82 M; GrW on DamMM 15th c&, IM, yam 481 at pp. 300-301 
Is Bridge v. Campbell DLowwt Co., Ltd [ 19621 AC 6W, [ 196211 AU ER 3 85 
84 Phonogmphic EpIpment (1958) Ltd. Y. Muslu 1196 1)I WLR 1379 ; see McQW on Dunqw I Sth 
e&, IM, pam 481 
[19621 AC 6W 
[196311 WLR 1313 
17 JbId, at p. 1323 
0 [196211 VALA 1133 
193 
ArchboAP, applying the decision of the Court of Appeal in Mushes cue, thought that as 
to rather identical depreciation clauses, they were bound to hold that the dm,, m tbwe 
were enforceable as not being a paWty. 
5.040 In Lombw* Ltd V. EweIP0, though the application of the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Mushes can was confted to a very limited area, nevertheless the court in a 
very cautious judgement, thought that it was not open to the court to say that the 
decision in Mushes case was contrary to Bridp v. Campbefl Diswunt C& LId and had 
therefore wrongly been decided. In this case, in an agreement for the hire-purchm of a 
motor-car, a depreciation clai, very similar to that in the MWIu cue was provided for. 
The County Court judge found himself bound to apply the previous decision of the Court 
of Appeal and held that the clause was not a penalty. on appeal, holding that the 
question of a clause being liquidated damages or a penalty depended on the construction 
of the clause considering all surrounding circumstances, the Court of Appeal remitted the 
case to the County Court judge for the evidence to be called as to the Mevaw 
circumstances. Upjohn L. L, in the course of his judgement. having expressed that it Was 
not possible to maintain the view that according to MusWs case, any ldmil@ depreciation 
clause, regardless of the subject-matter of the hiring and All relevant surrounding 
circumstances, would be valid- pointed out: 
"What the court detamhwd, and it was all that they could determine so as 
to bind us, was that where the subject-matter of the hire-purchase, was a 
particular jukebox, clause 6(c) (i. e. the depreciation clause] was valid .... We am however, quite unable to accept the view of Wmn J. that the cow 
determined that this clause must be valid in all drcumstances, &W we 
would overrule his decision. "91 
Thus, according to this decision, the applicability of the rule set out by the Ada& CNN 
was limited to a situation where the subject of hiring was a jukebox In Other. eventk 
however, the nature of the clause should be determined by the careftil construction of the 
clauK considering All appropriate inherent circumstances. 
[19621 CLY. 1409 
[196411 QB 415 
Jbid, 9 p. 426 
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5.041 This interpretation of Musids case results in an , ns&djfijctOry 
Even where the depreciation clause has not been drafted with regard to the inhwo 
circumstances of the case- and according to the general rules, relating to the penalty 
doctrine, could not be considered as a genuine pre-estimate of the likely actual damages- 
it night be upheld, for it might appear to meet the requirements of the Muslu case. The 
result seems to be inconsistent with the principles relating to the penalty doctrine and it is 
submitted that the can should not be Wowed, because firstly, it is irreconcilable with 
principles set out by Lord Dune& in the leading case of Dwdop Pnnmoatic 23*w CD. 
Ltd v. New GanW andMotor Co. Dd93; and secondly, it is contrary to the decision of 
the House of Lords in Bridge v. Ompbell Dtwou* Co. Ltd" and has been implicitly 
overruled. 
3.4.3. A Move towards Providing for the True Lou of Bargain 
3.4.1L PrO"X9fOrtheLo=qfPrqfdw*h of me 
5.042 In view of the above observations, a minimum payment clam in fingadn 
ti risactions should be upheld if it has been provided for to compensate the owner for his 
loss of profit by stipulating for the liability of the hirer to pay the arrears of rent plus an 
future instalmeM giving a legitimate rebate fbr the accelerated receipt of them and Wao 
giving credit for the realisable value of the repossessed goods, regardless of the 
description Sim to the clam by the parties. It should be noted that rwh a providw 
requires the birer to pay only the amount of deficiency and directly relates to, two 
subsWU elements: fiM the extent of the depreciation of goods; secor4 the period 
which the contract has been on foot since it takes into account the amounts which have 
already been paid to the owner. " In fact, it is not an arbitrary provision mW will am 
compensate the owner excessively in comparison with a situation whom the hirer commits 
no breach and the agreement runs its W course. 
5.043 A practicA but not complete, movement towards providing, fbr such g dam can 
92 Phanographk Ep1pnent (1958) Md v. Muslu [I%III WLR 13 79 
" 119151 AC 79 
94 [1962] AC 6W 
" 7AWL Jacob &, 710 MWIMUM Payment Claim bbxWk 119641 CJL. L IM at P. 126 
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be seen in Anglo Auto Finance Co. Ltd v. JameP. In thbo aumi in a hire-purchase 
agreement, it was provided that the owner would be entitled to recover "a sum equal to 
the amount (if any) by which the hire-purchase price (less the deposit plus monthly 
instalments already paid) exceeds the net amount realised by the sale of the ... vehicle 
by 
the ownee' upon termination for, inter afia, the hirees default in punctual payment. As it 
appears, the clause took into consideration the realisable value of the subject-mauff and 
its only defect was the fidlure, to give a proper rebate as to the accelerated receipt of the 
future instalments. In flict, this provision was much more accurate than the ** 
payment clause in the Bridge's caser. The clause, however, was held to be a penalty. 
Willmer L. J., delivering the main judgement of the court, having applied the decWon of 
the House of Lords in Bridp v. Campbell Discount Co. Ltd"ý held that the clau 
providing W effect for the owner company being entitled in all ch to recover 
ioo per cut. of the total purchase price could not be regarded as a genuine pro-estimme 
of damages resulting from breach and should be taken as amounting to a penalty which 
acts in terrorem of the hirer to induce him to carry on with the contract. " The Lord 
Justice based his conclusion on the following two main grounds: 
I) The observations of Lord Radcffe in the Bri4es case that the mininuun payment 
clam in that case had not taken into consideration the interest element in the finure: 
instalments and the realisable value of the goods. " After quoting the relevwu pump of 
Lord Radcfiffe! s speech, the Lord Justice stated: 
*That was a cue in which the particular clause in the contract provitled 
for a minimum payment of two-thirds. Here the clause is different, and 
provides for the plaintiff company always being able in effix; t to recover 
100 per cent., whether determination takes place in the first month of the 
contract or in the forty-seventh month of the contract. "101 
it should, however, be noted that ftstý the observations of Lord ftdcM do ax reh" to 
96 [196311 WLR 1042 
97 Bridge V. OMPbell DWOMt Co., Ltd [1962) AC 600, [1962) 1 AH ER 3115 
"Ald 
" Anglo-Auto Anance Co. Ltd V. Jmes [ 196311 WLA 1042, at P. 1043 
100 See M4p v. CavOell DWmt Co. Ltd. [19621 AC 600,1196211 AU Mt 3115, at pp. M 39&397 
seqective' q. at Ww supa., We 70 
"M Angk4lvto Fhuwm CA Ltd V. Jmes 1196311 WLR 1042, at pp. 1046-1047 
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the stipulation of two-thirds or 100 per cent. of the purchase price, but it only Sim the 
impression that any deficiency clause in hire-purchase agreement should tab those two 
essential elements into consideration, i. e. the realisable value of the subject-matter old the 
interest element in the future instalments. Although the clause in the Bridge's case'02 had 
failed to take both these elements into account, the provision in this case was a stop 
towards providing at least for the realisable value of the repossessed subject-matter to be 
credited in favour of the hirer. 10' The judgement, however, might seem to Si" the 
. on that in my event, providing for the liability of the hirer to pay the W purchase 
price (even with taking the above elements into account) should be doomed to hilure 
Such an unpression, if it odsts, in view of the above observations deserves aiticism 
Second, in assessing the stipulated amount, sums already paid to the owner am in any 
event, taken into consideration. Therefore, the payable amount under the clause will vary 
on the basis that the defliult occurs in the payment of first or forty-seventh instalment. In 
other words, it will relate to the period that the agreement has been in force. 
11) The other point on which Willmer LI based his judgement was that the clause in this 
case had not been described as a "minimum payment for depredation or eterioratioe. 
willmer LI, in the final part of his speech stated: 
"Clause 5(b) is the only clause which deals with the question of 
compensation in the event of the termination of the hiring. No clause is 
contained in the contract purporting to deal with depredation or 
deterioration of the vehicle. Had such a clause been inserted (&W 
assuming, of course, that it did not amount to a penalty clause), it may be 
that the plaintiff co any would have been entitled to recover something Im 
considerably more. 014 
n 
it is however to be noted that the clause in this cue was clearly a deficiency clause which 
also desk it seems, with the depreciation of the subject-matter. The reason is that in 
fomwlating the mmininum payment, it took into account the realisable value of the 
subject-matter: this is obviously a fitctor by which the owner's Ion resultiq ftm my 
102 [1962) 1 All ER 385,11962) AC 600 
103 Mw only ddbcý a sW4 was the thilure to ghv a proper credit a to the mceletMed twelpt of do 
Ature instalments and had WiUmer Ll remoned Ws judpnuw on ft point, ft woW bm been 
muftle- we McOMor on Damgcs, I Sth ed., 19U, pam 482 
"'AngloAmto Mmma Co. Ltd v. Jama [196311 WLR 1042. at p. 1047 
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depreciation of the subject-matter is nonnally covered. Furthertnom as aped bdbre*ý 
the description given to the clause, Pnma fade, does not show the real nature of the 
clause in fimcing transactions, and deficiency clauses of this kind normally provide for 
the compensation of the owner for his loss of profit irrespective of the description given 
to thm even where they are silent as to the description of the nature of payment. 
5.044 It is therefore to be concluded that although providing for a minin= paymat in 
an arbitrary way- like a portion of the purchase price, whether 7S%, two-thirds, SOOA or 
lWlo- is likely to fWl as constituting a penalty, nonetheless providing for the NU 
outstanding balance of the purchase price to be paid in the event of tenninstion Smn ii 
credit to the interest element in future instalments and an allowance to the realisable value 
of the repossessed subject-matter, should be upheld as a valid stipulation. 
A 4.3.2 Loss of Analn Vthe Subjed-NUWW is Left In the Prondsor's POMSSIM 
5.045 An alternative way in financing famuutions would seem to be to leave the aMect. 
matter in the hirees possession and to provide for the payment of the W ouwanding 
balance of the purchase price upon termination, giving credit to the accelerated recelpt of 
the future instalments. In fact, just as providing for the acceleration of future payments 
upon any de&Wt by the hirer, leaving the agreement on foot to run its fUH course, is 
supposed to be a valid stipulation if a proper rebate is given to the accelerated receipt of 
the future instalments'06, a provision requiring the hirer to pay such an accelerated 
amount upon taininstion, leaving the subject-matter in his hands should also be valid. 
5.046 The advantages of such a provision am as follows: First the owner is 
compensated for his loss of bargain and in fact he acquires what he would have owned 
had the contract run its full course and had there been no dehult by the hirer. On the 
other hand, the hirer is left with the subject-matter and acquires It for the contracted price 
with a difference that due to his de&dt, he has to pay the future ingtaiments immedistely 
with an allowance, of course, fbr the interest elonent in the future payments. SOMC 
the question of depredation of the subject-matter and all difficulties relating to the 
l'n &pm, pam 3.023 et seq. 
I'm See »pra., pam 333-3.34 
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assessment of the realisable value, like whether the resale of the subject-matter has been 
done properly, which might come across in so many cans, would not arise. 
It should also be noted here that the question of depreciation may sometimes asset the 
hirer more than the owner. Suppose that A ewers into a Wre-purchase agreemat as 
regards to a car with the hire-purchase price of 110,000. He pays 11,000 and stipulates 
to pay the rest by instalments. In fact, he borrows 19,000 ftom, the finance company 
which is to be paid by instalments. Since he has paid 11,000 of the priM he Sm an 
equity to the extent of his payments in the purchand car. But as he gets the car, it 
immediately starts to depreciate in value so that if it is offend for a see, it is hIWy to 
worth E8,000 or even less than that. This amount is not enough to pay off his loan to the 
ftance company. As a result he gets a negative equity in the subject-matter. As the car 
depreciates in value, the hirees negative equity gets big and bigger and in fact, the 
depreciation affects him more than it might affect the owner. That is why a stipulation 
for depreciation of goods, providing for the repossession of the subject-matter by the 
owner and reselling it, even by giving credit as to the realisable value to the hkerý cannot 
normally safeguard the reasonable interests of the hirer. While, leaving the addect-amw 
in his possession and providing for the outstanding balance of the ftiture instahnews to be 
paid by him, giving a proper rebate as to the finance charge in those payments, would at 
least have the effect that the hirer acquires the subject-matter which he had bargained for. 
5.047 The disadvantage of this method, however, is that by such a provision, the creditor 
might lose his real right in the subject-matter which is intended to be used as a won* to 
guarantee the payment of instahnents by the hirer. The creditoes real puqmm% in 
financing transactions, is to extend finance and to keep a real right in the suNect-matter 
for himself to guarantee the repayment of the extended finance. In &ct, as to a debtor 
who is unable to meet the due payment of instalmetits, such a stipulation. providing for 
the subject-matter to be left to him and his liability to pay the whole outstanding bahme 
of the instalments, ii giving a proper rebate as to the accelerated receipt of the A*n 
payments- would ruin the owners sequrity and would leave him with to insolvat him 
who is unable to pay a single instalment. 
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4. The Relevance of the Basis for Termination 
4.1. General Consideredons 
5.048 From what we have discussed so fir is dear that a contract may provide for the 
promisee's right to terminate the contract upon specific events, inter afid, the promisor's 
breach. Such a breach may be categorized as a repudiation, breach of a fundamental term 
or a fimdamental breach (hereinafter referred to as a repudiatory breach) which, even 
without a contractual stipulation, gives rise to a right of the promisee to terminate at 
common law. It may also be a breach of a non-essential term (i. e., a non-repudiatory 
breach), the termination upon which may only happen through a contractual stipulation. 
The question which is to be considered now is whether the basis of termination'" has any 
relevance to determining the nature of the minimum payment provided to be paid upon 
termination. 
5.049 As it appears from some cases, the bads for termination based on breach may be 
considered as a relevant factor as to determining the amount of damages to which the 
innocent party is entitled at common law. I& therefore, the parties, in pre-estimating the 
loss resulting from break are supposed to Un-dt themselves to the legally recoverable 
loss, such a basis should be regarded as a material point in determining the natu of the 
payment clause. This, however, as we will sM may lead to some sadsfkctory 
consequences among which is the possibility of sidestepping the common law principle by 
providing for a "time of the essence stipulation. Thus, the promisee, by carefW 
, can elevate a simple term 
into the category of conditions breach of which 
will entitle him to loss of bargain. This section will be devoted to considering this imm in 
detail: First, the measure of damages recoverable for breach at common law, and the 
relevance of the nature of breach in this regard win be discussed. The consideration win 
nod be given to the effect of determining the nature of breach on the application of the 
rules filsainst penalties to minimum payment clauses. A detailed discussion of the 
possibility of sidestepping the principle by alwafn a simple term into the cateocry of 
conditions, the n8atishetory consequences resulting ftom that, and the posible Whstions 
107 It is to be danved dim in Ws chapter we am only d"jinS wM a jwnjnW= bmd upon Iý, -P, 
The bads for teadnation hOm thus refen to whetber tembodon hes ban buM qpce a mpodlefty of 
bVWA 
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to avoid these consequences will form the next pan of this section. Band on previcius 
conclusions, the section will also ommine two important issues: fitctors which as to be 
taken into account in drawing up a minimum payment clause, and unliquidated danm4ges 
where the minimum payment clause is a penalty. The section will finalise by a deliberate 
consideration of the issue in Australian law. 
4.2. Nbasuro of Damages Recoverable thr Broach at Common Law 
4.2.1. IMe Presumption: Recovembility of loss of baqain 
5.050 it should first be noticed that the primafacte measure of damages at common law 
upon the happening of a breach is the recovery of low of bargah For instance, in a 
contract for the sale of goods, in cue of non-delivery or non-acceptance of the purchased 
goods, the measure of damages is normally determined by a reforerice to the difikence 
between the contract price and the market price of the goods at the time of brawk 1" It 
seems that in commercial contracts containing the tight of the promisee to terminate the 
agreement upon breach, recovery of loss of bargain was the presumption as to messiring 
the amount of damages recoverable by the promisee after termination. Some cams 
support this proposition: In Yeoman Credit Co. v. Waragowskiloo, in a hire-purchase 
agreementý the owner who repossessed the vehicle upon the happening of a breach by the 
hirer was held to be entitled to recover losses amounting to all unpaid rentals Ion the sum 
reafised in the ressle of the vehicle, and less the fee for the exerdse of the option to 
purc. hase. 
5.051 A year later, in Yeoman Cre&I Co. v. McLean"'O. the assessment of damages in the 
Wmagowshts can"' was accepted by Master Jacob with a 7% learald 
Master, considering the necessity of ii another allowance for the early receipt of the IPVM8 
fiftm instaltnents in assessing the owne? s daniages resulting fiom breach, pointed out: 
*The accelerated receipt of the proceeds of sale represents MOWA in the 
hands of the Plaintiffs which they would, in the ordinary course of their 
108 Carter J W, The Effeet of Dischup of a Conü= 00 the Amummt of DUMM tr gm" 
idiadon (Part U) (1989) 1 JCL 249; CXW 1 W, Ternüngßon Climm (IM) 3 ICL 90, at p. 111 
14» [1961) 1 WLR 1124, (1961) 3 All ER 143 
110 [1962] 1 WIR 131 
"I Yeoxm0*&tCo-v- Waregow&W[1%1] 1 WLZt1124, [1%113 All ER 145 
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budness as a finance company, put to use again to eam a Author profit or 
interest.. --X therefore, in assessing the damages suffered by the plaintft 
no reduction is to be made in the amount of their hire charges. the 
plaintiffs would, in effect, be receiving two of profit or interest at 
the same time on the Same SM Of Money. it 112 
Having aped that this point had not been discussed in the WanWow. * case'13, NInter 
Jacob held that the decision in that case did not preclude him firom reaching this 
conclusion. Thus, the amount of the owner's damages upon the hirer's breach of the 
contract and the consequent repossession of the subject-matter by the owner was hold to 
be the outstanding balance of the hire-purchase price (i. e. the whole rows 
giving credit to the realisable value of the subject-matter, and a legitimate allowawe for 
the accelerated receipt of the future instalments. As it appears, such an jumessmat is, in 
Sct, calculating the damages of the owner resulting from breach and the consequem 
.. on, on the basis of his loss of bargain. In allowing a discount for the accelerated 
receipt of the future instalments, the fact that the hirer Might be unable to sati* the 
judgement immediately was held to be irrelevant since such a probable loss was not the 
result of the hirees breach and Author, the judgement itself allowed interest at the legal 
rate. 
5.052 The decision in the MCLeaWS ca"I 14 Was soon approved by the Court of Appeal in 
Overstone Ltd v. ShIpway"s. This c4m, however, introduced an apparently hTelvant 
point that the right of the owner to recover his loss (amounting to loss of bargain) was 
limited to a situation where the owner, in repossessing the subject-matter, had SMMW 
"reasonably*. The iffelevance of the idea of *reasonableness", in such a situation, seems 
to be out of any doubt: The parties are completely five to provide for the d& of the 
"' 1196211 WLA 131, at P. 133; at alm Interoffice Tekphma Lid V. Robot Preeman & Qx Lid, 
11958] 1 QB 190 (CA) whom as to a claim for the recovery of damages in a hiriq qreemeK Wadmated 
by the owner on the hirer's breach, Jenkins IJ aid: wnken off die not raw a ascertained soins disco" 
shmild be allowed by remon of the ha that the plaintiffs would be receivinS in ON sma in amwAm 
which, bed the contract run its NU lenSth, they woWd have received only over a period of dx yum" at 
P. 195 
113 Yom= C*&t C& v. Waragow* 1196111 WLR 1124, [196113 All ER 145; Mow Jecob dmwvo&- 
OR is true in the cue cited no rich discount was made in the munum of demageik bA this poiK 
wha&u swk a dhocW dwW at should not be made, was not fmis4 nor arped, nor duk wft in *a 
C; vuft of APPOOL" reoman Ov&t Co. v. McLean 11%211 WU 13 1. at p. 134 
114 Ymnsm Cm&t CO. v. MbLeam 1196211 WLR 131 
115 11962) 1 WLR 117. [1962] 1 All ER 52 
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owner to repossess the subject-matter upon the occurrence of some specific events; OW 
with such a provision, if the owner exercised his right of repossession within the scope of 
the conbactual stipulation, the question of reasonableness of this act would not 
apparently arin. 116 
4.2.2. Relevance of the Nature of Breach to the Recoverable Damage 
A221. Loss up to the Date of TerntMadon where the Contrad is Teominated 
for a Non-repudkfwy Breach 
5.053 The assessment of damages with regard to the owner's loss of bargain was the case 
until the decision of the Court of Appeal in Financings Ltd v. BaldocP 17. in this cut, in 
a hire-purchase agreement, it was provided that on the happening of any breach by the 
hirer, the owner would have the right to temfmte the agreement and repossess the five- 
ton Bedford lorry, the subject-matter of the agreement. The contract also provided for a 
mhumum payment clause under which upon termination, the hirer was liable to bring his 
payments up to two-thirds of the hire-purchase price as compensation for depreciation. 
Upon the hirer's de&Wt in the payment of two instalments, the owner gave notice of 
tennination, repossessed the vehicle, hold it for 14 days, but having heard nothing from 
the hirer, who had said that he might be able to pay the arrears within 3 days, delivered it 
to the original dealers to be disposed of To recover his damages, the owner did not rely 
on the n2inimurn payment clause which was clearly penal, since it had not given any credit 
for the realisable value of the subject-matter and the early receipt of the future instWments 
up to the two-thirds of the purchase price. "' Instead, he claimed for his general damages 
at common law and obtained a judgement for damages to be assessed. 
5.054 In assessing the owner's damages, Master Harwood, applying the dicta in 
Oversione Ltd v. ShipwVP9. and having considered that the owner had not acted 
reasonablY in exercising his tight to repossess the vehicle, firrited his low to the 
116 Set M1010m, R P; Ptmaltics in Chattel Leases (Chapter 3 of Essays in Equity, by FirA P D), 1985, p. 
53 
117 [1963] 2 QB 104, [1963] 1 AH ER 443 
such a dause had been tooendy bdd to be a podty in Bridge V. CaVbell Dhvm* Co. Ltd [19621 
AC 600, [196211 All ER 385. 
119 [196211 WLR 117, [196211 
- 
AU ER 52 
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instaltnents in arrear at the date of termination. On appeW, the Court of A; qmk 
approving, in effect, the assessment of Master Harwood, refused to accept the novel 
concept of "reasonableness" as the basis for awarding loss of bargain damages, arguing 
that the power of termination had been expressly conferred upon the plaintiffs by the 
agreement, and in terminating the agreement and repossessing the vehicle, they had done 
nothing but the exercise of their contractual right within the contractual stipulation. 120 
The court, however, held that the principle laid down in Wamgowsk can 121 as to the 
Luessment of the owner's damages for the hirees breach would only apply where the 
hirer had repudiated the agreernent'22, and there being no repudiation by the hirer, the 
amount of damages would be limited to the arrears of rent at the date of termination plus 
interest. Denning L. J., in the course of his judgement, pointed out: 
"Once the hirer repudiated his liability for future rentals, the owners were 
entitled to treat the repudiation as itself a breach going to the root of the 
contract: and, on accepting it as such, they were entitled to regard the 
hiring as at an end and retake the vehicle. The repucUddon being itself a 
breach which took place before the termination, it is within the class of 
breaches for which the owners can recover damages according to the 
principle I have already stated. But if there is no repudiation, and simply, 
as here, a failure to pay one or two instalments (the failure not going to 
the root of the contract and only giving a fight to terminate by virtue of an 
express stipulation in the contract), the owners can only recover the 
instalments in arm, with interest, and nothing else: for there was no 
other breach in existence at the termination of the hiring. "123 
Also Diplock L. J., having argued that the hirees failure to pay two inst&lments, 
considering the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case, hver alia, 
evincing no clear intention by the hirer to show his unwillingness or inability to pay either 
120 UWohn U., in the course of his judgement, stated- *I should be sorry to find, a new concept of law 
introduced that a man may unreasonably curcise his right of termination, which was clearly Sim to 
him by the contract which he has entered into with the him and thereby alter his rights &W limbilida 
As I observed earlier, the owners were perfectly entitled to determine the agreement on the bilure to pay 
an instalment, and they M not to be criticized for that. " (PbmckW Ltd v. Baldock 1196312 QB 104, 
[1963] 1 Ali ER 443, at p. 115) It should also be noted that the concept of "reasonable soludw* was 
interpreted as intending to refer to the well-settled rule of law that a party to a contract has an option to 
treat the contract as rescinded when the other party has wron&Wy repudiated it. (Ibid., per Wack U. 
at pp. 122-123) 
121 Yeomm Credit Co. v. WaMowdd [1961] 1 WIA 1124, [196113 Ali ER 145 
122 The members of the court, in fio, tried to show that in the Waragow&W can and other cam *d1owing 
4. the breach culminating in termination was so grain that wad to the root of the control Hmnw, the 
cases themsehmes did not discuss the question of repudiation as a bads fbr the entitlement of the owner to 
reower his loss c(bargain. 
123 FbIaNCINP Ltd V. Bddgck [196312 QB 104, at pp. 112-113 
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arrears of rat or fiwther instalments, could not be regarded as a breach going to the root 
of the contract, stated: 
"The Ownees only remedy would have been to sue for the two instalments 
overdue and their measure of damages would have been the amount of 
these instalments, together with interest ... N 
124 
5.055 Two important points should be made as to this case: First, in reaching this 
conclusion, it appears, the court placed much reliance on Salter Jrs reasoning in FJ&y & 
Co. W v. H)de'23 to the effect that, on termination of a contract by an owner who 
exercises his contractual right for the hirees breach, the ownees loss would be limited to 
the interest on the amount unpaid and nothing more, because the loss for depreciation of 
the subject-matter "is not the result of the hirees breach of contract in being late in his 
Payments", but it is the result of the ownees election to terminate the agreement. it 
should, however, be noticed that this line of reasoning in that case was invoked to prove 
that the amounts payable, under the contract, upon termination were not subject to the 
rules against penalties. Although this conclusion itself had been overruled" by the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Coaden Engineering Co. Ltd v. Stmfbrd'2ý 
nonetheless its reasoning was referred to as a good law in the Baldocles case". 
Second, this decision shows that where termination occurred on the basis of the exercise 
of a contractual power by the owner for the hirees non-repudiatory breach which does 
not go to the root of the agreement, the amount of the owner's damages would be limited 
to his loss up to date of termination, i. e. the arrears of rent with intaft. Ilie ratson for 
this, in principle, is that in such a case, any damage flowing from termination is not the 
result of the hirees breach, but it is the consequence of the exercise of the owWs 
conhictual right to terminate the agreement: He has determined the contract for a non- 
repudiatory breach and he has to bear any losses resulting from that. In can of a 
124 Aid, at p. 120 
125 Elmy & Co., Ltd V. H)k* 0* MPOMd in Jorm mW Proudfoot's Notes on Him Purcbm Law, 2nd 
e&, p. 107, aWreft-m to in Re Apex Supply Co. [194211 Ch. 109 and in CoodenWheMOWCO. v. 
Stanford [195311 QB 86 
126 See npra., paras. 4.08-4.09 
127 [195311 QB 86 
128 F? nmdngs Ltd v. B41dod [1963) 2 QB 104, [196311 AU ER 443, per Denning LI at P. 112 
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repudiatory breach, however, the breach amounts to a right of termination at common 
law: In such a case, any loss resLdting from termination is attributable to the hirees breach 
vW therefore, he has to be riable for these damages. 
The conclusion and its reasoning introduce two interlocIdng ideas as to assessing the 
ownees damages resulting ftom termination: 
I) The materiality of the nature of the breach: Whether the breach is repudiatory or not 
will determine the amount of the owner's loss resulting from breach. 
II) The idea of causation: The owner would be entitled to recover damages resulting from 
termination (i. e. loss of bargain) only where these damages resulted from the breach. 
These ideas are tightly related to each other so that, as it has been stated, the Ion 
resulting from termination is caused by the hirees breach where the breach is repudiatory. 
5.056 By the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Baldocks case, in English law of 
damages, a new era as to the question of the assessment of damages flowing from breach 
started. As a resultý to prove the, causal connection between the breach and the losses 
resulting from termination, the nature of breach was investigated and where the breach 
was a breach of a fundamental term, a fundamental breach or a repudiation (i. e. a 
repudiatory breach), the promisee could be compensated for his loss flowing ftm 
(i. e. loss of bargain). Otherwise, i. e. where the breach was a nomcepudiatory 
one, &e promisees loss would be limited to any damages up to the date of termination 
and loss of bargain was supposed to result from the promisee's own act in terminating the 
agreen . 
129 Thus, in Charterhouse Credit Co. Lid v. Tollý130, as to a hire-purchase 
agreement, termination upon a contractual right where the hirer had, in fact, repudiated 
the contract was contrasted with a termination following a contractual right where there 
'" Chitty on CmIrects, 27th a&, vol. 1,1994, pam 26-W; FWmnon M P, ChelhiM Filbot A 
FurmstOn's Law of Contract, 13th a&, 1996, p. 638; Fumston M P, C*UUW Planninir. I Soddated 
DMOSM DPPOsitS and the Foramability Rule (1991) 4 JCL 1, at p. 9; Treitel GK Damages an 
Rescission for Breach of Contract [19871 LUC. LQ. 143; McGregor on Damages, 15th ad., 1988, parm. 
493; Meagher R P, Penalties in Chattel Leases (Chapter 3 of "Essays in Equity, by Finn, P D"), 1985. at 
pp. 53-54 
1" [196312 Q13 693, per Donovan L. J. at p. 702. The can Itself has been overruled an some odor 
glmn& bY PhOOD PrOdkWon UA v. Securicor Trawport UA 119801 AC 827 
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was only a simple, non-reVudiatory breach. 131 
4.2-2.2 Unsatisfaddry Consequenca Rauldngfrom the MAciple 
5.057 The treatment of the Court of Appeal in distinguishing termination upon a 
contractual right based on a non-repudiatory breach from a situation where termination is 
grounded upon a repudiatory breach may result in unsausfactory, and sometimes unfair 
consequences. The situation is illustrated by a dear example given by Lord Denning in 
Finamings Ltd v. Ba&ock'32: 
"A hirer does not pay two instalments, whereupon the owners retake the 
vehicle. There is no repudiation. The damages are limited to the unpaid 
instalments with interest. But take another case. If he had been more 
courteous and had written: "I cannot pay any more instalments", that 
would have been a repudiation and the damages would be multiplied 
tedoid. 033 
It is undoubtedly unreasonable and unjust that the extent of the promisoes liability could 
be mulfipfied because of being courteous. Such a law with such a consequence should be 
reconsidered. 
4.1 The Effect of Determining the Nature of Breach on the Application of 
the Penalty Doctdne to a Minimum Payment Clause 
5.058 As a result of the principle laid down in Baldocks case, when applying the rules 
against penalty to minimum payment clauses, a clause providing for a larger sum than the 
amount Whick considenng the nature of breach, was legally recoverable was hold to be a 
penalty. 134 In other words, a minimum payment clam stipulating for the liability of the 
hirer to pay the owner's loss of bargain upon termination was recognized as a penalty 
where the hirees breach, amounting to the exercise of the ownees contractual risk to 
terminate, was a minor, non-repudiatory breach. The reason for this, in addition to the 
131 See also Bra4l V. St MoSaret's 7ýust Ltd [ 196312 QB 494 ; United Dominions 7ýua (Cammardat) 
Ltd v. Ennis [1968] 1 QB 54 ; Edntn v. Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 722 ; Cq#tal 
Rnance Co. Ltd v. Donatt (1977) 121 S. J. 270 ; Lombard North Central Pla v. Butterworth 1198711 
QB 527 ; For a simils, decision in building contram sm 7homas Feather & Ca. fflra4lbro Ltd v. 
KeIghley CDrp. (1953) 52 L. G. & 30 in which the employer, having examised his conUutual right to 
dettermuke the conbact for the conuictor's unauthorised sub-conauting was held unable to scoom ft 
vdta cost of employing another conuactor to finish the wo& See also Beale R. Penalties in Terminadon 
Providons (1988) 104 L. Q. P- 355, at p. 336 
132 [196312 QB 104,11963) 1 AU ER 443 
133 All, alp. 113 
134 Sec ChitLY On ConUacts, 27th e&, vol. 1,1994, Pam 26-M 
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idea of limiting the innocent party to the legally recoverable loss, was that the promises's 
right to terminate the agreement was stipulated upon the happening of every breach of the 
contract by the promisor (whether trivial or serious). Since in such a case, the accepted 
principle, as laid down by Lord Dunedin in the leading case of Dunlop Pnewnafic T . we 
Co. Ltd v. New Gaftir and Motor Co. W 131, was that the strength of the chain should 
be taken at its weakest linklm, so the stipulated minimum payment, being compared with 
the legally recoverable loss resulting from a trivial breach, would have a mre chance to be 
considered as a valid liquidated damages 137. This Was because. according to the principle 
in the Baldocks case, the lepHy recoverable loss could be the promisees Ion of bargain 
only where the promisor had committed a repudiatory breach. 
5.059 The effect of determining the nature of breach on the application of the rules 
astainst penalty to agreed damages clause% like a minimum payment clause in a hire- 
purchase agreement, can clearly be seen in the case of Lombard North CemhW pla v. 
Buttenval0a. It is necmary to refer briefly to the fitcts of the case again: in an 
agreement for the lean of a computer, it was provided that the punctual payment of the 
instalments was to be of the essence [cl. 2(a)], that in the event of the defendant 
defitulting in the punctual payment of the instalments, the agreement might be terminated 
either by notice in writing or by taking possession of the goods (cl. 5), and that upon 
termination, the lessee would be under the liability to pay the arrears of rents, an further 
instalments which would, but for the termination Of the aVelmnent. have Men due less a 
discount for accelerated Payment, and damages for any breach of the contract [cl. 6(a)]. 
The first two instalments was duly paid but the lessee was late in the payment of the nw 
three rentals. On a fixther delay in making the sixth payment, the plaintiffs gave a notice 
of termination, retook the subject-matter and resold it. They, then, issued a writ, not on 
the basis of cl. 6(a), but on a similar ground claiming for a sum of money as damages 
'" [19151 AC 79 
` "N them we vWkw breaches to which one indiscriminate sum to be paid in breach is jqnAkd. dim 
the strength of the chain must be taken at its weakest link. " Dunlop Pneumade 73*w CD. Ltd Y. New 
GaMe andMotor Co. Ltd, Aid, per Lord Dunedin at p. 89 
1" See bLGrW on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 493; Mei*w R P, Penalties in ChOd Lama 
(Chapter 3 of "FAMs in Equity, by Finn, P D"), 1985, at p. 56 
136 [1997] 1 QB 527 
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resulting from the lessees breach, consisting of the arrears of rentals and all future 
4 nstalments with a credit given for the accelerated receipt of them and a fiuther allowance 
for the realisable value of the subject-matter. 
5.060 The Court of Appeal held that the lessee's delays in maldng payments, apart from 
cl. 2(a), could not be regarded as a repudiatory breach and accordingly, on the basis of 
the principle laid down in the Baldocks case, the agreed damages clause providing for 
nearly loss of bargain'39 should be held a penalty, for the stipulated amount was 
excessiv* large in comparison with the loss which was legally recoverable at common 
law for a non-repudiatory breach, i. e. the arrears of rent at the date of termination plus 
interest. The insertion or exclusion of an allowance for the realisable, value of the subject- 
matter in the minimum payment clause would not alter the conclusion, for even with the 
inclusion of a fiuther allowance for the realisable value of the computer, the clause would 
stipulate for the lessor's loss of bargain which was excessively large in comparison with 
the legally recoverable loss in the absence of a repudiatory breach. As Nicholls U 
observed: 
"... I consider thatý in the absence of a repudiatory breach, the outcome of 
this issue is not dependent upon the inclusion or exclusion of a resale price 
allowance, and indeed the legal result would have been the same if clause 
6 had contained a resale price allowance. "" 
Nevertheless, the court held that the lessor was entitled to recover the claimed amount 
(i. e. his loss of bargain). The reasoning of the court was mainly based on the Mowing 
ground: The effect of cl. 2(a) was to elevate a simple term into the category of a 
condition, breach of which went to the root of the contract. Thus, the breach being 
recognized as a repudiatory one, the lessee was held liable to compensate the lessor for 
his loss of bargain, consisting of the arrears of rent and all future rentals with a discount 
for the accelerated payment and an allowance for the realisable, value of the computer. 
It would therefore appear that in the application of the rules against penalty to a minimum 
Payment clause., the nature of the clause would be determined with a reference to the 
The only defta of the clause was apparently not giving any allowanot for the redisable VAIN of the 
r, -, mes PA subjeid-niatter. 
140 Lombard Nonih Central PIC. Y. Butterworth ( 199711 QB 527, at p. 543 
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nature of the breach upon which the tennination is provided to be based. 
5.061 It could, as a result of the above observations, be concluded that: 
1) If termination was stipulated to be based upon a repudiatory breach, then the 
payment clause providing for the innocent partys loss of bargain would be likely to be 
upheld as a valid liquidated damages clause. 
11) N the breach upon which termination is stipulated to be grounded was a non- 
repudiatory breach, the minimum payment clause would probably constitute a penalty if it 
provided for the promisee's loss of bargain. 
III) Where the contractual right to terminate was given to the innocent party, regardless 
of the nature of the promisor's breach, whether trivial or serious, "" the strength of the 
chain would be taken at its weakest link. Therefore, the minimum payment clause 
providing for loss of bargain would have a rare chance to be upheld as a valid stipulation. 
4.4. Sidestepping the Pdnciplo: Elevadng a Term Into the Categoty of 
Condidons 
5.062 The practical result achieved in Lombtvd North Central Pic. v. Butterworth 142 was 
the consequence of cl. 2(a) which provided that the time for the paymat of the 
instskiments was to be of the essence of the agreanent. In fact, them was no practical 
difference between this case and the Baldocles case'43, except providing for a "time of the 
essence" clause in the Butterworth'" case and that was this clause which justified 
achieving a substantially different result in the latter cue. Both Lord Justices who gave a 
detailed judgment in the case, however, considered this result as an UnSatisfitaory 
145 and I consequence. Nicholls U. viewed it with "considerable dissatisfaction" *61" 
L. J. said: 
"This is not a result which I view with much satisfaction... "146 
The importance of such a clause makes it necessary to consider, in detail, its effect and 
141 F-g, providin for a riot of termintion on ft occur=ce of cveiy dehult by ft promim, vAd& is 
a normal courn W moa financing tmmactions. 
142 [191p] I QB 527 
143 Rxxxinp Ltd v. Mdock [1%3] 2 QB 104, [196311 All ER 443 
"" Lombard North CwhW Pic. v. Butterworth [ 1987] 1 QB 527 
145 Aid., at p. W 
146 Aid, at p. 540 
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the reason for unsatisfactory consequences resulting ftom that and to look for any 
solutions to remove such an unsatisfactory result. 
4.4.1. The Effect of a "Time of the Enence" Provision 
5.063 As it was pointed out, the principle laid down in the Baldocks case drew a line 
between a repudiatory and a non-repudiatory breach in assessing the innocent party's 
damages resulting from. termination of the agreement for the other party's breach. In the 
case itseK the failure of the hirer to pay two instalments of the rent being recognized as a 
non-repudiatory breach, the owner was held unable to recover his loss of bargain and was 
limited to the recovery of any damages up to the date of termination, i. e. the arrears of 
rent with interest. The result of the case was unsatisfactory for the finance companies 
and made them draw the agreement in a way that the breach upon which the termination 
was provided for could be regarded as a breach of condition. One way of doing this and 
in fact avoiding the unsatisfactory results of the Baldocks case" was to elevate every 
tam providing for the promisoesobligations to the category of conditions by providing 
that the time for the performance of the promisoes obligations would be of the essence of 
the contract. In fact, there was a hint in the Baldock's case itself that drawing the 
contract in this way might lead to a different result: Diplock L. J., in the course of his 
speech, observed that time of payment in that case was not of the essence of the 
contract. '" He pointed out that "in the absence of any express provision to the contrary 
in the contract"149, the failure to pay two instalments could not be regarded as going to 
the root of the agreement. These parts of the Lord Justice's speech implies that had there 
been a provision to the contrary in the contract and if the time of payments had bm 
provided to be of the essence of the agreement, then another result might have been 
achieved. 
5.064 The decision of the Court of Appeal in the Butterworth caselso confirmed this 
implication and regarded the "time of the essence" provision as elevating a simple term 
147 Financings Ltd. v. Baldock [ 196312 QB 104, [196311 All ER 443 
140 [196312 QB 104, at p. 118 
149 [196312 QB 104, at p. 120 
1 so Lombard North Central Pic. v. Butterworth [ 198711 QB 527 
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into the caelpxy of condlitions breach of which went to the root of the contract and 
entitled the innocent party to recover his loss of bargain. Mustill L. J., having observed 
that according to the authorities for at least a century, it is open to the parties to assign a 
term to the category of conditions by their express agreement and that *making time of 
the essence is the same as making timely performance a condition""', stated: 
... it is Womatic that a person who establishes a breach of condition can 
terminate and claim damages for loss of the bargain, and I Imow of no 
authority which suggests that the position is any different where late 
performance is made into a breach of condition by a stipulation that time is 
of the essence. " 152 
Also Nicholls L. J., arguing that determining the effect of the "time of the essence 
provision is a question of construction which should be decided by considering all term 
of the contract, concluded: 
0... the "time of the essence" provision seems to me to be intended to bring 
about the rmult that dehult in punctual payment, is to be regarded (to use 
a owe fitshionable term) as a breach going to the root of the contract and, 
hence., as IP*VM'g rise to the consequences in damages attendant upon such 
a breach. ... If that construction of the agreement is correct then, as at 
present advised, it seems to me that the legal consequence is that the 
Plaintiff are entitled to claim damages for loss of the whole transaction. is 153 
it is, therefore, apparent that the specific effect of the "time of the essence provision is to 
elevate a simple term into the category of a condition so that the failure of which goes to 
the root of the contract in order to enable the innocent party to recover his Ion of 
bargain. As a result, with the e)dstence of such a provision, if the miniunurn payment 
clam provides for the entitlement of the promisee to recover loss of the whole 
transaction- by stipulating, for instance in a hire-purchase agreementý that the owner is 
entitled upon termination for the hirees breach to recover arrears of rent and all Ram 
instalments, giving a proper credit for the accelerated payment and a fiuther allowwwe for 
the realisable value of the repossessed subject-matter- the clause will be vay likely to be 
upheld as a valid liquidated damages clause. 
131 Ibid, at p. 336 
152 »id 
153 Aid, at p. 546 
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4.4.2. The Provision is not Subject to the Penalty Doctrine 
5.065 It should be noted here that the clause elevating a term into the category Of 
conditions, like the "time of the essence" provision, is not subject to the law relating 
penalties. 15'4 In other wor4 it could not be struck out as being a penalty by the reason 
that the existence of this clause, in effect, indirectly multiplies the amount of damages 
recoverable from the contract breaker. That is because such a clause does not determine 
the amount of damages which are recoverable in the event of termination for breach. As 
it was referred to, the express agreement of the contracting parties to promote a simple 
term into the category of conditions has been confirmed by the authorities for at least a 
century"' and the "time of the essence" provision also has such an effect. As Mustill U. 
rightly argued: 
"A clause expressly assigning a particular obligation to the category of 
conditions is not a clause which purports to fix the damage for breach of 
the obligation, and is not subject to the law governing penalty clauses. I 
acknowledge, of course, that by promoting a term into the category where 
all breaches are ranked as breaches of condition, the parties indirectly 
bring about a situation where, for breaches which are relatively small, the 
injured party is enabled to recover damages as on the loss of the bargain, 
whereas without the stipulation his measure of recovery would be 
different. But I am unable to accept that this permits the court to strike 
down as a penalty the clause which brings about this promotion. To do so 
would be to reverse the current of more than 100 yeare doctrine, which 
permits the parties to treat as a condition !? T which would not 
otherwise be so. I am not prepared to take this step. "' 
5.066 This proposition is supported by the decision of the Privy Council in Steedmw v. 
DrinkieI57, where in a contract fbr the sale of land by instalments, upon the debult of the 
purchaser in punctual payment and termination of the contract by the vendcC the 
Purchaser claimed specific performance. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Cvuwjl 
" Chitty on Contracts, 27th e&, vol. 1,19%, pam 26-M at P. 1259; McKendrick E. Contract law, 
(2nd e&, 1994). pam 21.3 at p. 326; DowrAs A., Textbook on Conbact, 3rd a&, IM, p. 330, 
migpsting that such a Provision is presumably subject to the rule in &port Ovdits Guomtee Depantmtent v. Universal Oil Products [ 198312 All ER 205 
'-" See ftff example: Beldni v. Gýv (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 183, at P. 187 ; HongKong PIr Shipping Ca. Ltd Y. Kawasaki Kinn KaIAa Ltd [ 196212 QB 26, at p. 70 ; Anancings Ltd v. Bddock R 96312 QB 104 ; Photo Prodwion Ltd v. Securicor Trouport Ltd [ 19801 AC 827, at p. $49 ; BOW CorpWaffam New York v. TradaxE*ort SA.. Panama [198 111 WLR 711, at pp. 715,719 (All cited in Lombard Pic v. Bufftvwofth 1198711 QB 527, per Mustill L. J. at p. 536) 
156 Lambard North Cenh*al Pk- v. Butterwonk [ 199711 QB 527, at p. 537 
213 
refused to decree specific performance on the ground that such a jurisdiction had never 
been exercised where the parties intimated that it should not apply to their agreement by 
providing for the time of the performance to be of the essence. The decision seems to 
follow that the "time of the essence" provision is valid and should not be struck down 
merely because the term, without such a stipulation, is not a condition breach of which 
entitles the promisee, to a diffirent measure of damages. 
4.4.3. The Unsatisfactory Results of the Provision 
5.067 As to the assessment of damages in relation to termination clauses and the 
application of the penalty doctrine to the minimum payment provided to be paid upon 
termination of the contract by the innocent party for the other party's breach, the 
stipulation with the effect of elevating a term into the category of conditions, like a "time 
of the essence" provision, brings about some unsatidhaory results. The reason for such 
an unsatisfactory consequence has well been illustrated in the judgment of Nicholls L. J. in 
LombardNorth CentralPIc. v. Butterworth"' where he states: 
*There is no practical Merence between (1) an agreement containing such 
a power [i. e. the power to terminate the contract upon the non-payment of 
instalments] and (2) an agreement containing a provision to the effect that 
time for payment of each instalment is of the essence, so that any breach 
will go to the root of the contract. The difference between these two 
agreements is one of drafting form, and wholly without substance. "159 
in fact, the only justification for achieving dfferent results in the cam of Bahbck'60 and 
Butterworth"' was the e7dstence of the provision to the effect that time of payments in 
the latter case was of the essence. It is, as stated by Nicholls L. J., only the question of 
form and no substantial difference can be found between these two cases to justify the 
substantial difference in the results. 162 That means that the amount of recoverable 
damages in the event of termination and also the nature and validity of the ii 
payment clause will be determined by the skill of draftsman'63: If he draws the contract in 
"" 1191611 AC 275 
[199711 QB 527 
Jbid, at p. W 
160 Flnandngs Ltd v. Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104,11963] 1 All ER 443 
161 Lombard North Central PIc. v. Butterworth [ 1987] 1 QB 527 
162 Tivitel G H, Damages on Rescission for Breach of Contract [1987] L. M. C. L. Q. 143, at p. 144 
163 Sfw Furmston M P, Contract Planning: Liquidated Damages, Dqx)sits and the Foreseekbift Rub 
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a way that the obligations of the promisor is promoted to the category of condition& the 
recoverable amount as damages payable upon termination will substantially be greater 
than a case in which the promisor's obligations could not be regarded as conditions. As a 
result, the minimum paymew clause providing for the promiseds loss of bargain would be 
valid in the first case, whereas in the second, it is very likely to be struck down as being a 
penalty. Thus, the application of the rules against penalties to the minimum Payment 
clause would bring about substantially different results by a small change in 
terminology. 1" That is why it has been suggested that, as a result of such triumph of the 
form Over substance, "the law as to penalties is subverted to such an extent that it is not 
worth preserving as a separate body of rules. " "63 
4.4.4. How to Avoid the Unsatisfactory Consequences of the Provision 
5.068 The more important issue is whether this acceptedly unsatisfactory result could be 
avoided? Could stiPuktions like the "time of the essence" provision be interpreted in a 
way to reftain the Promisee from side-stepping the legal principles by skirW 
draftsmanship? The answer appears to be "Yes": There seems to be two different, but 
related, analysis to show that merely the "time of the essence" provision should not be 
regarded as altering the outcome of the case in such a way illustrated in the -Baldock,, 
and "BUtterWOrW Cases: First, the provision elevating a term into a condition, only 
confers upon the promisee a right to terminate and is not enough indication of intention 
for recoverability of loss of bargain damages. Second, providing for the right of the 
Pronlisee to terminate for the Promisoes breach is, by itself, an enough indication of 
intention for the recoverability of loss of bargain damages, even in the absence of a 
provinon elevating a term into the category of conditions. 
4-4-4--l- TkeprOVINIOR only confers the rightto terminate 
5.069 It has been suggested'" that a clause with the effect of elevating a term into the 
category of conditions should only be construed as conferring upon the innocent party the 
(1991) 4 JCL 1, at P. 9; Koffman L. & Macdonald E., The Law of Contract (London: FOurmat 
PubHshin& IM), pp. 379-379 
164 Chitty an Contracts, 27th c&, vol. 1.1994, pam 26-066 at p. 1260 
165 Jbid 
166 Chitty on Conbulk 27th c&, vol. 1,1994, pam. 26-066 at p. 1260 
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right to terminate the agreement, but not entitling him to recover damages for his loss of 
bargain unless the agreement of the parties as to the recoverable damages upon 
termination could be regarded as a valid liquidated damages. This proposition has been 
explained in clear term 167 : Where the breach of a specific term is described in a contract 
as being "repudiatory", the word *repudiatory" may refer to the nature of the breach or 
its kgal consequences. In the first sense, it is used to justify why a breach results in 
termination, but in the second, it is just to point out that the breach will result in 
termination. In this sense, the breach may lead to tertnination, even though it does not 
amount to repudiation. The express agreement of the parties to the effect that the 
innocent party will have a right to terminate the agreement for the other pwVs default, 
can clearly play this role; in other words, such an agreement makes the breach 
repudiatory in the second sense, for it points out that the breach will have a consequence 
of termination. Looking at the Baldocks case 168 with this analysis, it can be inferred that, 
because of the express agreement of the parties in that case to confer the right of 
termination upon the owner for the hirees default in punctual payment of instalments, the 
breach was repudiatory in the second sense. Also in the Butterworth case'69, the failure 
of the lessee in punctual payment of instalments was not to be regarded as a repudiation 
in the first sense, but since the contract had conferred the right of termination upon the 
lessor for the lessee! s breach and since the punctual payment by the express agreement of 
the parties had been provided to be of the essence, so the breach was a repudiatory 
breach in the second sense; for, the effect of both these stipulations was to point out that 
the breach would justify the termination. The only difference between these two cam 
was that in the latter case, the contract emphasized the fact of the justification of 
termination upon breach Mce rather than once which was the case in the Ba&bcks ca 
Therefore, in fact, in both cases the breach was repudiatory in the second sense. 
5.070 It might be said that in the Butterworth case, the "time of the essence" provision 
made a simple term a confton breach of which went to the root of the contract. But 
again the matter is the ambiguity of the word "condition". A term of a contract may be 
167 Treitel G H, Damps on Rescisdon for Breach of Conalct [1987] LALCI. Q. 143, at pp. 144-146 
"0 Financings La v. Baldock 11963] 2 QB 104,1196311 AH ER 443 
"0 Lombard North Central pie. v. Butterworth [ 198711 QB 527 
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classified as a condition either by the a; prcss agreement of the ParWeS or by law Where 
the express agreement of the parties tunis a term into a condition, the breach of such a 
term is repudiatory in the second sense, whereas the breach of a term which is classified 
by the law as a condition is repudiatory in the first sense. According to this analysis, even 
in the Baldocks case, the undertaking of the hirer to pay the instalments punctually was a 
condition in a sense that breach of which was regarded as a repudiatory breach in the 
second sense, and so it was in the Butterworth case, even if the time of payment had not 
been provided to be of the essence of the agreement. 
It could accordingly be concluded that there was no sufficient distinction between these 
two cases to justify the substantial difference in the outcome, and unless there was a vaUd 
minimum payment clause conferring the right of damages upon the innocent party, as 
implicitly referred to by Diplock L. J. in the Baldocies case'70, the outcome of both cases 
should have been the same This outcome, since the tight to damages for loss of bargain 
should be confined to the repudiatory breach in the first sense and since there was no 
breach in this sense in both cases, should have been the recovery of losses up to the date 
of termination, i. e. the arrears of rent with interest. 
5.071 Two points could be made on this analysis: 
1) The effect of this analysis, in fact, is that the intention of the parties as to giving the 
legal consequences of a repudiatory breach to a simple term- by conferring the right of 
termination upon the innocent party for the breach of that term, or describing it as a 
condition by conferring the pre-said right or providing for the time of performance to be 
of the essence- is only effective to the extent that failure of that term justifies termination 
of the agreement by the innocent party, but does not confer on him the right to recover 
damages resulting from that termination. Such a distinction by giving the innocent party 
the right to terminate and then depriving him from the right to damages seems to be 
e4s and without any reason: Why the parties who are free to give the legal 
consequences of a repudiatory breach to a simple term cannot confer these consequences 
completely? Why should they be taken as free to agree on a right of termination as a part 
170 FynwlCiW Ltd v. Baklock [196312 QB 104, at p. 121 
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of the consequences of a repudiatory breach and then assumed to be deprived to recover 
the damages resulting from that termination as the other part of the effect of such a 
breach? And finally, why the parties who agree on a right of the innocent party to 
terminate the agreement for the other party's breach cannot take this step without any loss 
to be suffered by the promisee? 
11) This analysis seems to recognize the right of the contracting parties to agree on a 
valid minimum payment clause to enable the innocent party to recover his damages. But, 
assuning that the pre-estimated loss by the parties should be confined to the legally 
recoverable loss as it was apparently proposed by Mustill L. J. in the Butterworth case 171 , 
and that the legally recoverable loss in both cases of "Baldocks" "2 and "Butterworth"'71 , 
as it was suggested 174 , should be limited to the loss up to the date of termination, how 
could the parties' agreement on a minimum payment clause providing for the innocent 
Party's actual loss resulting from termination be a valid stipulation, unless we assume that 
the breach occurs at the very end of the contractual period which would be a rare case? 
Hence, it should inevitably be concluded that the pre-discussed analysis recognizes the 
right and power of the parties to agree on the minimum payment clause providing for 
damages which are not legally recoverable at common law . 
175 
4-4-4-2 Pývýngfir the light to terminate is enoughfor the recovay of Im of 
bargain 
5.072 The effect of the "time of the essence" provision in the Butterworth case'76 was to 
make the timely performance a condition so that breach of which could be regarded as a 
repudiatory breach. Now, it might be argued that providing for the right of the promisee 
to terminate the contract for the other party's breach (i. e. in fact, providing the 
consequence of a repudiatory breach for a simple term) implies the intention of the parties 
to promote the breach of that term to the category of repudiatory breaches. Putting 
another way, the parties are free, according to the authorities for a century, to agree as to 
171 LombardPIc. v. Butterworth [1987) 1 QB 527, at p. 537 
172, Rnancings Ltd v. Baldock [ 1963] 2 QB 104, [196311 All ER 443 
173 Lombard North Central Pic. v. Buttenyorth [ 1987] 1 QB 527 
174 See abme pam 5.070 
17,5 Supre, Pam 2.14; Also sm abm, pam. 5.016 et seq. 
176 Lombard NorM Central Pic v. Butterworth [ 1987] 1 QB 527 
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of the consequences of a repudiatory breach and then assumed to be deprived to recover 
the damages resulting from that termination as the other part of the effect of such a 
breach? And finally, why the parties who agree on a right of the innocent party to 
ter -6 the agreement for the other parWs breach cannot take this step without any loss 
to be suffered by the promisee? 
II) This analysis seems to recognize the right of the contracting parties to agree on a 
valid minimum payment clause to enable the innocent party to recover his damages. But, 
that the pre-estimated loss by the parties should be confined to the legally 
171 
recoverable loss as it was apparently proposed by Mustill L. J. in the Butterworth case , 
and that the legally recoverable loss in both cases of "Baldocks" 172 and "ButterWorihn 173, 
as it was suggested'74 , should be limited to the loss up to the date of termination, 
how 
could the parties' agreement on a minimum payment clause providing for the innocent 
ParWs actual loss resulting from termination be a valid stipulation, unless we assume that 
the breach occurs at the very end of the contractual period which would be a rare case? 
Hence, it should inevitably be concluded that the pre-discussed analysis recognizes the 
right and power of the parties to agree on the minimum payment clause providing for 
damages which are not legally recoverable at common law . 
175 
4.4-4.2 Pro"n9for the right to terndnate is enoughfor the recovery of loss of 
bargain 
5.072 The effect of the "time of the essence" provision in the Butterworth case"m was to 
make the timely performance a condition so that breach of which could be regarded as a 
repudiatory breach. Now, it might be argued that providing for the right of the promisee 
to terminate the contract for the other partys breach (i. e. in fact, providing the 
consequence of a repudiatory breach for a simple term) implies the intention of the patties 
to promote the breach of that term to the category of repudiatory breaches. Putting 
another way, the parties are free, according to the authorities for a century, to agree as to 
171 Lombard pIC. v. Butterworth 1198711 QB 527, at p. 537 
172 FInancings Ltd V. Baldock [196312 QB 104, [196311 All ER 443 
173 Lombard'North Central pIC. V. BUtter Wor& [Igg7l I QB 527 
174 See above panL 5.070 
175 Supra, para. 2.14; Also see above, pams. 5.016 et seq. 
'76 Lombard North Cenow Pla v. Butterworth [ 1987] 1 QB 527 
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the nature of a term; in factý their agreement as to this issue shows the seriousness or 
triviality of the breach of that term in their mind. Such an agreement might be oress or 
: Where the parties expressly agree on a nature of a term as a condition, breach of 
such a term will go to the root of the contract and be considered as a repudiatory breach. 
The parties! implicit intention also has the same effect. Just as providing for the time of 
to be of the essence implies the intention of the parties to promote a term 
into the category of conditions, stipulating for the right of termination would also seem to 
have such an effect. 
It has basically been argued that the right of the innocent party to recover loss of bargain 
damages in the event of a repudiatory breach has its roots in the intention of the parties; 
viz., the parties have intended that loss of bargain would be recoverable where 
.. n is based on a repudiatory breach. "n Now, if the parties expressly or implicitly 
indicate that a specific term is elevated into the category of conditions so that the breach 
of which would be regarded as a repudiatory breach, such an agreement is, in fact, an 
indirect way of stating when the parties have envisaged loss of bargain to be recoverable. 
Regarding the time of the promisor's performance to be of the essence, and conferring a 
right of termination upon the promisee in case of breach of a specific term are both 
implicit indications by the parties that the breach of such a term should be regarded as a 
repudiatory breach. 
It might, as a result, be concluded that there is no distinction between the two cases of 
"Baldock" and "Butterworth": In both, the breach of the term providing for the punctual 
payment should be regarded as a repudiatory breach enabling the promisee to recover his 
loss of bargain. Hence, in both cases, had the parties agreed on a minimum payment 
clause providing for the creditoes loss of bargain in the event of termination, the clause 
should have been regarded as a valid liquidated damages. 
5.073 Some cases support this argument: in Sofiras Shipping Inc and Aeco, Maritime 
177 See Carter J W, The Effect of Discharge of a Contract on the Assessment of Damages for Breach or fiatiOn 0'aft 11) (1999) 1 JCL 249, p. 261 
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&I v. Swneiet ScdlxAW7ý in a contract for the side of a ship it was provided that upon 
failure of the sellers to deliver the ship on the contractual time, the buyers would have the 
right to terminate the contract; and that upon termination, the sellers would be under the 
liability to "make compensation for any loss caused to the buyers by non-Rdfilment of this 
contract". (cl. 14) The sellers were, in fact, late in delivering the ship. The buyers 
terminated the agreement and claimed for damages resulting from breach. The Court of 
Appeal, having emphasized that the actual loss suffered by the buyers was attributable to 
the sellers breach, and not to the buyere ad in terminating the contract'79, had no doubt 
that the buyers were entitled to recover their loss of bargain"O, even though the seller's 
failure to deliver the ship on the specified date, apart from the buyees contractual right to 
terminate the agreement upon breach, was not regarded as a repudiatory breach. It 
follows that presurnably the buyer's contractual right to terminate the agreement for the 
seller's breach was regarded as elevating the sellees contractual undertaldng to deliver on 
time into the category of conditions breach of which entitled the buyer to recover his loss 
of bargain. 
4A The Effect of Providing Expressly for loss of bargain to be the 
Recoverable Damage 
5.074 Assuming that merely providing for the right of tennination upon breach does not 
sufficiently indicate that the promisor's breach would be regarded as a repudiatory 
breach, it has alternatively been suggested that, to avoid the unsatisfactory consequences 
resulting ftom. the Baldocks case"', the parties could expressly provide for loss of 
bargain to be recoverable upon termination of the contract for the promisor's breach. 1'2 
The argument supporting this proposition runs thus: The rationale behind the Bakibas 
case and other cases following that presumably is that merely providing for the fight of 
- mination upon breach, does not put the promisor on enough notice that for his breach, 
loss of bargain will be recoverable. What the stipulations elevating a term into the 
category of conditions, like the "time of the essence" provision, do is, in fact, to put the 
17' [IMI I LIOyWS Rep. 605 (7he Solholt can) 
1" kid, at p. 607 per Donaldson KPL 
'so Although the final result wu the dimissal of the buyer's claim on the issw of mitigation. 
181 RAcncings IAd v. Bakfw* [1963] 2 QB 104, [1963] 1 All ER 443 
"2 Beak FL, Penalties in Termination Provisions (1999) 104 LQ. R. 355, at p. 357 
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promisor on notice that his breach will be regarded as a breach of condition going to the 
root of the contract, and enable the promisee to recover his loss of bargain. Now, if such 
stipulations make the promisor aware of the consequences of breach, while they are not 
express as to these effects, undoubtedly the express agreement of the parties as to the 
ability of the promisee to recover loss of bargain for the other party's breach will put him 
on complete notice as to the consequences of his breach. Therefore, stipulating for such 
a provision would enable the promisee to recover his loss of bargain. In other words, a 
valid minimum payment clause to the effect of the recoverability of loss of bargain upon 
termination for the promisor's default, would be an effective provision and should be 
upheld, unless it exceeds excessively the genuine pro-estimate of the promisee's actual 
loss resulting from termination (i. e. his loss of bargain). 
83 ect 5.075 The dicta of Diplock U. in Robophone Facilities, Lid v. Blank' to the effi 
that the parties may agree on actual losses resulting from premature termination of the 
contract, even though they might normally be too remote to be recoverable at common 
law, supports this view. '" As it was already concluded"'- relying, inter afid, on this 
dicta- the loss which the parties are supposed to pre-estimate, when entering into a 
contract, is not confined to the loss which is recoverable at common law. It might also 
include the promisee! s actual loss resulting from termination based on breach, even 
though it might be assumed not to be recoverable under the general law of damages. 
Therefore, even assuming that upon termination for a non-repudiatory breach, the actual 
loss resulting from termination (i. e. the promisees loss of bargain) is not legally 
recoverable at common law, the parties' agreement on the minimum payment clause might 
include such a loss, and there seems no reason why, contrary to the observations of 
Nicholls U. in the Butterworth case'". such a clause should not be upheld. 
113 [196613 All ER 128 
"4 Ilia learned Lord Justice, in the course of his judgment stated: "If the contract contained an express 
undertaldng by the defendant to be responswe for all amal loss to the plaintiff occasioned by the 
defimdant's breach, whawer that loss might tam out to be, it would not affect the defendant's liability for 
the loss actually sustained by the plaintiff that the defendant did not know of the spwial cimunstances 
Which Vvere likely to cam any enhancement of the plaintifIrs loss. " see Ibid., at p. 143 
'as See supra, paras. 2.10 et seq.; Also above, paras. 5.016 et seq. 
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5.076 Furthermore. there is an indication to the validity of this conclusion in the 
judgment of YAM= IJ. in Anglo Auto Rmnce, Co. Ltd v. Jwnes'87 where the Lord 
Justice, having concluded that the minimum payment clause providing, in effect, for the 
payment of the M hire-purchase price less the realisable value of the subject-matter 
would constitute a penalty, added: 
"Clause 5(b) [the minimum payment clause] is the only clause which deals 
with the question of compensation in the event of the termination of the 
hiring. No clause is contained in the contract purporting to deal with 
depreciation or deterioration of the vehicle. Had such a clause been 
inserted (and assunfing, of course, it did not amount to penalty clause), it 
may be that the plaintiffs would have been entitled to recover something 
considerably more. " 'a 
It would seem to be a hint in this passage that if the minimum payment clause covered the 
actual loss resulting from termination, it would be upheld, even though such a loss was 
not recoverable in an action for unliquidated damages at common law. 
5.077 It has been suggested'89 that even though in commercial contracts, and generally in 
non-COnsumer cOntws, the above outcome as to the validity of a minimum payment 
clause Providing for the Promisee's loss of bargain upon termination would raise no 
problem and so such a clause should be enforced, nonetheless, in consumer context, 
there are good reasons fbr not enforcing such clauses. For, consumers entering into 
contracts containing such a minimum payment clause may not notice the effect of the 
provision and this problem is more likely to happen in standard form conftds in which 
the consumer usually signs the agreement without even reading or understanding it. 
Thew arguments, with aU respect, do not seern to be convincing and are subject to 
serious objections: First, the effect of the clause, considering its Wress language as to 
the recoverabilitY of loss of bargain, would seem to be clear enough fbr everyone who 
makes the agreement. Second, basically such a problem is more likely to happen where 
the Parties Achieve this result by providing for the time to be of the essence, since it 
iNWUO* indicates the right of the promisee to recover loss of bargain. Nevertheless, as 
"7 [196311 WLR 1042 
JbkL, at p. 1047 
'" Beale R, Penaldes in Tenningdon Pmvisions (1988) 104 L. Q. K 355, at p. 359 
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to the effect of such a provision, no distinction between consumer and non-consumer 
contexts has been recognized 
In any event, even if the protection of consumer requires the non-enforceability of a 
payment clause providing for loss of bargain upon termination for a minor 
breach, such a step, it is submitted, should be taken by the legislator, and its effect, of 
course, should also be extended to clauses promoting a minor term into the category of 
conditions. The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994" might be 
invoked in this relation: Under the Regulations, in any contract concluded between a 
seller or supplier and a consumer"', any "unflie term'92 which has not been individually 
negotiated'" is not binding on the consumer'94, even though the rest of the contract may 
continue in existence without the unfair term. " A contractual term will be regarded as 
"unffie i& "contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in 
the parties! rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer". 196 
A minimum payment clause providing for the liability of a consumer to pay loss of 
bargain damages upon termination for his minor breach, if it was stipulated for in a 
standard form contract for the sale or supply of goods or services, might be caught by the 
provisions of the Regulations'97; and having been regarded as an "unfair" term, it might 
be struck down as an unenforceable clause. 
190 Implenlentin the EEC Council Directive 93/13 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
191 Sec. 3(l) 
192 Sac. 4 
1" Sac 3(l). Sac 3(3) provides: -... a term shall always be regarded as not having been individually 
negotiated wh= it has been drafted in advance wd the consumer has not been able to influence the 
substance of the term. " It should, howem, be noted that the fiwt that a clause in a contract has been 
individually negotiated, does not prevent the rest of the contract to fall within the scope of the Directive ff 
the overall assessment of the contract shows that it is a apre4rmulatW standard contraW. Sac 3(4) 
194 Sec. 5(l) 
I" Sec. S(2) provides: "The contract shall continue to bind the parties if it is capable of continuing in 
existence without the unhi term. " 
196 Sec. 4(l) 
197 Although such a provision does not. it seems, fdl within the category of the "indicative and non- 
." list Of terms, provided by Schedule 3 of the Regulations, which may be considered as unW, 
u0ndh6m this list, as it appears from the language of section 4(4) is not exhaustive, and a clausk 
6MM within the scope of the definition of unfai terms, as provided by section 4(l), may still be 
regarded as not being binding on the conswner. 
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4A Concluding Discussion 
5.078 Taking the whole discussion into account, the followings could be suggested as 
conclusions and propositions: 
4.6.1. The Present Status of the Law in England 
5.079 The law, as it stands in England, with regard to a minimum payment provided to 
be paid upon termination based on breach seems to be as thus: 
I) Where termination of the agreement is based upon breach of a minor term (i. e., a non- 
repudiatory breach), damages recoverable are limited to the loss up to date of 
e. g. the arrears of rent with interest in financing transactions. Therefore, a 
payment clause providing for a sum excessively larger than the legally 
recoverable amount- for instance, the innocent partys actual loss resulting from 
termination (i. e. loss of bargain)- is presumably doomed to be struck out as being a 
penalty. 
II) Where a repudiatory breach (referred to as fundamental breach, breach of a 
term and repudiation in this context) is stipulated to be the basis of the right 
of the innocent Party to terminate the agreement, the breach will go to the root of the 
contract and jus* its termination at common law. The legally recoverable loss would 
therefore be the actual loss resulting from termination (i. e. loss of bargain) and a 
minimum Payment clause providing for such a loss would be very likely to be upheld as a 
valid liquidated damages. 
Ell) If termination has been provided to be based upon every breach of the contract by the 
promisor, whether repudiatory or not, the strength of the chain would be taken at the 
weakest link and therefom a minimum payment clam providing for loss of bargain 
would have a rare chance of being upheld as a valid stipulation. 
IV) The stipulations elevating a term into the category of conditions, like a "time of the 
essence" Provision, have the effect of turning the breach of a minor term into a 
repudiatory breach giving rise to the innocent partys right to recover his actual loss 
resulting from terminafion. In such a case also, the minimum payment clause stipulating 
for the PrOtnisees loss of bargain would have a chance of being upheld. 
224 
4.6.2. The Contractual Right to Terminate. Indicating the Intention for the 
Recoverability of Ion of bargain 
5.080 The present state of the law does not seem to be satisfactory. '" To avoid the 
unsatisfactory, and sometimes unfair, consequences resulting from the present legal 
position, Merent solutions and arguments have been suggested. '99 It would seem that 
providing for the tight of termination upon breach of a specific term by the promisor, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, primafacie indicates the intention of the parties 
that breach of that term would be regarded as a repudiatory breach going to the root of 
the agreement and enabling the promisee to recover his loss of bargain in the event of 
termination for that breach. The indication is even stronger where the parties expressly 
provide for a minimum payment clause to the effect that loss of bargain damages (or even 
greater than that in case of the clause being a penalty) would be recoverable upon the 
exercise of the contractual right to terminate by the promisee for the other partys breach. 
As a result a minimum payment clause providing for the recoverability of the promisees 
loss of bargain upon the exercise of his contractual right to terminate for the promisoes 
breach should- in any event, whether the breach is apparently serious or trivial- be upheld. 
For, in flict, although the loss which the parties are supposed to pre-estimate when 
entering into the contract and agreeing on the minimum payment clause- as it was 
submitted earlie*- should not be taken as confined to the legally recoverable loss"', 
nevei ffieless, according to the above argument, assuming that the parties have conferred 
the right of termination upon the promisee for the other partys breach, loss of bargain is 
the loss which should also be recoverable at common law. Therefore, a clause providing 
for such a loss as an agreed damages clause (in the form of minimum payment) should not 
be struck out as being a penalty. Several reasons support this proposition: 
4.6.3. Reasons Supporting the iproposal 
5.081 1) Basically, as to the assessment of the promisee's damages, the distinction 
198 SCIC smpra., Pam 5.067 
1" Mww SUUWdOns MA argunmo for them were in detafl consWred. see supra., pam. 5.068 et seq. 
200 Supra, pam 2.14; Also see above, pams. 5.016 et seq. 
"' Assummg the force of this submission, even. where conferring the right of termination is not talum a 
msddn the breach upon which the termination Is based a repudiatory breach and so the legally 
A verable low is supposed to be deftnnined by rderence to the mature of breach, the minimum payment 
CIBUIC PrOvidiM for the pMmhWs actual loss resulting ftom termination based on breach (i. e. his 1015 of 
bargain) shoulid be regarded as a valid stipulation. 
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traditionally made between termination upon a contractual right for the PromisWs 
repudiatory breach and such termination based on the promisor's minor breach is not 
without problem: First, providing for the promisee's right to terminate for the other 
party's breach, so far as the classification of contractual terms is concerned, promotes a 
mmor term- upon breach of which the termination has been stipulated- into the category 
of conditions202 so that the breach of which should be regarded as a repudiatory breach. 
Second, such a distinction, as it was referred to earlier203, sometimes leads to 
unsafisfitctory and unjust consequences. For instance, i& in the Baldocks case, the hirer, 
because of being polite and genteel, had written to the finance company that he could not 
pay the instalments, his failure to pay rentals would have been regarded as a repudiation 
and the owner would, as a result, have been entitled to recover loss of bargain damages. 
In fiLct, the law which imposes a considerably great liability on the promisor, because of 
his politeness, dxKdd not be regarded as a good law. Third, it is not more than a 
question of form in some cases. If, for example, the parties provided for the time of 
performance to be of the essence, a simple term would be promoted to the category of 
conditions and termination for breach of that term would be regarded as entitling the 
promisee to loss of bargain damage& in fact, as it was suggested by some leading 
lawYae, the amount of recoverable damages, as a result of such a distinction, would 
depend on the skill of draftsman. Thus, it is a kind of triumph of form over substance and 
is not in fine with the important principle of giving effect to the true intention of the 
parties. Fourth, the basis for such a distinction apparently lies in the causation theor)r It 
has been &Wed that where termination merely occurs by the exercise of a conbutual 
20 Set Carta LW., Breach of Cmatract, 2nd, e&, 1991, pam 1221 at pp. 449-450, also pam 507 at p. 
100; Carter J W, MIC EMDM of Discharge of a Con= on the Assesstneut of Damages for Breach or 
RMAStion (Pad 11) (1999) 1 JCL 249, at pp. 259-260; see also MardarPeach & CO. Ltd v. Affica Sea 
Coriers Corp. of Liberia (Ae Lacon4 [Ign AC 950, where a time chafterparty provided for the 
payment of the hire $eml-monthly in advium. it fw1her provided under clause 5: "... Wing the punctual 
mid Iregul" Payment Of the hire, ..., or on any breach of this charterparty, the owners shall be at hlw: rty to withdraw the vessel from the service of the charterers The hirers failed to pay a single instalment of 
hire on time, and the shipowners withdrew the vessel " in effmt, terminated the operstion of ft 
cOntr&M All members of the House of Lords had no doubt as to the validity of such a provision, and the 
efienfiveness of the withdrawal for the hirer's breach. in effect, the hirer's contractual obligation to pay 
the instalment of hire on time acted as a condition, for the conUM provided for the shipowners right to 
tffMIUft UPOU failure to make a punctual payment. 
20 See above, paras. 5.062-5.063 
2" See Furnwton M P, Oxitract Phuming: Liquidýftd Damages, Deposits mid the Foresecability Rule 
(1991) 4 JCL 1, at p. 9 
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right to terminate in the absence of a repudiatory breach, loss of bargain results from the 
promisees own act in exercising his right to terminate. Had he not exercised this d8K he 
would not have suffered the loss of the whole transaction. As a result, the promisee 
should bear the losses which results from his own act. This basis, however, does not 
reflect the reality and sometimes gives the defaulting promisor a windfid? ": In 
commercial relations, the purpose of providing for the right of termination is mainly to 
save the time and expense by avoiding the necessity of having recourse to the problematic 
cue law in respect of proving a fundamental breach or a repudiation. Compelling the 
promisee, after exercising this right, to prove a repudiatory breach to enable him to 
recover his actual loss resulting from termination- by arguing that such a loss, in the 
absence of a repudiatory breach, has been resulted from the promisee! s own act- would be 
regarded as forcing him to something which the parties have intended to avoid. This, in 
fact, pays insufficient attention to the realities of commercial fife and merely adds to the 
time and expenses of litiption. 2" This artificial separation between the promisor's breach 
and the promisee! s right of termination, as it has been suggested in some Australian 
CaSeS"7, is a distinction between "legal fault" and "legal liability" and "fie(s] ill with 
modern notions of causation and remoteness in the law of contract". 
5.082 Furthermore, it would seem that in determining the recoverable amount Of 
much attention should be paid to the intention of the parties2u: Where the 
parties expressly stipulate for a clause providing that the promisee's loss of bargain would 
be recoverable in the event of termination for the promisoes breach, effect should be 
given to such a stipulation. Thus, for instance, a minimum payment clause providing for 
the ownees loss of bargain to be recovered upon the exercise of the promisee's right of 
203 Clarke, bft Justice KLIL, CommentM on professor Funnston's article entitled "Contract Planning: 
Upddated DamaM Nposilts and the Foresmbaity Rule (1991) 4 ICL 11, at P. 12 
2w See Carter J W, The Efta of Discharge of a Contract on the Assessment of Damages for Breach or 
liation (Pan 11) (1999) 1 JCL 249, at p. 263; also Carter J. W., Breach of Contract 2nd ad., 1991, 
pam 1222 at p. 452 
2" AMEV-MCRnt=ce Ltd v. Austin (ig&6) 162 C. LP, 170, per Deane J at p. 206 ; See also Chh36 
Nyuk Y, Finance Leases and I., oss of Bargain: Judicial Impulses in the ffigh Court (1993) 23 University 
of Western Australia IAw Rev. 279, at pp. 292-293 
208 On " point and contrasting the intention theory with the theories of causation and nature of breach: 
me, Carter J W. Tk Effect of Discharge of a Contract on the Assesment of Damages for Breach of 
Nation (Part 11) (1989) 1 JCL 249, esp. at pp. 252-253,263 
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termination for the hirees breach should be valid and enforceable. The causation theory 
and the nature and extent of the breach, for the reasons r; efi: rred to above, should not be 
regarded as a bar to achieve this result where termination is based upon breach of a minor 
termt. Where there is no express intention as to the recoverable damages, attention should 
be paid to the implied or imputed intention of the contracting parties. As it was 
suggested, providing for the fight of termination, in the absence of a contrary evidence, 
primajbcie, indicates the parties' intention that the actual loss flowing from termination 
(i. e. loss of bargain) would be the recoverable darnages. "9 It is submitted that the 
implied intention of the parties in this relation should be regarded as effective and 
enforceable. Where, also, the minimum payment clause, because of being in excess of the 
actual loss resulting from termination, is held to be a penalty, again it would seem that the 
penalty clause, at least, gives the impression that the parties intended loss of bargain to be 
the recoverable damage in the event of termination. 210 Having regard to such an 
intention, loss of bargain damages should be considered as the promisee's recoverable 
damage. 
5.083 H) This view is in fine with cans fike & Solholl case" in which the Court of 
Appeal assumed without any doubt that loss of bargain was the recoverable damages, 
where the buyers had exercised their right of termination for the sellees minor breach in 
being late in delivery. Moreover, in this case, Donaldson M. R., in the course of his 
sPeeck emphasized on the point that the buyers! actual loss should be attributed to the 
breach, not to the act of the buyers in terminating the agreement: 
"It is trite law that in deciding whether or not to exercise a right to cancel 
the contract in such circumstances, the buyer need have no regard to the 
fact that in the absence of cancellation he would suffer no loss. If he 
cancels, the loss will be attributable to the sellers' breach of contract and 
not to the canCenafion. *212 
200 See Cwmwdl P, Commentary on "Terminaton Clauses by Carter" (IM) 3 JCL 126, at p. 128 
210 See Goode RK Penalties in Finance Loeases (1988) 104 L. Q. P. 25, at p. 28, proposing also the 
altemativC arPment that the penalty clause may be held to be enforceable up to the actual Ioss resulting 
from termination; Cuter J W, Termination Clauses (1990) 3 JCL 90, at p. 119; Com%vll P, Commentary 
On"TenninatiOn Clauses by CXTW (1990) 3 JCL 126, at p. 129 
211 
13ýOtirw SPIAPPIng Inc v. Smeiet Solholt [ 198311 Uoyds Rep. 605; see supra, pam 5.073 
212 Did, at p. 607 
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5.084 111) Ilke view is also in complete conformity with the true nature of financing 
transactions. AS it Was discussed earher; 213, the true nature of these agreements is to 
extend finance and to provide for a real right in the subject-matter for the financier to 
secure the repayment of the extended finance. Thus, in such a transactions, the financier's 
legitimate expectation is to get his extended sum of money with a proper interest and this, 
in fiLct, justifies any provision for the recovery of loss of bargain in the event of 
termination. Presumably, even in the absence of a minimum payment clause, providing 
for the right of termination for the hirer/lessee's default in such transactions should be 
taken as an indication that the financier intends to achieve his reasonable wqxrtation, i. e. 
the recovery of loss of bargain in the event of a premature termination of the agreement. 
5.085 IV) The view is also supported by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Kemdc Tractor SWes Ltd v. Langille' ,a case concerning an agreement to 
lease certain 
pieces of agricultural equipment. The contract gave the lessor, in the event of defliult by 
the lessee, an option to terminate the agreement, and repossess and sell the equipment. 
Upon termination, the contract provided for the liability of the lessee to pay "the 
difference baween (a) the sum of all rentals called for by the lease plus an amount equal 
to twenty (20) Percent of the aggregate minimum rental charge for the unexpired portion 
of the lease term ... and (b) the sum of all rental paid and proceeds of the sale7. The 
lessees other option under the contract was to claim damages at law. The lessors failed 
to pay the rentals after the first year of the agreement. The lessee, relying on its 
C011traCtUal right, repossessed the equipment, sold it and claimed damages. The apparent 
ground of the claim for damages was the agreement of the parties as to the recoverable 
loss in the event of termination, but, in fact, as it was pointed out by Had J. A. in the 
Nova Scotia Court of AppeaP15, it was grounded on the recovery of damages in general 
common law. The trial judge, having found that the plaintiff had acted reasonably in 
disposing Of the equipment, calculated the lessoes damages by deducting from the agreed 
value of the equipment, the amount of rentals already paid, adding the percentage margin 
213 SM at*VC, pU=. 5. ()()5 et seq. 
214 [198712 S. CJR. 440 , (19U) 43 DIX (4th) 171; see Ziegel J S, Damages for Breach of Mum I to in Canada (19U) 104 L. Q. P, 513 
215 The decision at the CWM of Appeal has ban repmed in Lansille v. Keneric Tractor Sales Ltd (1995) 
19 D. LJR- (4th) 652, on at p, 656 per Hm J. A. 
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(which was a contractual basis for computing the rent), and then deducting the net 
proceeds of the sale. The appeal to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court of Canada were dian6sed. 
in the Supreme Court, one of the issues raised was the question whether the assessment 
of damages would have made any diffference, had it been proved by the lessee that the 
216 breach had not been a repudiatory breach. In other words, the question was whether 
loss of bargain damages should be confined to cases where termination was based on a 
repudiatory breach rather than a case where the agreement was terminated merely by the 
exercise of a contractual right to terminate. The Supreme Court of Canada answered 
then questions in negative. Wilson J., in the course of her judgment, stated: 
*Repudiation may be triggered by either the inability or the unwillingness 
of a party to perform his contractual obligations. The same is true of a 
breach of contract that gives rise to a right to terminate; it may be the 
result of inability or unwillingness to perform. The breach and the 
repudiation are merely subdivisions within a general category of conduct, 
i. e., conduct which gives the innocent party the right to treat the contract 
as terminated. Thus, there is no conceptual difference between a breach of 
contract that gives the innocent party the right to terminate and the 
repudiation of a contract so as to justify a cifferent assessment of damages 
when termination flows from the former rather than the latter. General 
contract principles should be applied in both instances. 417 
Although the dedsion of the court as to the assessment of loss of bargain danvkM 
because of not giving a credit for the accelerated receipt of the future instalment? ", maY 
be criticized, nonetheless the reasoning put by Wilson J., giving the leading judgment of 
the court, clearlY supports our proposed view. 
4.6-4. Validity of a Minimum Payment Providing for the Recovery of Ion of 
bargain 
5.086 As a final point, it should be concluded that in any event, the minimum payment 
216 In WilsDn L's words, "ItIhe question at hand is whether the assessment of damages in a case of 
based on breach of a term of the contract should be any different from the aumment of 
damages in a case of termination based on repudiatioe. see (1988) 43 DLR (4th) 171, at p. 190 
217 Keneric DUCtor SWes Ltd v. Langille [198712 S. C. R. 440, (1998) 43 D. L. R. (4th) 171, at pp. 454 
and 180 respectively 
218 Coubld the decision of the Court of Appeal in Anglo Auto Finance Co. Ltd v. James [ 1963] 1 WLR 
1042 
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clam providing for the promisees loss of bargain to be recovered in the event of 
termination for the promisor's breach should be upheld either for the reason that such a 
loss, as it was submitted, is the legally recoverable loss where the right of termination for 
the promisee is provided for in the event of any breach by the promisor, or, even 
assuming that loss of bargain is the recoverable damage only where the breach is 
repudiatory, on the ground that the parties, in agreeing as to the minimum payment as an 
agreed damages clause, should not be taken as confined to the legally recoverable loss, 
but they can preo-estimate the actual loss resulting from termination, even if it is not 
recoverable in an action for unliquidated damages at common law. 
5. Factors to be Taken Into Account In Drawing up a Minimum 
Payment Clause 
5.1. General Remar*s 
5.087 Under the Present status of English law, where termination is provided to be 
exercised for a nOn-rePudiatorY breach or for every breach, whether serious or triviaL the 
minimum Payment clause Providing for the promisee's loss of bargain would be very likely 
to be a penalty, for it is excessively large in comparison with the legally recoverable loss 
[i. e. the Wears of rent with interest]. Hence, in such a situation, in order to be valid, the 
clause should not greatly exceed the legally recoverable amount. Where, however, the 
termination clause is provided to be activated for a repudiatory breach, loss of bargain 
would be recoverable and the minimum payment clause providing for the promiseds loss 
of bargain would be a valid stipulation. 
The Present law, however, has been criticized: The proposition supported by different 
arguments is that where a right of termination is provided for the promisee in the event of 
breach, whether repudiatory or not, the minimum payment clause providing for the 
promisees loss of bargain should be upheld. This loss of bargain is the actual loss to the 
Promisee rmAting from termination for breach. In many commercial contracts, such a 
loss is computed as a difference between the contractual price of the promises 
performance And its market price at the time when the breach OCCUrs. 219 In financing 
219 Cadw J W, The Effect of Discharge of a Contract on the Assessment of Damages for Breach or RePudi2dw (Pad 11) (1989) 1 JCL 249 
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transactions, however, determining loss of bargain and drawing up the minimum payment 
clause in a way to include that, and not to exceed it greatly, is of considerable 
importance. 
5.088 In such a transaction, for the clause to be valid, two important factors should be 
taken into consideration: First, the future instalments contain a considerable amount of 
interest. In premature termination of the agreement and providing for loss of bargain 
damages upon that, a proper credit should be given for such an interest. m That is 
because the promisee recovers the future instalments before the due termination of the 
-, - and 
for this accelerated realization, a proper rebate as to the interest element in 
such instalments should be given. Second, it is normally provided that upon termination 
the creditor has the right to repossess the subject-matter of the agreement and resell it. 
The amount realised in such a sale is the second element which needs to be taken into 
account. In other words, a proper allowance should be given for the increased value to 
the creditor, resulting from repossession. 221 
5.089 In this regard, the issues which need to be discussed in detail are as follows: I) As 
to giving a rebate for the interest element in future rentals, what amount of discount 
should be given? Should the recoverable amount be the present value of future 
or should the interest [L e. finance charge] as computed in making the 
contract be deducted from the future instalments? H) The conduct of the creditor in 
selling the repossessed equipment and giving credit for the realisable value in different 
kinds of financing transactions. M) After repossessing the equipment does the creditor 
have any duty to mitigate his loss by conducting in a suitable way in disposing of the 
equipment. These issues will, in turn, be discussed here. 
&L How to Discount Future Instalments? 
5.090 There is no doubt that in computing loss of bargain damages resulting from 
2ý* Fridman GH4 The Decline of a Claim for Damages: A Moral Tale (1963) 26 M. L. P, 199, at p. 202; 
bft4OW R P- Pftdtift in CUMCI Leases (Chapter 3 of -Essays in Equity, by Finn, P D"), 1985, at p. 54; Barnes T, Agreed Damages Clauses in Financing Contracts in the Light of Qd= Ausbalia LtdL x H22ft [19961 A. B. L. P, 63, at p. 67; Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. Ltd. [1962] AC 600, per Lord Radclift at p. 625 
221 Pridman, ibid; Meagher, ibid.; Banles, ibid; &Idge v. Cwnpbell Dis=nt Co. Ltd, Ibid. 
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premature termination of the agreement for the promisor's breach, the future instalments 
should be Properly discounted. m The important issue, however, is how this rebate 
should be computed. Two related views night, in this relation, seem relevant: First the 
rebate should be assessed according to the percentage return which the creditor himself 
has contracted for. In other words, the whole finance charge [or interest) element should 
be taken away from the future instalments by giving a discount at the rate in which the 
finance charge has been computed when the contract has been entered into. This seems 
to be the accepted view in the cases of Yeoman Cre&t, Lid v. McLeanm and Overaone, 
Lid v. SWpwa>A4. In the hitter case, in describing the assessment of Master Jacob in the 
former, Holroyd Pearce L. J. pointed out: 
"As a means of arriving at the correct figure, he [Master Jacob] calculated 
the interest rate implicit in the hire-purchase charges, and gave credit at 
that rate for sums received by the owners before their due date. ... But the learned master rightly pointed out that in assessing damages, the function 
of the court is not to act as mathematicians, but to endeavour to ascertain 
the amount of the loss suffered by the injured party and, so far as money 
could do k to Put the itýjured party in the same position as if the contract 
had been Performed. I. entirely agree with the method suggested by the 
learned master as a convenient guide to the figrure that one is seeking to 
find. It is not a question of exact calculation. - 
Although the Passage quoted above shows that the assessment of rebate is "a matter of 
impression to be fixed by the court on a broad view and not by precise 
computation"m, nevertheless the tendency of the courts in both cases mentioned above 
was to assess the amount of rebate by reference to the percentage return, i. e. the Tate 
upon which the creditor himself had computed the finance charge when entering into the 
222 IU =900 for this dMV1Y is tha the financier, by recovery of loss of bw*n in the event Of 
would be We to recetve future payments immediately rather than within a specified 
contracbW period of time Therefore, a prom rebate should be gmn as to the hftrW element in future 
instalmeaft which bas been added to the capital outlay because of the contractual provision for its 
periodic repayment by instalments. Among the authorities which support this. the observations of Ptairce 
L. J. in Overstone, Ltd v. Shipway [19621 1 All ER 52, might deserve motion; the Lord Justice, in 
assessin the financier's loss resulting from the premature termination of the contract, relying on the 
decision of Jenkins U. in Interoffice Telephonesý Ltd. v. Robert Freeman Co. Ltd. [1957] 3 All ER at p. 
482, [1958] 1 QB at p. 195, stated: *Some discount should be allowed on the ground that the plaintiffs 
had received back their money earlier than they would have done if the oontract, had been NOW Ibid, 
at p. 57 
123 [196211 WLR 131 
224 [196211 AH ER 52 
2" Ibid. at pp. 57-58 
zm Cx)Odc ILNE, Him4ftrcbm law and Prwtice, 2nd ed., 1970, p. 400 
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weement. 
5.091 This view seems to be subject to a serious objection: The purpose of providing for 
the creditor's right to recover his loss of bargain is to put him in a place in which he 
would have been had the contract been performed. As a result, even though by interest 
rates remaining in a steady status, the assessment of the discount by a reference to the 
percentage return may result in fair consequences, nonetheless if the interest rates 
changed between the times of assessing the finance charge and the discount, referring to 
the percentage return, in order to compute the discount rate, would not do justice either 
to the creditor or the debtor. This is because, where the usual interest rate was much 
lower than the rate by which the finance charge had been computed, the creditor would 
got an amount of the future instalments which even by reinvesting them for the remaining 
period of time at the usual interest rate, he would not be able to get the expected value of 
the former contract; in other words, he would not be in a position in which he would have 
been had the debtor performed his agreement. On the other hand, if the usual interest 
rate was higher than the percentage return, then the creditor would be in a much better 
position than a situation where the debtor had completed his contract. This criticism 
leads us to the second view in assessing the discount. 
Second, the creditor should be given the right to recover the present value of the future 
instalments. 227 The discount rate, therefore, need not necessarily eliminate the whole 
interest element in the future instalments, even though it n-dght do that where the usual 
interest rate at the time of termination is equal to the percentage return. According to 
this view, in assessing the discount rate, the usual interest rate at the time of termination 
should be taken into account. By using this rate, in fact, the creditor will get the present 
value of the future instalments which by reinvesting them for the remaining contractual 
period, he could be presumed to be at a position in which he would have been if the main 
contract had been completed by the debtor. There still, however, remains another 
problem: the creditor, by getting the present value of the future instalments, is deprived of 
the interest he would have supposed he would acquire had the contract run its M course. 
227 MOO" R P- P021tics in ChMI LAMM (Chapter 3 of "Essays in Equity, by Finn, P D"), 1985, at p. 54 
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He may not immediately be able to invest his money in other transactions, and thus he 
may lose the contractually stipulated interest for a period of time in which he is unable to 
reinvest. This is, it appears, a relevant factor which should be taken into account in 
calculating the creditor's loss, and the parties, especially the creditor, should be allowed 
to provide for precautions, to avoid such a loss when they enter into the contract. In 
practice, the creditor is stipulated to be entitled for the interest for a certain period of 
time, e. g. three months, in which he would reasonably be able to reinvest his money. 
5. M Two small points need to be made here: 1) In agreeing as to the ii 
payment the contracting parties might refer to the usual interest rate as the 
discount rate at the time of termination; or to be precise, they might relate the discount 
rate to a suitable objective list such as a specific bank interest rate or the rate of a 
particular financial institution. H) It should be noted that in order to determine the nature 
of an agreed damages clause, the test is whether the parties! pre-estimation is ewasively 
large in comparison with the actual loss resulting from breach. 2n Therefore, even where 
the discount rate in the minimum payment clause is not a precisely specific rate, it should 
not, it is submitted, affect the validity of the minimum payment clause if the chum does 
not amount to an excessively large sum in comparison with the creditoes actual loss 
resulting from termination. 
U. Giving Credit for the Increased Value to the Creditor Resulting from 
Ropossession 
5,093 For a minimum payment clause to be valid, a proper allowance for the increased 
value to the creditor resulting from repossession and disposing of the subject-matter 
should be given. This allowance is rather differently achieved in different financing 
transactions: In some financing contracts, like hire-purchase agreements, the subject- 
matter is provided to be purchased by the hirer at the end of the contractual period by 
exercising his option. In such agreements, the assumption is that the subject-matter does 
not come back to the ownees possession, except where the contract is prematurely 
terminated and the owner exercises his contractual right of repossession. Therefore, 
there is no residual value provided for in the agreement. On the other hand, in some 
M See supra., paraL 2.26-2.27,2.35 
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financng like leans, in which the subject-matter of the asreeamw is 
normally provided to come back to the lessoes possession at the natural termination of 
the agreement, a residual value, which reflects the expected value of the subject-matter at 
the end of the contract, is provided for. 
5.094 In contracts of hire-purchase nature, the allowance should be given to the 
realisable value of the subject-matter at the time of repossession. This value is normally 
determined either by the resale value of the subject-matter where the owner sells it after 
repossession in a property conducted sale, or by the price fixed in the certificate of an 
independent valuer if he does not. ' However, in agreements like leases, where the 
realisable value of the subject-matter, which is determined as above, exceeds the residual 
value as provided for in the contract [or its true value at the end of the lease if the 
residual value is not provided for in the agreement], an allowance should be given for the 
diffuence between the realisable value and the residual value of the subject-matter. 
Clearly, the parties may provide for the difference between these two values to be taken 
into account as a part of minimum payment, where the realisable value of the subject- 
matter is less than its residual value. 
5.095 It should be noted that in either case, the cost of repossession and any sums which 
are normally necessary to be spent to put the subject-matter in a resaleable condition 230 
my be provided for to be taken away from the realisable value of the subject-matter. 
&t The Credh0j's Duty to Mitigate his Loss 
5.096 Generally. the innocent party who has sufffered loss for the other party's breach has 
the duty to take reasonable steps to initigate his loss. 11is failure in this relation would 
confine him to recover his damages only to the extent the he would have been entitled to 
had he taken such reasonable measures to minimize his loss. This general rule seems to 
apply with equal force to a situation where the parties have stipulated for a minimum 
payment clause providing for the promisee's loss of bargain resulting from termination for 
the promisoes breach. In financing transactions, where the repossession and resale of the 
2" See Washer R P, POWtics in Chattel Loeam (Chapter 3 of "Essays in Equity, by Fijm P D"), 1985, 
at P. 55 
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is provided for as a right of the creditor in the event of defkult by the other 
party, the duty of mitigation mainly arises in relation to taldns reasonable measures in 
disposing of the repossessed subject-matter by the creditor. In fact, one of the criticisms 
which is frequently open to the finance companies is their manner of disposing of the 
repossessed goods Such companies, relying on their contracmal right under the 
payment clause to recover their loss of bargain damages, normally dispose of 
the repossessed subject-matter at low prices. That is why it has been sometimes 
suggested that the minimum payment clauses encourage either the creditor to be careless 
in his way of disposing of the repossessed goods231; or the hirers/lessees to dispute the 
sum for which the repossessed subject-matter could have been disposed of by the 
creditor. 232 
5.097 In any event, the duty of the creditor to minimize his loss by taldng reasonable 
measures in disposing of the repossessed goods would seem to be beyond doubt2", even 
though there are some suggestione that in computing the creditor's loss of bargain no 
allowance for any mitigation of damages should be made. In fact, suggestions of this 
kind imply the duty of mitigation where a chattel leased is truly unique; in other 
situations, however- considering that after repossession, the creditor is left with one less 
leased chattel than would be the can if there were no breacW35- the duty of mitigation 
has been denied. It would seem that the measures which the creditor should take to 
230 See in general Meagher, Ibid, at p. 54 
231 See Ziegd, Jacob S., The Minimum Paymew Clause Muddle 119641 C. L. J. 108, P. 110 
232 Molony COGIMitta oil Consumer Protection, 1962 reporL Cmnd. 1781, Pam 548 (cited, also in Aid, 
p. 129); Out can we here the advantage of a suggestion (am supm, para. 41) do the creditor can leave 
the subject-matter in the hiredlesnes possession and claim for the arrears of rot and all future 
instalments giving credit to the accelerated receipt of them, under a minimum payment clause which 
provides so. 
2" See 04 BPI4V V- C4VbeII &WOUnt Co. Ltd. [19621 AC 600, in which, on remission of the cast to 
the County Court to assess the ownW loss, the question was whether the owners had acted reasonably in 
mitigating their loss by Uying to obtain the best price available in the resale of the repossessed vehicle. 
Ilk COUIO Court judA considering the facts of the case and all surrounding circunulances conduded 
that the owners, by resale for cash, had Dot disposed of the vehicle in the best possible way, and had they 
dOut 30, their loss Would have been confined to L26, rot the; E303 that thq had actually Claimed. Set also 
Fridman 0HL, 71)e Decline Of a Claim for Damages: A Moral Tale (1963) 26 MIX 198, at p. 202 
"4 Meagher R P. Penalties in Chattel Leases (Chapter 3 of "F-wp in Equity, by Finn, P D"), 1983, p. 55 
2" Aid 
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... his loss depends on the terms of the contract and all surrounding 
circumstances-236 The creditor is not necessarily supposed to lease the repossessed goods 
for the remaining contractual period to be taken as relieved from his duty of mitigation. 
I-fis manner in disposing of the goods would be reasonable iý considering the terms of the 
agreement and all circumstances, he, objectively, chose the best way in this regard. 
Therefore, he may sell the repossessed goods, as it is the situation in so many cases, for 
cash and there is no doubt, even from the writers who suggested the negation of the duty 
of mitigation, that in such a situation, the goods should be sold "at a properly conducted 
sale. "237 The duty to sell the goods "at a properly conducted sale" is not anything but 
taking reasonable steps to mitigat6 the loss. It would, therefore, seem that, despite the 
objections which have been apparently raised, the creditor's duty of mitigation is an 
accepted principle. 
5.098 As it was referred to, the terms of the contract and aU surrounding circumstances 
should be taken into consideration in determining whether the creditor has taken 
reasonable steps to mitigate his loss. The realities of commercial life also should not be 
ignored. " In particular, as it was pointed out by Professor Goode, the following should 
be borne in mind: 
"(a) finance houses do not have facilities for selling direct to the public ... so that they are obliged to sell to dealers either at auction or by private 
treaty flius obtaining at best the trade price not the retail price; (b) it is 
commercially desirable for the finance house to sell repossessed goods as 
rapidly as Possible rather than seeking to hold out for a higher price which 
they might not obtain, since the value of the goods will depreciate with the 
passage of time and storage and insurance are expensive; (c) dealers are 
well aware of these difficulties and are thus in a position to drive a hard 
bargain; (d) in a great many cases repossessed goods have been neglected 
and misused in the hands of the hirer and come back to the finance house 
in a deplorable condition; and (e) the briskness of trade, for resale 
purposes, is very much dependent on the stringency of terms control, and 
in a period of high deposit requirements dealers may be reluctant to add to 
2w See Goode ILK, Ifirt-Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd ed., 1970, p. 403: *What is reasonable depends 
on the circurnstanoes and no dogmatic rule can be laid down-" 
237 Mteglier R P, Penalties in Cbaftd Leases (Mapt" 3 of AEssays in Equity, by Finn, P D"), 1985, at p. 55 
Coode RAL, Kho-Purcbm Law and Prwd4x, 2nd ed., 1970, at p. 403 
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5.099 It might be suggested that re-letting the repossessed goods in the form of hire- 
purchase or lease, is what a reasonable creditor should do rather than disposing of the 
goods in a resale for cash. 2A Although in some rare situations this proposition might be 
practical, nonetheless in most financing transactions where a finance house is involved, 
this view does not conform with the realities of commercial fife. That is because; iFirst, 
the finance house is not commercially in the trade of selling or letting goods to public but 
its trade is to odend finance to customers through dealers; second, even where the 
creditor can find a retail purchaser rather than a dealer to dispose of the goods, it is 
difficult for him to turn down a cash offer merely to preserve an opportunity to dispose of 
the goods in the form of hire-purchase or lease elsewhere'; third, assuming that he is 
able to re-let the repossessed goods, then the main difficulty is that, until the end of the 
new agreement, it is not possible to determine the amount realised from disposing of the 
goods to credit that amount to the old hirer/lessee in assessing the recoverable 
damages. 242 
S. Australian Law 
& 1. General Rwnai*s 
5.100 The law, as to the application of the penalty doctrine to minimum payments 
provided to be paid upon termination of the contract for breach, in Australia, is moving 
towards a more satisfactory position. The distinction between repudiatory and non- 
repudiatory breaches upon which the termination of an agreement may be based, in 
determining the nature of a minimum payment clause, by the recent decisions of the I-figh 
Court of Australia M AAEV-UDC Finance Lid v. Aus&2" and Esanda Finance 
Colpmudon Ltd v. Plessnie has now been to a large extent eliminated and a single 
2" Goodle, loc. cit., at p. 403, note 5 
20 See Bent*vHh F"Inancc. Ltd v. Jennings (196 1) 111 L. Jo 488 
241 GOD& P-M. Hire-Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd ed., 1970, p. 404 
20 See jbid 
20 (1996) 162 CLA 170 
2'" (19U49) 166 C. LJL 131 
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unique approach is apparently applied irrespective of the fitct whether termination has 
beert based on a repudiatory or non-repudiatory breach. Such an approach which is in 
fine with giving effect to the express intention of the parties should be welcomed. There 
are, however, still some uncertainties about determining the unliquidated damages of the 
innocent party where the agreement of the parties as to the minimum payment, for any 
reason, constitutes a penalty, though there are some judicial statements245 to the effect 
that the innocent partys actual loss resulting from tennination should be recoverable even 
where the minimum payment clause is held to be a penalty, regardless of the kind of 
breach upon which the termination has been based. It should be hoped that in completing 
this welcome move, such judicial statements will be given legal force, by reconsidering 
the subject in future cases. This section will thus be devoted to exploring the position of 
the Australian law as to the application of the penalty doctrine to minimum payments 
provided to be paid in the event of termination for breach in some detail, and will also 
deal with the prospect of the movement started in Australian courts as to this issue. 
&I Measure of Damages Recoverable: Loss up to the Date of 
Termination In the Event of a Non-repudiatory Breach 
5.101 Like English law, the damages which were recoverable for termination of the 
agreement following a breach by the promisor, primafacle was loss of bargain. 246 This 
principle, before the decision of the Ngh Court in SheWII v. 7he Builders' Licensing 
Boartf', was applicable to commercial contracts. As a result, a minimum payment 
clause which provided for the actual loss resulting from termination to be recoverable by 
the innocent party upon termination of the agreement by him fbr the other partys breach 
was prima facie a valid stipulation, regardless of whether the breach upon which the 
termination was based was a repudiatory breach or not. 248 A shift towards the principles 
laid down by the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Financings Ltd v. 
20 See the jWgenxmu of Dome and Dawson jj. in AMEv-uDC Finance Ltd v. Ausfin (1986) 162 
C. L. R. 170: Infira, pams. 5.111-5-113 
2* CWW J W, Termination Clauses (1990) 3 JCL 90, at p. I 11 
20 (1992) 56 A. UIL 793, (M) 149 C. L. PL 620 
248 See c. & JA. C. (Leasing) Ltd v. Humphrey (1972) 126 C. L. P. 131, It should be noted that in our 
discussion the phrase 'repudiatory breach" refers to breach of a Awdamental term, Amdamental breach of 
the COnUad and TRX"Ou; and therefore the breach of a minor term Which does not result in any Of the 
SbOve CCMMPcncu is referred to by a "non-repudiatory breaW. 
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Bakkr-e, appeared in Australia by AMR v 77w BuiHers'Licensing Bowne", which 
to some extent can be referred to as the Australian copy of Bakiocks case. As a r=dt of 
this case, recovery of loss of bargain damages was confined to cases in which termination 
had been based on a repudiatory breach. Where, therefore, the promisee exercised his 
contractual option to terminate the contract for a breach of a minor term by the promisor 
(i. e. a non-repudiatory breach), the recoverable amount was limited to the loss up to the 
date of termination. The reasoning behind this decision was the known argument that in 
the event of a termination for a non-repudiatory breach, the loss flowing from termination 
results from the promisee! s own act in exercising his option to terminate the contract and 
cannot be attributed to the breach. 
5.102 In this case, in a contract for the lease of land, it was provided that in the event ot 
among other events, the lessee's default in punctual payment and the rent remaining 
unpaid for 14 days, the lessor had the right to re-enter the land. The right of re-entry, it 
was stipulated, was without any prejudice to the lessoesaction for damages. The lessee 
having defaulted in the payment, the lessor claimed repossession and sued the defendants, 
the guarantors of the lessee, for damages. The judge at first instance awarded damages 
amounting to the outstanding balance of the instalments. An appeal to the Court of 
Appeal being dismissed, the guarantors appealed to the lEgh Court. The ffigh Court 
allowi ng the appeal, held the guarantors liable only for nominal damages, arguing that the 
lessees breach in Pundual Payment was not a repudiatory breach: Loss of bargain, 
therefore, was caused by the lessoes own act in determining the contract and could not be 
attributed to the lessee! s breach. Thus, the lessors were entitled orgy to damages up to 
the date of temination, i. e. the unpaid instalments up to the date of repossession together 
with the cost of repossession and interest. Although the decision of the FEgh Court in 
this case was contrary to some Australian authorities, like Larratt v. Bankers and Dadm 
Inswance Co. La251, and some English cans, &e The Solhol? 52, it was nonetheless 
2* [196312 QB 104, [196311 All ER 443 
250 Shevill v. 77te Builders' Licensing Board (1982) 56 KLIPL 793, (1982) 149 C. L. IL 620 
251 (1941) 41 S. PL(N. S. W. ) 215, in which Sir Frederick jordan stated: "Where [an agreement] is avoided by virtue of an mcpress right of avoidance, the consequences which now from an avoidance depend on the intention of the parties, actual or imputed, and in the absence of some express or implied indication of intention to the contrary. are governed by the ordinary law applicable to the avoidance of contracts for 
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0.3. The Effbct of ElevaUng a Tenn Into the Category of Conditions 
5.103 In the SkWits case4 itself, though conferring the right of termination was not 
considered as sufficiently indicating the implied intention of the parties as to the 
recoverability of the actual loss resulting from termination for breach, yet the power of 
the contracting parties to promote an apparently minor term into the category of 
conditions, so that the breach of which would entitle the promisee to recover his loss of 
bargain, was recognized. Gibbs U., having considered that a covenant to pay rent at 
specified times would not clearly constitute a fundamental or essential term with the 
effect that any failure, even n-Anor, would entitle the lessor to terminate the agreement at 
common law, stated: 
"However, the parties to a contract may stipulate that a term will be 
treated as having a fundamental character although in itself it may seem of 
little importance, and effect must be given to any such agreement. "25S 
The chieflustice, however, thought that a contractual right to terminate upon breach was 
not enough in itself to show the common intention of the parties for the recoverability of 
loss of bargain upon such a termination. He said: 
... it would require very clear words to bring about the result ... that whenever a lessor could exercise the right given by the clause to re-enter, 
he could also recover damages for the loss resulting from the failure of the 
lessee to c4urTy out all the covenants of the lease- covenants which, in some 
cases, the lessee might have been both willing and able to perform had it 
not been for the reý_entry. "2% 
bmichm of essential Promises. ' at pp. 225-226 
SOdPOIS ShiPPINg Inc v- Svnelet Solholt [1983] 1 Lloyd! s Rep. 605 
See c. & Austin v. United Dominions Corporation Ltd. [1984) 2 N. S. W. L. R. 612 ; Progressive Mailing 
How PfY- Ltd v. Taball PIY. Ltd (1985) 157 C. L. R. 17, in which, upon the authority of the Shevill case, 
ft was held that where the exercise of the power to terminate was based upon a repudiatory breach, the 
party in default would be liable for loss of bargain damages. ; The same reasomng on which the Shevill 
case was based was followed in Lessom (Aus) pty v. Westley [1964-5] N. S. W. K 2091, mid it was also 
nuntiOned without disapproVal in O'Dea v Alktates Leasing System (WA) Ply. Ltd (1983) 57 AJLJ. R. 
172, (1983) 45 A. L. R. 632; see am the application of this principle in AkEV-UDC FInance Ud V. 
Austin (19N) 162 C. 1, JL 170: in 
. 
*gL, pam 5.107 et seq, 
254 Sh"Ill v. 7716 Buil1krs'LiOmsing Board (1982) 36 A. L. J. R. 793, (1982) 149 C. L. P- 620 
2-" Jbid, at p. 627 
2W rbid, at p. 623 
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5.104 In Citicorp Ausirdid Ltd v. Hendir>X', in a contract for the lease of three cranes, 
a clause to the effect of elevating every term into the category of conditions, by 
stipulating for the time of the lemee's performance of his contractual obligations to be of 
the essence, was provided for. (cl. 9.19) The parties also agreed that in the event of the 
lessee! s breach in punctual payment and continuance of the default for 7 days, the whole 
unpaid balance of the rent (4ess a rebate in respect of the rent instalments not then 
accrued due to be ascertained by applying the rate of ten (10) per centurn per annum... ") 
would become due and the lessors would have the right to retake possession of the 
goods. (cl. 10-0) Upon retaking the possession of the subject-matter, it was provided 
that the goods should be disposed of by the lessors at the best price which reasonably 
could be obtained: if the realisable value was less than the residual value, as stipulated in 
the contract, the lessee was liable to pay the Merence and if it was more than the 
residual value, the excess was to be set off against any unpaid rent for the unexpired 
portion of the lease. (cl. 11.2) 
The lessee having failed to pay instalments, the lessors claimed from the defendants, the 
guarantors of the lessee, the amount provided for in the minimum payment clause. The 
New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the stipulated sum amounted to a penalty. 
The judgment was mainly based on the two following grounds: First, the rebate 
stipulated to be given as to the future instalments of rent, considering the percentage 
return which the lessor vq)ected to receive, was too small so that the minimum payment 
could not be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate of the lessoes actual loss. Second, the 
parties, entering into the contract, were supposed to pre-estimate the legally recoverable 
loss resulting from breach; since this loss- considering that the lessee! s breach in the 
punctual payment of the rental instalment could not be regarded as a repudiatory breach- 
was the loss up to the date of repossession, the minimum payment Providing for the 
actual loss resulting from termination would not have a chance of being upheld as 
liquidated damages. Mahoney LA., relying on the latter argument, rOected the lessoes 
contention that the agreed damages clause had been provided for the actual loss rather 
than the legally recoverable loss, arguing that "the law of penalties is based upon a policy 
237 (1935) 4 N. S. W. L. P, I 
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of limiting recovery to the damages recoverable at law"251. 
5.105 As to the effect of the "time of the essence" clause, Mahoney J. A. thought that cl. 
9.19 could not sufficiently indicate that the parties had intended the obligation as to the 
punctual payment to be a condition, because the clause related to all obligations of the 
lessee, some of which were to be performed within a reasonahk time. Furthermore, 
under clause 10.0 the lessor had the right to terminate the agreement only where the 
payments were in anur for at least 7 days and this, in Mahoney Ys view, made it difficult 
to infer that the time of performance was fundamental for the lessors. He, accordingly, 
held that although the parties had the right to elevate every term into the category of 
conditions, nonetheless it is difficult to conclude that the "time of the essence" provision 
in this case "... indicates an intention that timeous performance of all the lessees 
obligations is at the heart of the lease agreement. "29 
S. 106 This conclusion seems to be subject to a serious ob ection: Where the parties j 
provide for the time of performance to be of the essence, they, in fi4 regard the 
performance of the promisoesobligations at any stipulated time to be of this character, in 
other words, even where an obligation is provided to be perfonned within a remnable 
time, the parties may agree that performing in a reasonable time is to be of tbe essence. 
T"he policy behind such a provision is that first, the parties intend to show their true 
intention as to the nature of the term; and second, the promisee, regarding the 
performance of the obfigWon as an essential and vital factor, might have some ph= like 
reinvesting the sums he expects to receive in a remnable time, in some other projects. 
It, therefore, seems that the "time of the essence" provision in the Cificmýs case should 
have been taken as a clear indication of intention to elevate the terms regarding the 
lesseds obligations into the category of conditions. Assuming the correctness of this 
conclusion, even in Mahoney J. A. 's view, the lessor would have been entitled to recover 
his loss of bargain and so the minimum payment clause providing for such a loss would 
have been a valid stipuMon. The result therefore, would have been rather like what had 
20 lbid, at pp. 13-14 
20 Aid, at P. 10 
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been achieved in the English case of Lombard North Central Pic, v Butterwort0m. All 
the criticisms made to that case as to the preference of the form over substano? " would 
have therefore been relevant here. 
6.4. Recoverabift of loss of bargain Damages 
6.4.1. Starting Point: the AMEV- UDC case 
5.107 The Shift towards the recoverability of loss of bargain damages under the minimum 
payment clause, regardless of the nature of the term breached by the promisor, started by 
the important decision of the High Court of Australia in AAEV-UDC Finance Ltd v. 
Ausdn*2. In this cam in two similar agreements for the lease of certain printing 
equipment, it was provided OW the entire rents were due and payable upon the execution 
of the contract, but the lessor would agree to receive the rentals by instalments, provided 
the lessee made instalment payments punctually or within seven days of their due date; 
dw upon the lessees breach in the punctual payment of instalments and upon the default 
continuing for 14 days, the lessor might call up the entire rent and thus the whole balance 
of unpaid rents would become payable forthwith (cl, I(b)); that upon the failure to pay 
any instalment within 7 days of its due date, or committing any breach of the provisions 
of the aWeement, Or happening of some other specified events, the lessor would be 
entitled to repossess the goods and terminate the agreement whereupon the whole unpaid 
balance of the total rent would immediately become payable (cl. 7); that the lessor would 
have the right to sell the repossessed equipment and if the net proceeds of resale were 
less than the residual value, as provided in the contractual schedule, the lessee would be 
liable to pay forthwith the deficiency (cl. 10); and that the whole residual value would 
become Payable if the lessee Wed to return the equipment within 7 days of the expiration 
of the contractual period or its prior termination, together with the whole unpaid balance 
of the total rents plus interest (cl. 12). 
The lessee defaulted in payment of one instalment in each lease. The default having been 
260 [1987] 1 QB 527 
361 Sulwa, pm 5.067 
20 AAIEV-UDC Fbmce Ltd V. AUWA (1996) 162 C. L. P, 170 
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continued for seven days, the lessor exercised his right to terminate the agreements, 
repossessed the goods and called up the outstanding balance of the rent. He sold the 
equipment, the subject-matter of one of the agreements, well in excess of the wqxxted 
residual value but was unable to sell the other. The lessee, having gone into liquidation, 
the lessor instituted proceeding against the defendants, the guarantors of the lessee, 
claiming payment of $291857.40 representing the arrears of rent as at the time of 
repossession, the outstanding balance of the future instalments and the residual value of 
the equipment less the net proceeds of the resale of the equipment which had been sold 
plus interest. 
5.108 The precise nature of the claim was unclear from the statements but obviously the 
accelerated payment of the total rentals could not have been claimed, since, as pointed 
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out in O'Dea v. AlIsWes Leasing System (WA) Pty. Ltd , the clause providing for the 
entire rentals to be due in advance was inconsistent with another clause providing for the 
liability of the lessee to pay the whole outstanding balance of rentals upon termination for 
his default. 3" Hence, considering the contract as a whole, there could not be a present 
debt which, by indulgence on the part of the lessor, had been provided to be paid by 
instalments. The claim, therefore, inevitably was for the damages resulting from 
termination for the lessee! s breach under the agreed damages clause provided fbr in the 
agreements. 
The judA at first instance, applying the decision of the High Court in the O'Dea case? ", 
held the agreed damages clause to be a penalty since the clause allowed neither any rebate 
for the accelen'ted receipt of the finure instalments, nor any credit for a probable excess in 
the reilisable value Of the repossessed goods over the residual value. He, however, 
arguing that the equity relieves a party from a penalty on the condition that the other 
PartY would be compensated for his actual loss, did not disregard the penalty clam mid 
enforced it up to the lessor's actual loss resulting from termination amounting to arrears 
of rent, future rentals less a discount for the accelerated receipt of them, and the residual 
20 (1983) 45 A. LR. 632, (1983) 57 ALUR 172, at p. 175 per Gibbs C. J. 
264 set =prdL, paras. 3.40,3.47-3.48 
2'" 0 D*a v- AlUat" Leadng *MmMA) Pty. Ltd (1983) 57 A. L. J. P, 172 
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value of the resold equipment lea the realisable value of the resale. 
5.109 The majority of the Court of AppeaL holding the clause to be a penalty, disagreed 
with the judge at first instance and held that, even applying the equitable principles, the 
lessor would be entitled to recover his loss up to the date of termination, i. e. the arrears 
of rent plus interest. On appeal, the majority of the High Court of Australia affirmed the 
decision of the Court of Appeal arguing that with the development of the penalty doctrine 
by the common law, there was no room for the old equitable jurisdiction to grant relief in 
this area. Holding the agreed damages clause to be a penalty, the majority emphasized 
the principle that upon termination of the agreement for the lessee's non-repudiatory 
breach, the lessor would be entitled to recover merely his loss resulting from breach, the 
actual loss flowing from termination was caused by the lessor himself in exercising his 
option to terminate the contract and could not be attributed to the breach. Thus, they 
confined the lessoes damages to arrears of rent with interest. This was clearly stated in 
the judgment of Gibbs C. J. where he, discussing as to the recoverable damage by the 
lessor where the agreed damages clause was held to be a penalty, pointed out: 
"It is true to say, as Roger J. said, that the lessor is entitled to recover its 
actual damage. However, it is the actual damage which flowed from the 
breach which alone can be recovered. ... It is wen established in the modern law that the liability of a party who has broken a contract which 
contains a penalty clause is to pay the damages that have resulted from the 
breach. In the present case, the additional damage in respect of which the 
appellant seeks to recover did not result from the breach; it resulted from 
the determination of the hiring which the appellant itself chose to bring 
about. "m6 
5.110 The apparent result achieved in this case seems to be in line with the principle laid 
down by the English Court of Appeal in the Baldocks caSe17 and accepted in the 
decision of the Ifigh Court in the Shevills cue; but finther consideration shows that 
the majority believed the law as representing and supporting another view: Mason & 
Wilson JJ, reviewing the law as to penalties, suggested that the courts should give the 
parties greater latitude to determine the terms of their contract. They, having referred to 
2" AAIEV-UDC Rnmcc Ltd V. Austin (1986) 162 C. L. R. 170, at pp. 175,176 
267 Fbulnclngs Ud v. Daldock [ 196312 QB IN, [1963] 1 All ER 443 
261 SUWII V. 7he Bull&rs'Llcensing Bbard (1982) 56 A. L. J. PL 793, (1992) 149 C. L. R. 620 
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the advantages of such a latitude as to the provisions for agreed danu4W Ind 
emphasizing on the "supervisory jurisdiction" of the courts to relieve against Provisions 
which are so extravagant and unconscionable that are penal in nature and not 
compensatory, proposed some tests in drawing a distinction between penalties and 
liquidated damago? ", and added: 
*our r0ection of the appellads arguments should not be taken as 
throwing any doubt on the right of the owner or the lessor to recover his 
actual loss on his early termination of a hire-purchase agreement or chattel 
lease, pursuant to a contractual right, for the hirees non-fundamental 
breach, under a correctly drawn indemnity provision ... there 
is no reason 
to suppose that a provision which gives the lessor an indemnity, on his 
early termination for the lessee's breach, in the form of all unpaid 
instalments of rent, suitably discounted for early receipt, plus the residual 
value of the goods adjusted so as to reflect their actual value at the 
relevant time, would constitute a penalty. m2M 
As it appears from the passage quoted above, the learned judges, though holding the 
agreed damages clause in this case to be a penalty, proposed the view that the creditoes 
actual loss resulting from termination, if inserted properly in a minimum payment clause, 
would be recoverable under that clause, even where termination of the agreement was 
triggered off by the exercise of the creditoes contractual right for a non-repudiatory 
breacIL However, they considered that where the parties' pre-estiniation of the actual 
loss went beyond the correct formula and turned to be penal in nature, the courts could 
not undertake the "unfamiliar role" to rewrite the parties' agreement so as to confine it to 
the actual loss which the lessor had sustained. "' In such a case, therefore, the creditor 
would only be able to recover his damages to the extent which is recoverable at common 
law, and in a case where termination was based on a non-repudiatory breach, it would be 
confined to the loss resulting from breach, i. e. the arrears of rent with interest. 
S. III The dissenting judgments were delivered by Deane and Dawson JJ. Deane J., 
accepting Apparently the proposal laid down in the joint judgment of Mason and Wilson 
JJ. as to the recoverability of loss of bargain damages where it has been inserted in a 
"r. orrec; dY drawn indemnity provision" even where termination is triggered off by a non- 
20 Ssopn, Pm 2.52 
"0 AW7-UDC FIRmce Ltd V. AuMn (1986) 162 C. L. P, 170, at P. 194 
271 Aid, at pp. 192-193 
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rePudiatory breach, considered that even the agreed damages clause being a penalty, the 
actual loss resulting from termination should be recoverable. He based his judgment 
mainly on the ground that a penalty clause is not void at common law and it is not even 
completely unenforceable. "Common law unenforceability", he said, "while ab initio,..., is 
limited to the extent to which fiabifity under the clause exceeds the true damnification. "2n 
Put another way, the learned judge held the penalty clause to be enforceable up to the 
amount of actual loss resulting from termination. 
5.112 Dawson J., agreeing in effect with the conclusion achieved by Deane J, based his 
judgment on the following grounds: 
I) There is inconsistency in the idea that loss of bargain damages resulting from 
termination can be recovered under a contractual provision to that effect, while if the 
provision is held to be a penalty, the lessor will be restricted to the loss flowing from 
breach, disregarding the legitimate termination based on that breach. 
II) There is no justification for the view that in order to determine the nature of an agreed 
damages clause, the stipulated payment (i. e. loss of bargain) should be regarded as 
payable upon breach rather than upon termination of the agreement, while the clause 
being characterized as a penalty, the recoverable amount should be confined to that which 
results from breach and not loss of bargain which results from termination (where there is 
a non-repudiatory breach). 
III) The agreed damages clause, even where it is held to be a penalty, can clearly indicate 
the intention of the parties to provide for compensation to the lessor in respect of 
damages which result from termination pursuant to a contractual right, and there is no 
reason why the law should not give effect to such intention: "If it cannot do so by 
reference to the stipulated amounts because they are penalties, there is no reason why it 
should not do so by way of unliquidated damages. u2n 
M The Parties may admittedly agree that a minor term to be treated as a condition and 
thus give effect to the breach of that term to be regarded as a repudiatory breach giving 
rise to the right of recovery of loss of bargain damages. There is no reason why, just like 
272, rbid, at p. 203 
273 jbid, at p. 216 
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such an agmmeat, the parties should not be able *to prescribe the measure of 
comimmdon payable upon termination for breach of an inessential term"274 . 
5.113 The intention of the parties extracted from their agreement as to the recoverability 
of the actual loss resulting from termination was the very core of Dawson Ys arguments. 
The learned judge, relying on the observations of Deane J. in Progressiw Mailing Houm 
Pty. Led v. Taball Pty. Lid275 and also the English case of the Solhol? 76stated: 
"... where a contractual power to terminate an agreement is exercised 
upon breach, damages for loss of the bargain should be recoverable, not 
only where the breach amounts to repudiation or is fundamental, but also 
where it is intended by the parties that such loss should be recoverable. 
And if it is the intention of the parties, it will not be correct to say that the 
loss was due solely to the act of the party terminating the agreement. It 
will be attributable also to the breach because it was contemplated by the 
parties as something for which damages should be recoverable. "rn 
5.114 The reasons given for the recoverability of loss of bargain damages in the event of 
termination for a non-repudiatory breach, where the agreed damages clause is held to be a 
penalty seem to be convincing. The proposition is also supported by the arguments 
discussed in the earlier part of this chapter278 and we do not need to repeat them again. It 
is, therefore, fitting to suggest here that the intention theory gives the best justification for 
determining the loss which the creditor is entitled to recover where he terminates the 
contract exercising his option to do so. According to this theory, the recoverable damage 
should be the actual loss resulting from termination, i. e. loss of bargain, even where the 
minimum payment (or agreed damages) clause is held to be a penalty regardless of the 
nature of breach upon that the termination of the agreement has been based. 
274 JbId, at p. 217 
275 (1995) 157 CJ.. P, 17 
276 SOdrOS Sylipping Inc. V. Smeiet Solholt [198311 Lloyd! S PAP. 005 at P. 607 
277 AA&V-UDC Rhance Ltd v. Austin (1986) 162 C. L. P, 170, at pp. 219-219 
m Where vve discussed the issue that the rewyerabie loss at common law should be loss of bargain if the 
parties have agreed for the promisee's right to terminate the contract upon the promisor's breach. see 
supra., peras. 5.090 ef seq. 
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6.4.2. Adoption of the Recoverability of loss of bargain under a Minimum Payment 
Clause 
5.115 The dicta of Mason and Wilson JJ. in AAEV-UDC Finance Lid v. AusdrP- as to 
the entitlement of the lessor to recover his loss of bargain damages resulting from 
termination for a non-repudiatory breach, under a "correctly drawn indemnity provision"- 
were applied by the High Court of Australia in Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v. 
PkssWe: In an agreement for the hire-purchase of a truck made between the appellant 
(finance company) and the respondents, W and Mrs Plessnig (the hirers), it was provided 
that upon the hirers! de&Wt in any payment under the agreement, the owner would be 
entitled to repossess the vehicle whereupon the hiring would terminate, and the hirers 
would be under the liability to pay the "recoverable amount" as liquidated damages to the 
owner. The "recoverable amount" was agreed to be calculated as thus: the total rent and 
all other moneys payable for the entire period of the agreement (including all costs of 
repossession, maintenance and resale) less deposit, all rentals paid before retaking 
possession, the realisable value of the goods being the best wholesale price reasonably 
obtainable for them at the time of repossession and a rebate of charges. The hirers 
making default in payment of three monthly instalments, the owner repossessed the 
vehicle (accotding to the findings of the courts belown') and claimed for the moneys due 
under the contract (Le. the recoverable amount). The judge at first instance, accepting 
the claim entered judgement for the hirers! liability to pay the "recoverable amount" 
claimed. 
5.116 In the Full Court of South Australia, the majority (Von Doussa J. dissenting), 
allowing the appeal, considered the agreed damages provision to be a penalty. They 
based their judgment mainly on the ground that first, the criteria approved in IA-C- 
(Leasing) Ltd v. Humphre? 2and by Mason and Wilson JJ in the AAEV-UDC case'3, 
as to agreed damages clause was in relation to leases with no option to purchase, while 
V9 (1936) 162 C. L. PL 170 
20 (19") 166 CJLIL 13 1; we Carter J. W., lAquidated DtnmWu and PCWties: Ilbe SAP COnfinkm 
(1989-90) 2 XL 73 
301 Aid, Pcr Wibm & TOOhcy JJ at P. 136 
22 (1972) 126 C. L. R. 131 
2B3 AAMV-UDC FInance Ltd v. Asuan (igs6) 162 C. L. R. 170 
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here the agreement was one of hire-purchase; second, the clause did not provide for any 
credit to be given to the hirers where the realisable value of the subject-matter happened 
to exceed the amount owing to the owner. 1184 
5.117 On appeal, the High Court of Australia, unanimously held that the clause providing 
for the owner's actual loss resulting from termination for the hirer's breach would not be a 
penalty. Wilson and Toohey JJ., having emphasized on the test laid down by Mason and 
Wilson JJ. in the Ak&V-UDC can in determining the nature of agreed damages clause 
and repeating the principle that the agreed sm is a penalty only where it is "out of all 
proportions", *extravagant", "exorbitant or unconscionable" in comparison with the likely 
actual loss resulting from breach, pointed out: 
"As O'Dea and AA&V-UDC show, the fact that the "recoverable amount" 
payable by the respondents under cl. 6 is payable upon termination of the 
agreement consequent upon breach, rather than in respect of the breach 
alone, does not mean that the clause escapes the scrutiny of the law 
relating to penalties. But it does mean that in determining whether the 
"recoverable amount" is a genuine pre-estimate of loss or a penalty, 
"relevant loss" is not restricted to the loss flowing immediately and merely 
from the actual breach of contract; it includes the loss of the benefit of the 
contract resulting from the election to terminate for breach... "285 
They also considered that the agreement being one of hire-purchase, and not merely hire, 
should not be regarded as a material elementý since until the hirer had not exercised his 
option to purchase, he was only a bailee and should have no property in the subject- 
matter Other members of the High Court, in effect, agreed with these argulnentS. 286 
Brennan I hold that, for the moment, he accepted the view that in determining the nature 
of the *recoverable amount" prescribed by the contract, the owner's loss resulting from 
termination for the hirees non-repudiatory breach should be taken into account. 2" 
However. he considered that the law, in holding the owner to be restricted to the low 
resulting from breach. in the event of termination by the exercise of a contractual right, 
for a non-repudiatory breach, and at the same time allowing him to recover his actual loss 
resulting from termination under a "correctly drawn indemnity provision", accepted an 
2" See Wilkin L, Penalties wd the Financial Contract [1990] L. M. C. L. Q. 16, at p. 25 
20 EsandaRnance Corporation Ltd. v. Plessnig (1988-89) 166 C. L. R. 13 1, at p. 140 
2" See Ibid, at p. 153 per Dome J., p. 157 per Gaudrin J., and p. 147 per Brennan J. 
07 Ibid, at p. 147 
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incongruity. He dw added: 
"It may be appropriate to reconsider this incongruity in some later caw 
and, if that is done, it may well be necessary to canvass the correctness of 
some earlier decisions of this court. "2" 
5.118 The decision of the High Court in Esanda Finance Corporation Lid v. Plessidgw 
should be welcomed. It is in conformity with the true nature of financing agreements and 
avoids the problems which the financiers might face in drafting such contracts. It also 
eliminates, to some extent, the problems Eke the preference of form over substa= 
introduced by some authorities, like the English case of Lombard North Central Pic. v. 
Butterword? ". More importantly, the decision is in line with the principle of freedom of 
contract and the necessity of respect to the true intention of the parties, for it recognizes 
the latitude of the contracting parties to determine the terms of their agreement including 
the consequences of the breach of any contractual undertaldng. However, though to a 
great extent it reflects the realities of commercial life by allowing the creditor to recover 
his actual loss resulting from termination for a non-repudiatory breach under a "correctly 
drawn indemnity provision", yd in the absence of such a provision or where the provision 
is held to be a penalty, the law still restricts the creditor to his loss resulting from breach 
and denies his entitlement to recover his actual loss flowing from termination for the 
other partys non-repudiatory breach. Many arguments were adduced, in the earlier part 
of this chapte, in favour of the view that providing for the right of termination for the 
promisee to be exercised in the event of the promisor's breach should be regarded as 
sufficiently indicating the common intention that the contracting parties have 
contemplated the actual loss resulting from termination to be the recoverable damage 
where the agreement is terminated by the innocent party for the other partys breach. 
This indication is em stronger where the parties have expressly provided for loss of 
bargain [or greater than that in case of the clause being penal] to be recoverable in the 
event of termination for the promisor's non-repudiatory breach. m Accordingly, if the 
2m Aid, at p. 147 
389 (19U49) 166 C. L. P, 131 
290 [19&n I QB 527 
"' Supra., parm. 5.080 et seq. 
"2 CmnwcU P, COmnmmtWY on "rermination Claum by Carter" (1990) 3 JCL 126, at p. 128 
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agreed damages clause providing for loss of bargain to be recoverable upon termination is 
held to be a penalty, the actual loss resulting from termination should be recoverable 
under the general rules at common law. The arguments raised in the judgments of Deane 
and Dawson JJ. in the AAIEV-UDC case? " do clearly support this view. 
5.119 From the above observations, it could be inferred that the present status of the 
Australian law as to this issue- i. e. denying the entitlement of the creditor to recover his 
actual loss resulting from termination where the agreed damages clause providing for loss 
of bargain is held to be a penalty, and restricting him to the loss flowing merely from 
breach- seems unsatisfactory and it should be hoped that, considering the arguments of 
Deane and Dawson JJ., the present position will, in future cases, be reconsidered so that 
the promisee will be able to recover his actual loss resulting from termination for breach 
where the express, implied or imputed intention of the parties indicates so. Thus, the 
creditor in financing transactions wiH have the right to recover his loss of bargain for a 
non-repudiatory breach, even where the agreed damages clause is held to be a penalty. 
AA-MV-UDC Rhance Ltd v. Austin (1986) 162 C. L. P, 170 
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Part Two 
Relief Against Forfeiture 
255 
Introduction 
The parties to a contract, instead of providing for the agreed damages to be paid upon 
breach, may stipulate for the forfeiture of advance payments on the occurrence of a 
default by the payer in performing his contractual undertakings. In a contract for the sale 
of land by instalments, for example, the vendor may ask for a deposit, and the contract 
may contain a stipulation providing for the right of the vendor to repossess the land and 
retain the deposit and all other payments made by the purchaser in case of any default by 
the purchaser of his contractual obligations. Such a provision is referred to as a 
"forfeiture clause" and may be considered as a good alternative to providing for agreed 
damages. The term "forfeiture" in this context, as it is clear from the example, refers to 
two different, but related, concepts: First, losing some interest in the subject-matter of 
the agreement as a result of a default in performing contractual duties. Second, losing 
the moneys paid before termination in consequence of that default. Thus, in the exwnple 
given above, if the vendor wishes to enforce his contractual right, the purchaser will 
forfeit both his equitable interest in the land and also the deposit and the instalments, paid 
before termination. It is why the decided cases, as it will be seen, discuss the availability 
of relief against forfeiture of both the payees interest in the subject-matter and the 
moneys already paid. 
The right to repossess the subject-matter and to retain all payments made by the 
contract breaker may act as a security for the creditor against the debtoes default': The 
debtor is prevented from breaking his contractual obligation, because as a result he might 
lose the possession and the payments made; the creditor also may look at the clause as a 
means of preventing the debtor from any default and compelling him to perform his 
promises punctually. Accordingly, upon any default, the creditor may be wining to 
negotiate and reschedule the performance of the debtoes undertakings; but his right to 
repossess and retain payments will provide him with a strong bargaining power. As a 
result, he might be able to impose any harsh terms and conditions, even at the negotiation 
stage. 
1 Sm CoMm IL, TM Law of Contrw: ý (2nd ed., 1993), p. 334 
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Furthermore, upon the premature termination of the agreement, the creditor who 
repossesses the subject-matter is very unlikely to wish to retain the property for himself 
He will normally try to retransfer it as soon as it is practicable. On the other hand, the 
debtor is interested in maintaining possession. The creditor, therefore, needs to be certain 
of the due performance of the debtors contractual duty, i. e. the payment and completion 
of the agreement. It is, thus, provided in the contract thaý upon termination for the 
debtor's default, the creditor would have the right to retake possession of the subject- 
matter and retain the payments already made. In most cases, therefore, such a provision 
does normally act as a guarantee for the creditor against any probable default by the 
debtor in the punctual payment and due performance of the contract. 
Providing for the forfeiture of advance payments upon default is very similar in effect 
to an agreed damages clause: the parties, instead of providing for a large sum of money 
to be paid upon breach, stipulate for the forfeiture of a large amount of money already 
paid upon the payees default. In principle, therefore, there might be good reasons for the 
application of the rules against penalties to forfeiture provisions; in other words, such a 
forfeiture provision should, it may be said, simply be regarded as subject to the rules 
against penalties, and the courts should relieve the payer from the consequences of his 
breach to the extent that the forfeited sum exceeds the actual loss of the payee resulting 
from breach. As we shall see, however, the rules relating to relief against forfeiture and 
the rules against penalties, though having a common origin in equity, have developed 
differently. They, therefore, are, to some extent, different from each other. 
As a general principle, common law respects the right of parties to provide for a 
forfeiture clause. Thus, upon termination of a contract for the payees default, the 
advance payments may be forfeited by the payee if there is a contractual term to that 
effect2, or, even in the absence of a forfeiture provision, where the right of the payee to 
2 McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1999, para. 505; Ogus, The Law of Damages, P. 53; TreiK 
citure ments Remedies for Brewh of contract, 1988, p. 235; Pawlowsld, Relief Against FOrf Of Instal 
(1993)'Psta Gazette, p. 122; For the best judicial discussion on the subject see Sfockloser v. Johnson 
[1954] 1 Q. B. 476; The Australian approach appears to be the same: see, e. g., Greig & Davis, 7110 IAw 
of Contract (Australia), p. 1279; Carter, Breach of Contract, 2nd ed., 1991, para. 1259 
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the prepayments is unconditionae; but, at the same time, the courts of equity, having 
recognized the realistic purpose of a forfeiture clause and that the creditor is not usually 
interested in possession of the property, and having considered that, in some cases, the 
clause may act as a penalty4, have established certain rules to protect the proprietary or 
possessory interest of the debtor, and also to relieve him against forfeiture of the advance 
payments. Some statutory measures have also been provided for to protect the 
possessory interest of the debtor. 3 
Although, in general, there is no doubt about the existence of a jurisdiction to relieve 
against forfeiture of the payees possessory or proprietary interest and also the moneys 
already paidý, the scope of this jurisdiction, its boundaries and the circumstances upon 
which the jurisdiction might be exercised are not very clear 7. The equitable jurisdiction to 
relieve against the payees interest in the subject-matter should not be regarded as distinct 
from the jurisdiction to relieve against moneys already paid. Although with regard to the 
applicable rules and principles, they might seem different, nonetheless, in effect, they are 
closely related to each other: Where a court relieves the payer from the forfeiture of his 
equitable interest in the property, it, in fact, also prevents the vendor from retaining the 
moneys already paid for his own benefit. Put another way, the court normally grants such 
3 Sm infra., para. 6.20 
4 This is the case, for instance, whM ft amount of damages resulting from the payees breach is 
considerably less than the advance payment which is subject to forfeiture. 
5 See, e. g., as to forfeiture of leases for breach of covenants other than payment of rent, Law of Property 
Act 1925, sec. 146 ; as to Conan= credit transactions, Consumer Credit Act 1974 ss. 87-89 requiring 
the creditor to give a special notice that the default in payment nsks the repossession of the goods by 
hinL See 8150 L 129 empowering the court to allow time for payment if it regards it just to do so. There 
are also some statutory measures to empower the court to order repayment of the advance payments: see, 
e. g., as to the land Ummactions sec. 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (for a detailed discussion of 
this section see infra., pams. 9.10 et seq. ); as to "consumer hiring agreements" see sec. 132, Consumer 
Credit Act 1974 
6 Furmston M P, CheshiM Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract, 13th ed., P. 942; Chitty on Contracts, 
27th e&, vol. 1,1994, para. 20-070; Treitel, The law of Contract, 9th ed., pp. 908-910; McGregor on 
Damages, 15th e&, para. 506; Ogus, TU Law of Damages, 1973, pp. 54-56; Collins, The Law of 
Contract, (2nd ad., 1993). p. 334; Downes, Textbook on Contract, 3rd. ed., 1993, p. 334; Guest A 0, 
Anson's Law of Contract 26th edL, 1984, p. 513-314; Harpum, Relief Against Forfeiture and the 
Purchaser of Imul [1984] C]LJ 134, at p. 136; Pawlowski, Relief Against Forfeiture of InStRIments, Estate 
Gazette, issue 9312,27 March 1993,122; Law Commission, Working Paper, No. 61, Penalty Clauses 
and Forfeiture of Monies Paidý 1975, pams. 54-56 
7 See, e. g., Sport International Bus=m BV v. Inter-Footwear Ltd [1984] 2 All ER 321, [19841 1 WLR 
776; lAw Commission, Working Paper, No. 6 1, ibid 
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relief by giving the payer extra time to complete his part of bargain. By granting such 
relief, the payees default is in fact ignored and the moneys already paid areý upon 
completion of the agreement, taken into account as the purchase price. Moreover, the 
court may grant relief against forfeiture of moneys already paid by granting the payer 
extra time within which the contract is to be completed. Granting relief in such a way 
does, in effect, also relieve the payer from forfeiture of his equitable interest in the 
property. 
Considering the rules and principles relating to relief against forfeiture, examining the 
scope of this equitable jurisdiction, and determining the relationship between these 
principles and the rules against penalties are the main aims towards which this part will be 
directed. However, before discussing the jurisdiction of courts to relieve against 
forfeiture, it is appropriate to consider, rather briefly, two preliminary issues: first, the 
rules regarding the recoverability of advance payments by the contract breaker at 
common law, and wcond, a historical review of the equitable jurisdiction of courts to 
relieve against forfeiture. This part, therefore, will be structured as follows: 
Consideration is given first to the prelimWay issues, as referred to above. (Ch. 6) This 
will be followed by a detailed analysis of the equitable rules for relief against forfeiture of 
the payer's interest in the subject-matter (Ch. 7), and the rules relating to relief against 
forfeiture of moneys already paid (Ch. 8). Though the equitable jurisdictions as to these 
two heads of relief are closely related to each other, it seems preferable to discuss them 
separately; for the rules applicable to each of them and their interrelationship with the 
penalty doctrine are, as it will be seen, to some extent different. The consideration will 
also be given to the interrelationship between each head of relief and the rules against 
penalties. Finally some important statutory jurisdictions to relieve against forfeiture will 
be given a close analysis (Ch. 9). 
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Chapter 6 
Some Preliminary Issues 
6.01 To discuss the availability of relief in equity against forfeiture of advance payments 
and its relationship with the penalty doctrine, it should first be seen to what extent then 
payments, after a premature termination of a contract for the promisor's default, could be 
recovered by the breacher in an action at common law. It is also preferable to review 
briefly the historical evolution of the doctrine of relief against forfeiture. This chapter will 
be responsible for illuminating these two preliminary issues. 
1. Recoverability of Advance Payments at Common Law 
I. I. General Considerations 
6.02 Upon termination of a contract, in which some advance payments have been made 
for the payees breach, one of the main questions which may arise is whether the payments 
made are recoverable by the contract breaker. The issue gains practical importance 
where the amount of prepayments is more than damages suffered by the innocent party as 
the result of breach: If there is no right for the contract breaker to recover the advance 
payments to the extent that it exceeds the damages suffered by the innocent party, this 
may result in an unjust enrichment and injustice. Mi 
6.03 Discussing the principles of common law in this regard, the issue should be limited 
to a situation in which no forfeiture clause has been provided for, since where the parties 
have stipulated for the forfeiture of advance payments upon termination for the payers 
defaWt, there is no right at common law for the contract breaker to recover the 
prepayments', even if they are out of all proportion to the actual or probable damages 
1 SWUoser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 Q. B. 476, specially at p. 490 per Denning LI ; 
see also McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 505 ; Ops, The Law of Damages, 1973, p. 53 ; 
Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, 1988, P. 240 ; Pawlowski, Relief Against Forfeiture of 
Instalments, Esta Cmette, March 27 1993, p. 122; This is also the can where there is an implied 
intention as to the non-recovembility of an advance payment by the contract breaker, like the can in 
deposits: we, eg., &ocklawr v. Johnson, Ibld, where Denning LL at p. 637 stated: "Where them is a 
forfeiture chum or the money is. expressly paid as a deposit (which is equivalent to a forfeiture clause), 
then the buyer who is in defitult cannot rcoover the money at law at all. " 7U position is the smut in 
Australia. SM e. g.. Ortig & Davis, The Law of Contract, 1987 (with fourth cumulative UffICUICAto 
1"2), p. 1279 ; Carter, Breach of Contract, 2nd ed., 1991, para. 1259 
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which may flow from the breach. The question, therefore, is, whether, in the absence of 
any forfeiture provision, there is any right for the defaulting party to recover his 
prepayments. 
6.04 The relevant principle is that the discharge of a contract has no retrospective effect2. 
This principle has been affirmed by the House of LoW after years of controversy on the 
issue of the effect of termination. On a simple analysis of the principle, it might be argued 
that where the tight to payments has accrued before discharge, then the party in default 
remains liable, and if there has been a payment, there will be no right for its recovery by 
the contract breaker4- It should, however, be noted that such an analysis is an 
oversimplification of the issue and where the damages are less than the amount of 
advance payments, it may lead to an unjust enrichment. As we shall see, the position at 
common law depends on the construction of the clause requiring the advance payments 
and the object with which the payments have been made. To start with, it is necessary to 
consider the traditional approach to the subject. Then some important cam which may 
cW* the issue should be examined. 
1.2. Traditional APPrOach 
6.05 For many years, it was thought that, in the absence of an express or impfied 
forfeiture provision, upon the premature termination of a contract for the payees breach, 
afl advance payments, even deposits, were recoverable. 5 In Hinton v. Sparkd, on the 
2 HirjiMuyiv. CheongYwSS Co. Ltd. [1925] AC497, per Lord Sumna at p. 510; see also FurmstonM 
P, CheshiM Filbot & Furmston's Law of Contract, 13th ed., p. 640; Beatson J, Discharge for Breach: 
IU position of Instalmý Dtpo" and Other paymeats Due Before Completion (1981) 97 LQR 399 
(Reprodwed with revision in J. Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (Essays on the Law of 
Restitution), (Oxfoa, Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 45) 
3 Johnson v. Agnew [19801 AC 367, overruling Horsier v. Zorro [1975] Ch. 302 ; see 8150 Colonial Bank 
v. European Grain & Shipping Ltd (1he Daminique) [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 239, at p. 248 per Hobbouse 
L, affinned on this aspect by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords- [1989] AC 1056 
4 Duncan Wallsoe I. N., Hudson! s Building and Engineering Contracts, I Ith ad., Vol. 1, Pam 4.025 at p. 
489, citing Taylor v. Laird (IM) 23 LJ Ex 329, and Salmond and Winfield on the Law of Contract 
(1927 ed. 1 p. 296 
5 SM e. &, Ifinion v. Sparkes (1869) LR 3 CP 161; C4"M v. Roberts (1862) 31 Bexv. 613,34 ER 1277, 
32 L. J. 105, Ch., where Sir John Romilly, M. P, held: "An agreement certainly might be made the the 
deposit should be forfeited in case the purchase should not be completed, but this must either be 
=pressed or clearly implied from the contract itself, ... Them is ... no authority which holds that the deposit must be considered as forfeited in the absence of any agreement whatever, or orke which COUld 
neither be enforced at law nor in equity. " at p. 106, 'Me judgment of the Court of Queens Beach, 
261 
que3tion of the recoverability of a deposit, Bovill C. J. held: 
"In C4&m v. Robeiris, 32 L. J. 105, Ch., it was held that there must be an 
agreement express or implied, for the purpose of working a forfeiture of a 
deposit, and that there was no authority to show that it would be forfeited 
without an agreement to that effect. With that case I entirely concur, and 
therefore it is only necessary to see if in this case there is an agreement 
express or implied that the deposit should be forfeited. .. . "7 This was the case until a series of decision? in which a sharp distinction was made 
between deposits and other part payments: In Howe v. Smid?, in a contract for the sale 
of a certain freehold land, a deposit of 1500 was paid by the purchaser. The contract 
contained no provision at all as to what should be done with the deposit if the contract 
was not completed'o. Due to the purchaser's default, the contract was practically brought 
to an end by the vendor. In an action for, inter afta, the recovery of deposit, it was held 
that the purchaser having failed to perform his contractual undertaking, had no right to 
the return of the deposit. The members of the court mainly based their judgment on the 
nature of the advance payment. They held that a deposit in addition to being a part of 
the purchase money if the contract was completed, was a guarantee of performance, and 
therefore the defaulting purchaser could have no right to recover it. in the course of his 
judgment, Cotton L. J. said: 
"The deposit, as I understand it, and using the words of Lord Justice 
James is a guarantee that the contract shaff be performed. If the sale goes 
on, of course, not only in accordance with the words of the contract, but 
in accordance with the intention of the parties in making the contract, it 
goes in part payment of the purchase money for which it is deposited; but 
if on the defaWt of the purchaser the contract goes ofý that is to say, if he 
repudiates the contract, then, according to Lord Justice James, he can 
delivered by Iord Demnan CJ., in Palmer v. Tempk (1&39) 9 Ad. & El. 5og, 112 ER 1304 could also be 
read in this way: wnw ground an which we rest this opinion is, thj4 in the absence of &ny q)ed& 
provWon, the question, whether the deposit is forfeited, depends on the uwd of the parties to be 
collected ftom the whole instruwAnt ... " at pp. 520,1309 respectively.. 
6 11869] L. T. 600 
Aid, at p. 601 
I See, e. &, Ev par* Barrell (1975) 10 Lk CIL App. 512, in which Sir George Mellish L. J. held: *... it 
appears to me dear that, even where there is no clause in the contract as to the forfeiture of the deposit, if 
the pmchaser reptidiates the contract he cannot have back the money, as the contract has gone off 
through his debult" at p. 5 14 ; Collins v. Samson IIQ. B. D. 142 per Baron Pollock J. at p. 143 ; How 
v. SWA (1884) 27 Ch. D. 99 
9 (1984) 27 Ch. D. 99 
10 TU ConbUt only provide& "L500 part of the purchase money of L12500 has ban paid as a deposit 
and in part payment of the purchase money. " 
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have no ri& to recover the deposit. "" 
6.06 On the other hand, advance payments other than deposits, in the absence of an 
express or implied forfeiture provision, were recoverable by the defaulting payer. 12 The 
core of such a distinction lay on the point that, having regard to the nature of deposits, 
there should always be an implied term to the effect that, upon a premature termination of 
the contrita for the payees breach, the deposit would be forfeited by the payee. Such an 
implication can clearly be inferred from the words of Fry W. in Howe v. SMi&13: 
"Money paid as a deposit must, I conceive, be paid on some terms implied 
or expressed. ... The terms most naturally to be 
implied appear to me in 
the cam of money paid on the signing of a contract to be that in the event 
of the contract being performed it shall be brought into account, but if the 
contract is not performed by the payer it shall remain the property of the 
payee-* 
6.07 A simple analysis of the distinction made between deposits and other prepayments 
would show that the recoverability of advance payments depended on the nature of 
payments and the purpose for which they were required. If the payment could be 
described as a "guarantee of performance" or as an "earnest to bind the bargain", then an 
implied term requiring the forfeiture of such an advance payment in the event of 
termination for the payees default would be inferred from the contract. if, however, the 
payment was only a part of the purchase money, it was then recoverable where the 
contract was prematurely brought to an end for the payees breach, unless the contract 
provided otherwise. 
6.08 The most important authority for the recoverability of part payments is provided by 
14 Dies v. Brifish and JnW73adonal Mining and Finance Co. Ltd. . In this case, the 
" Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Cb. D. 89, at p. 95 
12 See, c. &, Mayson Y. Clovet [1924] AC 980, where Lord Dunedin convincingly argued that all the 
arguments about the f(wfeitability of the deposit in Ifowe v. SWIh, iba, would have been unnecessary if 
the can could. have been solved by the simple proposition that, upon termination for the PaWl, breach. 
the itmooent party 'may keep anything that be has got from the partial fidfilment of the contracLw at P. 
996 ; Pahner v. Tempk (1939) 9 A. & E. 508,112 ER 1304; Dies v. British and InternatIOMI AfinkW 
andFlAwsce Co. Ltd [1939] 1 KB 724; SY; ockawr v. Johnson 1195411 Q. B. 476, at pp. 483,489-490 
13 (1994) 27 Ch. D. 89, at p. 101 
14 (193911 KB 724, This cast was followed in Rover international Ltd v. Cannon Fibn Saks Ltd (No. 
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Plaintiffs entered into a contract to buy some rifles and ammunition for a total am of 
L270,000. In breach of the contract, the buyers, having paid 1100,000 of the purchase 
price, refiLsed to pay the balance and also to take delivery of the goods. The defendants 
elected to bring the contract to an end. In an action by the buyers for the recovery of the 
part payment less the agreed damages, it was held that the purchasers were entitled to 
recover the sum of 1100,000 which had been paid in part payment of the price, subject to 
the sellers' claim for damages resulting from the purchasers" breach. In the course of his 
judgement, Stable J. - having discussed the nature of the advance payment, and 
concluding that the payment was a part payment of the price and not a deposit- held: 
"... Where the language used in a contract is neutral, the general rule is 
that the law confers on the purchaser the right to recover his money, and 
that to enable the seller to keep it he must be able to point to some 
latwage in the contract from which the inference to be drawn is that the 
parties intended and agreed that he should. "" 
He also rejected the contention that the foundation of such a tight to recover the part 
payment was a total failure of consideration. "In my judgement", he said, "the real 
foundation of the tight... is not a total failure of consideration but the right of the 
purchaser, derived from the terms of the contract and the principle of law applicable, to 
recover back his money. "16 
6.09 This case clearly showed that part payments would generally be recoverable if there 
was no reason to suggest that it was an earnest to bind the bargain or a guarantee for due 
perflormance. The argument in Dies 17 also implied that where a prepayment could be 
classified as a deposit, there should be an implied intention of the parties to the effect that 
such a prepayment would not be recoverable if the contract was terminated for the 
3) 1198911 W. LJL 912, [198913 All ER 423 
15 Aid., at p. 743 
16 Ibid., at p. 744; I'he judgment could also well be justified on the basis of total failure of consideratiom Upm the hcts, there was no doubt that the advance paymest had been paid for a consideration which had totally failed. IU reason why Stable j. did not ground his judgment on this restitutionary basis may, it has been suggested, be that the case was decided before the decision of the House of Lords in J; Mroia SPOIka Akc>Yna v- Fairbaim Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32, overruling the unjustified decision in Chandler v. Webster [1904] 1 KB 493 to the effect that to claim an amount on the basis of 
total failure of consideration, the contract must be void ab initio. In fact, Stable J. might have probably fOlIOWCd the 12ttcr cam as be was bound to do so. see Burrows A., 11e Law of Restitution, (Bufterwortim 1993), p. 274 
17 Ibid 
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payees breach. The UWWonal approach, therefore, was generally the recoverabiRty Of 
part payments and the forfeitability of deposits upon the premature termination of the 
agreement for the payees breach. 
1.3. Recent Developments 
1.3.1. Apparent Inconsistency of the Traditional Approach with Principle 
6.10 The dedsion in Dies, at first glance, looks inconsistent with the principle regarding 
the non-retrospective effect of discharge. " The principle requires that the property 
transferred before discharge should remain the property of the party to whom it has been 
transferred, and the fact that the contract has been terminated afterwards should not 
affect the existent rights of the parties before discharge. Accordingly, the advance 
payments should remain the property of the payee and there should be no right for the 
payer to recover them after termination. Such a view, however, is not compatible with 
the traditional approach. Nor can it be reconciled with the case law as to the 
recoverability of pan payments, and, as it has been argued by Lord Dunedin in Mayson v. 
Clouet". it negates the elaborate arguments in cases which distinguish deposits from 
other advance payments. It has also been suggested that the simple analysis of this 
principle would increase the danger of unjust enrichment", because it would allow the 
payee to keep all advance payments which may considerably exceed his actual loss 
resulting fi. OM breaCIL21 It would also increase the Went of claims for the recovery of 
payments which were due before discharge but the debtor has refused to pay them. 
Having considered these issues, it should however be conceded that the points made, 
though correct, do not by themselves remove the apparent inconsistency between the 
decision in Dies and the principle requiring the non-retrospective effect of discharge. 
1.3.2. Hyundai Cases 
6.11 In addition to this inconsistency, much confusion has been added to the issue by the 
" Sm Beetwn, loc. ciL, no. 2, pp. 393-394 
19 [1924] AC 980, at p. 986 
20 Beatson, loc. cit, no. 2, pp. 393-394 
21 It is to be remembered that, as it will be seen, there is an equitable jurisdiction empoweritts the court 
to grant relief against forfeiture of advance payments, but the scope of vxh a discretionary Jurisdiction is 
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rather recent decisions of the Court of Appeal in Hyundai Shipbuil&ng & Heavy 
Inchaftles Co. Ltd v. PournarasP and the House of Lords in Hyundai Heavy IndWiries 
,2 Co. Ltd v. Pcwtdopoulas 3. The facts of both cases were rather similar: In two 
contracts for the construction and sale of ships to certain companies, the payment of the 
contractual price, which had been provided to be by certain instalments, was guaranteed 
by the defendant. The buyers having failed in the payment of the second instalment, the 
plaintiffs, i. e. the shipbuilders, elected to bring the contract to an end and brought an 
action against the guarantors claiming the unpaid instalment. It was held in both cases 
that the guarantor was liable to pay the instalment of price which was due before 
termination, but had remained unpaid. In the Pournaras case24, Roskill L. J., delivering 
the main judgment of the Court of Appeal, based his judgment mainly on the nature of the 
surety agreement2s. He also emphasized the point that the accrued liabilities of the 
original debtor to pay the instalment has remained unaffected by termination, and the 
buyers being liable, the guarantors would also, according to the terms of surety, be under 
the liability to pay the unpaid instalment. He stated: 
"To my mind, the fact that these contracts came to an end on Oct. 21, 
1976, did not free the buyers from their respective obligation to pay the 
various instalments, liability for which had already accrued, and 
accordingly ... the guarantors' several liabilities under the respective 
guarantees remained wholly unaffected. oo26 
The words of RosIdU L. J. in this case cast a shadow of doubt on the correctness of the 
decision in DJe? 7, though it was decided that, even assuming the correctness of Dies, the 
guarantors were not able to take advantage of the right which the principal buyers might 
have, to recover the part payments less damages resulting from breach. 
6.12 Also in the Papadopoulos case, the House of Lords unanimously held the 
to a large wdmt controversial. See Infra, diapter 8 
22 11978] 2 LIoyd! s L. R. 502 
23 [1980] 2 All ER 29 
24 [1978] 2 Lloyd's L. P- 502 
25 The ugwnmb relating to the nature and construction of the surety agmment are not material bem 
26 Ibid., at p. 507 
27 [193911 KB 724 
28 [198012 All ER 29 
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guarantor liable to pay the accrued instalmeju. The majority of their Lordshipi" band 
their judgment mainly on the ground that the cancellation of the agreement by the builders 
had no effect on their accrued right to recover the unpaid instalment from the buyers, and 
since the letter of guarantee had provided for the liability of the guarantors to pay "all 
sums due or to become due by the Buyer" to the shipbuilder, the defendants were under 
the liability to pay the unpaid instalment. Two of their lordships, Viscount Dilhorne and 
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, distinguished Dies on the basis that it was a case just for sale, 
while here the contract was a contract to "build, launck equip and complete" a vessel and 
"to deliver and sell" her to the buyers. In fact, in this case the shipbuilders had to spend 
e: Kpenses to construct the ship. Put another way, it was a contract for work and 
materials, not merely a contract for sale. 
6.13 Miscount Dilhorne- assimilating the contract in the instant case to a building 
contract, and citing some parts of the statements of Hudson on Building Contracts, under 
the heading "Express terms for payment by instalments", to the effect that the contractor, 
after abandonment or repudiation of the contract, has the right to sue the employer for 
any accrued instalment- stated: 
"... save in the case of sales of land and goods and where there has been a 
total failure of consideration, it was the law prior to the decision in Moschi 
v. Lep Air SerWces Ltd. [1972] 2 All ER 393, (1973] AC 331 that 
cancellation or rescission of a contract in consequence of repudiation did 
not affect accrued rights to the payment of instalments of the contract 
price unless the contract provided that it was to do so. "30 
His lordship, then, convincingly argued that there was nothing in the speeches in the 
Moschi case to show any change in the law with regard to the recoverability of accrued 
instalments which had remained unpaid. 
6.14 Lord Fraser rejected the contention that if the buyer in Dies was entitled to recover 
his advance payment, a forWart the shipbuilder in this cue would have no right to 
MOWN an unpaid instalment. since had the buyers paid it before termination, they would 
have been entitled to recover it. He distinguished the Dies case on the ground that in that 
29 Lord Russell and Lord Keith, though dissenting on this ground, held the guarantor liable to pay the 
instalment 11 the tam of guarantee. 
30 Md, at p. 35 
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caw the contract was simply a contract of sale which "did not require the vendor to 
perform any work or incur any exinnse on the subjects of sale. But the contract in the 
instant case [was] not of that comparatively simple character. The obligations of the 
buyer were not confined to selling the vessel but included designing and building it... 01 
Ifis lordship, then, explained that the contract price in this case was not simply a purchase 
price, and on this basis concluded that a shipbuilding contract had little similarity with a 
contract of sale: it was in fitct simik to a contract "in which the party entitled to be paid 
had either performed work or provided services for which payment [was] due by the date 
of cancellation". 32 This conclusion led his lordship to the view that in contracts of this 
nature, the builder or the provider of services would not be deprived of his accrued rights 
under the contract because of any premature termination of the agreement. 
6.15 Lord Edmund Davies- though being, in effect, of the same opinion- appeared to 
33 have based his judgement generally on the non-retrospective effect of discharge. Citing 
a description of the Dies case as an uneasy decision to be reconciled with earlier authority 
from Goff and Jones's Law of Restitutioný", his lordship, like Roskill L. J. in the 
Pournaras case, seemed, at least in effect, to cast some doubt on the correctness of the 
decision in DieS. 35 
6.16 The decisions in the two Hyund: d cases, at first sight, seem to be in fine with the 
principle regarding the non-retrospective effect of discharge. At the same time, it njight 
appear that these decisions are inconsistent with the traditional approach which allows the 
recovery of part payments by the payer: According to this view, as contended by the 
31 Md., at p. 44 
32 
'bid., at P. 45 
33 In his L*TdAip's OPWOn, the Usertion, that termination of a contract for the other party's brewh 
randm the right to a POYWAmt which has already accrued due 0 e., before twnination) as no longer 
dkctive is "an iffadoW aSSumption unsupported by any direct authority". In his view, on the contrary, 
"there am sound conimercial reasons for holding that a vested and indubitable right to prompt payinent 
on a spedfied date of a SPedfied sun'6 expressly provided for in the contract, should not be supplanted by 
or merged in or sdbstituted by a right to recover at some filmm date such indefmite sum by way of 
daniagm as, on balance and on proof, might be awarded to the builders, following on a scrutiny of the 
Parties' MR)OCU" rights and obligations under the contract as a whole. " Ibid., at p. 39 
34 2nd e&, 1978, p. 381 
35 See Hyun" He4vy I n&shle5 Co. Ltd v- PaPadOPOulos [199012 All ER 29. at p. 40 
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9WUW9Ors' cOunsch in both Hyundai cam afordort an unpaid part payment could not 
be recovered by the Prospective payee, since had it been PaK it would have been 
recoverable by the payer. Despite this analysis, in both H)w"2i cases, the unpaid 
instalment was held to be recoverable by the shipbuilder. Now, analysing the position on 
the whole, the question is whether the Dies case is actually against the principle of non- 
retrospective effect of discharge? Is the decision in Dies a wrong decision or is it 
somehow reconcilable with the principle and the decisions in the two Hyundai cases? 
And finally, does the traditional approach need to be modified according to the H)ý 
cases? 
13.3. The relationship between Dies and Hyundai Cases 
LM. L General Proposidon 
6.17 Considering the relationship between the Dies and the Hyundai cases, it has been 
suggestee that either Dies was a wrong decision or the rule in Dies is only applicable to 
contracts of sale and not to a shipbuilding contract where in addition to transferring the 
ownership of the vessel to the buyers, a great deal of work is also involved 37 or in the 
Hws" cases, despite Dies, there was no total failure of consideration, because the 
buyers there had taken advantage of the work which the shipbuilder had done before 
termination. It would be suggested that the first of these proposals could not be a correct 
approach to the issue; the other two, which are very similar in nature, however, are the 
right analyses which could be put in some general terms. 
6.18 Them are two diffierent, but closely related, analyses to explain the relationwp 
between thew cases: First, an analysis based on the construction of the contract: this 
analysis, as we shall see, gains its credibility from construing the intention of the parties 
through a thorough consideration of the terms of the contract and all surrounding 
circumstances. Second, the analysis based on the restitutionary approach: according to 
this view, the basis for the recovery of money paid before termination is an action in 
restitution for money had and received. Thus, if it can be established that the money was 
36 Fumlbm M P- Chcshfte FifoOt & FU=on's Law of Contract 13th CCL, 1996, p. 641 
37 S0e " NfcKcnMck 9 COnftu-t Law, (2nd c&, 1994), p. 334 
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paid for a consideration which has totally failed, the payer would be entitled to recover it 
in a restitutionary action. In cast of instalments; accrued due before termination, but 
remained unpaid, the argument runs on the basis of the necessity of a symmetry between 
the position of paid and unpaid sums: If the unpaid sum could not have been recovered by 
the payer had it been paid, the prospective payee should logically have the right to 
recover it. 
6.19 As far as the recovery of part payments in contractual relations is concerned, them 
two views are closely related to each other. In most cases, as we shall see, the 
recoverabilitY of an advance payment could be explained on both bases, but the 
restitutionary approach, mainly because of the requirement of the total failure of 
consideration, is, it is submitted, unable to explain the recoverability of some advance 
payments. In fict, in contractual relations, the restitutionary approach is reduced to a 
species of the construction approach3s, for to determine the total failure of consideration, 
as a requirement for the action in restitution, regard should be had to the construction of 
the contract and determining what the parties have bargained for. 39 We shall now 
proceed with individually considering each of these bases. 
L3.3-2. Consftc&n Approwk 
6.20 The issue of the recoverability of an advance payment upon the premature 
termination of the contract for the payer's breach could well be explained by construction 
of the conumd to determine the nature of the payee's right to the part payment*: this 
right might be conditional or without any condition. "' The right of the owner to an 
38 Sm BeatM loc. cit. no. 2, pp. 74-75 
" For the concept of a "bargained for performanW as the only cousideration which might prevent the 
failim of consideration from being total see Rover International Ltd v. Cannon F71n: Sales Ltd (No. 3) 
[1989] 1 W. L. R. 912,1198913 All ER 423 
40 Sao CbiUy on Coubuts, 27th ad., vol. 1,1994, pam 20-070 ; Beatson, loc. cit., no. 2. pp. 397-398 
HAIPUM C-. ReW A42ilW FOrffihm and the Purchaser of Land 119941 C. L. J. 134, at ]pp. 135-136 
010ig & Davis, 71k LEW Of COntrad (Australia), 1987, pp. 12U-1289 
41 The distinction between conditionally and unconditionally acquired rights has also been recognized in 
the 'ýAOiralian case Ot MODOnald v. DennYs Lascelles Ltd. (1933) 48 C. L. R. 457 (ffigb Court ot 
Australia) whom Dbwn J., in the course of his leading judgment, said: "When a party to a simple 
contract upon breach by the other contracting party of a condition of the contract elects to treat the 
contract U DO kKW binding upon him, the contract is not rescinded from the beghmin& Both parties 
an disclarged fn)m further perforruarwe of the contract, but rights are not divested or discharged which 
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advaWA payment in a hire-purcha3e agreement, for example, is an unconditional right. 
That is why there has been no doubt that upon termination of a hire-purchase agreement 
for the hirees defitult, the instalments paid are retainable. ' As it has been argued by Lord 
Denning in Kelly v. Lombard Banking Co. W. 43, with regard to the retainability of an 
initial payment, the hirer who pays the initial payment in consideration of the option to 
purchase, gets what he has paid for from the moment of payment. In other words, the 
owner's right to that payment is not conditioned upon anything else. If, on the other 
hand, the construction of the parties, agreement shows that the parties have intended the 
payee's right to part payments to be conditional on partial or complete performance, then 
there will rationally be no right for the payee to retain the payments unless the condition 
has been fuffiffed. This analysis would seem to explain the relationship between the 
Dje? 4 and the H)wn"O cases. In DieA the right of the seller to the instalments of price, 
though it was an existing right which had accrued before termination, was conditional 
have already been unconditionally acquire&" at p. 477 (emphasis added) ; see dw the observations of 
Lord Wright inRbrosa Spolka Akcyina v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. [ 1943] AC 32, where 
be stated: "The condition of retaining it [the pan payment] is eventual peiformance. Accordingly when 
that condition AdIs, the right to retain the money simultaneously fail. " at p. 65 
42 See, for examp* Brooks v. BeIrnstein [190911 KB 98, where upon the hirer's default in payment of 
instalinents, the owner retook possession of the subject-matter under the contract and claimed for the 
instalments which had accrued due before discharge. it was held that the owner was entitled to recover 
those instalinents. Bigham L said: wrhe agreement, in so conferring the right to retake possession on a 
breach by the hirer. does not take away any other rights which the law gives to the owners, among which 
rights is that of suing for the monthly rent which had already accrued. " at p. 102; see also Kelly v. 
Lombard Banking Co. Ltd [19591 1 WIR 41, [195813 All ER 713,103 Sol. Jo. 34; Chatterton v. 
Maclean [195111 All ER 761; Belsize Motor Supply Co. v. Cox [1914] KB 244; South Bedfordihire 
EZectrical Rnance Ltd v. Bryant [ 193813 All ER 580; Overstone Ltd. v. Shipway [ 1962) 1 W. L. It 117 ; 
8W the Canadian case Of Pacific Leasing Corporation Ltd. v. Fire Valley Land & Cattle Co. Ltd and 
Jordw (1%9) 68 WWR 411; see further Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed., vol. 2,1994, para. 36-274; 
Goode, Hirc-PUFC11230 Law and Practice., 2nd ed., p. 359; Guestý The Law of Hire-Purcham 1966, para. 
592-596. It should be noted that in certain circunutances an equitable relief against forfeiture of 
instalments might be available, but at common law the instalments paid could not be recovered by the 
dcfiWdM hirer. 
43 [1959] 1 WLR 41,11958] 3 All ER 713,103 Sol. Jo. 34; In this case as to the hirees claim to recover 
his initial payment which had been paid in consideration of granting him the option to purchase, it was 
held that the him had no right to that advance payment. Lord Dennin& in the course of his judgement, 
argued: wrhe option to purchase is an e)dsting right as from the moment of signing the contract and the 
PSYMOU Of 11101107. SO [the him] has got what he has paid for. He has to fulffi the condition in order to 
exercise the option. But he has paid for an option which he has got. 0 at p. 44 
44 [1939] 1 KB 724 
45 HYu"d ShObuilding & HeavY Industries Co. Ltd. v. Poumaras [1978) 2 Lloyd's UL 502 (C. A. ) 
HYunt" He"Y Industries CO. Ltd v. Papadopoulos [ 198012 All ER 29 (H. L. ) 
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upon the complete performance of the agreement. 46 That this is clear, it has bow 
suggestee, is shown by Stable Ts extensive quotation from Pahner v. Temple" where A 
distinction was made between deposits which were forfeitable upon the buyer's de&Wt on 
the one hand and simple part payments of price "the right to which depended on the 
of the contract*49 on the other. The decision in Dies, therefore, should not 
be considered as a wrong decision or inconsistent with the principle of non-retrospective 
effect of discharge. It was a right decision because the right to retain the instalments 
being conditional and the condition having failed, there is no ground for justifying the 
entitlement of the seller to keep the instalments. The decision is also not miconsistent 
with the principle: The principle requires that the discharge should not have any 
retrospective effect; put another way, any existing right before discharge should remain 
unaffected. It is suggested that this was the case in Dies. The existing right of the seller 
was, in fact, unaffected, but this right itself was a conditional right, and the condition 
having failed, the seller lost his right to retain the instalments. In other words, as it has 
neatly been put by a learned writer", mit is not the discharge qua discharge that affects the 
right but discharge as the product of the initial contractual specification of the extent of 
the right". 
6.21 In the Hyundai cases, on the other hand, the contract was, in fact, for work and 
naterial. The shipbuilders had to incur expenses from the beginning of the contract to 
provide materials and to build the ship. In fact, they needed instalments to spend on the 
work they had to do under the contract. In such a contract, in the absence of any express 
provision with regard to the recoverability or forfeitability of instalments, upon the 
46 In McDonald v. DennYs Lascelles Ltd. (1933) 49 C. L. P, 457 (High Court of AugmHa), in a contma 
to guarantee the Payment Of the Outstanding instalments under a contract for the sale of land. Dixon L 
expressly recognized the conditional nature of the payee's right to the instalments paid. The learned 
judge said: "VAm a contract stipulates for payment of part of the purchase money in advance ý, the purchaser relying only on the vendor's promise to give him a conveyance, the vendor is entitled to 
enfi= payment before the time has arrived for conveying the land; yet his title to retain the money has 
been considered not to be absolute but conditional upon the subsequent completion of the contract. " at p. 
477 
47 Beat= loc. dt., no. 2, p. 398 
48 (1839) 9 Ad &E 508,112 ER 1304 
0 Beabim ibld 
So Beafton, ibld, p. 398 
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premature temiination of the contract, the reasonable construction of the agreement 
requires that the right of the builders to instalments should be unconditional. This clearly 
was the ground upon which Lord Fraser based his judgment in PapadopouloP. Theway 
his lordship distinguished cases like Dies and Pabner v Temple- as cases in which "the 
contracts were simply contracts of sale which did not require the vendor to perform any 
work or incur any expense on the subjects of sale! '52_ clearly support this. 
6.22 This analysis also explains the non-recoverability of a deposit by the payer, upon the 
premature termination of the contract. A deposit, as it has been emphasized, is a 
guarantee of performance and an earnest to bind the bargain. The nature of such a 
payment requires its forfeitability upon any failure by the payer. The right of the payee to 
such a payment, therefore, is an unconditional right. That is why a deposit is not 
recoverable by the payer upon termination of the agreement for his defaWt. 
LIM. Resftfionary Approach 
6.23 It can, alternatively, be argued that in Dies, there was a total failure of 
considerationý3: the buyers received nothing from what they had bargained for. In the 
Hyundai cases, on the other hand, the buyers received part of the consideration for which 
they had contracted: the contract was to build, launch, equip and complete a vessel and to 
deliver and sell her to the buyers and the assumption in the case, as it was explained by 
Lord Fraser", was that the shipbuilders had performed their contractual duty up to the 
date of termination. Therefore, there being no total failure of consideratioN the 
shipbuilders were entitled to retain the instalments, and in case of the instalments which 
had accrued due and remained unpaid, they had the right to sue the buyers for their 
recovety. 
51 HywdW Heavy Indkdfies Co. Ltd Y. Papadopoulos [ 1980] 2 All ER 29 
52 Ibid, at p. 44 
53 This has somefimes been accepted as a general principle in the context of the recoverability of moneys 
already paid: SM e. g., Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, 4th ed., 1993, pp. 428429 ; Halsbury's 
Law's of Enghmd, 4th ad., vol. 9, para. 672 
54 Lord Fraser stated. "There was no evidence either way whether the builders had in fad carried out 
their Obligations tO 989 desiguIRS and building the vessel, but in my opinion we must assume, in the 
absezice of evidence or em averment to the contrary, that thq had carried out their part of the bargun 
up till the date of cancelMon. " at p. 45 
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It appears that Viscount Dilhorne in Papadopoulos reasoned his decision on this basis. In 
his view, except "in the case of sales of land and goods and where there has been a total 
faure of consideratiore'55, the payee's accrued rights to part payments remains 
unaffected. The exception of sales of land and goods could, it has been suggested: ", only 
be justified on the ground that in such cases there is normally a total failure of 
consideration where the contract is prematurely brought to an end. 
6.24 The relationship between Dies and Hyundai cases could, as it appears, be explained 
on both construction and restitutionary bases. The issue however is which of these bases 
could provide a generally acceptable ground for the recoverability of advance payments at 
common law. To approach this point, it is appropriate to consider analytically the merits 
of both bases. 
6.25 Several reasons have been suggested to show that the restitutionary approach, 
though intellectually attractive, cannot provide a general rule in this context: First, the 
concept of total failure of consideration, as the main requirement for an action in 
57 
restitution, is based on "arbitrary and uncertain" concepts. This has been illustrated by 
the different treatments of the court in the cases of Papadopoulo? ' and Fibrosa". The 
latter cue was concerned with an agreement to purchase certain textile machinery for 
f4,800. The buyers made an advance payment of 11,000, but before delivery, the 
contract came to an end by reason of frustration due to the outbreak of the Second World 
War. The House of Lords found in favour of the buyers in their action to recover the 
advance payment. The expenses which the sellers had incurred in manufacturing the 
machines did not prevent the House from holding that there was a total failure of 
consideration. The relevant fitcts of this case was shnilar to those of Pqwdbpoulos. In 
both the sellers had to incur expenses in order to perform their contractual obligations, 
whereas the House rejected the existence of the total failure of consideration in the latter 
55 HYWI" HeavY Indkstries CO- Ltd Y. Papadopoulos [ 1980] 2 All ER 29, at p. 35 
56 Beauoik loc. ciL. no 2, pp. 58-59 
57 Boom loc. cit, no 2, p. 64 
38 Hffldat Hea9 Indudries Co. Ltd v. Papadopoulos (198012 AU ER 29 
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can. This portrays, it is thought, the arbitrariness of the concept of total failure of 
consideratiom 
An important distinction which night explain the diftbrent treatments of the House in 
these cases is the consideration for which the parties had bargained for: In Pcqxrdopoulas, 
the contract was for building, launching, equipping the vessel and delivering and selling 
her to the buyers, while in Fibrosa, the substance of the agreement was to sell the 
machines to the buyers. The apparent intention of the parties, derived from the words 
used by them was that in Fibrosa, the parties had bargained for the transfer of the end 
product, and the expenses incurred by the seller in manufacturing the machines were not a 
part of the parties contract. In the former case, however, the bargain clearly included 
designing and building, as well as delivering and selling. From the time that the process 
of designing the vessel started, the buyers had been getting a part of consideration for 
which they had bargained, while in Fibrosa this was not the case. " This analysis does 
also gain support from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Rover International Ltd v. 
Camion Fibn Sales W' where the court expressly recognized the concept of the 
"bargained-for performance! ' as the criteria for determining whether the failure of 
consideration had been total. In this case, Kerr LJ, describing the test to determine the 
existence of a total failure of consideration, held: 
"The test is whether or not the party claiming total failure of consideration 
has in fact received any part of the bene: #t bargained for under the 
contract or purported contract. sA2 
S9Rbro=SpoAaAkcyJnav. Fairbalm Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd[ 19431 AC 32 
60 It has also been argued that the contract in Papadopoulos was a severable contract, Le. "the ObliPtiOn 
to design and build the vessel was severable from the obligation to deliver and sell her"- or alternatively 
assummg the contract as an entire contract, the buyers' default prevented them from argumg that the 
socepitance of services provided by the seller was not proratable-, while in Fibrosa the contract was an 
entire ccmtract. 17he rault is that the sellers in Papadopoulos were entitled to a recompense for SWAM 
pirovided by them, whmas in FIbrosa the sellers could not make such a claim. Now, since in a sense the 
services constituting performance of consideration (and preventing the failure of consideration from 
being toW) on the one hand and services which generate a restitutionmy claim by themselves on the 
otber me the two sides of to am coin, it could be concluded that in Rbrosa there was a total failure of 
consideratiM while such a failure could not be established in Papadopoulos. For a detailed anabrsis see 
Beasson, loc. cit., no 2, pp. 65-71 
61 1198911 WIR 912,1198913 All ER 423 
62 Jbid., at p. 923 [emphasis added] 
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6.26 Second, it might fiirther be argued that the unevennese of the concept of total 
failure of consideration could be considered as a barrier in developing a general rule for 
the recoverability of advance payments based on the restitutionary approach. The 
argument runs as follows: As to entire contracts, rendering part of services provided for 
in the contract would not normally entitle the provider of services to recompense. " One 
exception to this rule is where the recipient of services is in breach of the contract, 
because in such a case, his own fidlure will prevent him from contending that his 
acceptance of services was with the expectation of receiving the full performance. Thus, 
the concept of qtuznlum meruit would, as it appears, be an uneven concept because it 
"draws a sharp distinction between the position of a contract-breaker and an innocent 
party"". This unevenness, though not unreasonable in itself, is not quite consistent with 
the principle regarding the non-retrospective effect of discharge. Now, since it may be 
argued that services generating a restitutionary claim on the one hand, and services 
constituting a pad performance which prevents the failure of consideration from being 
total on the other should be considered as the two sides of the same coOý the result of 
this argument would be that in entire contracts, the breacher would not be able to claim 
63 By "unevenneW I mean the odstence of arymmetry between the position of either paid and unpaid 
sums (see infra., note 66) or breacher and non-breacher. 
64 Unless of course the semoes provided could amount to an "incontromuble beneftt" (I e., an 
"hxw, *a(e and maUzabk pin to the ddendant" or "saving him an Inevitabk e)gense) which in 
conuactual relations is very difficult to be established. The reason for the rule in the text is that a claim 
ft a recorapense for those services may face an immediate defence that the semces won accepted "in 
the context of the contractual performance as an entity", i. e., with the expectation that the full 
performance, as provided by the contract, will follow. See Beatson, loc, cit., no 2, p. 69 
65 Beatson, loc. cit, no 2, p. 71 
66 Though the separate development of the claims for the recovery of moneys paid on the one hand, and 
claims for the recovery of a recompense for services suggests to the contrary: see Beatson, loc. cit., no 2, 
p. 70; Thus, in entire contracts, a clear asymmetry between the position of paid and unpaid Vmns could be 
seen: A part performer who cannot claim for a recompense for services rendered, where the contract is 
prematurely disch; arged for his breach, will not normally be liable to return the pan payments maft by 
the other party on the ground that there was no total hilure of consideration. (see JAw Commission, 
Working Paper No 65, Pecuniary Restitution on Breach of Contract, 1975, para. 20; see also Baltic 
&WPPIng Co. v. Dill" Me MMall Lermontov) (1993) 176 CLR 344, whom a passenger on a cruise 
ship, after the ship being mink, was held not to be entitled to recover the fare paid- on the ground that 
there was no total failure of consideration- whereas had the fare become due on completion of the voyage, 
it Would not have been recoverable. ) The Law Commission, though suggesting in general the entitlement 
of the paw to claim, in restitution, for the difference between moneys paid by him and the value of 
services rendered by the payee in the Working Paper, did not recommend, in its subsequent report, any 
change in the adsting rule under which the paw's only remedy in the above-mentioned situation is in a 
claim for damages (see Law Commission's Report, No 121, Pecuniary Restitution on Breach of 
Canuict, 1993, part IIL especially para. 3.11) 
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for the recovery of his part payments, because the provider of services being entitled to a 
recompense for services provided, the recipient has received part of consideration which 
will prevent the failure of consideration from being total. While if the discharge of the 
contract is not for the recipient's breach, the provided services will not entitle the 
provider to a recompense, and thus there should be taken to be a total failure of 
consideration which should allow the recipient to recover his part payments. 67 Such all 
outcome would obviously be unsatisfactory, because it would be in apparent 
inconsistency with the principle regarding the non-retrospective of discharge: if there is 
an unconditionally accrued right for the payer before discharge, it should remain 
unaffected regardless of whether he was the breacher or not. 
6.27 Third, the major problem with the restitutionary approach in this context, is, it 
seems, the requirement that the failure of consideration should be total. This, it has been 
suggested, has led the courts to find, in some cases, the existence of the total failure of 
consideration in an artificial way. " For instance, in the cases of sales of cars by non- 
owners", despite the use of the car by the buyer for long periods of time, the court has 
decided that there was a total failure of consideration, and has ordered the seller to return 
the price on this basis. Here, it has been argued, the failure of consideration could not be 
regarded as total, for the buyer has had the benefit of using the car for a certain period of 
time, but due to the non-recognition of the concept of pev-dal failure of consideration, 
and thus the impossibility of the apportionment of the price, talcing into account the 
61 Under the wisft law, howem, such a payment may not be recoverable; the payer's only remedy is 
in damages. set Law Commission's Report no 12 1, part IH 
a See Burrows A., 11e Law of Restitution, (Bunerworths, 1993), p. 255; Beatson, loc. cit, no 2, p. 71 
" Scr, for example, Rowland Y. Divall [1923] 2 KB 5W, where despite the ha that the car was used by 
the buyer for two mondw the Court of Appeal held that there was a total failure of consideration bmmm 
the buyer had not been gWen what he had bargained for (see jbid, per Atkin LJ at p. 506); Butterworth v. 
Kingsway Motors Ltd. 1195411 WLR, 1286, see also Rover International Ltd. v. Cannon F7hn Saks Ltd 
(No. 3) [198911 W. L. R. 912, [1989] 3 All ER 423, when in a film distributorship AFftmeld, incurring 
certain expenses by Canzion in delivering the films to Rover, and also the possession and use Of the 1111115 
by Rover were not regarded as a consideration which had been bargained for. Kerr LJ held: "... delivery 
and possession were not what Rover had bargained for 7U relevant bargain, at any rate for Pfelent 
purposm was the opportunity to cam a substantial share of the gross receipts pursuant to dam 6 of the 
schedule, with the certainty Of at least breaking even by recouping their advance. Due to the invalidity of 
the agreement Rover 9% nothing of what they had bargained for, and them was clearly a total failure of 
consideration. " at pp. 924-925; we also Birks P, An introduction to the Law of Restitution, (Oxford* 
Clarendon PnwN 1989). note 17 at p. 465 & note 30 at p. 476 
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benefit received by the buyer7o, the courts have tried to artificiaRy find the existence, Of 
the laW failure of consideration. 
6.28 Both restitutionary and construction approaches do, it appears, come to the same 
point where the payee's right to the part payment, according to the intention of the 
parties derived from the terms of the contract and surrounding circumstances, is 
conditional either on the beginning of the contractual performance by the payee, or on the 
provision of the end-product. In the first case, as in Pqadopoulos, by the payee starting 
to perform his contractual obligations, his right to the part payments becomes 
unconditional; or on the alternative approach, consideration which prevents the failure 
from being total is provided. Thus, the payer will not be entitled to recover the 
instalments already paid, and will be under the liability to pay the instalments which have 
accrued due before discharge, but remained unpaid. In the second case, like most cases 
of sales of goods or land, unless the end product is transferred, the payee's right remains 
conditional; and on the restitutionary approach, there will be a total failure of 
consideration unless the payee performs his contractual obligation fully, Le. transfers the 
end-product. 
6.29 Where, however, the payee's right is conditional upon partial or full perfonnance of 
services7l, then based on the construction approach, the payee's right will not be 
un(-A)nditjon&j unless the services bargained for are provided. Whereas on the basis of the 
restitutionary approach, by the payee starting to perfonn his contractual obligations, it 
may be argued that no loud failure of consideration could be established, although the 
bargained for services have not yet been provided. 72 The result would be that the part 
70 in the car cases of cowse, the seller's lack of title to the car would negate any possibility of his 
entitlement to a restitutionary claim on the basis of quantum valebat (see Burrows A., The Law of 
ResdaWon, (Butterworths, 1993), pp. 255-256; Birks P, An lnbuhwdon to the Law Of RutitutiOn, 
(Oxford: - aarendon Press, 1989), aft 30 at p. 476, ad note 17 at p. 465), but as to the Romp 
Internatimal cue, it has been suggested (see Birks, loc. cit, p. 476) that "the value Of the use Of the 
films should have been taken into account in calculating Rover's quantum merult. " 
71 What, for example, the PaM's right to each instalment of payment is conditional upon provision of a 
specific part of services Provided for m the contract, or where it is conditional on the provision of full 
services. 
72 Because the actual beneficial enjoyment of the payer from services has already been started, so it is 
difficult to argue that the failure of consideration is total. For the concept of "actual beneficial 
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payments may be recoverable on the construction approach, while they are not on the 
restitutionary approach. This limitation on the restitutionary approach may, to some 
extend, be removed by accepting the concept ofparfial failure of consideratioe, though 
such a change, it has been submitted7", could not be achieved on the basis of the existing 
case law. Therefore, the restitutionary approach, in its present form, in the context of the 
recoverability of advance payments, is, it appears, reduced to a species of the 
construction approach: In addition to the fact that to determine the "bargained for 
consideratioe for the purpose of deciding whether there has been a total failure of 
consideration, the intention of the parties, having regard to the terms of the contract and 
surrounding circumstances, should be construed", the recoverability of advance payments 
based on the restitutionary approach could well be explained on the construction 
approach as well; while, as it was seen, the recovery of part payments on the construction 
approach, might sometimes not be explainable on the basis of the restitutionary approach. 
For these reasons, it seems that the construction approach, in the context of the 
recoverability of advance payments at common law, should prevail. This approach, in 
addition to being capable of protecting both reliance and restitutionary interests of the 
payee, can provide a general principle as to the recoverability of advance payments, 
h HU regardless Of whether Or not te Payer is in breach of contract-76 Thus, detenni ing the 
nature of the payee's right to the advance payments by properly construing the intention 
of the parties will generally provide the answer to the issue of the recoverability of part 
payments, upon the premature termination of the contract, at common law. Such a 
solution is, as it was seen, completely consistent with the principle regarding the non- 
retrospective effect of discharge. 
enjoymmC as a determinative factor in determining the total failure of consideration set Burrows A., 
Ilk IAw of Restitution, (Buftrworths, 1993), pp. 253 et seq. 
73 Such a change was Provisionally proposed by the IAw Commission in its Working Paper No. 65, 
though in its sdIxmqpent report, the Connussion suggested the necessity of adhering to the concept of 
total failure of consideration. Law Commission, s Report No. 121, Pecuniary Restitution on Brach of Contract, part III. Ilds has sometimes been described as "a major disappointment". see Burrows A., TU 
LAW of Restitution, (BUUerwOrths, 1993), p. 261 
74 Beatson, loc. cit., no 2, p. 75, where he suggests. "Common law development ... cannot renwe the requimnent that the bilure of consideration be total ... " 
75 In other words, such a "bargained for performance is "a product of contractual specUlcation!. set Beatson, loc. cit., no 2, pp. 74-75 
76 Sft Bcstwn. loc. cit, no 2. pp. 59-60; ChittY on Contracts. 27th ed., vol. 1.1994, para. 26-071 
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1.4. The CrIteda for Deciding the Nature of the Payee's Right to 
Prepayments 
1.4. L Express or Implied Intention of the Parties 
6.30 Whether the right of the payee to advance payments is conditional or unconditional 
would seem to depend on the intention of the parties which should be ascertained by the 
interpretation of the contract according to its terms and all surrounding circumstances. 77 
Where, therefore, the parties have expressly or implicitly provided for the forfeitability of 
the payment upon termination of the contract for the payees default, the right to advance 
payment would be unconditional. " It on the other hand, the express or implied intention 
of the parties is that, upon termination, the advance payment would be recoverable by the 
payer, the right of the payee to that payment would undoubtedly be a conditional one. 
1.4.2. Imputed Intention of the Parties 
6.31 Where no express or implied intention could be discovered from the contract, then 
the imputed intention of the parties would clw* the situation: 
First, if the advance payment is a deposit and is paid to guarantee the performance of the 
contract, then, in the absence of any express or implied intention of the parties, the 
imputed intention would be that the right to the deposit is unconditional; and therefore 
the payee has the right to retain it. 
6.32 Second, where the payment is only a part payment of the price, then if the payee 
has to incur e)qmm in performing his contractual promise, his right to the part payment 
will, pfimafade, be unconditional. '9 It does, however, appear that a distinction should 
" Set Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, 4th cd., 1993, P. 430 
7' Sce, e. g., Colonial Bank v. European Grain & Shipping Ltd [ 199711 Lloyd's Rep. 23 9, In this cast, 
as to a charterparty Providing for the advance payment of the freight and the owner's entitlement to that 
regardless of any subsequent events, it was held that the owner's right to the freight was unconditional. 
b& Justice Hobhouse, in the course of his judgment relying on the Papadopoulos can, said: "ff on a true 
construction of the contract the creditor has done all that is required of him to cam the entitlement to the 
relevant payment or payments by the debtor then in principle, and in justice, the creditor should continue 
to be added to those PaYMOU reprdless of subsequent events which occur before the time or times at 
which those sums ban actually to be pWd and regardless of the failure of the creditor to perform 
s0sequent obligations under the COntract. " at p. 248 Me case his been affirmed on this asped by both 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords: [19891 AC 1056, at pp. 1098-99 per Lord Brandon) 
79 See Goff & Jones, The Law Of Restitution, 4th ed., p. 43 1; McKendrick E, Contract I^ (2nd ad., 
1994), p. 334; Beatson, loc. cit., no. 2, p. 401 ; Harpum, loc. cit., no. 46, p. 136 -, Greig & Davis, Ilia 
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be made between the following situations: if the parties have agreed for the end-product 
(i. e. only the final result has been bargained for), there should be no unconditional right in 
the payee to instalments before the completion of the performance. 10 A clear example is a 
can where a famous painter undertakes to paint a certain picture in consideration of a 
price provided to be paid by instalments. He will obviously have to incur expenses, and 
spend considerable time to produce the &W product. But if for any reason the contract 
is prematurely brought to an end, the painter will not be entitled to retain the instalments, 
for his right to put payments- according to the apparent construction put on the contract, 
in the absence of any intention to the contrary- is conditional upon the provision of the 
final product, as has contractually been bargained for. " If, however, there is no hint that 
Law of Conhad (Austmtia), 1987, p. 1280 
So SM e. g., Mbroxa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32, where the 
parties' contract was for the purchase of certain machines which also involved incurring expenses in 
manuOicturing them by the sellers. The apparent construction of such an agreement was that the parties 
had bargained for the and-product. Thus, expenses incurred by the payee in performing his obligation 
did not turn his right to advance payments to an unconditional right. 
" There is no doubt that in case of a discharge for the payer's breach, the painter will have a remedy in 
damages He might alternatively, it may be argued, be able to sue the other party, on the bads of 
quantum meruit, to nwm a reasonable remuneration for the work already done. See, e. g., Phvwhi v. 
Wburn (1931) 8 Bing. 14, when the plaintiff was engaged in writing a volume of a certain series of 
books which was to be published by the defendants. Upon the abandonment of the publication by the 
defendants, it was held that the plaintiff might be entitled to recover the value of the work he had already 
done on the bads of quantum meruit. It should, however, be mentioned that this case which has, for 
long, been regarded as an authority for the plaintiff's right to elect between damages and restitution [sm 
e. g, De Bernardy v. Harding (1853) 8 Ex. 822; Ladder v. Slowey 119041 AC 442 (PQ; Hoenig v. Isaacs 
[1952] 2 All ER 176, at P. 180 per Somervell LJ-, Renard Construction AM) Pry Ltd v. Minister of 
Publk Works [IM] A. C. L. Rep. 325 (Court of AppeaL N. S. W. )], is a controversial decision and not 
immune ftm strong criticism: Mrst, the case was decided at a am when the rules as to discharge for 
breach had not yet been developedL Thus, the decision, as it appears from the report and also from the 
consequent authorities considering the case, was based on the ground that the contract bad been 
rescinded ab initio. Second, though the first criticism has been overcome by the further development of 
the concept of tepudiatory breach and discharge for that (see, e. g., Renard case, ibid. ), it might still be 
argued that the desirable consequences could be achieved by an action for darnages. Put another way, the 
plaintiff could either carry on with the contract, and upon the defendant's actual failure to perform his 
contractual obligation, bring an action for damages On such a case, he would be limited to the recovery 
of the contract Price, (See GOff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed., p. 424) and damages resulting 
ftom breach if he can prove them (see ibid, at p. 428)], or, because of the repudiation of the contract by 
the defendant due to his anticipatory breach, treat the contract as discharged, and immediately bring an 
action for damages TU whole argument is that in cases like Planchil v Colburn, the plaintiff sWild 
not bm the right to elect between damages and restitution: FIM generally speaking damages and 
restitution an not mutuallY exclusive renieffies. Second, one of the elements/bases for a restitutionary 
action is enrichment. That is, them must exist a benefit which unjustly enriches the de&-ridant at the 
Plainfiff's ex; xmse. In Planchi v. Colburn, the existence of such a benefit could not be provedý because 
the plaintiff had only incurred reliance expenditure in performing his pan of the bargain: that was in fed 
not a benefit to the defendard, but a reliance loss to the plaintiff . [for the concept of benefit constituting enrichment we Goff A Jones, loc. cit., p. 426 (objective, "bargained-for" benefit); Burrows A. S., Free 
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the contract- i. e. what has been bargained for- is only for the end-product and the payee 
has to incur expenses to perform his contractual due, then it is presumed that the 
parties have intended that the payee wiU have the right to retain the instalinents. 
6.33 It would seem that such an intention is ascribable to the parties where the 
perf, Drmance has commenced, and in fact the payer has started to benefit from the 
agreement. ' This view is supported by the assumption made by Lord Fraser in the 
Pqmakpoulos case to the effect that the shipbuilders had carried out their obligations, 
Acceptance and the Law of Restitution (IM) 104 LQR 576, at pp. 596-597 (either incontrovertiVe or 
"bargained-for" benefit, but generally the WON In cam like Planchi v. Colbum, when the contract is 
far the production of the end-result, it is difficult to disoern any benefit conferred on the defendant being 
capable of a ground for a restitutionary claim The works done by the plaintiff is, in fiwtý in the nature of 
preparatory work for the purpose of performance, which should certainly entitle him to compensation in 
an act= for damages. Thus, it has sometimes been suggested that "the case is best viewed as awarding 
the equivalent of contractual expectation damages and not restitution7. [Burrows, loc. cit, at p. 589; cf 
Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 127, who 
tries to justify the decision using the concept of "limited acceptance: the defendant by entering into the 
contract should. be deemed to have accepted to pay for the preparatory expenses incurred by the plaintiff 
in perfiaming his contractual obligation. This has been considered as a benefit to the defendant enough 
to SM rise to a claim in restitution. ) Third, the most important ism is, in such cases, the recovery of a 
possuft claim based (a restitution could not, in principle, exceed the contractual price. [cf. Lodder v 
Slowey 119041 AC 442 (affirming (19M) 20 N. Z. L. R. 321); Set also the California can of Boomer V. 
Muir 24 P. 2d 570 (1933); For more American authorities see George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution, 
vol. 1,0.4ttle, Brown and Company, 1979), s. 4.4 esp. cases cited in note 1] Although the restitudonary 
claim is regarded W independent from contract, based on the concept of unjust enrichment, nonetheless 
the benefit rendered to the defendant is determined by reference to the terms of the contract. Further, the 
acceptance of this benefit by the defendant is also analysed as a numer of obligation: The defendant by 
his breach of contract is estopPed from denying that he has accepted the benefit rendered by the plaintift 
That being so, how at the valuation stage, an independent basis for the chum can be assumed. The 
inevitsbic conclusion should be that, the benefit and its acceptance being determined by the terms of the 
contrio, which also include the contractual price, the remuneration also should not exceed the contract 
price. [we Nq>vs v. PWn, 27 P. 548 (1891), at p. 549 per Anders CJ (State of Washingwa); Witchter v. 
MtrgeraM, 163 P. $19 (1917) (Staft of Oregon); see also Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, p. 427; 
Burrows distinguishes incontrovertible benefits from benefits deriving merely from bargained-for 
pentrunnoe: in can of the former, the plaintiff is not. in his view, restricted to the contract prick while 
as to the latter, be can"11000M more than the contract ceiling. See Burrows, Ibid., at p. 587; see also 
Gum W The Role of Subjective benefit in the Law of Unjust Enrichment (1990) 10 OIL. S. 42, at p. 
55; For the sa view but on slightly diftrew arguments see Birks P., In Ddem of Free Acceptanok 
[Published in: Essays on the Law of Restitution, ed. Andrew Burrows], (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 199 1), 
p. 1361 
32 Like the facts in the cases of Pournaras and Papadopouku 
33 Bengfiting from the WOW bY ft Payer is not necessarily the actual enjoyment, but getting the 
bargained for performance from the psyce. see Infra., pars. 6.34 
14 [1980] 2 All ER 29, where he sap: "... in my opinion we must assume., in the absence of evidence of 
even. averment to the c(MUM7. that they Re- the builders] had carried out their part of the bargain up till 
the date of cancellation. " (at p. 45); cf. Bcatson, loc. cit., no 2, pp. 60-61, Professor Beatson, though 
suggeaing a modification of taking the actual, rather than the likelihood of, reliance into account, thin 
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up to the date of termination. It is therefore suggested that, in the absence of any 
contrary intention, it is the fact of partial performance and incurring expenses by the 
payee, and not merely being bound to incur expenses according to the contractual tams, 
which entitles the payee to retain the instalments. 
6.34 This proposition might be criticized by saying that according to that, the payeds 
right should be regarded as unconditional, regardless of whether the commencement of 
performance by him has actually conferred any benefit upon the payer. Furthermom 
there might be cases in which the benefit enjoyed by the payer as a result of the partial 
perfornmince is considerably less in value than the instalments; retained or sued for by the 
payee. It would appear that the "actual enjoyment" of the payer is not a determinative 
hictor in this regard; it is enough that the payer has started to get what he has bargained 
for, though it may not necessarily amount to "actual enjoyment". In Papadopoulos, for 
that, according to Urd Fraser in PapadRpoulos, merely being bound to incur reliance expenditure by the 
payee will give him an unconditional right to the part payments. He refers to this as a disadvantage of 
the owstruction approa* becam it May leave open the possibility of unjust enrichment where the 
paM though being contractually bound to in= expenses, had not in ha incurred any reliance 
expenditure. (see ibid., at p. 60) With all due respect, however, it appears that Lord Frasers judgment in 
Papadopoulas may haw an indication to the contrary: In addition to the assumption made by his 
lordship, as referred to above, he states in another part of his judgment: "... I think it is dear that the 
shipbuilding contract has little simiMty with a contract of sale and much more similarity, so far as the 
present issues are concerned, with contracts in which the party entitled to be paid had either performed 
work or provided services for which payment is due by the date of cancellation. " (at p. 45) He also 
repeats the assumption made above as a bads for his judgment: "In the instant case the buyers have not 
actually enjoyed any benefit from the work which the builders have performed, but it had been performed 
(or at least we must so assuine, in the absence of evidence to the contrary) on the faith of the bqWs 
promise to pay the instalments on the due dates. (at p. 46) On the other hand, his statement to the effect 
that "Ii]t is enough that the builders were bound to incur considerable eqx%ses in carrying out their pea 
of the contract long before the Actual sale could take place' (at p. 44) might be taken as a support for the 
view that meriely being bound to incur expenditure ma the payee's right to advance payments 
unconditional. It should however be noted that such a statement was made in the context of 
distinguishing a shipbuilding contract from a contract of sale, like contracts in Dies or Palmer v. Temple. 
To make such a distinction, it was enough to see that the builders were bound to incur reli 
expenditure "long before the actual sale could take place. it does not, it seems, show that, in his view, 
merely being bound to incur expenses makes the payee's right to the payments an unconditional right. 
Furthermore, turiiing to the restitutionary approach, it is obvious that merely a promise to perform, 
though constituting enough consideration as far as the formation of contract is concerned, cannot amount 
to a consideration which prevents the failure of consideration from being total. It is the actual 
perfimmance which may amount to that: we Fibrosa Spolka AkWna v Fa"alm Lawson Cambe 
Bw*ow Ltd [1943] AC 32, per Lord Simon, at p. 48; see also Rover International Ltd v. Cannon Pyho 
Sales Ltd (Wo. 3) [1989] 1 WIX 912,11989] 3 All ER 423, where Kerr W observed: "Wben referring 
to the provision of consideration in this context, .... one is not referring to the original promise to 
perform the contract. IU q=Uon is whether there was any consideration in the natm of part 
performance for which the instalment was payable ... " (at p. 932, emphasis added); see also p. 923 per Kerr LJ 
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instance, though "the buyers [had] not actually enjoyed any benefit from the work which 
the builders [had] performed"13, they had started (or, at least, in the words of Lord 
Fraser, it had to be ammed so in the absence of any evidence to the contrary) to get the 
barpined for peiformance from the seHers. 
6.35 it is however difficult, it seems, to ascribe to the parties the intention that the payee 
has the right to retain all the instalments paid regardless of the expenses incurred by the 
payee or the value of benefits conferred upon the payer by the partial performance. For 
example, in a contract to build and sell a ship, there might be different stages in the 
process of performing the contractual undertakings by the shipbuilder, like getting an 
export licence, planning the vessel, building the structure, constructing other different 
parts, equipping the ship, launching and delivering her to the buyers. In such a contract, 
if the parties provide for the payment to be made by certain instalments, then, in the 
absence of any express or implied intention as to the forfeitabifity of instalments, allowing 
the shipbuilder to retain all the instalments paid by the buyers for the mere reason that the 
payee has commenced performing his undertaking, without any regard to the expenses 
incurred by him and/or the benefits conferred on the buyers through partial performance 
might unjustly enrich the shipbuilder: He, for instance, might be at the first stage of the 
process of performing his undertaking, while the buyer has made an advance payment for 
the half of the price. In a well-planned contract, of course, this is less likely to happen, 
because most probably the parties provide for the payment of the instalments in 
proportion to the progress of the work undertaken by the payee. 86 But where this is the 
case, it would seem that the parties would hardly be likely to intend that the payee be 
entitled to keep the instalments paid before termination, regardless of the expenses 
incurred by the payee and the benefit conferred upon the payer through the partial 
performance. 
In the course of his judgement in the Papadopoulos case", Lord Fraser referred to the 
83 Hyundat HeavY Indu»les CO- Ltit v. PaPadopomlos [198012 AB ER 29, per Lord Fraser at p, 46 
86 As it is tbe cm in mm modern consbucdon contracu 
87 [198012 All ER 29 
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p Wbility of a proportion between the instalments paid by the payer and the expenses om 
incurred by the payee in the following terms: 
"It seems very likely that the increasing proportions of the contract price 
represented by the five instalments bore some relation to the anticipated 
rate of expenditure, but we have no information on which to make any 
nice comparison between the amount of expenses ... and the amount of instalments payable by the buyers. "" 
But, then, his lordship negated the necessity of such a comparison and added: 
"It is enough that the builders were bound to incur considerable expense in 
carrying out their part of the contract long before the actual sale could 
take place. "89 
The question which may arise is whether the outcome of the case would be the same if 
the buyer had paid a considerable part of the price, say three quarters, as the instalments, 
and the builders, were only at the stage of planning the structure of the ship. It seems 
unlikely that, in the absence of an express or implied term, the intention of the 
forfeitability of such instalments could be ascribed to the parties relying on the facts that 
the buDders have to incur expenses to perform their part of the contract, and they have 
commenced to perform it. 
6.36 A distinction, it appears, should be made between entire and severable covenants: 
Where the covenant of the payee, though consisting of many parts, form the parts of one 
whole which may not be considered as separable, then merely having to incur expenses by 
the payee in fiMlling his obligations and the fact of starting to perform those 
undertaldngs will entitle him to retain the instalments paid upon the premature 
termination of the contract for the payees default. 90 If, however, the covenants of the 
payee are severable, he should be entitled, it is submitted, to retain the instalments only in 
proportion to each severable covenant. 9' That seems to be the reasonable intention 
81 Aid, at p. 44 
99 Did 
90 it may well be argued that in Papadopoulos, the payee's covenant was an entire obligation, and since 
the payer had to incur expenses in performing his obligations (and he has actually, or at least 
pmmably, suaW to perform), therdbre his right to advance payments was unconditional. 
91 In a well planned contract the UMVIments relating to each severable covenant will certainly have a 
relation to the expenses incurred by the payee and the benefit conferred upon the payer ftom the 
fuitilment of that severable covenant. 7U possibility of the appordonment of the consideration has been 
recognized in 77m Government OfNewfoundland v. Newfoundland Rattway Co. (1888) 13 App. Cas. I ", 
when the plaintiff company entered into an agreement with the Government to construct and maintain a 
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which could be ascribed to the parties in the absence of any express or implied tam 
Thus, in severable contracts the commencement of performance by the payee of each 
severable covenant will make his right to the instalment proportionate to that covenant as 
an unconditional right-92 Therefore, though the payer might have paid a considerable part 
of the whole price in the form of instalments, upon the premature termination of the 
contract for his default, he may be entitled to recover those instalments the severable 
covenant relating to which has not yet been commenced to be performed. 
6.37 Third, in all other cases, the right of the payee to the part payment would, it seems, 
be conditional upon performance of the contract. Therefore, the payer would be entitled 
to recover the advance payment if the contract was prematurely terminated. 93 The right 
of the payee might be conditional upon complete performance or the commencement of 
performance which should also be determined by construing the contract according to its 
terms and all surrounding circumstances. 
1.5. The CrIteda for Distinguishing Deposits from Pad Payments 
6.38 Having concluded that the issue of the recoverability of an advance payment by the 
payer upon the premature termination of the contract for his default is a matter of 
construction to discover the express, implied or imputed intention of the parties with 
regard to the right of the payee to the advance payment, it is now appropriate to discuss 
the criteria for determining whether an advance payment is a deposit or a mere part 
railway in considerstion, ot inter afta, an annual subsidy for thirty-five years. Upon breach of the 
contract by the company aft completion of a portion of the railway, the company claimed, inter alla, a 
carton amount of subsidy for the completed portion of the railway The Privy Council answered the 
question "[W]hether by the non-completion of the whole railway within the, Um stipulated, the company 
forfeit their right to the payment of the subsidy in respect of so much of the line a is complete and 
operatur in ftvour of the plaintiffis. In the Board's view, upon the true construction of the contracý on 
the completion of each severable section of the fine, a proportionate part of the whole subsidy 'Ibecame 
payable as a separate subsidy, beginning at the next day of payment and continuing for thirty-five yeaw. 
so at pp. 208-209 per IA)rd Habhouse 
9'2 This is the caw in most building contracts: In these contracts, the instaltnents of the coubmict pro an 
determined and paid According to tM progress of the work. Such a contract may, it seems, be said to be 
severable which consists of several separable entire obligations. The n& to each instalment will be 
uncovAtional as the payee starts performing the relevant severable covenant 
93 See, c. &, Dies v. British and International Mining and FInance Corporation Ltd. [ 193 9] 1 KB 724 
Reid MoAw Ltd v. Wood [197811 N. Z. L. R. 319 ; Stevenson v. Colonial Homes Ltd. (1961) 27 D. LIL 
(2nd) 699 ; Ten= Rewurces N. L. v. Mavet Petroleum Ply Ltd. (19 88) 1 W. A. & 144 
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payment. This is particularly important because, as it was pointed out", the advame 
payment being recognized as a deposit is undoubtedly forfeitable by the payee upon 
termination of the contract for the payer's default. 
1.5.1. Functions of a Deposit 
6.39 The attention should be paid, first and foremost, to the functions of a deposit which 
would help in recognizing the nature of an advance payment. Fry L. J. in Howe v. SMUO 
explained these fimcdons in the following terms: 
" Money paid as a deposit must, I conceive, be paid on some terms implied 
or expressed. In this case no terms are expressed, and we must therefore 
inquire what terms are to be implied. The terms most naturally to be 
implied appear to me in the case of money paid on the signing of a 
contract to be that in the event of the contract being performed it shall be 
brought into amount, but if the contract is not performed by the payer it 
shall remain the property of the payee. It is not merely a part payment, 
but is then also an earnest to bind the bargain so entered into, and creates 
by the fear of its forfeiture a motive in the payer to perform the rest of the 
contract. "96 
This passage clearly shows that a deposit is (a) a part of the purchase price if the contract 
is completed, and (b) an earnest to bind the bargain: it shows the fkct that the payer 
means business. In other words, it constitutes a guarantee for the performance and 
completion of the contract by the payer. 9' If, therefore, the conwwcdon of the contract" 
showed that the advance payment had been paid to fiffi these functions, it should be 
recognized as a deposit. 
94 Slwpm, pam 6.31 
95 (1884) 27 Ch. D. 89 
% Did, at p. 101; also we Soper v. Arnold (1889) 14 App. Cas. 492 at 433,435 ; Levy v. Srogdon 118981 
1 Ch. 478,485 (affirmed by the Court of Appeal: 1189911 Ch. 5) ; Hall v. Burnell [1911] 2 Ch. 551; 
Low v. Hope [19701 CIL 94, at pp. 97,98 ; Re A Solicitor 11966] 3 All ER 52,57 
97 It has been doubted that deposits can still be a guarantee of performance. The reason, as it has been 
pointed out by the Conveyancing Standing Committee of the Law Commission and the Law Society in a 
report published in February 1988, is that the old practice of keeping the deposit by the vendors' 
solicitors as stakeholders has been replaced by the practice of allowing the vendor to use the deposit in 
his own purchase. Consequently *only the vendor at the top of the chain has money in his hands to 
forfeit in the event of the chain collapsing. " It has been argued that the new practice of permitting 
"travelling deposits" questions the justification given for the payment of a deposit as providing a security 
for the vendor against the purchasees default. See Oakley A J, Deposits: still a guarantee of 
performance?, part L TU Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, Jan-Feb 1994, pp. 45-49 
98 See NkKmWdck E. Contract Law, (2nd ed., 1994), p. 332; Pawlowski, Relief Against Forfeiture of 
Dqwdts, Gazeft Nov 21,1992, p. 76 
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1.5. L The lAnguage Used by the Parties 
6.40 The language used by the parties to describe the payment is also material. " 
Although the use of the term "deposit" is not conclusive", nonetheless it, pritnafacie, 
shows that the parties have truly intended the advance payment to be a deposit. In Howe 
v. SWth'01, Bowen J., discussing the meaning which a businessman attaches to the term 
"deposit", observed: 
" ... a deposit, 
if nothing more is said about it, is, according to the ordinary 
interpretation of business men, a security for the completion of the 
pUrchase. 002 
it was, finihermore, held in Elson anspector of Taxes) v. Prices Tailors Ltd. 103 that using 
the term "deposit" would normally imply that the prepayment was a security for the 
performance of agreement: 
""Deposit" bears a perfectly well and commonly known meaning of 
security for completion of the pUrChaSe. "104 
It may, therefore, be concluded that using the term "deposit" raises a presumption that 
the prepayment is intended to be a deposit. 103 Needless to say that such a presumption 
could, by evincmig enough evidence to the contrary, be rebutted. This can clearly be 
inferred from the observations of Lord Hailsharn of St. Marylebone L. C. in Ling# 
Plantations Ltd v. Jagathee&=106 where he stated: 
"It is also no doubt possible that in a particular contract the parties may 
use language normally appropriate to deposits properly so called even to 
forfeiture which turn out on investigation to be purely colourable and that 
in such a case the real nature of the transaction might turn out to be the 
99 See Furmston M P, Cheshire Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract, 13th edL, 1996, p. 640; Furmston 
M P, Contract Planning: Liquidated Damages, Deposits and the Foreseeability Rule (1991) 4 JCL 1, at p. 
3; Harris, Remedies in ConbW and Tort, 1988, p. 27; Pawlowski, loc. cit., no. 98, p. 76 
100 See, e. g., Reid Motors v. Wood [197811 NZIAL 319 where despite the use of the word "deposit", 
the advance payment, considering the circumstances in which the contract was made and the reasons for 
sdpulating for such a law amount, was regarded as a pan payment at pp. 326-327 ; see also McGrW 
on Damages, 15th e&, 198k para. 503; Carter, Breach of Contract, 2nd c&, 1991, para. 1252, no. 294 
101 (1884) 27 Ch. D. 89 
"' Jbid, at p. 99 
103 [1963] 1 W. L. PL 287; SM alsO Soper v. Arnold (1889) 14 App. Cas. 429, at p. 435 per LA)rd 
hiacnaghten; Gallagher v. Shilcock [194912 KB 765, at p. 768; Stocklawr v. Johnson [1954) 1 Q. B. 
476, at p. 490 
104 Did, at P. 292 
105 Sm Goff & JonM TU IAw of Rafitution, 4th ad., p. 432, cf. &nyth v. Jessup [1956] V. L. K 230 
106 [197211 KL. L 89 
288 
imposition of a paWty, by purporting to render forfeit something which is 
in truth part payment. "14" 
1.5.3. The Circumstances of Each Particular Case 
6.41 In determining the nature of an advance payment and deciding whether it is a 
deposit or a part payment, regard should also be had to the circumstances of each 
particular case. 101 Put another way, the court, considering the terms of the agreement, all 
circumstarices surrounding it and the words used by the parties should determine whether 
the advance payment is a deposit or merely a part payment. This has been emphasized by 
Finnemore I in Gallagher v. Shilcock'09 where he said: 
"As I understand the position, in each case the question is whether the 
payment was in fitct intended by the parties to be a deposit in the strict 
sense or no more than a part payment: and, in deciding this question, 
regard may be had to the circumstances of the case, to the actual words of 
the contract, and to the evidence of what was said. ""O 
6.42 Where the language of the contract is neutral and there is no evidence to show 
whether the payment is a deposit or a part payment, then the prepayment will be 
considered as a part payment. "' That is because the money paid following the signing of 
the contract is supposed to be a part of the contractual price unless the contractual terms 
or any other evidence show that it is a deposit to bind the bargain or guarantee the 
performance of the agreement. The proposition is supported by the judgement in Dies 112 
in which there being no evidence to indicate that the payment was a deposit, it was held 
that the money advanced was a mere part payment of purchase price. Stable I stated: 
"In the present can, neither by the use of the word "deposit" or otherwise, 
is there anything to indicate that the payment of f 100,000 was intended or 
was believed by either party to be in the nature of a guarantee or earnest 
for the due performance of the contract. It was a part payment of the 
107 Ibid., at p. 94 
log HaWmy's Lam of England, 4th ed., vol. 4 1, pam 8 11, no. I 
109 [1%9] 2 KB 765,1194911 All ER 921 
110 )bld., at P. 769 ; we WSO EWn (Inspector of Taxes) v. Prices Tailors Ltd. f 1963] 1 W. L. R. 287, at pp. 
291-292 per Ungoe&Thoulas I 
111 See Cloff A Jomm, Mic Law of Restitution, 4th ed., pp. 430,432; McKendrick E, ConUW Law, (2nd 
ed, 1994), p. 332; Downm Texd)ook on Contracý 3rd ed., 1993, p. 333 ; see also McDonald v. Dennys 
Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CIAL 457, at pp. 478-479 per Dixon I 
112 [193911 KB 724 
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price of the goods sold and was so described. 013 
2. A Historical Review of the Jurisdiction to Relieve Against 
Forfeiture 
6.43 The other preliminary issue which, before discussing the equitable jurisdiction to 
grant relief against forfeiture, should be given a consideration is a review of the historical 
development of the equitable intervention of courts to grant relief against forfeiture. The 
penalty doctrine and the rules relating to the equitable relief against forfeitures- though 
they, in the course of time, appeared to have developed along independent lines- have the 
same origin. 1lie main areas in winch a court of chancery granted relief were those of 
mortmes, leases and bonds. "" The history of the Chancellor's intervention to grant 
relief against forfeiture of mortgages and leases originally follows that of bonds. "' RAef 
against satisfied mortgages in the early fourteenth century"" was probably a special form 
of relief against bonds which, despite the actual payment, had not been cancelled nor 
there was any formal acquittance or release"'. Turner dates the first relief afforded to a 
mortgagor who had failed to pay the debt on the specified day back to the reign of 
Elizabeth (1558-1603)118, and speculates that such a relief had seemingly arisen out of the 
Chancellor's intervention to give relief against forfeiture of bonds of all Und in the 
sixteenth century. 119 It is in this time that some cases of relief against forfeiture of leases 
for non-payment of rent could also be found. "' 
6.44 Sir George CAFY, Veal* of the position as to relief against penalties and 
forfeitures by the beginning of the seventeenth century, explains the established 
113 Aid, at p. 742 
114 Simpson AWB, A History of the Common Law of Contract, 1975, p. 118 
115 Fair the history of penalties, we npra., chapter 1, section 1 
116 A reftance to some rempized equitable jurisdiction over satisfied mortgages could be found in the 
Year Book of 9 E& TV. See Turner R. W., The Equity of Redemption, 193 1, pp. 21-22 
117 St. German's Doctor and Student, edited by: Plucknett T. F. T & Barton J. L. (Sel. Soc., vol. 91,1974). 
Fir# Dialogue, ch. X04 pp. 77-79; set =pra, pam 1.07 
111 Tunier R. W., The Equity of Redemption, 193 1, p. 24; we also supra., pam 1.08 
119 See ibid 
120 SM e. g., Browne v. WentwoHh, Monro (Acta Chwellarlae) 638 (cited by Turner, loc. cit., pp. 24-25) 
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jurisdiction of the Courts of Chancery to grant relief against forfeiture of bonds in special 
circumstances where the exaction of penalties would result in hardship. 121 He, then, adds: 
"The like favour is extendable against them that will take advantage upon 
any strict condition, for undoing the estate of another in lands, upon a 
small or trifling default. "122 
This shows both the established jurisdiction of the Courts of Chancery to relieve against 
forfeiture and the fact that this jurisdiction had the same origin and basis as the 
jurisdiction to relieve against penalty of bonds. Turner refers to some cases decided in 
the close of the sixteenth century'23 and the early seventeenth century'24 where the 
Chancellor granted relief to a mortgagor who had failed to comply with the condition and 
suffered a forfeiture, though the reports, according to him, have not normally stated the 
basis upon which these decisions were grounded. He concludes that the Chancellor 
during this period intervened to relieve "where it seemed to be equitable'. 123 
6.45 Although the jurisdiction was first limited to cases of hardship, its scope was 
gradually widened in the course of time so that the Chancellor started to grant relief as of 
course. There was, therefore, no need for the mortgagors to show special circumstances 
to be sW to get relief A judicial statement in 1639 shows how far the Chancellor had 
extended his jurisdiction by this time: 
"[The court] will relieve a mortgage to the tenth generation, though the 
purchaser had no notice, because it is supposed that he cannot purchase, 
but it must be derived from the mortgage, and in some cases, where the 
mortgagee will suddenly bestow unnecessary costs upon the mortgaged 
lands, of tuTose to clogg the lands, to prevent the mortgagor's 
redemption. "' 
121 Cary I (cited by Simpson, loc. cit., no 114, p. 119; Turner R. W., TU Equity of Redemption, 1931, 
p. 25); see supra., Pam 1.09 
122 C; ary 2 (cited by Turner, loc. cit, ibld) 
113 Lmgford v. Barnard (1594) Tothill 134; Sedgwick v. Evan (1582) Choyce Cases 167 (relief rdhsed 
becmm the defendant was in possession for forty years) 
124 Cowtnan v. Convers (1601) Moum 7"; MIkey v. Dagge (1608) Moum 107 where Sir John Tyndal 
observed: "I find him [i. e., the nuntpgor] a very poor man, and am very creditably informed that the 
defendants be hard-dealing mee; Hxwer v. Lochard (1612) Totbill 132; Holman v. Vaux (1616) 
Toddll 133 
125 Turner R. W., l1w Equity of Redemption, 193 1, p. 26 
126 Bacon v. Bacon (1639) Tothill 133 (cited by Turner, loc. cit., p. 29) 
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6.46 By the middle of the seventeenth century, there seems to be no doubt that the 
jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture had, together with the jurisdiction as to relief 
asmin penal bonds, well been developed. 127 This jurisdiction mainly derived from the 
wide and established jurisdiction of equity to relieve against the unconscionable use of 
legal rights. A bill, passed by Cromwell in 1654 as an Ordinance, limiting the redemption 
of mortgages to one year after the entry of the mortgagee for the condition breached, 
shows the extensive relief afforded by the Courts of Chancery against forfeiture of 
mortgages. This bill, however, was repeatedly ignored by the Commissioners in 
Chancery, and was finally thrown over by the legislature of the Restoration. 121 
6.47 Although the practice of granting relief against penal bonds, as we have already 
seen 129 , was adopted by the Common Law Courts towards the middle of the seventeenth 
century, and although the relief against mortgages and bonds had originally developed in 
the same fine, yet the Common Law Courts did not appear to make the same attempt to 
recover their power with regard to mortgages. The reason, according to Coke'30, was 
that "in a mortgage the ownership in the thing pledged had already been transferred, 
whereas in a bond the sum forfeited had not yet been paid over to the obligee. " 
6.48 The basis for the intervention, as emphasized earlier 131 was that the exaction of 
penalties and forfeitures would be inequitable where the obfigee could be compensated 
for the low suffered from the breach. 132 The notion of a forfeiture provision being in the 
nature of a security for the production of a stated result did, it appears, considerably help 
the Chancellor to formulate and extend his jurisdiction to grant relief, though it is a 
127 See Yak D. E. C., An Essay on Mortgages and Trusts and Allied Topics in Equity (An Inbuluction to 
"Lord NoWngbam's Chancery Cans, vol. U, 1961"), Sel. Soc., vol. 79,1, at p. 15; Turner PLW., The 
Equity of Redeimption, 193 1, p. 30 
128 Spence, MOP^ vol. 1,602 et seq. (cited by Turner, loc. cit, p. 30) 
129 Sft supra., paras. 1.20 et aq. 
m Co. Lim, pam 334 (cited by Turner, loc. cit, pp. 33 -34) 
131 See supra., pam 1.13 
132 Simpson, loc. cit, no. 114, pp. 120-121 
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matter of discussion 133 whether it was the very first basis upon which the jurisdiction was 
grounded. In Emanuel College v. Evans34, as to a lease of a certain property for 500 
years, the court "conceived the said Lease being but a Security, and that Money paid, the 
said Lease had been void, as well against the said College, as against any other; and 
though the Money not paid at the Day, but afterwards, the said Lease ought to be void in 
Equity, as weff as on a legal Payment, it had been void in Law against thern. "133 This is 
apparently the only case before the Restoration where the Court of Chancery has referred 
to the concept of a mortgage being a security for a debt. However, this conception has 
frequently been used after the Restoration as a ground for relief against forfeiture 
afforded to mortgagors. 'm 
6.49 T'he twelfth maxim of equity stated by Francis in the early eighteenth century shows 
the well established jurisdiction of equity to relieve against penalties and forfeitures: 
"Equity suffers not advantage to be taken of a penalty or forfeiture, where 
compensation can be made. "'37 
By this time, the equitable rules for distinguishing penalties and forfeitures had been 
evolved; and the courts of equity had begun to settle some meaningfW rules with regard 
to the notion of proprietary interests. A series of significant discussions regarding the 
equitable relief against forfeiture in a number of cases' shows the origin and the 
evolution of the doctrine in this century: The established rule was that where a party to a 
contract had been prevented from the literal enforcement of the agreement through 
unavoidable accident, fraud, surprise or ignorance, which was not wilful, the courts of 
equity would intervene and grant relief against forfeiture. Among these discussions, the 
remarks of Sir Richard PepperArden M. R. in &ton v. Lyon 139are worth mentioning. He 
133 See Turner ILW., The Equity of Redemption, 193 1, pp. 36 et seq. 
134 
(1625) 1 Chan. Rep. 19,21 ER 494 
135 
ibid, at pp. 20,495 respectively 
136 see, e. g., Aarnbrough v. Baker (1676) 3 Swans. 628,36 ER 1000, Lord Nottingham in this can 
refers to this concept as one of "natutal justice and equity". See also supra., para. 1.14 
137 Ed. princ. 1728 (cited by Simpson A. W. B., A Iftory of the Common Law of Conbact: The Rise of 
the Action of AssunVdt, 1975, p. 12 1) 
138 See, e. g., Hardy v. Martin (1783) 1 Cox 26,29 ER 1046; Sloman v. Walter (1793) 1 Bro. c. c. 419,28 
ER 1213 
139 (1799) 3 Ves Jun 690,30 ER 1223 
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pointed out: 
"At Law a covenant must be strictly and literally performed: in Equity it 
must be really and substantially performed according to the true intent and 
meaning of the parties, so far as circumstances will admit: but if by 
unavoidable accident, if by fraud, by surprise, or ignorance not wilful, 
parties may have been prevented from executing it literally, a court of 
Equity will intervene: and upon compensation being made, the party 
having done everything in his power, and being prevented by the means, I 
have alluded to, will give relief , 140 
It appears that in this period, the relief was limited to the heads of accidents, ftaudý 
surprise and ignorance, and had not been extended to wilful breaches. 
6.50 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, a judicial disagreement can be seen 
regarding the exercise of the equitable power to relieve against forfeitures: The settled 
point was granting relief against penalties in the shape of forfeiture where it was possible 
accurately to compensate the other party for the loss suffered. Lord Nottinghams 
observations in Cage v. RUSWf4l can clearly illustrate this: 
"... it is a standing rule of the Court that a forfeiture should not bind where 
a thing may be done afterwards, or any compensation made for it- as 
where the condition was to pay money or the like. " 
As it also appears from the judgrnentý equity did always assume the compensation 
possible where the penalty of forfeiture had been inserted for non-payment of a sum of 
money. " It was, for instance, the established rule of the Court to grant relief against 
forfeiture of leases for non-payment of rent 143 , 
but there was also a tendency to extend 
this jurisdiction to the breach of other covenants. In Wa&nan v. Calcraft'"I Sir William 
awt, the Master of the Rolls, made some observations in the following terms: 
"The plaintiff Seeks to be relieved against a forfeiture of this lease; which 
he states to have been incurred solely by non-payment of rent; and if that 
is the ground of this ejectment, there is no doubt equity will relieve against 
the forfeiture; considering the purpose of the clause of re-entry to be only 
140 Jbid., at pp. 692-693 and p. 1224 respectively 
141 2 Ventris 352,86 ER 481 
142 See, e-&, DMS V. Thomas (1930) 1 Russ. and My. 5W, 36 ER 195 
143 This Old Cquit" jurisdiction SO survives (see, e. g., Howard v. Fanshawe [1895] 2 CIL 591; 
Lomlock v. MmV [196312 QB 786; 771atcher v. CH pearce & Sons (Contractors) Ltd [ 1968] 1 WLR 
748; Abbey National Building Society v. MaAeech Ltd, [198413 WLR 793), though subsequent statutes 
haw modified it or Wended its scope in certain circumstances. 
144 (1804) 10 Ves Jun 66,32 ER 768 
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to secure the payment of rent; and that, when the rent is paid, the end is 
obtained; ... . But in this lease [there] are several other covenants; and it 
seems admitted, that relief is not to be given in equity against a forfeiture, 
occasioned by the breach of those covenants. "145 
In this case, Lord Chancellor Eldon, who heard the case upon appeal, clearly confined 
the jurisdiction to the breaches of covenants for payment of rent. Lord Erskine, on the 
other hand, two years later, in Sw&rs v. Pope'", relieved the lessee from the 
consequences of his breach of a covenant to lay out a specific sum in repair in a given 
time. Ffis lordship pointed out: 
-There is no branch of the jurisdiction of this court more delicate than 
that, which goes to restrain the exercise of a legal right. That jurisdiction 
rests only upon this principle; that one party is taking advantage of a 
forfeiture; and as a rigid exercise of the legal right would produce a 
hardship, a great loss and injury on the one hand arising from going to the 
fiiU extent of the right, while on the other the party may have the full 
benefit of the contract, as originally framed, the Court will interfere; where 
a mode of compensation can be discovered. "'47 
The Lord Chancellor, then, citing the observations of Lord Nottingham in Cage v. 
Ruwý", emphasized the importance of the rule of compensation; and subject to the 
possibility of fidl compensation, extended the jurisdiction to wilful breaches: 
-Undoubtedly, unless it is plain, that full compensation can be given, so as 
to put the other party in the same situation precisely, a Court of Equity 
ought not to act; ... If the covenant is broken with the consciousness, that it is broken, that is, if it is wilful, not by surprise, accident, or ignorance, 
still if it is a case, where fUH compensation can be made, these authorities 
say, not that it is imperative upon the court to give relief, but that there is 
a discretion. "149 
6.51 This expansive view was fbUowed in Davis v. West'". However, it was soon =ch 
145 Md., at pp. 68-69 and p. 769 respectively 
146 12 Ves Jun 282,2 Ves Jun Supp 298,33 ER 108,34 ER 1103 
147 Ibid., at pp. 289,110 respectively 
148 2 Ventris 352,86 ER 491 
149 Sanders v. Pope 12 Ves Jun 282,33 ER 108, at pp. 291-293 and pp. 111-112 respectively 
ISO (1806) 12 Ves Jun 476,33 ER 180 where it was held: "Where covenants are broken, and there is no 
fiaid, and the party is capable of giving complete compensation, it is the province of a Court of Equity to 
interfere, and grit the relief assim the forfeiture for breach of other ownmis, as well as that for 
payment of rent said the only distinction is, that in the latter case it is considered so clear, that the object 
of the clause for re-entry is only to secure the payment of the rent, that the legislature interposed; and 
made it unnecessary to come into Equity-, ... " 
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questioned: In Hill v. Barclay's' and Reynolds V. pi, 1152, Lord Eldon refused to grant 
relief for breach of covenants to repair and to insure against fire. 153 The restricted 
approach towards the equitable relief against forfeiture appears to have been applied for 
quite a long time. Thus, in Barrow v. Isaacs & SOn154 the court refused to grant relief for 
breach of a covenant not to underlet the premises without the consent of the lessor. The 
rernarks of Kay L. J. in this case, neatly summarises, the position and clearly illustrates the 
lack of any "central concept"'" for the equitable jurisdiction of relief against forfeiture: 
"Long ago Courts of Equity assumed jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeitures and penalties where the only object was to secure payment of a 
definite sum of money, even though there was no fraud, accident, surprise, 
or mistake. ... At first there seems to have been some hesitation whether 
this relief [i. e. relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent] might not 
be extended to other cases of forfeiture for breach of covenants such as to 
repair, to insure, and the like, where compensation could be made; but it 
was soon recognised that there would be great difficulty in estimating the 
proper amount of compensation; and, since the decision of Lord Eldon in 
Hill v. Barclay (18 Ves. 56), it has always been held that equity would not 
relieve, merely on the ground that it could give compensation, upon 
breach of any covenant in a lease except the covenant for payment of rent. 
But of course this left unaffected the undoubted jurisdiction to relieve in 
case of breach occasioned by fraud, accident, surprise, or mistake. "'m 
151 (1811) 16Ves Jun 402, IS VOL 56,34ER 1200 
152 (18 12) 19 Ves Jun 134,34 ER 469 
153 See also Lovat v. Lord Ranelagh, 3 Ves & Bea 24,35 ER 388; Bracebridge v. Buckley, 2 Price 200, 
146ER69; Royev. Harris, 2 Price 206,146ER71; White v. Warner, 2Mer. 459,3SER1016; Hannon 
v. South London Water Works Company, 2 Mer. 61,35 ER 863 
154 [1891] 1 QB 417 
155 Set LU& A. G., FOfftitm Of IUMMM in Land (1984) 100 LQR 427, at p. 429 




Relief Against Forfeiture of the Payer's Interest in the 
Subject-matter 
1. Introduction 
7.01 Upon entering into a contract, the payer may acquire an interest in the subject- 
matter. ' In an agreement for the sale of land by instalments, for instance, the purchaser 
obtains an equitable interest in the property on exchange of contractS2 ; and if he has taken 
possession of the land, there will also be a possessory interest for the purchaser. 3 Now, if 
such a contract provides for the right of the vendor to terminate the agreement, retake 
possession of the land and retain the moneys already paid upon the purchaser's breach, 
the payer will forfeit his equitable interest in the subject-matter, as well as the moneys 
already paid following his default and the exercise of the right to terminate by the vendor. 
1 This may be a legal interest where a right over an identifiable asset (which is referred to as a "real 
righf' or a right in rem) is acquired by the party to a contract. Such a right may result from ownership, 
possession Or equitable charge. It may also be an equitable interest: This happens where a party acquires 
a personal right to have a real right (which is referred to as ad rem or a right in personam and rem). For 
instance, the right Of A buyer to Whom the asset has not been transferred nor delivered is a right in ad 
rem. Such a right is not regarded as a mere personal right (in personam) in Equity, but the buyer, it is 
said, has a proprietary interest in the subject-matter, provided that the contract is capable of being 
specifically performed The important difference between legal and equitable rights, in this context, is 
that an equitable right is enforceable against anyone except a bonafide purchaser who takes the asset for 
value, without notice of the existence of the equitable right. See, generally, Goode R., Commercial Law, 
2nd ed., (Penguin Books, 1995), pp. 28-3 1; Megarry, Sir Robert & Thompson M. P., Megarry's Manual 
of the Law of Real Property, 7th ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), pp. 56-69 
2 See, e. g., Shaw v. Foster (1872) 27 LT 281, LR 5 HL 321 where Lord Cairns said: "... there cannot be 
the slightest doubt of the relation subsisting in the eyes of a court of equity between the vendor and the 
purchaser. The vendor was a trustee of the property for the purchaser; the purchaser was the real 
beneficial owner in the eye of a cwrt of equity of the property, subject only to this observation, that the 
vendor, whom I have Called the trustee, was not a mere dormant trustee, he was a trustee having a 
personal and substantial interest in the property... - at p. 283 ; Lysaght v. Edwards (1876) 2 Ch. D. 499 ; 
Lake v. Bayliss [1974] 2 All ER 1114, [19741 1 WLR 1073; For a short historical account on the 
evolution Of equitable interests see Swiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1979] Ch. 548, at pp. 
565-566 per Browne-Wilkinson J. (reversed on a different point: [1982] AC 584); see also Gibson's 
Conveyancing, 21st ed., 1980, p. 178; Megarry, Sir Robert & Thompson M. P., Megarry's Manual of the 
Law of Real Property, 7th ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), p. 66; Carter J W, Breach of Contract, 
2nd edL, 199 1, para. 1067 
3 Also a lessee in possession, for example, has a possessory interest in the subject-matter for the period of 
lease. Such an interest is also a real right (in rem). 
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7.02 This, of course, is the position at common law. The purchaser, however, might, in 
certain circumstances, be relieved from the consequences of his breach, i. e. the forfeiture 
of his equitable interest and moneys already paid, in equity. Though the equitable 
jurisdictions to relieve against forfeiture of the payer's interest in the subject-matter on 
the one hand and moneys already paid on the other have the same origin, due to different 
principles which are applicable to each of them, it is appropriate to discuss them 
separately. It should, however, be born in mind that these two heads of the equitable 
jurisdiction are closely related to each other: The purchaser, being relieved against 
forfeiture of his equitable interest in the subject-matter, is also, in effect, relieved against 
forfeiture of moneys already paid. 4 
2. Development of the Jurisdiction 
7.03 Though the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of an interest in the property has 
not been limited to any particular case5, the development of the jurisdiction, nonetheless, 
has been mainly taken place through the cases of leasee and We of land by instalments. 
The principles regarding the exercise of the jurisdiction, however, as it will be suggested, 
seem to apply to any other similar case. 
7.04 As the historical review of the subject shows, the courts of equity, looking at the 
substance of the parties! agreement, granted relief against forfeiture where the object of 
the forfeiture clause was "to secure the payment of money"7 provided that the innocent 
party could fully be compensated. " In an instalment contract, the power of forfeiture is 
normally stipulated for the failure in the payment of instalments. In such cases, it has 
clearly been established that if the debtor is willing, ready and able to perform his 
' See supra., pp. 259-259 
5 Meagher, R. P., Gummow, W. M. C., Lehane, I R. F., Equity Doctrines & Remedies, 3rd ed, 1992, 
pm. 1805 at p. 439 
6The jurisdiction with regard to leases is now mainly governed by statute. (see, for example, sec. 146, 
Law of Property Act 1925) The other instances for the exercise of the equitable jurisdiction were 
mortgages, and copyhold tenure. see Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, loc. cit., ibid 
7see Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding [1973] AC 691, at p. 722 per Lord Wilberforce ; Davis v. 77somas 
(1830) 1 Russ &M 506, at p. 507 per Leach M. R.; Re Dixon [190012 Ch. 561, at p. 576 per Rigby LJ 
2 See, in addition to the historical account on the subject (supra., paras. 1. IS- 1.19,1.28), Reynolds v. Pitt 
(1812) 19 Ves. Jun. 133,34 ER 468 per Lord Eldon at p. 140; Binks v. Lord Rokeby (1818) 2 Swans. 
222, per Lord Eldon at p. 226 
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obligation, i. e. to pay the instalments due with interest and the creditor's costs, the court 
may grant relief against forfeiture of the payer's interest in the subject-matter by 
decreeing specific performance or granting him one or more extensions of time to 
perform his obligation. 10 
7.05 The foundation of such a relief could be found in the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Chancery in Re Dagenham (1hames) Dock Co., ex parte Hulse". The 
Company, which had been incorporated by Act of Parliament, agreed to purchase land 
from Hulse to build a dock on the north bank of the Thames. Half of the price was paid 
on the execution of the contract, and the other half, plus interest, was, after some changes 
in the date of payment by the parties' agreement, eventually agreed to be paid on a certain 
date. Time of the payment was expressly made of the essence. It was also provided that 
upon the company's failure on the payment of the balance, the vendors would be entitled 
to repossess the land and retain all moneys already paid. The company went into 
possession and carried out some work on the dock, but failed to pay the balance of the 
purchase price on time. Shortly afterwards the company went into liquidation. The 
vendors brought an action for ejectment. Lord Romilly M. R. was only prepared to offer 
them an order for the sale of the land in order to enable the vendors to enforce their hen 
for the balance outstanding. The vendors did not accept this offer and appealed. The 
Court of Appeal in Chancery, having upheld the decision of Lord Romilly M. R., granted 
the company relief against forfeiture of their interest in the land upon payment of the 
balance of the purchase price with interest. 
Sir W. M. James L. J., in the course of his judgement, stated: 
"It would be a strong thing to hold that a company authorized to buy land 
for purposes beneficial to the public could enter into a bargain with a 
landowner that if ever so small a portion of the purchase money which the 
company is to pay him remains unpaid on a particular day, he shall be 
entitled to take back the land with all the works which have been executed 
Sm Starside Noperties Ltd. v. Mustapha [ 1974] 1 WLR 816 
10 See FulmmtOn M P, Cheshire, MOO & Furmston's Law of Contract 13th ed., p. 642; Goff & Jones, 
The Law of Restitution, 4th edL, 1993, p. 437 ; Beale K Unreasonable Deposits (1993) 109 ILQR 526 ; Harpum C, Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [19741 CLJ 134, at p. 142 ; Lang A G, Forfeiture of Interests in Land (1984) 100 LQR 427, at p. 447 
11 (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022 
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upon it by the company. " 12 
It appears from this passage that the court considered the vendoes conduct in bringing an 
action to retake possession of the land with all the work which had been carried out on it 
and to retain all moneys paid as unconscionable. The forfeiture clause was also regarded 
as penal in nature", because it had provided for the forfeiture of both the company's 
interest in the property and the moneys already paid on the purchaser's failure to pay the 
balance on the specified date without any regard to the loss actually suffered as the result 
of breach. The case provides a clear authority for the availability of relief against 
forfeiture of the purchaser's interest in land where the forfeiture clause is in the nature of 
penalty and also where, probably, the vendoes conduct in exercising his right of forfeiture 
is unconscionable. 
7.06 It is not clear whether the vendors in Re Dagenham had terminated the contract for 
the purchasees default. There is some tendency in the subsequent authorities considering 
the case to construe that the contract there had not been terminated: In Stockloser v. 
Johnson", Romer L. J., analysing the case, favoured this view arguing that the decision of 
the court in granting relief, despite the provision that time was to be of the essence, was 
only justifiable "by reason of the fact that the plaintiff, themselves had twice postponed 
the date which had been originally agreed for the payment"". This argument implies that 
the parties, having twice postponed the date of payment, had, in fact, waived the 
stipulation making time of the essence. The plaintiffs, therefore, were not entitled to 
terminate the agreement, since there was no contractual right to terminate, and the 
defendant's breach could not be regarded as a repudiatory breach. It has, on the other 
hand, been suggested that the vendoes action for ejectment cannot be consistent with the 
continued performance of the contract, and therefore the contract was terminated when 
"the writ in the ejectment proceeding was served" 16. 
12 Jbid, at p. 1025 
13 Sir G. Mellish L. L stated: "I have always understood that where there is a stipulation that if, on a 
certain day, an agreement remains either wholly or in any part unperformed- in which case the real 
damage may be either very large or very trifling- there is to be a certain forfeiture incurred, that 
stipulation is to be treated as in the nature of a penalty. " Ibid., at p. 1025 
14 [1954] 1 QB 476, at pp. 496-497 
Is Ibid., at p. 497 
16 Harpum C, Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land, loc. cit., no. 10, at p. 148, citing Car 
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7.07 There is much to be said in favour of the view that the mere extensions of time 
should not be regarded as a waiver of the "time of the essence" stipulation. Where the 
parties agree about a certain date for payment, and also make the time of the essence, 
their agreement, in fact, has two parts: first, determining a certain date as the date of 
payment; and second, agreeing that the time of payment shall be of the essence. Where 
an extension of time is given, the parties alter the first limb of their agreement, but the 
second part, in principle, remains unaffected by a mere change in the date of payment; 
and unless there is enough evidence that the parties, extending the date for payment, have 
also waived the "time of the essence" stipulation, the latter stipulation should, in principle, 
remain on foot. 
Enough support for this proposition might be found in the authorities: In Buckland v. 
17 Famer & Moodý , there was no doubt that "if a vendor ha[d] once made time of the 
essence of the contract and then allow[ed] a further extension to a fixed date, the time 
remain[ed] essential. ""' The issue was also dealt with in detail in Barclay v. Messenger19 
where Jessel M. R. concluded: 
"It appears to me plain that a mere extension of time, and nothing more, is 
only a waiver to the extent of substituting the extended time for the 
original time, and not an utter destruction of the essential character of the 
time. "20 
It could also be argued that any extension of time is an indulgence granted by the 
creditor, and such an indulgence should not put the debtor in a better position than the 
one in which he would have been had the time not been extended. 
7.08 Having said that, it could be argued that in the Dagenhwn case, the time stipulation 
retained its essential character despite the extensions agreed by the parties. Thus, the 
purchaser's failure was a breach of a payment stipulation time of which was of the 
essence, and it would entitle the vendors to bring the contract to an end. The vendoes 
and Universal Finance Co. Ltd. v. Caldwell [1956] 1 QB 525,556 per Upjohn L. J., and Garnac Grain 
Co. Inc. v. H. M. F. Faur & Fairclough Ltd. [ 1966] 1 QB 650,675 per Sellers L. J. for the support of the 
proposition. 
17 [197911 VaR 221 
18 Aid, at p. 23 1, per Buddey L. J. 
19 (1874) 43 L. J. Ch. 449 
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action for ejection, as it was already argued 21 , was a clear indication that the vendors 
had 
exercised their right to tenninate. The contract, thus, had been brought to an end when 
the writ for the ejectment proceeding had been served to the purchasers. 
The decision in this case, therefore, might be treated as an authority for the view that, 
even after termination for the purchaser's breach of an essential time stipulation, the court 
may grant relief against forfeiture of the purchaser's interest in the property, by decreeing 
specific performance or giving the purchaser extra time to perform his contractual 
obligation. 22 
7.09 The decision of the Court of Appeal in the Re Dagenham casep was followed by 
the Privy Council in Kilmer v. British Columbia Orchard Lands LId. 24 in which in an 
agreement for the sale of land by instalments, it was provided that if the purchaser made 
default in the punctual payment of any one instalment, the contract would be null and 
void, and the vendors would be entitled to re-sell the land and retain all payments already 
made. Time of the payments was expressly declared to be of the essence. There was an 
extension of time by mutual agreement for the payment of the second instalment. The 
purchasers having made default in the payment of this instalment, the vendors declared 
the contract to be of no effect and brought an action to enforce their right of forfeiture. 
The purchaser counterclaimed for specific performance and obtained leave to pay into the 
court the instalments due. The trial judge dismissed the action and gave judgment for the 
purchaser, relieving him from any forfeiture incurred, on the ground, apparently", that 
the vendor's conduct in exercising its strict legal rights was harsh and unconscionable. 
The company, therefore, was not regarded as entitled to terminate the agreement. The 
interesting point, however, is that, in his view, even if the vendor had been able to 
terminate the contract by relying on its strict legal tights, there was enough authority to 
20 Md., at p. 456 
21 See supra., para. 7.06 
1 The point will also be discussed later: infra., paras. 7.48 et seq. 
23 Re Dagenhon (77james) Dock Co., exparte Hulse (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022 
24 [19131 AC 319 
25 As it appears from the report (pp. 319-320,322) and the full description of the case by Harpum, loc. 
cit., no. 10, at pp. 148-149 
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relieve the purchaser from forfeiture. 
An appeal to the Court of Appeal of British Columbia was allowed. The court by the 
majority held that the vendor, being able to take advantage of the term making time of the 
essence, could terminate the contract. Furthermore, there was nothing in the vendoes 
conduct to preclude it from relying on its strict legal rights. There, therefore, being no 
ground for granting relief against forfeiture, the appeal should be allowed. However, the 
Privy Council, allowing the appeal, held that the forfeiture clause was in the nature of 
penalty, and the purchasers were entitled to be relieved against that. The short reasoning 
of the Board in their judgment, delivered by Lord Moulton, was, in part, in the following 
terms: 
"The circumstances of this case seems to bring it entirely within the ruling 
of the Dagenham Dock case. It seems to be even stronger case, for the 
penalty, if enforced according to the letter of the agreement, becomes 
more and more severe as the agreement approaches completion, and the 
money liable to confiscation becomes larger. "26 
7.10 The counsel for the both parties mainly concentrated their arguments on the 
provision making time of the essence. On behalf of the vendors, it was agreed that the 
time of payment was still of the essence, despite the extension agreed by the parties, The 
counsel for the purchasers, on the other hand, argued: 
"As they [the vendors] had submitted to postpone the day of the enforcing 
payment they were no longer entitled to say that time was of the essence 
of the contract. The rigid date having been altered they were not entitled 
to say the substituted date was rigid to the extent of being unalterable. "27 
Despite these arguments, the Board in its judgment did not refer at all to the "time of the 
essence" provision. They said that there were other points raised in the course of the 
argument, but they did not think it necessary to refer to them. 28 The logical inference to 
be drawn from this, it has been suggested", is that the Privy Council did not see it 
relevant to consider the "time of the essence" provision for the purpose of making a 
decision with regard to the grant of relief against forfeiture. This, in fact, is an obvious 
26 [19131 AC 319, at p. 325 
27 Ibid, at p. 320 
28 ibid., at p. 325 
29 FIWum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land, loc. cit., no. 10, at p. at p. 150 
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inference: if the Board had thought it relevant to decide first with regard to the waiver of 
the provision making time of the essence to enable it to make a decision on granting relief 
against forfeiture, it should have referred to the arguments and made its position clear, 
especially where the point was so controversial between the parties and it had been 
referred to and dealt with by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal. 
This being so, the case might, it seems, provide another authority for the view that relief 
against forfeiture may be granted irrespective of the termination of the agreement for the 
purchaser's breach of an essential time stipulation. 
7.11 A shadow of doubt was cast on the development of the jurisdiction to relieve 
against forfeiture of the payer's interest in the property by the decisions of the Privy 
Council in Stee&nzm v. Drinkle 30 and Brickles v. SnelP, in which relief by decreeing 
specific performance was denied for the purchasers who had defaulted in payment of an 
instalment on the due date, time having been expressly made of the essence. In Stee&nan 
v. Drinkle 32 , 
in an agreement for the sale of land by instalments, it was, inter alia, 
provided that if the purchaser made default in punctual payment of any one instalment, 
the vendor would be entitled to terminate the contract, keep all payments already made, 
as liquidated damages, and retain all improvements made on the premises. Default having 
been made in the payment of the first instalment, the vendors cancelled the contract. The 
respondent, who was the purchasees assignee, tendered the instalment due by the time he 
received the notice of cancellation; but the appellant, who was the administer of the 
vendoes estate, refused to accept it. Drinkle, the respondent, then, brought an action 
claiming specific performance of the contract. The statement of claim, as it appears from 
the report, was as follows: 
"(I) Specific performance, or alternatively damages; (2) in the alternative 
that they should be relieved from the forfeiture (if any) of their rights and 
interests under the agreement, and of their equitable rights or interests in 
the land, upon terms. "33 
The appellant, Steedman, countercWmed for a declaration that the agreement had been 
30 [191611 AC 275 
31 [191612 AC 599 
32 [191611 AC 275 
33 Ibid., at p. 276 
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validly terminated. Newlands J., the judge at first instance, thought that, the time of 
payments being expressly made of the essence, he could not decree specific performance. 
He, however, offered the respondent an amendment of claim, so as to relieve him against 
forfeiture of moneys already paid. Drinkle, refusing this offer, successfully appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Saskatchewan which, reversing the decision of Newlands J., 
4 decreed specific performance, upon the authority of Kilmer v. British Columbd , on the 
term that the respondent should pay the amount due. The Privy Council held that the 
respondent should be relieved against forfeiture of moneys already paid, but he was not 
entitled to specific performance. The reason was that, though the forfeiture clause was in 
the nature of penalty against which the purchaser was entitled to be relieved, the Courts 
of Equity never granted specific performance where the parties have expressly made time 
of the essence. Viscount Haldane, delivering the judgment of the Board, stated: 
"Courts of Equity, which look at the substance as distinguished from the 
letter of agreements, no doubt exercise an extensive jurisdiction which 
enables them to decree specific performance ... . But they never exercise this jurisdiction where the parties have expressly intimated in their 
agreement that it is not to apply by providing that time is to be of the 
essence of their bargain. "35 
The Board explained Kilmer v. British Columbia"' on the ground that in that case the 
Board was of the view that the "time of the essence" provision had been waived, because 
the date of payment had once been extended which showed that, the Board said, "the 
stipulation had not been insisted on by the company". 37 
7.12 This case, and Brickles v. SnelPs in which the principle stated in Stee&nan v. 
Drinkle 39 was followed, might be regarded as authorities for the proposition that relief 
against forfeiture of the purchasees interest in property could not be granted where the 
purchasees breach is of a stipulation time of which has expressly been made of the 
34 Kilmer v. British Columbia Orchard Lands Ltd. [19131 AC 319 
35 [1916] 1 AC 275, at p. 279 
36 [1913] AC 319 
[191611 AC 275, at p. 279 
[191612 AC 599 
39 [1916] 1 AC 275 
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essence. ' If this proposition is correct, then a payer may only be relieved against 
forfeiture of his interest in the subject-matter, where the contract has not been terminated 
for his default of an essential time stipulation. It is, however, suggested that this view 
should not be maintained 41: Much was said 42 about the point that the explanation of 
Kilmer v. Brifish Columhie as a case in which the "time of the essence" stipulation had 
been waived could not be correct. Both the principle and the authorities support the view 
that the mere extension of time does not indicate the waiver of the essential character of 
the time. Furthermore, the facts of the case and the judgment of the Board do not in any 
way show that the parties had, expressly or implicitly, intended that the essential 
character of the time should cease to be applicable by an indulgence given by the vendor. 
It may, therefore, be suggested that the Kilmer case" was wrongly explained in Stee&nan 
v. DvIWW'; and the facts of the latter case falling within the principle stated in Kilmer, 
the Board could, and should, have granted relief by decreeing specific performance. 
7.13 In principle, fiirthermore, if it is accepted that there is an equitable jurisdiction to 
relieve the purchaser against forfeiture of his interest in the property where the forfeiture 
'40 See also Hedworth v. Jenwise Ltd. [1994] EGCS 133 where the Court of Appeal, relying on Steedman 
v. Drinkle (ibid. ), rdbsed to extend the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of the purchaser's interest 
in property to a case where the purchaser was in default of an essential contractual stipulation, though it 
assumed for the purpose of this case (but not deciding the point) the existence of the jurisdiction. see 
infra., para. 7.58; see also Collins H., The Law of Contract, (2nd ed., 1993), pp. 354-355 ; Pawlows)d 
a, Relief Against Forfeiture: Contracts for the Sale of Land (1995) 14 Litigation 135; Hogged B. K, 
Houses on the Never-Never (1975) 39 The Conveyancer and the Property Lawyer 343, at pp. 348-349 
41 See also Beale H., Unreasonable Deposits (1993) 109 LQR 524, at p. 526 ; Harpum C, Relief Against 
Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [19841 CLJ 134, at pp. 143-144,156 ; Hodkinson K., Specific 
Performance and Deposits (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 137, at pp. 140-141; Pawlowskiý loc. 
cit., no. 40, p. 144 ; Goode R. NE, Hire Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd ed., 1970, p. 383. In Hedworth 
v. Jenwise Ltd [1994] EGCS, 133, the Court of Appeal was prepared to assume the existence of the 
jurisdiction. see Jnfta., para. 7.58; see also the important decision of the High Court of Australia in 
Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406. In Australia, before this decision the prevailing view, relying 
mamly on Stee&nan v. Drinkle, was that courts had no power to grant relief against forfeiture of the 
payer's interest in the subject-matter resulting from termination for the payer's breach of an essential 
stipulation: see, e. g., Hoad v, Swan (1920) 28 CLR 258, at p. 264 ; Real Estate Securities Ltd. v. Kew 
GotfLinks Estate Ply. Ltd. [19351 VLR 114 ; Bull v. Gaul [1950] VLR 377, at p. 379 ; Petrie v. Dwyvr 
(1954) 91 CLR 99, at p. 105 ; see also Lang A., Forfeiture of Interests in Land, loc. cit., no. 10, p. 440 
42 Supra., pams. 7.07,7.10 
43 [1913] AC 319 
44 Kilmer v. British Columbia Orchard Lands Ltd. [ 19131 AC 319 
45 1191611 AC 275 
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clause is penal and/or the vendoes conduct in exercising his strict legal rights is harsh, 
vindictive and unconscionable, there should not be an open gate for the creditors to 
circumvent this equitable principle, by stipulating simply for the time of payments to be of 
the essence. Put another way, a vendor by making time of the essence, which may easily 
be attained in contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power, and by avoiding 
any indulgence which might be interpreted as the waiver of the essential character of time, 
could prevent the equitable principle of relief against forfeiture of the payer's interest in 
the subject-matter from being enforced. This could ruin the whole purpose behind the 
equitable jurisdiction of relief. Considering the policy reasons behind the jurisdiction, 
therefore, there seems to be no justification for refusing relief against forfeiture of an 
interest in the subject-matter where the contract is terminated for the payer's breach of an 
essential time stipulation. 
7.14 There have been some attempts to explain Stee&nan v. Drinkle46 and Brickles V. 
Sne/P as cases dealing with the issue of refief against forfeiture of moneys already paid. 
It has been suggested" that the purchasers in both cases claimed "relief against the 
forfeiture of instalments of purchase money". Thus, the decisions were not relevant to 
the different issue of the purchaser's right to be relieved against forfeiture of his interest in 
the property. Therefore, upon the authority of Kilmer v. British Columb&9 and Re 
Dagenham" casesý the court would be able to grant relief against forfeiture of the 
purchasees equitable interest in the property, even if the contract was terminated for the 
purchasers breach of an essential time stipulation. This explanation, however, runs 
counter to the facts of the case, as it has been reported. The claim, as quoted before5l, 
was expressly, inter alid, for specific performance. Furthermore, the judgments delivered 
in both cases show that the Board expressly refused to grant specific performance on the 
ground that such relief could not be granted after termination for the purchasees breach 
46 [1916] 1 AC 275 
47 [191612 AC 599 
" Mason and Deane JJ. in the Australian case of Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, at p. 445 
49 [1913] AC 319 
-50 Re Dagenhwn (77tames) Dock Co., ex parte Hulse (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022 
51 See supra., para. 7.11 
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of an essential time stipulation. The only possible view, it seems, is that these cases, as 
far as they decide that specific performance could not be decreed after breach of a 
stipulation of which time is of the essence, have wrongly been decided and should not be 
fonoWed. 52 
7.15 There appears, however, to be a problem which might seem difficult to be explained 
in principle: Where the agreement is terminated by the vendor for the purchaser's breach 
of an essential time stipulation, there, then, is no contract; i. e. the contractual relations of 
the parties, by the exercise of the right to terminate, have been brought to an end. The 
contract being at an end, how could the court grant specific performance or give extra 
time in order to enable the purchaser to perform his obligation? There, in fact, is no 
contractual obligation to be performed in the extra time given by the vendor. One 
possible answer is that the purchaser, asking to be relieved against forfeiture of his 
interest in the property, in fact, asks to be excused for his default. If the court grants 
such a request, Le. excuses the purchaser for his breach, then the termination of the 
contract could not be valid, and there could be no objection to the decree of specific 
performance. " This view, though it explains the problem raised above, may itself be 
subject to an objection: If, by granting relief against forfeiture of an interest in the 
property, the purchaser is excused for his breach, then there should be no consequence 
for the default, while in all cases regarding the issue, relief is given, in proper 
circumstances, upon terms that compensation should be made by the purchaser for the 
damages caused by the breach. The problem may, it appears, be explained in the 
following terms: where the "time of the essence" provision is attached to a forfeiture 
clause which amounts to a penalty, then the court by relieving against forfeiture, in fact, 
declares the "time of the essence" provision to be of no effect. Because just as the 
forfeiture clause cannot be enforceable in equity, the "time of the essence" provision 
attached to it, also, could not be relied upon by the vendor. Therefore, granting relief 
against forfeiture would mean that the "time of the essence" provision, as a part of the 
forfeiture clause is of no effect; and therefore the vendor, relying on that, could not 
52 See Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land, loc. cit., no. 10, at p. 151 
33 FlaMtUM, ibid. 
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validly terminate the agreement. The contract remaining on foot, there would be no 
objection to the decree of specific performance; and the default having been made by the 
purchaser, this should be conditioned upon the compensation being made by the 
purchaser. 
7.16 There is at least one more case which supports the existence of a wider jurisdiction 
to relieve against forfeiture of property. In Starside Properties Ltd v. Mustapha 34, in an 
agreement for the sale of a house by instalments, it was provided that if the purchaser was 
in arrears with her payments for more than 14 days, the vendors would be entitled to 
terminate the contract and forfeit all the sums paid by the purchaser, and she would also 
have to vacate the property. The purchaser falling into arrears, the vendors terminated 
the contract and brought an action against her in the County Court claiming possession, a 
declaration that the contract had been validly terminated, and that they had the right to 
retain all moneys paid by the purchaser. The judge at first instance held that the forfeiture 
clause was in the nature of penalty. Making an order for possession, therefore, he 
postponed his order for three months in order to give the purchaser time to raise money 
and buy the property at the contracted price. Three days before the expiry of this time, 
the purchaser applied for an order requesting an extension of her time for eight more 
weeks. The judge refused the application on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to 
extend the granted time by revising his previous order. On appeal, the Court of Appeal 
held that in a proper case and where the justice of the case required, the court had 
jurisdiction to extend the time first granted to relieve the purchaser from forfeiture. The 
case indirectly illustrates that, even after termination, the court has the power to grant 
relief against forfeiture of property. It is not clear from the reports whether the time of 
payment stipulation which was breached by the purchaser was of the essence, though it 
has been suggested that it almost certainly was. 55 However, the contract had clearly been 
terminated for the purchaser's breach. The case, therefore, provides an authority for the 
view that relief against forfeiture of an interest in property could be granted even after the 
contract had validly been terminated for the purchaser's breach. 
m [1974] 1 WLR 816, [197412 All ER 567; see Fairest P B, Equitable Relief Against Penalties [1974] 
CIJ 12 
'55 Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land, loc. cit., no. 10, at p. 155, citing 
309 
3. The Scope of the Jurisdiction 
3.1. General Consideradons 
7.17 A review of cases relevant to the issue shows much controversy with regard to the 
scope of the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of property. Whether the jurisdiction 
is limited to the special type of cases, whether it is available after breach of covenants 
other than payment of a certain sum of money, and, on the whole, whether the 
jurisdiction is an unlimited and unfettered jurisdiction or there are some limitations, and 
also the issue of the existence of the jurisdiction in cases not concerning an interest in 
land are the issues which have often been discussed in cases, and will be dealt with in this 
section. It will be shown that although the jurisdiction cannot be regarded as an unlimited 
and unfettered power for the courts, it should not yet be considered as limited to the 
breach of covenants concerning only with payment of money. It may also be invoked and 
applied where the forfeiture in question is not a forfeiture of an interest in land, but a 
forfeiture of the payer's interest in personal property. A good and comprehensive 
consideration of the subject has been provided by the House of Lords in the leading and 
important case of Shiloh Spinners Lid v. Hardine6. We will proceed with a careful 
consideration of the principles laid down in this case. 
3.2. Availability of Relief after Breach of Covenants other than Payment of 
Money 
7.18 In the Shiloh Spinners case, it was expressly emphasized that the jurisdiction had 
not been confined to the special type of cases, though, in practice, it had been commonly 
57 
exercised with regard to cases of mortgages and leases. Lord Wilberforce , in the course 
of his judgment, stated: 
"There cannot be any doubt that from the earliest times courts of equity 
have asserted the right to relieve against the forfeiture of property. The 
jurisdiction has not been confined to any particular type of case. The 
commonest instances concerned mortgages, giving rise to the equity of 
redemption, and leases, which commonly contained re-entry clauses; but 
other instances are found in relation to copyholds, or where the forfeiture 
Harold WoodBrick Co. Ltd. v. Ferris [1933] 2 KB 198, in which there was a similar provision. 
-" [1973] AC 691 
-11 With whom Viscount Dithorne, Lord Pearson and Lord KUbrandon concurred. 
310 
was in the nature of a penalty. "" 
Referring to the fluctuation of authority regarding the self-limitation on this equitable 
power, his lordship added: 
"There has not been much difficulty as regards two heads of jurisdiction. 
First, where it is possible to state that the object of the transaction and of 
the insertion of the right to forfeit is essentially to secure the payment of 
money, equity has been willing to relieve on terms that the payment is 
made with interest, if appropriate, and also costs. ... 
Secondly, there were 
the heads of fraud, accident, mistake or surprise, always a ground for 
equity's intervention, the inclusion of which entailed the exclusion of mere 
inadvertence and afo? Wori of wilful defaults. "" 
As it appears from the passage quoted above, other than the heads of fraud, accident, 
mistake or surprise, the jurisdiction was widely exercised where the forfeiture was 
occasioned by the breach of a covenant for the payment of a sum of money. 
7.19 The prevailing view was that relief could not be granted for breach of covenants 
other than payment of a certain sum of money. 60 The reason for this view was that relief 
should be granted upon compensation being made by the contract-breaker, and since in 
breach of covenants for payment of money, the liability of the party in breach was readily 
calculable, the compensation could easily be made and the relief, therefore, was available; 
while in case of other breaches of covenants, damages could not easily be computed and 
the supervision of court for the steps to be taken for compensation was also practically 
impossible. 61 
Lord Wilberforce, however, reviewing the previous authorities, argued that the denial of 
relief in the previous cases, such as Hill v. BardeV 2, was because the breach there was a 
Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973] AC 691, at p. 722 
Ibid. 
60 See, e. g., Wadman v. Calcraft (1804) 10 Ves 67,32 ER 768; Hill v. BarcW (1811) 18 Ves 56,34 ER 
238; Bracebridge v. Buckley (1816) 2 Price 200 ; Barrow v. Isaacs & Son [1891] 1 QB 417; see also 
Baker P V, Snell's Equity, 29th ed., 1990, p. 542, Meagher, Gununow & Lehane, loc. cit., no. 5, para. 
1805 
Key U. in Barrow v. Isaacs & Son [1891) 1 QB 417 favoured this reasoning in the following terms: 
"... it was soon recognized that there would be great difficulty in estimating the proper amount of 
compensation; and, since the decision of Lord Eldon L. C. in Hill v. Barclay it has always been held that 
equity would not relieve, merely on the ground that it could give compensation, upon breach of any 
covenant in a lease except the covenant for payment of rent. " at p. 425; see also Meagher, Gummow & 
Lehaw, loc. cit., no. 5, para. 1805 
62 (1811) 18 Ves 56,34 ER 238 
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wffW breach. 63 He also rejected, as a reason for denying relief, the impossibility for the 
courts of supervising the work which should be done as compensation, "foe' he argued 
"what the court has to do is to satisfy itseI4 ex post facto, that the covenanted work has 
been done, and it has ample machinery, through certificates, or by enquiry, to do precisely 
thW'. " IEs lordship concluded: 
"I would fully endorse this: it remains true today that equity expects men 
to carry out their bargains and will not let them buy their way out by 
uncovenanted payment. But it is consistent with the principle that we 
should reaffirm the right of courts of equity in appropriate and limited 
cases to relieve against forfeiture for breach of covenant or condition 
where the primary object of the bargain is to secure a stated result which 
can effectively be attained when the matter comes before the court, and 
where the forfeiture provision is added by way of security for the 
production of that result. ""' 
This clearly shows that, regardless of whether the covenant breached by the payee is for 
the payment of money, courts may have jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of 
property provided that the forfeiture provision had been inserted to secure a stated result 
which can effectively be attained when the matter comes before the court. 66 
7.20 One important prerequisite for the existence of the jurisdiction, therefore, is that the 
forfeiture clause must be added to secure a stated result, and this result must be attainable 
if the matter comes before the court. The recent decision of the Court of Chancery 
Division in Nutting v. BaldVViW7 is a good illustration of a case not falling within the test 
provided by Lord Wilberforce, for the object of the forfeiture provision, though it was to 
secure a stated result, was not subsequently attainable: Under the rules of an association 
of individuals formed to co-ordinate and finance certain legal proceedings, the committee 
63 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973] AC 69 1, at pp. 722-723 
' Ibid., at p. 724 
65 Ibid. 
66 It should be born in n-dnd that, even in the 19th century when the jurisdiction was narrowly exercised, 
there were some statutory provisions which empowered the courts to grant relief against forfeiture of 
leases for breach of covenants and conditions (Section 146, Law of Property Act 1925 now contains the 
important part of those provisions), but until the decision of the House of Lords in the Shiloh Spinner 
caw, the existence of the equitable jurisdiction to grant relief against forfeiture of leases for breach of 
covenants other than payment of a certain sum of money was doubtful. Thus, the cases not falling within 
the statutory jurisdiction will now remain subject to the equitable jurisdiction. (see Meagher, Gummow & 
Lehane, loc. cit., no. 5, para. 1808 ; Baker, Snell's Equity, 29th ed., 1990, p. 543) 
67 [1995] 1 WLR 201 
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of the association had the power to declare any member to be a defaulting member if 
he/she failed, inter afid, to pay any additional subscription fees which had been levied by 
the committee and supported by a resolution of the majority of two-thirds of members 
present at the general meeting. The effect of such a declaration, under rule 9, was to 
deprive a defaulting member of any share in recoveries, i. e. the fruits of any proceedings 
brought in the names of members. The defendants, having failed to pay the additional 
subscription fees, were declared to be defaulting members. Subsequently two actions, 
brought by the association, were compromised by an agreement under which the 
association was agreed to be paid a sum of 11 16m. In an action by the committee, 
seeking declarations that the defendants had been defaulting members and the association 
had the right and power to distribute the recoveries between the members other than the 
defaulting members, the court was asked to determine, inter afid, whether it had 
jurisdiction to relieve the defaulting members against forfeiture of their rights to share in 
the proceeds of actions brought by the association. Rattee J. - arguing that a member's 
interest, by virtue of rule 9, to share in the benefits of recoveries is a proprietary interest, 
and depriving him from this interest as the result of his failure to pay the subscription fees 
on time is a forfeiture- held that the court had no jurisdiction to relieve the defaulting 
members from such a forfeiture: The forfeiture provision had been inserted to secure a 
stated result, but that result was impossible to be attained when the matter came before 
the court. Rattee J. stated: 
"... the object of the rules of the association was to achieve a situation in 
which the rights of action of all the members against the Lloyd's agents 
were enforced together for the benefit of all the members at the shared risk 
of all the members .... To allow a member who has not undertaken his 
share of the risk by paying his subscriptions on time to come in after the 
litigation has been successfully concluded, so that there is no longer any 
risk, and still share in the fruits of the litigation on payment of his overdue 
subscription would, in my judgment, undermine rather than attain the 
,, 68 object of the forfeiture provision against which relief is sought ... 
3.3. Unlimited or Unfettered Jurisdiction? 
7.21 The decision of the House of Lords in the Shiloh Spinners case demonstrates the 
existence of the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of property for breach 
of covenant or condition in "appropriate and limited" cases. There was, however, a more 
a' Ibid., at p. 2 10 
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liberal view expressed by Lord Simon of Glaisdale who held: 
6'... equity has an unlimited and unfettered jurisdiction to relieve against 
contractual forfeitures and penalties. , 69 
His lordship regarded the limitations to the jurisdiction as considerations which the court 
should weigh in order to decide whether it should exercise its unfettered jurisdiction. He 
called them as internal considerations, rather than any external limits on the jurisdiction. 
Though this view is, in effect, close to the approach taken by the majority, his theoretical 
approach towards the scope of the jurisdiction has not been followed by any other judges 
in subsequent cases. 
3.4. Availability of the jurisdiction In cases not conceming land 
7.22 The jurisdiction has not been confined to the cases concerning land, and it might be 
exercisable with regard to hiring or lease of chattels. 70 In Barton Yhompson and Co. Lid 
v. Stapling Machines Co . 
71, in a contract for the lease of certain machines, it was 
provided that in case of breach of any term of the agreement, the lessors were entitled to 
terminate the contract if the lessees had failed to remedy the breach within 30 days of the 
service of a notice requiring that. The lessees having failed to make payments due under 
the contract, and to comply with a notice requiring payment, the lessors terminated the 
agreement. On the same day the lessees issued an originating summons seeking relief 
from forfeiture. Pennycuick J., having considered the arguments of the parties, held: 
"I am not prepared to hold that it is plain and obvious as a matter of law 
that in the absence of unconscionable behaviour the court has in no 
circumstances power to relieve against forfeiture under any conceivable 
lease of a chattel. This is, I think, a point which the plaintiff should be 
allowed to argue if his case is otherwise maintainable, 02 
This view which implies the existence of the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of 
property other than an interest in land relied upon and apparently approved by Edmund 
Davies U. in Starside Properties Lid v. Mustaphal. 
69 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973] AC 691, at p. 726 
70 See Mea&U, Gummow & Lehane, Equity Doctrines & Remedies, loc. cit., no. 5, p. 42 1, Keeton G W, 
Equity, 2nd. ed., 1976, p. 316; Baker, Snell's Equity, 29th ed., 1990, p, 542 ; Lang A 0, loc. cit., no. 10, 
p. 431; Clarke MJR, Commentary on "Contract Planning: Liquidated Damages, Deposits and 
Foresecability Rule, by Prof. Furmston" (1991) 4 JCL 11, at p. 14 
71 [1966] 1 Ch. 499 
72 Ibid., at p. 509 
73 [1974) 2 All ER 567, [1974] 1 WLR 816, at p. 822 
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7.23 In Slockloser v. Johnson74, Romer L. J., considering the hypothetical case of a 
purchaser who buys a necklace by instalments on terms that if he defaults in the payment 
of a single instalment, he has to return the necklace and forfeit all the instalments paid, 
said: 
"It would certainly seem hard that the purchaser should lose both the 
necklace and all previous instalments owing to his inability to pay the last 
one. ... 
The court would, doubtless, ... give 
him further time to find the 
money if he could establish some probability of his being able to do so 
t&75 
This hypothetical example, though it has no authoritative force, shows the tendency that 
relief against forfeiture of property should be available in case of sale of chattels by 
instalments. 
7.24 The position has neatly been summarized by Dillon L. J. in the rather recent case of 
BICC Pic. v. Burndy Corp. 76, where he, considering the previous cases, said: 
"There is no clear authority, but for my part I find it difficult to see why 
the jurisdiction of equity to grant relief against forfeiture should only be 
available where what is liable to forfeiture is an interest in land and not an 
interest in personal property. Relief is only available where what is in 
question is forfeiture of proprietary or possessory rights, but I see no 
reason in principle for drawing a distinction as to the type of property in 
which the rights subsist. "77 
This passage was relied upon and described as the "underlying principle" in the recent 
case of Transag Haulage Ltd v. Leyland DAF Finance p1c . 
79. In this case, in three hire- 
purchase agreements for the hire of three vehicles, it was provided by the clause 13(o 
that if a receiver should be appointed for the hirer's assets, the owner would be entided to 
terminate the contracts; and upon termination, retake the possession of the vehicles. The 
hirer, in such a case, was also obliged to pay the whole instalments remaining unpaid less 
the value of the repossessed vehicles. The hirer, having gone into administrative 
receivership, the owner terminated the agreements. The hirer brought an action seeking 
74 [1954] 1 QB 476, [1954] 1 All ER 630, at pp. 644-645 
75 Jbid, at p. 644 
76 [198511 All ER 417, [19851 Ch. 232 
77 jbid, at pp. 427-428 and p. 251 respectively 
78 [ 199412 BCLC 88 
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either a declaration that clause 13(f) was void as a penalty or relief from forfeiture of his 
interest in the agreements. Knox I held that the right to repossess the vehicles upon 
termination did not constitute a penalty. However, he considered the loss of the hirer's 
probable right to buy the vehicles under the agreements as the forfeiture of a proprietary 
right and held that the court had jurisdiction to relieve against such a forfeiture. 
Considering the conditions to exercise such a jurisdiction, the learned judge found the 
case as a suitable one for granting relief, and therefore relieved the hirer from forfeiture of 
his interest in the subject-matter on condition that the outstanding instalments should be 
paid to the owners within seven days. The decision in this case is important from 
different aspects which will be considered in its place; but for the time being, it is 
sufficient to be noted that the case does clearly confirm the existence of the jurisdiction to 
relieve against forfeiture in cases concerning an interest in personal property. 
4. The Limits of the Jurisdiction 79 
7.25 Though the jurisdiction of courts to grant relief against forfeiture of property has 
not been confined to any special type of case"', considering the purpose and nature of 
relief available, the courts have set a series of limitations on their equitable power. 
Although the principle as to the existence of the jurisdiction is a well-established one, 
"there has7', in the words of Lord Wilberforce, "undoubtedly been some fluctuation of 
authority as to the self-limitation to be imposed or accepted on this power. ""' The reason 
behind these self-limitations would seem to be that the exercise of the jurisdiction runs 
counter to the principle of freedom of contract: A court by granting relief against 
forfeiture, in fact, prevents the enforcement of an express contractual tenn. The courts, 
therefore, have tried to step within the boundaries of a well-defined equity, and confine 
themselves to these boundaries. That is why it has sometimes been suggested that the 
79 Drawing a definite line between the scope and the limits of the jurisdiction is extremely difficult: one 
view may be that any point relating to the existence of the jurisdiction should be discussed as an i 
relating to the scope of the jurisdiction, whereas points regarding the exercise of an existent jurisdiction 
sbould be considered as a relevant issue in the "limits of the jurisdictioe. In this sense, the scope of the 
jurisdiction will be responsible for the jurisdictionary points, while the lin-dts of the jurisdiction will focus 
on the discretionary points. In this study, I have tried to discuss any point which could incontrovertibly 
be regarded as a jurisdictionary point in the "scope of the jurisdiction", and left the matters which may be 
controversial from the point of view of being jurisdictionary or discretionary to "the limits of the 
jurisdictioe. 
80 Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding [19731 AC691, per Lord Wilberforce at p. 722, see supm, pam. 7.18 
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court should not make, in the words of Lawton L. J., "its decision by what it considers to 
be the length of the chancellor's foot, nor by taking on the role of a fussing judicial nanny 
seeking to protect the improvident from their folly by entering into disadvantageous 
contracts. vM 
7.26 The limits to the jurisdiction will be discussed by reference to the following criteria: 
First, the nature of the debtor's interest in the subject-matter; second, availability of relief 
after termination for breach of an essential time stipulation; third, availability of relief in 
commercial contracts. 
4.1. The Debtor's Proprietary orPossessoty Interest 
7.27 Relief against forfeiture of property is normally, in a proper case, granted by 
decreeing specific performance or giving the contract-breaker extra time to remedy his 
breach. It can, therefore, be possible in a contract which could specifically be performed. 
If, therefore, a contract is not capable of specific performance, the court will normally not 
be prepared to extend the jurisdiction to such an agreement. A contract for services, for 
example, which does not transfer any proprietary or possessory right to the debtor is a 
contract in respect of which the courts have always disclaimed any jurisdiction to decree 
specific performance-83 With regard to such a contract, thus, if a contractual tem 
provides for the withdrawal of services in case of breach of any contractual stipulation by 
14 the debtor, the court will have no jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Starside Properties Ltd v. Mustapha [1974] 1 WLR 816, at p. 826 
83 See the speech of Lord Diplock in &andinavian Trading Co. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (7he 
Scaptrade) [198312 AC 694, at pp. 700-701, citing Clarke v. Price (1819) 2 Wils. 157 ; Lumley v. 
Wagner (1852) 1 De G. M. & G. 604. The absolute emphasize in Lord Diplock's words has been slightly 
criticized by some writers: "It is perhaps putting it too high that the courts have always disclaimed 
jurisdiction to gmnt order for specific performance of contracts involving the rendering of services: see 
the comments of Megany J. in CH. Giles & Co. Ltd. v. Morris [1972] 1 WLR 307,318-319. There is no 
doubt, however, that as a general rule no order for specific performance of a contract to render services, 
e. g. the supply of a ship and its crew, can be obtained. " Thompson, J. Ni (1983) 99 LQR 489 
84 See Furmston M P, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract, 13th ad., 1996, p. 643; Chitty on 
Contracts, 27th ad., vol. 1,1994, para. 20-070; Guest A G, Benjan-dn's Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, p. 
795; Downes T A, Textbook on Contract, 3rd ed., 1993, p. 334; Collins H., The Law of ContracL 2nd 
ed., 1993, p. 355; Harpurn C., loc. cit., no. 10, at pp. 167-169; Thompson, J. M. (1983) 99 LQR 489; 
Carter J W, Breach of Contmct, 2nd ed., 1991, para. 1065; Lang A, loc. cit., no. 10, at pp. 431-433 
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4.1.1. Development of the Limitation: Time Charterp" Cases 
7.28 This limitation to the jurisdiction has developed through time charterparty cases, 
otherwise than by demise. A time charterparty is a contract to render services which 
confers no proprietary or possessory interest upon the charterer. In the words of Lord 
Diplock, "A time charter, unless it is a charter by den-ýise, ... transfers to the charterer no 
interest in or right to possession of the vessel; it is a contract for services to be rendered 
to the charterer by the shipowner through the use of the vessel by the shipowner's own 
servants, the master and the crew, acting in accordance with such directions as to the 
cargoes to be loaded and the voyages to be undertaken as by the terms of the charterparty 
the charterer is entitled to give to thern. "85 
It is common for these charterparties to contain a withdrawal clause which provides for 
the right of the owner to withdraw the vessel from the charterer's service, if he defaults in 
the punctual payment of the hiring charge. A clause, called as an "anti-technicality 
clause7, also sometimes appears in these contracts. This clause provides for the necessity 
of the service of a notice before the shipowner can exercise his right under the withdrawal 
clause. Until the decision of the House of Lords in The ScapirWe", it was controversial 
whether the court had jurisdiction to grant relief against the operation of a withdrawal 
clause in a time charterparty. The obiter dicta of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Ae 
Laconia" lent support to the view that the court had such a jurisdiction, though in the 
case itself, the House did not accept the point to be taken in the appeal, since it had not 
been raised in the courts below. He arrived at this conclusion mainly by an analogy 
between the possibility of relief in respect of the operation of a withdrawal clause in a 
time charterparty and the relief against forfeiture of leases for non-payment of rent. 
7.29 In Yhe Afovos", Lloyd J., who had been counsel for the charterers in 7he 
33 Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatorlana (Fhe Scaptrade) [198312 AC 694, 
at p. 700 
86 scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) [1983] 2 AC 694 
87 Mardof Peach & Co. Ltd. v. Attica Sea Carriers Corporation of Liberia [ 1977] AC 850, at pp. 873- 
874 
88 Afovos Shipping Co. M v. Pagnan and Vi, (The Afovos) [ 1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 469 
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Laconia 99 , was the judge of the commercial court, and held that such a jurisdiction did 
e3dst. On appealý*, the House of Lords decided the case on the ground that the 
withdrawal notice, upon the true interpretation of the "anti-technicality clause", was 
invalid, and the question of availability of the jurisdiction to grant relief was not, 
therefore, discussed. 
7.30 However, in The Sciptrad? ', the House expressly disclaimed any jurisdiction to 
grant relief against forfeiture with regard to the operation of a withdrawal clause in a time 
charterparty. In fact, though the word "forfeiture" was sometimes used to describe the 
withdrawal of services from the charterer-92, it could not be a precise description; for such 
a contract did not transfer any proprietary or possessory interest in the vessel to the 
charterer. Therefore, upon termination of the agreement, there was no conceivable 
interest for the charterer to be forfeited by the shipowner. Put another way, there was no 
"forfeiture' relief from which could be discussed. 93 
Lord Diplock, delivering the main judgment of the House, argued that a time charterparty 
could not be analogous to a lease, for a time charter is only a contract for providing 
services, and transfers no interest in the vessel to the charterers. He, then, added: 
"To grant an injunction restraining the shipowner from exercising his right 
of withdrawal of the vessel from the service of the charterer, though 
negative in form, is pregnant with an affirmative order to the shipowner to 
peiform the contract; juristically it is indistinguishable from a decree for 
specific ptiformance of a contract to render services; and in respect of that 
category of contracts, even in the event of breach, this is a remedy that 
English courts have always disclaimed any jurisdiction to grant. "94 
7.31 The counsel for the charterers had relied upon the principle, stated by Lord 
89 [19771 AC 850 
90 [198311 All ER 449 
91 Scandinavian D-ading Tanker Co. v. Rota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (Ae Scaptrade) [ 1983) 2 AC 694 
92 See, e. g., TankeVress Als v. Compagnie Finan Ciere Beige des Petroles S. A. [The Petrofina] 119491 
AC 76, at p. 99 ; MardorfPeach & Co. Ltd. v. Attica Sea Carriers Corporation of Liberia Me Laconia] 
[1977] AC 850, at p. 874 
93 It may also be noted that in the Scaptrade and other litigated time charterparty cases, no forfeiture of 
money was also involved, because no money had in fact been paid by the charterer. 
94 Scandinavian Traft Tanker Co. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) [1983] 2 AC 694, 
at p. 701 
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Wilberforce in Shiloe, that where the withdrawal clause had been inserted to secure a 
stated result which could effectively be attained when the matter came before the court, 
the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture would, in "appropriate" circumstances, exist. 
Lord Diplock citing Lord Wilberforce's speech in Yhe Laconia" where he had pointed 
out the difference between a time charter and a lease of land, considered that this 
principle had no application to a contract for the provision of services which transfers no 
proprietary or possessory right. Flis lordship also argued that the purpose of a 
withdrawal clause in a time charterparty was not to secure the payment of hire. The 
payment of hire is a means to provide a fund for running and manning the vesse197 Without 
which the provision of the proposed services to the charterer will practically be 
impossible. 
7.32 Moreover, Lord Diplock referred to some policy reasons for refusing to create such 
a jurisdiction. Approving the observations of Robert Goff L. J. in the Court of Appeal", 
his lordship referred to the availability of legal advice to the parties in such contracts, and 
the necessity of speed and certainty in commercial transactions. He, then, pointed out 
that the creation of any jurisdiction to grant relief would require the detailed examination 
of all facts and surrounding circumstances which would be against the requirements of 
speed and certgnty 
The case is an authority for the view that the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of 
property can e)dst only in contracts which involve the transfer of proprietary or 
possessory rights. More recently Rattee I in Nutting v. Baldwi?? 9 was in no doubt that 
the jurisdiction should be limited to cases which involved forfeiture of a proprietary or 
possessory interest. In his view, however, the "beneficial interest" of each member of a 
certain association to share the proceeds of certain claims brought on behalf of the 
95 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973] AC691, at p. 724 
96 [1977] AC 850 
97 Scandinavian Trading Tanker CO. v. F70ta Petrolera Ecualoriama (The Scaptrade) [198312 AC 694, 
at p. 702 
96 [1983] QB 529, at pp. 540-541 
99 [1995] 1 WLR 201, the facts of the Case have already been given: supra., para. 7.20 
320 
members could be regarded as a proprietary interest. 100 Therefore, in any contract for the 
provision of services, e. g. a time charterparty otherwise than by demise, such a 
jurisdiction would not be available. 
4.1.2. Hirer's proprietary interest in a hire-purchase agreement: availability of 
relief 
7.33 Although an option to purchase had long ago been regarded as a proprietary 
interest'01, the issue of the availability of relief against forfeiture of the hirer's interest in 
the subject-matter was not quite clear. The situation can be summarized as follows: In a 
hire-purchase agreement, it is commonly provided that upon the failure of the hirer to 
make payments punctually, or to observe his other undertakings, the owner would, inter 
afta, be entitled to terminate the contract, retake possession of the subject-matter, and 
retain all the instalments already paid. Now, if the hirer is ready, able and willing to pay 
the outstanding balance of the instalments with interest, is there any case for him to be 
relieved against forfeiture of his interest in the subject-matter? 
7.34 Until the recent decision of the Chancery Division in Transag Haulage Ltd v. 
Leyland DAF Finance PIc. '02, the point was subject to a large controversy. 103 On the 
100 Ibid., at p. 209, where Rattee J. held: "... by virtue of rule 9 each member was left with a proprietary 
interest in the form of his beneficial interest under the trust declared by that rule. " 
101 See London and South Western Railway Co. v. Gomm (1881) 20 CIL D. 562, where Jessel M. R. 
stated: -Tbe right to call for a conveyance of the land is an equitable interest or equitable estate. In the 
ordinary case of a contract for purchase there is no doubt about this, and an option for purchase is not 
different in its nature. A person exercising the option has to do two things, he has to give notice of his 
intention to purchase, and to pay the purchase money; but as far as the man who is liable to convey is 
concerned, his estate or interest is taken away from him without his consent and the right to take it away 
being vested in another, the covenant giving the option must give that other an interest in the land. " at p. 
581; see also Mackay v. Wilson (1947) 47 S. X (N. S. W. ) 315, at p. 325 per Street J.; Imperial Chemical 
Industries Ltd v. Su&vnan (Unreported) May 28,1976 per Oliver J. (cited in Pritchard v. Briggs [ 198011 
Ch. 338, at p. 391); Pritchard v. Briggs, ! bid., per Goff LJ at pp. 388-389. A right of pre-emption (often 
called a right of first refiLW) is not, on the contrary, regarded as a proprietary interest- see Pritchard v. 
Briggs, ibid., per Goff IJ at pp. 389,394,399, and per Ternpleman LJ at p. 418; see also Megarry, Sir 
Robert & Thompson M. P., Megarry's Manual of the Law of Real Property, 7th ed., (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1993), p. 66 
102 [1994] 2 BCLC 88 
103 See Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed., vol. 2,1994, para. 36-273 at pp. 637-638 ; Goode R. M., Hire- 
Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd ed., 1970, pp. 382-383 ; Diamond A L, Equitable Relief for the 
Purchaser of Hire-Purchase Goods (1956) 19 MLR 498 ; Prince E J, Equitable Relief in the Law of Hire- 
Purchase (1957) 20 MLR 620 ; Diamond, Equitable Relief in Hire-Purchase: A Rejoinder (1958) 21 
M LR 199 
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one hand, some cases'04- which, without any reference to the equitable relief, had 
approved the right of the owner to retake possession of the subject-matter and retain 
moneys already paid- were cited as supporting the view that such a jurisdiction did not 
exist. it was, on the other hand, arguedo' that these cases provided no authority for the 
view, for they all had been decided purely on common law principles, and without any 
reference to the equitable power of the courts. Furthermore, considering the economic 
realities of the hire-purchase agreements, and the real object for these contracts, there 
was no reason to differentiate between them and contracts for sale of goods, so far as the 
equitable power of the court to grant relief against forfeiture was concerned'06. 
107 7.35 In the recent case, the facts of which have previously been given , Knox J., 
discussing the general issues about the equitable jurisdiction of relief against forfeiture of 
property and its availability as to the forfeiture of an interest in personal chattels, 
reaffirmed that the probable right of the hirer to buy the subject-matter as the final 
process of the contract in a hire-purchase agreement is, in fact, a proprietary right which 
against its forfeiture, in proper circumstances, the hirer may be relieved. The learned 
judge said: 
"The only forfeiture that I can discern in the case before me where no 
claim is being made in respect of past payments by company is the loss of 
the contingent right to buy the goods for 15 under cl. 24. ... In my view, 
although that right was then subject to that contingency, it can 
nevertheless be truthfully said that there was a forfeiture of proprietary or 
possessory rights and not merely contractual rights, Even a contingent 
'0' See, e. g., Cramer v. Giles (1883) Cab. & Ell. 151 ; Brooks v. Beirnstein [1909] 1 KB 98 ; South 
Bedfordshire Electrical Finance, Ltd. V. Bryant [193813 All ER 580 ; Campbell v. The Official Assignee 
of Buckman (1909) 28 N2LR 875 ; cf. Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Co. v. Charters (1882) 21 NBR 
480 where in an agreement for the hire-purchase of a sewing machine, after the hirer's defaWt in paying 
the monthly instalments and upon tendering the payments due by the hirer before arty action on behalf of 
the owner, it was held that even though the property in goods did not vest in the hirer before the payment 
of the whole instalments, the tender of the unpaid instalments; before action would prevent the owner 
from repossession. 
105 Diamond, Equitable Relief in Hire-purchase (1958) 21 hILR 199, at p. 200 
106 Diamond, Equitable Relief for the Purchaser of Hire-purchase Goods (1956) 19 NLR 499, where he 
said: "... although a true hire purchase agreement is not a contract of sale, it does contain an element of 
sale imported by the option to purchase. It is therefore submitted that for this purpose the difference 
between a hire-purchase agreement and a contract for the sale of goods is not of importance. There is, it 
is suggested, a tendency for the courts to apply similar rules wherever possible. " at p. 504 ; see also 
Diamond (1958) 21 hUR 199 
117 See supra., para. 7.24 
322 
right to exercise an option appears to me to be properly described as a 
4proprietary right'. "'Os 
The case, therefore, can be considered as a reconfirmation of and an authority for the 
view that the hirer's contingent interest in the subject-matter is a proprietary interest, and 
that the courts can, in proper circumstances, assume jurisdiction to relieve the hirer 
against forfeiture of that interest, on the condition, of course, that the hirer would be 
ready, able and willing to pay the outstanding balance of the instalments with interest and 
costs. 
4.1.3. The trend to extend the scope of the limitation 
7.36 A tendency to confine further the scope of the jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture of property does clearly appear from the decision of the House of Lords in 
Sport Internadonal Bussum VI v. Inter-Footwear Dd. '09. The case concerned an 
agreement embodied in a consent order under which the licences to use certain names and 
trademarks were granted to the defendant. The defendant agreed to pay certain sum of 
money in three instalments, and to furnish guarantees for the second and third instalments 
immediately upon the payment of each previous instalment. It was also provided that 
upon any failure by the defendant to pay on the due date or to provide guarantees, the 
whole outstanding balance would become due; and the licences would terminate. The 
defendant having failed in furnishing the second guarantee, the plaintiffs brought an action 
claiming the whole outstanding balance and seeking a declaration that the licence had 
been terminated. The judge at first instance, accepting the claim, rejected any jurisdiction 
to relieve against forfeiture. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. On appeal to the 
House of Lords, dismissing the appeal, the House held that the case was not a suitable 
one in which to define the boundaries of the equitable relief against forfeiture, and since 
the facts of the case did not fall within the recognized boundaries, so the equitable 
jurisdiction could not be applied in this case. 
7.37 The only judgment, given by Lord Templeman, is rather ambiguous: It is not clear 
whether his lordship disclaims the jurisdiction or does not see the case as an appropriate 
one to exercise the jurisdiction. In the course of his judgment, he relied on the 
106 Transag Haulage Ltd. v. Leyland DAF Finance PIc. [ 199412 BCLC 88, at p. 99 
109 [1994] 1 VAR 776, [1984) 2 All ER 321 
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observations of Oliver L. J. in the Court of Appeall'o with regard to the importance of 
certainty in such commercial agreements"', and argued that the conduct of the plaintiffs 
in terminating the agreement could not be considered as unconscionable or oppressive. 112 
These might be taken as indications that the House did not find the case as an appropriate 
one to exercise the jurisdiction. On the other hand, his lordship rejected the reliance 
placed by the counsel for the defendants on the famous principle stated by Lord 
Wilberforce in the Shiloh Spinners case"', holding that this principle had been confined 
by the House in 77w Scaptradel 14 to contracts concerning transfer of proprietary or 
possessory rights. This might imply that, in his lordship's view, the licences to use certain 
trade marks and names did not create proprietary or possessory right, though he did not 
expressly mention this point, and merely declared his reluctance to extend the equitable 
jurisdiction of relief beyond the recognized boundaries. "' When the case was considered 
in the subsequent case of BICC pic v. BUMdY C07P. 116 , Diflon 
L. J. appeared to have 
understood it as a case not concerning proprietary or possessory rights. ' 17 Some 
commentators also interpreted the decision of the House to refuse the equitable relief to 
be "on the ground", inter alia, "that the contractual licence to use a trade mark was not 
the kind of possessory interest for which relief from forfeiture would be given". "" 
7.38 The decision of the House, in addition to its ambiguity, seems to be subject to a 
"' [1984] 1 All ER 376, at p. 384 
111 [198412 All ER 321, at p. 325 
112 "The inclusion of Cl 13 in the contract and the reliance of Sl [the plaintiffs] on that clause do not 
constitute conduct which can be stigmatised as oppressive or unconscionable" ibid, at p. 324 
113 Shiloh SpinnerS Ltd v. Harding [1973] AC 691, where he pointed out that the courts may relieve 
against forfeiture where the forfeiture clause had been inserted to secure a suted result which could 
effectively be attained when the matter comes before the court. at p. 724; see supra., para. 7.19 
114 Scandinavian Trading Tar*er Co. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana Me Scaptrade) [198312 AC 694 
11-5 [199412 All ER 321, at p. 325 where his lordship said: "Counsel submitted that in the present can 
the licences to use the trademarks and names created proprietary rights in intellectual property. He 
admits, however, that so to hold would be to extend the boundaries of the authorities dealing with relief 
against forfeiture. I do not believe that the present case is a suitable case in which to define the 
boundaries of the equitable doctrine of relief against forfeiture. " 
116 [ 1985] 1 All ER 417 
117 Aid, at p. 427 
"a Collins K ne Law of Contract, 2nd ed., 1993, p. 355 
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serious objection: IMere can be less doubt that a contract granting licence to one party to 
use certain trade marks and names creates proprietary and possessory interest in 
intellectual property which is of great commercial interest. "9 Since the contractual clause 
permitting forfeiture of this interest had been inserted to secure the payment of certain 
instalments, there was, it is submitted, the jurisdiction for the court to relieve the 
defendant from forfeiture of his interest. It should, however, be noted that, considering 
the facts of the case and circumstances in which the agreement had been entered into'20 , 
and in view of the availability of legal advice to both parties which were dealing at arm's 
length and also the great importance of certainty in such a commercial compromise, the 
case was not an appropriate one to exercise the existent jurisdiction. 
7.39 This criticism is supported by the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal in 
BICCpIc v. Burndy 121 , 
in which a clause providing for the assignment of the defendant's 
half shares in certain patents and other joint rights to the plaintiff upon the defendant's 
failure to pay his share of costs within 30 days was considered as the forfeiture of 
proprietary and possessory right against which the court had the equitable jurisdiction to 
relieve the defendant. 122 There are, of course, some differences between a contractual 
licence and a joint ownership of certain patents, but as far as the creation of proprietary 
and possessory rights is concerned, in both agreements, one party has the right to use a 
11" See Collins, ibid 
120 The agreement was a part of a consent order bringing an end to all hostilities between the parties. 
The consideration provided to be paid by the defendant was not, in fact, only the purchase price of the 
licences: "it waC, in the words of Lord Templeman, "a sum payable by the appellant in part 
consideration for all the benefits provided by SI [i. e. the respondents) as consideration for the consent 
order, including the abandonment of all claims for injunctions, damages, interest and costs and a grant of 
two-year licences subject to termination under cl. B. " see Sport International Bumn: B. V v. Inter- 
Footwear Ltd. [ 1984) 2 All ER 32 1, at p. 324 
121 [1985] 1 All ER 417 
122 The court, in fact, was prepared to exercise its jurisdiction to grant relief by allowing the defendant a 
further time in which to perform his obligation. Dillon U., considering the authorities and concluding 
that he had jurisdiction, analysed the facts of the case and said: "In my judgment, the case for relief is 
made out and, if I had not taken the view that Burndy had a good defence to the action on the ground of 
set-oM I would grant Burndy relief, by way of an extension of time, against forfeiture of its rights under 
cl 10(iii). " (at p. 428) Kerr U., the dissenting judge, also held: "... for the reasons stated by Dillon U., I 
also agree that this is a case where the court's equitable jurisdiction goes further. It entitles the court to 
grant an extension of time to Burndy to comply with cl 10(iii) in order to relieve them from forfeiture of 
their proprietaxy share in 'the joint rights'. " (at p. 429) 
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certain kind of intellectual property for a period of time'23, and from this point of view 
such agreements can be assimilated to a contract for the lease of a property. 
7.40 It can, on the whole, be concluded that the equitable jurisdiction of relief against 
forfeiture of property has not been confined to any special type of case, it can be 
extended to contracts conceming personal chattels, and even intellectual property. It 
would, however, be limited to cases conceming transfer of proprietary or possessory 
rights. " Where, therefore, the forfeiture is purely contractual (as opposed to the 
forfeiture of proprietary or possessory rights), the mere fact that the forfeiture clause has 
been inserted to secure a stated result, which can effectively be attained when the matter 
comes before the court'25, would not be enough to attract the jurisdiction. 
4.2. Availability of Relief In Commercial Contracts 
7.41 The important issue which needs to be considered here is whether the court has 
jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture in commercial agreements. There is at least one 
case which clearly suggests that there is no equitable jurisdiction for the courts to 
intervene for relief against forfeiture in commercial contracts where the parties are 
dealing at arm's length. Oliver L. J., giving the judgment of himself and Ackner L. J. in the 
Court of Appeal, in Sport International Bussum B. V v. Inter-Footwear Ltd 126 referred to 
this issue and held that the equitable jurisdiction of courts to relieve against forfeiture had 
historically been confined to cases concerning land and there was no reason to extend this 
jurisdiction to commercial agreements. He, relying on the observations of Robert Goff 
L. J. in the Court of Appeal in Vie Scapirade 127 , based his judgment on the ground of 
" Some writers have described them as -more or less identical" and the distinct decisions in the two 
relevant cases as "difficult to justify" or "not justifiable in commercial terms7: see Chitty on Contracts, 
27th ed., vol. 1, para. 26-070, no. 92 ; Collins K Ile Law of Contract, 2nd ed., 1993, pp. 355-356 ; 
Downes T A, Textbook on Contract, 3rd ed., 1993, pp. 334-335 ; Professor Atiyah in his interesting 
essay entitled "Freedom of Contract and the New Right" referred to the distinction between patent rights 
and commercial licensing agreements as an "absurd distinction". Essays on Contract, 1990, p. 372 
124 See also Nutting v. Baldwin [1995] 1 WLR 201, where the right to share in the benefits of recoveries 
from actions brought by a certain association was regarded as a proprietary interest 
123 Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding [ 19731 AC 69 1, at p. 724 per Lord Wilberforce 
126 [1984] 1 All ER 376. The case has been affirmed in the House of Lords on narrower grounds: 119841 
I WLR 776,11994] 2 All ER 321 
127 SCandinaVian Trading Tanker Co. v. Flota Petrolera Ecualoriana (The Scaptrade) [1983) 2 AC 694, 
[19831 QB 529, at pp. 538-541 
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policy considerations. The importance and necessity of speed and certainty in commercial 
contracts contrasts, he pointed out, sharply with the equitable intervention which requires 
a detailed examination of relevant facts and other circumstances. Furthermore, in such 
agreements, parties are normally at arm's length, any legal advice is available to them, and 
they take advantage of an equal bargaining power. They, therefore, should be able to 
look after thew own interests when entering into contracts. The Lord Justice, then, 
referred to the special facts of the case and rejected any possibility of equitable 
intervention for relief in the instant case. 
7.42 Though the policy considerations, referred to in the judgment, should be given 
importance, and though in commercial contracts the parties are more concerned about 
certainty and speed than any other point, nonetheless these considerations do not 
necessarily negate the existence of the jurisdiction in commercial dealings. A review of 
the cases concerning the jurisdiction reveals the fact that the equitable intervention, 
though it has normally been exercised as regards contracts concerning land, has not been 
confined to any special type of cases. The introductory observations of Lord Wilberforce 
in the Shiloh Spinners case, referred to before"$, the points made by Pennycuick I in 
Barton Thompson and Co. Ltd V. SVIing MaChineS Co. 129 which cast a serious doubt 
on the non-availability of the equitable power to relieve against forfeiture with regard to a 
lease of chattel in the absence of unconscionable behaviour'30, the observations of 
Edmund Davies LI in Starside Properties Ltd V. MUSWha 131 and Romer L. J. in 
Stockloser v. Johnson 132 all show the possibility of relief against forfeiture in commercial 
agreements. Furthermore, the policy reasons behind the equitable intervention, 
particularly preventing a party having a legal right to exercise it in an unconscionable and 
oppressive way, is a common consideration between the commercial and non-commercial 
agreements. There may be a case where a commercial party exercises his legal right 
unconscionably which will certainly make the equitable intervention desirable. It is, 
128 Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding [ 1973] AC 69 1, at p. 722; supra., para. 7.18 
129 [1966] 1 Ch. 499; see also Keeton G W, Equity, 2nd ed., p. 316 
130 ibid., at p. 509 ; see supra., para. 7.22 
131 Starside Amcperfies Ltd. v. Mustapha [ 197411 WLR 816 
132 [1954] 1 AU ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
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therefore, suggested that there is no compelling reason to deny the jurisdiction of courts 
to relieve against forfeiture in cases concerning commercial agreements. 
7.43 This jurisdiction should, of course, be exercised in an appropriate case where the 
facts and circumstances of the case require such an intervention. There is no doubt that 
the jurisdiction exists only where the transfer of proprietary or possessory right is in issue 
and the contract is specifically enforceable. Since the payee's interest in commercial 
agreements is normally of a non-proprietary nature and the contract is not capable of 
specific performance, the equitable relief from forfeiture in such agreements, as it has 
been pointed out by some writers 133 , will not be a 
frequent occurrence. It should also be 
noted that even where the equitable jurisdiction exists, the exercise of this jurisdiction, 
considering the equal bargaining power of the parties in most commercial dealings and 
the importance of certainty and speed in these contracts, will be very exceptional . 
134 It is 
because, where the parties are dealing at arm's length, proving the unconscionability and 
oppressiveness of the party's conduct who exercises his legal right will be extremely 
difficult. 
7.44 The decision of the Court of Appeal in the Sport International case"' should not, 
for the following reasons, be considered as a bar to assume the existence of the 
jurisdiction for relief against forfeiture in commercial agreements: First, this decision 
was affirmed in the House of Lords on some narrower grounds. The House did not 
apparently approve the general proposition that the jurisdiction of relief against forfeiture 
had been confined to cases concerning land, and could not be extended to commercial 
agreements. 
7.45 Second, the Court of Appeal, shortly after the decision in the Sport International 
case, in a welcomed decision adopted and affirmed its jurisdiction to relieve against 
133 Carter J W, Breach of Contract, 2nd ed., 1991, para. 1066; Harpurn, Relief Apinst Forfeiture in 
Commercial Cases (1984) 100 LQR 369, at pp. 371-372, and Mirpum, loc. cit., no. 10, at pp. 166-169 
131 See McKendrick E., Contract Law, 1990, p. 265; Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, 4th a, 1993, 
pp. 437-438; Harpum, loc. cit., no. 10, at p. 169 
135 Sport International Bussum AVV. Inter-Footwear Ltd. [ 1984] 1 All ER 376 
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forfeiture in a commercial contract: In BICC pic v. Burndy Corp ", in a series of 
agreements following the dissolution of a partnership, a commercial agreement was also 
entered into which provided that any joint rights (such as patent rights) were to be vested 
in the parties jointly so that each of them had the right to exploit them. It was also 
provided that the plaintiff was primarily responsible for maintaining and paying the costs 
relating to the joint rights, and the defendants were obliged to pay their share of the costs 
within 30 days of the plaintiff s written request to do so. Upon the defendant's failure to 
comply with the notice, it was provided, the plaintiff was entitled to require the defendant 
to assign to the plaintiff his interests in the patent rights concerned. The defendants made 
default at a time when they were under the impression that there was no urgency in the 
payment, and also the amount of the plaintiffs indebtedness under the agreement was 
well in excess of the amount due to him as the half of the costs. The plaintiff immediately 
exercised his contractual right and brought an action to require the defendants to assign 
their interest in the relevant patents to him. The defendants contended, inter afia, that (1) 
because of their right to set-off, there was no breach of contract to attract the exercise of 
the plaintiffs contractual tight; (2) they were entitled to be relieved against forfeiture of 
their interest in the patent rights. 
The Court of Appeal, by majority, accepted the first limb of the defendant's defence and 
refused the plaintiffs claim for specific performance. All members of the court, however, 
were prepared, without any doubt, to relieve the defendants against forfeiture of their 
interest in the patent rights. Dillon L. J., considering the previous authorities, argued that 
there was no reason to disclaim the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture with regard to 
commercial contracts, and in fact he found the facts of the case appropriate to exercise 
the jurisdiction. He, after expressing the view that the jurisdiction should be extended to 
cases where the forfeiture of proprietary or possessory rights in personal property is in 
question, said: 
"The fact that the right to forfeiture arises under a commercial agreement 
is highly relevant to the question whether relief against forfeiture should be 
granted, but I do not see that it can preclude the existence of the 
jurisdiction to grant relief, if forfeiture of proprietary or possessory rights, 
136 [1985] 1 All ER 417, see also Harpum C, Set Off, Specific Perforinance, and Relief Against Forfeiture 
(1985) 44 CLJ 204 
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as opposed to merely contractual rights, is in question. ""' 
7.46 Third, the observations of Dillon L. J. were cited and followed by Knox J. in the 
recent case of Transug Haulage Lid v. Leyland DAF Finance Pic. 131, where the learned 
judge, assuming the jurisdiction to relieve the hirer from forfeiture of his interests in three 
vehicles, which were the subject-matters of three hire-purchase agreements, found the 
facts of the case suitable to exercise the jurisdiction. This case can also provide an 
authority for the view that there is, in appropriate cases, an equitable jurisdiction for the 
courts to relieve against forfeiture in cases concerning commercial agreements. 
7.47 It can, to sum up, be said that the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture should not 
be confined to non-commercial contracts, and the courts, in appropriate commercial 
cases, have such a jurisdiction, though considering the specific nature and particular 
requirements of commercial transactions, this jurisdiction will only be exercised in 
exceptional cases. 
4.3. Relief After Termination for Breach of an Essential Time Stipulation 
7.48 The availability of relief against forfeiture of the debtor's proprietary or possessory 
interest in the subject-matter, where the contract has been terminated by the creditor for 
the debtor's breach of an essential time stipulation, is not yet settled in England. 139 On 
the one hand, it is argued that in such a case where the parties have expressly made the 
time of the essence, the contract is not specifically enforceable, and therefore relief from 
forfeiture of property by decreeing specific performance or granting the debtor extra time 
to perform his obligations will not be possible, though another form of relief, in 
appropriate circumstances, may be available. 140 On the other hand, it has been suggested 
137 Ibid., at p. 428 
138 [199412 BCLC 88, for the facts of the case see supra., para. 7.24 
139 Some writers support the existence of such a jurisdiction: see, e. g., Beale, Unreasonable Deposits, loc. 
cit., no. 10, at p. 526 ; Harpum, Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land, loc. cit., no. 10, at 
pp. 143-144; Keith Hodkinson, Specific Performance and Deposits, loc. cit., no. 41, at p. 140 ; 
Pawlowsid, Relief Against Forfeiture: Contracts for the Sale of Land (1995) 14 Litigation 135, at p. 144 ; 
Goode, Hire-Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd ed., p. 383 ; For the opposite view see Hugh Collins, The 
Law of Contract, 2nd ed., pp. 354-355; Hoggett, Houses on the Never-Never, loc. cit., no. 40, at pp. 348- 
349 
140 Sm Stee&nan v. Drinkle [ 1916) 1 AC 275 ; see infra., pam. 8.09 
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that where the debtor claims for relief from forfeiture, he, in fact, asks to be relieved from 
the consequences of his breach; and if the court grants such relief, there win be no 
effective termination of the contract. Put another way, granting relief against forfeiture 
would be a preliminary to the decree of specific performance, and there would be no bar 
for the court to decree specific performance or give the debtor extra time to perform his 
obligation. 
7.49 It was argued, in the early part of this chapter 141 , that, 
in principle, there seems to 
be no compelling reason to negate the jurisdiction of courts to relieve against forfeiture of 
property, even where the contract has been tenninated for the debtor's breach of a 
provision time of which has expressly been made of the essence. The main reason which 
justifies the existence of the jurisdiction is that the courts of equity should not allow a 
contracting party to exercise his legal rights in an oppressive and unconscionable way. A 
creditor, after the debtor's breach of an essential time stipulation, may exercise his right 
to terminate the contract unconscionably, e. g. to gain a windfall. In such circumstances, 
there should be a ground for equity to intervene and prevent the creditor from such 
unconscionable conduct. If the debtor is relieved from this unconscionability, there wiU, 
then, be no effective termination of the agreement; and the court will be able to decree 
specific performance or grant the debtor extra time to perform his contractual obligation. 
Furthermore, where the time of the essence provision attaches to a forfeiture clause 
which amounts to a penalty, the court, by relieving the debtor from forfeiture, in fact, 
declares the "time of the essence" provision, as a part of a penal forfeiture provision, of 
no effect. There, therefore, remains no bar for relief by decreeing specific performance or 
granting extra time. Thus, it does seem that, in principle, the courts should have 
jurisdiction to relieve from forfeiture of property even after the contract has been 
terminated for the debtor's breach of an essential time stipulation. 
7.50 Some policy reasons, referred to before"", also support this proposition. It should, 
however, be borne in mind that this jurisdiction should be exercised in exceptional 
141 See supra., para. 7.15 
142 See SUpra., para. 7.13 
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cases"where the penal nature of the forfeiture clause with the essential time stipulation 
attached to it, or the unconscionability of the vendor's conduct in exercising his strict 
legal rights is clear. This is because the exercise of the jurisdiction in such cases is an 
obvious departure of the contractual terms agreed between the contracting parties, 
especially the term which makes the time of the debtor's performance of the essence. 
7.51 Despite the reasons referred to above, the weight of English authority seems to be 
against the e)CMence of such a jurisdiction. 144 The relevant authorities were previously 
discussed"', and it was suggested that Stee&nan v. Drinkle'46and Brickles v. Snelf 47 , as 
far as they decide that the courts have no jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of 
property after termination for breach of an essential time stipulation, had wrongly been 
decided and should not be followed. 148 
7.52 The decision of the House of Lords in The Scaptrade 149 is sometimes relied upon 
to show that the courts have no such a jurisdiction. '" In this case, as to a time 
charterparty, the House refused to grant relief against the operation of a withdrawal 
clause to a charterer who had failed to pay the instalment of hire on time. Lord Diplock, 
in the course of his judgement, also referred to the point that the parties when entering 
into the agreement, have expressly made the time of payments of the essence. He, then, 
added: 
"When time is made of the essence of a primary obligation, failure to 
perform it punctually is a breach of a condition of the contract which 
143 See infra., pams. 7.73 et seq. 
144 The law has more recently been stated in Redworth v. Jenwise [1994] EGCS 133 where, relying on 
Sfee&nan v. Drinkle [19161 1 AC 275, the availability of relief by way of an order for spemc: 
performance after breach of an essential stipulation was denied. 
11 Supra., paras. 7.05 et seq.; Other than the authorities discussed, the early decision in Vernon v. 
Stephens (1722) 2 P. Wms. 66,24 ER 642 should also be mentioned in which, in a contract for the sale 
of a manor, Lord Macclesfield L. C. relieved the purchaser from forfeiture of his interest in the property 
by decreeing specific performance, even though the contract had already been terminated for the 
Purchaser's defindt of a Payment stipulation time of which was of the essence. 
146 [191611 AC 275 
147 [191612 AC 599 
148 See =pra., para. 7.14 
149 Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (Ae Scaptrade) [ 1983] 2 AC 694 
150 Collins H., The Law of Contract, 2nd ed., 1993, pp. 354-355 
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entitles the party not in breach to elect to treat the breach as putting an 
end to all primary obligations under the contract that have not already 
been performed. ""' 
The point made by Lord Diplock is undoubtedly correct; but there is no reason to suggest 
that his lordship refied on this point to refuse the availability of the jurisdiction to grant 
relief. It seems that the reference to this point was for an emphasis on the legal right of 
the shipowner to terminate the contract when the charterer had failed to make instalment 
payments punctually, the obligation of which time was of the essence. It should not, 
however, it is respectfully suggested, be considered as a ground for refusing relief against 
the operation of the withdrawal clause. 152 This case, therefore, could not be regarded as 
an authority for the view that the courts have no jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture 
of some interest in real or personal property following termination of a contract for 
breach of an essential stipulation. 
7.53 In Australia, there is now no doubt about the existence of the jurisdiction to relieve 
against forfeiture of property where the contract has been terminated for the purchaser's 
breach of an essential stipulation'53 , though the scope of such a jurisdiction is, to a large 
extent, controversial. The leading Australian case is the decision of the Rgh Court of 
Australia in Legione v. Hateley'54 . There the majority of the Court"', holding the 
traditional view to be wrong, was in no doubt to grant relief by decreeing specific 
performance to a purchaser who was in default of a payment stipulation time of which 
had contractually been made of the essence. On the facts, the purchaser had built a house 
on the land which had significantly improved the value of the property, and if the 
"' Scandinavian P-ading Tanker Co. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) 1198312 AC 694, 
at p. 703 
152 It has also been suggested that if Lord Diplock intended this statement to be a ground for refusing 
relieý "it is made obiter in the context of the issues in The Scaptrade and that the English appellate 
courts are free to consider that issue when it arises". see Lang, Forfeiture of Interests in lAnd, loc. cit., 
no. 10, at p. 433 
153 Regardless of whether the parties have initially made the time for the performance of the purchaser's 
obligations of the essence, (see, e. g., Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; Beny v. Hodsdon [198911 
Qd R 361) or this has been done by serving a notice to complete by the vendor maldug time of the 
essence, and the contract has been terminated for the purchaser's non-compliance with that notice (see, 
e. g., Stern v. McArthur (1988) 62 ALJR 588; Tang v. Chong (Unreported) I December 1988, Supreme 
Court of N. S. W, Young J) 
II Leglone v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 
155 Consisting Of Gibbs CJ and Murphy J. and Mason and Deane JJ who delivered two joint judgments. 
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forfeiture were to stand, the vendor could gain a great windfall. As it appears from the 
judgments, such a jurisdiction should, however, be exercised sparingly where the 
intervention of courts to prevent unjust results is necessary. It is not clear whether there 
is a divergence of opinion in the reasonings provided by the majority's two joint 
judgments. Gibbs CJ and Murphy J had argued that relief against forfeiture could be 
granted "if there is nothing to render such an order inequitable", though they agreed that 
a time of the essence stipulation would generally make such relief inequitable. 1m Mason 
and Deane JJ, on the other hand, basically believed that the jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture could be exercised even where the forfeiture clause was not in the nature of 
penalty. Such a jurisdiction, however, in their view, should be limited to exceptional 
circumstances where the vendor's conduct in insisting on the exercise of his legal rights 
amounts to unconscionability. 157 
7.54 In the subsequent authorities considering the case, there is a tendency to construe 
the two joint judgments as suggesting two divergent reasonings: In Stern v. McArlhurl$ý 
for example, Brennan J described the approach taken by Gibbs CJ and Murphy J as a 
somewhat broader approach, and declined to accept it. He thought the view suggesting 
the exercise of the jurisdiction where it would prevent injustice is not adequately specific 
to be accepted. '59 Also Gaudron J described the difference between the two reasonings 
as being "manifest": In her view, Mason and Deane JJ, by concentrating on the existence 
of the unconscionable conduct, took "the quality of the vendor's action" into 
consideration, while Gibbs CJ and Murphy J were only concerned about the 
consequences of the vendor's conduct as being in the nature of penalty. 160 On the other 
hand, in the same case, Deane and Dawson JJ were of the view that they had understood 
Brennan J delivered the dissenting judgment. 
Im Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, at p. 429; Their Honours also made it clear that "where the 
parties have chosen to make time of the essence of the contract the grant of relief against forfeiture as a 
preliminary to an order for specific performance will be exceptional". (Ibid) 
157 Ibid., at p. 444 
11 Stern v. Mc. 4rthur (1988) 62 ALJR 588; see Nicholson K, Relief Against Forfeiture in Australia 
(1990) 106 LQR 39 
1" Ibid., at p. 598 
160 Ibid., at p. 609 
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no "significant dfference between the two approaches. 161 In their view, "in referring to 
uncons6onable conduct, Mason and Deane JJ were not saying that there must be 
unconscionable conduct of an exceptional kind before a case for relief can be made out. 
Rather, what being said was that a court will be reluctant to interfere with the contractual 
rights of parties who have chosen to make time of the essence of the contract. The 
circumstances must be such as to make it plain that it is necessary to intervene to avoid 
injustice or, what is the same thing, to relieve against unconscionable- or, more 
accurately, unconscientious- conduct. 2A62 To depart from the parties' bargain by 
equitable intervention, therefore, "a strong case" must be made out, and it is in this sense 
that the existence of exceptional circumstances has been required. Such circumstances 
would normally be shown if there were "something such as fraud, n-dstake, accident or 
surprise before relief [is] granted", but- and this is the important feature of the judgment- 
"fflhese elements do not ... exhaust the scope of unconscionable or unconscientious 
behaviour; they are referred to in this context to emphasise that a strong case must be 
made out to warrant departure from the general approach". 163 In the case itself the I-Egh 
Court, by a majority'64, granted relief to a purchaser of a certain piece of land who had 
defaulted in the punctual payment of instalments. The contract had been terminated by 
the vendor after the purchaser's non-compliance with a notice to complete. The 
purchasers had gone into possession with the vendors knowledge, though contrary to the 
contractual terms, and had erected a house on the land. For this reason, and also 
considering the fact that the contract was a long term contract and had been terminated 
after nine years, the value of the property had been significantly increased, The dissenting 
judges, though accepting the existence of the jurisdiction, thought that the exceptional 
circumstances justifying its exercise, could not be proven upon the facts of the case: No 
unconscionable conduct could be ascribed to the vendor, and in the words of Mason CJ: 
"to extend relief against forfeiture to instances in which no exceptional 
circumstances are established would be to eviscerate unconscionability of 
its meaning. , 165 
161 Ibid., at p. 03 
162 ibid. 
163 Ibid., at p. W4 
164 Deane and Dawson JJ and Caudron J (Mason CJ and Brennan J dissenting) 
165 ibid., at P. 593 
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7.55 From the majority, Deane and Dawson JJ considered the situation as analogous to a 
case where a forfeiture clause had been inserted to secure the payment of money. 166 The 
object of the provision capable of being achieved in the long term, it, the judges held, 
woWd be unconscientious for the vendor to take advantage of the forfeiture. They said: 
"The circumstance in the present case which warrants relief being granted 
is not only that the forfeiture provision was by way of security for the 
payment of the purchase money, but also that the contract as it was 
carried into effect was essentially an arrangement whereby the appellants 
[i. e., the vendors] undertook to finance the respondent's purchase upon 
the security of the land. In other words, there was a close and obvious 
parallel between it and a purchase with the aid of a mortgage ... and the 
parties acted on that basis. " 167 
In their Honours' view, the security nature of the forfeiture in the special circumstances 
of the case would well justify the exercise of the jurisdiction, but as a further justification, 
the windflill gained by the vendors as a result of the forfeiture 1611 would bring about the 
circumstances in which the intervention of the court would be desirable. Gaudron J., on 
the other hand, held that the conduct of the vendors in insisting on the strict exercise of 
their rights amounted to unconscionability which justified the exercise of the jurisdiction 
to grant relief 169 
7.56 Though the cases show some sort of uncertainty as to the exercise of the 
jurisdiction to gmt relief against forfeiture of property after termination for breach of an 
essential term, they, no doubt, leave no room for any argument against the existence of 
such jurisdiction. We will deal with the issues relating to the exercise of the jurisdiction 
in the next section, but for the time being, it suffices to point out that the jurisdiction of 
courts to relieve against forfeiture of property in circumstances where parties have 
166 Ibid., at pp. 604-605 
161 Ibid., at p. 604 
I" Their Honours observed: "The forfeiture of the reslxmdent's interest in the land would truly result in a 
windfall to the appellants whereas relief against forfeiture would not result in a gain to the respondents 
property described as a windfall. " Ibid., at p. 605 
169 Ibid., at p. 610; In her view, "[ilnsistence on those rights, involving the loss to Mrs Bates of her 
house, the loss to the respondents of their interest under the contract, the forfeiture of the deposit and the 
indefinite retention of the instalments; already paid, so long as an action for damages was commenced 
within 12 months of termination, when a decree of specific performance would swure all that the 
appellants had contracW for was ... unconscionable. Her Honour also believed that the purchasem' 
conduct was mot such as to disentitle them from relief against forfeiture. (ibid., at pp. 610-611) 
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expressly showed their intention as to the essential character of the term breached by the 
debtor should not open a floodgate to debtors to abuse the court's equitable power. It 
should, therefore, as it has already been suggested'70, be exercised in exceptional 
circumstances where it is clear that the creditor's insistence on the exercise of his legal 
rights would amount to unconscionability. 
7.57 There are two recent English cases which show the tendency of the courts to relieve 
the debtor against forfeiture of his interest in the subject-matter in such circumstances. 
First, in Transay Haulage Ltd v. LeyJaW DAF Finance PIC. 171, the Court of Chancery 
Division was in no doubt to relieve the hirer from forfeiture of his interest in the subject- 
matter of three hire-purchase agreements, even though the contracts, by the exercise of 
the owner's contractual fight, had been terminated. Though the termination of the 
agreements in this case was due to the appointment of an administrative receiver, 
nonetheless the case clearly illustrates the availability of relief against forfeiture of the 
debtor's proprietary or possessory interest after termination; and that the determination of 
the agreement should not be regarded as an obstruct to attract the jurisdiction. 
7.58 Second, in Hedworth v. Jenwise Dd. 72, the Court of Appeal was prepared to 
assume, for the purpose of this case, the existence of the jurisdiction to relieve from 
forfeiture of the purchaser's proprietary interest after termination for breach of an 
essential stipulation: In a contract for the sale of a freehold property, the purchaser failed 
to complete the contract on the contractually provided completion date, and also on the 
dates which had later been fixed by the mutual agreement subject to the purchaser paying 
compensation to the vendor. The vendor, then, purported to terminate the contract. The 
purchaser brought an action seeking relief from forfeiture by decreeing specific 
performance. The Court of Appeal, relying on Stee&nan v. Drinkle'73, held that the 
equitable doctrine of relief against forfeiture of the purchaser's interest in property in 
English law did not extend to a case where the purchaser was in default of an essential 
170 SUPra., para. 7.50; see also infra., paras. 7.73 et seq. 
171 [199412 BCLC 88, for the facts of the case see supra., para. 7.24 
172 [19941 EGCS 133 
173 [ 191611 AC 275 
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contmctual term. The court, however, referring to the leading decision of the High Court 
of Australia in Legione v. Hateley 174assumed for the purpose of this case (though not 
deciding the point) the jurisdiction to grant relief by decreeing specific performance after 
breach of an essential stipulation, although it did not find the circumstances of the case 
suitable to exercise the jurisdiction. The decision, which shows the tendency to accept 
the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of proprietary or possessory interest following 
termination for breach of an essential contractual term, should be welcomed. It should be 
hoped that in future the courts would consider the decision of the Privy Council in 
SteealMan V. Drinlde175, and would hold that they have the jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture by decreeing specific performance or granting extra time after termination for 
breach of an essential stipulation. 
5. The relevant circumstances for the exercise of the jurisdiction 
7.59 Having discussed the scope of the jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of the 
debtor's proprietary or possessory interest and the limits of this jurisdiction, it is now 
appropriate to consider the conditions for the exercise of the jurisdiction and the 
circumstances upon which relief may be granted. It should, first and foremost, be noted 
that the power to grant such a relief is a discretionary jurisdiction'76 , and its exercise to a 
large extent depends on the judge's discretion. There are, however, some indications in 
cases which suggest the circumstances in which the discretion should be exercised. 
5.1. A Contrast: "'Contractual Forfeiture,, and "Legal Forfeiture" 
7.60 In order to discuss these circumstances, a distinction should, it seems, be drawn 
between relief against "the contractual forfeiture" and relief from a forfeiture which is the 
creditor's common law right'77: 
(1) The parties to a contract sometimes stipulate for a clause which provides, inter afid, 
for the forfeiture of the debtoes interest in the subject-matter, upon his default in 
174 (1983) 46 ALR 1 
175 [191611 AC 275 
176 Shiloh SpinnersLtd. V. Harding [1973] AC 691, at p. 727 per Lord Simon 
177 See Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, per Mason & Deane JJ at p. 445; Stern v. McArthur 
(1988) 62 ALJR 588, at p. 609 per Gaudron J; see also Thompson, J. M. (1983) 99 LQR 489, at pp. 491- 
492 
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performing certain contractual obligations. Such a clause is a "contractual forfeiture 
clause", and in certain proper circumstances relief against such a forfeiture may be 
granted. 
(2) The forfeiture is sometimes the creditor's legal, as opposed to the contractual, right. 
The debtor breaches an essential contractual condition which is regarded as a repudiatory 
breach, and entitles the creditor to bring the contract to an end. Upon termination, the 
debtor forfeits his interest in the subject-matter. In fact, the forfeiture in such a case is 
the consequence of the creditor's termination for breach of an essential stipulation which 
is the creditor's common law right. Even if the parties have inserted such a legal 
consequence as a contractual clause in their agreement, this does not alter the legal nature 
of such a forfeiture, and is merely an emphasis on the creditor's common law right. 178 
5.2. The Relevant Circumstances for Relief Against "Contractual 
Forfeiture" 
7.61 A contractual forfeiture provision may be inserted to secure the performance of a 
principal obligation. It was discussed before that against such a forfeiture, courts have 
jurisdiction to grant relief, if the clause amounts to the forfeiture of the debtor's 
proprietary or possessory interest. It also appears that Lord Wilberforce's famous 
statement in the Shiloh Spinners case79 with regard to the availability of the relief against 
forfeiture of the debtor's interest for his breach of covenant or condition- "where the 
primary object of the bargain is to secure a stated result which can effectively be attained 
when the matter comes before the court, and where the forfeiture provision is added by 
way of security for the production of that result"180- refers to a contractual forfeiture 
provision. There is, therefore, no doubt that the courts, subject to the limitations 
discussed, have jurisdiction to relieve against the exercise of such a contractual forfeiture 
provision. 
7.62 The circumstances in which this jurisdiction may be exercised have been considered 
by Lord Wilberforce in the Shiloh Spinner case. His lordship confines the availability of 
relief against a contractual forfeiture to "appropriate and limited cases"; and then explains 
11" See Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, per Mawn & Deane JJ, Ibid 
179 Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Hardng [1973] AC 691 
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the word -appropriate' in the following terms: 
"The word 'appropriate' involves consideration of the conduct of the 
applicant for relief, in particular whether his default was wilful, of the 
gravity of the breaches, and of the disparity between the value of the 
property of which forfeiture is claimed as compared with the damage 
caused by the breach. ""' 
in the case itself, his lordship, considering the clear and wilful breaches of the assignee of 
more than one covenant, the continuous disregard of the assignor's rights over a period 
of time, the lack of enough evidence to show the assignee's ability to remedy speedily and 
adequately his defaults, and finally the failure to show any disproportion between the 
damages suffered by the assignor resulting from the breaches and the value of the interest 
which was subject to forfeiture, did not find the case as an appropriate one to exercise the 
jurisdiction. Two important points need more emphasis and consideration here: First, the 
penal nature of a contractual forfeiture provision which may reveal the relationship 
between the penalty doctrine and relief against forfeiture of a proprietary or possessory 
interest in the subject-matter. Second, the relevance of the unconscionable conduct of 
the creditor in exercising his legal rights to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction to 
relieve against forfeiture. 
5.2.1. The penal nature of a contractual forfeiture provision 
7.63 The disproportion between the damages suffered by the creditor as a result of the 
breach and the value of the interest which is subject to forfeiture under the contractual 
forfeiture provision is one of the issues which the court should review when it considers 
the exercise of its jurisdiction to grant relief This is what which is normally done as 
regards an agreed damages clause to determine whether it is a penalty or liquidated 
damages: As it was previously discussed 192 , 
if there is a gross disproportion between the 
actual damages which are likely to be suffered by the innocent party as a result of the 
breach and the amount which has been agreed to be paid under the agreed damages 
clause, the clause is normally considered as a penalty. 
7.64 In a sense, a contractual forfeiture provision is very similar to an agreed damages 
180 Ibid., at p. 723 
181 Ibid., at pp. 723-724 
182 Supra., paras. 2.26-2.27 
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clause. The only diffierence is that, instead of providing for a certain sum of money to be 
paid or a certain act to be done by the contract-breaker in the event of breach, the 
forfeiture of the debtor's interest in the subject-matter in the event of his breach of a 
certain contractual undertaking is provided for. There is much to be said in favour of the 
view that the courts should have the same attitude towards these two clauses. It does, 
however, seem that the courts exercise their jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of the 
debtor's proprietary or possessory interest in a wider extent than they normally exercise 
their power to strike out penalties. Other than being penal or in the nature of penalty- in 
a sense that there is a clear disparity between the actual likely damages suffered by the 
creditor and the value of the interest which is subject to forfeiture- there are, as it appears 
from the judgment of Lord Wilberforce, some other considerations- such as the conduct 
of the applicant for relief and the gravity of breaches in question- which should be 
pondered when the court considers the exercise of its jurisdiction to grant relief against 
forfeiture. 
7.65 It is, however, suggested that where the forfeiture clause is penal or in the nature of 
penalty, in the sense explained above, the court should have no doubt to exercise its 
jurisdiction to relieve the debtor from the forfeiture of his proprietary or possessory 
interest. This approach is in line with the view that the courts should adopt the same 
policy in respect of contractual forfeiture provisions and agreed damages clauses. It is 
also supported by some authorities in which the court relieved the debtor from forfeiture 
of his interest in the property on the ground that the forfeiture clause amounted to a 
penalty. 193 
in Re Dagenbwn'", a case which was considered before"', Mellish LJ stated: 
"... where there is a stipulation that if, on a certain day, an agreement 
ren'Wns either wholly or in any part unperformed- in which case the real 
damage may be either very large or very trifling- there is to be a certain 
forfeiture incurred, that stipulation is to be treated as in the nature of a 
183 Though the forfeiture provision, it seems, was regarded as in the nature of penalty on the technical 
ground that a certain forfeiture was to be incurred for different breaches of varying importance. 
184 Re Dagenhwn (Mmes) Dock Co., ex par* Hulse (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022 




James LJ also seems to be of the same opinion where he says: 
"In my opinion, this is an extremely clear case of a mere penalty for non- 
payment of the purchase money. "" 
He concludes that against such a penalty, the purchaser should be relieved on the 
payment of the residue of the purchase price with interest. 
Kilmer v. British Columbia'" also was a similar case in which the Privy Council, applying 
the decision in Re Dagenham, said: 
"It seems to be even a stronger case, for the penalty, if enforced according 
to the letter of the agreement, becomes more and more severe as the 
agreement approaches completion, and the money liable to confiscation 
becomes larger. "'89 
5.2.2. The Unconscionable Conduct of the Creditor 
7.66 Despite the similarity between contractual forfeiture provisions and agreed damages 
clauses, being penal has not, it appears, been the only ground for the exercise of the 
jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of property. From the early times, the courts of 
equity, granted relief against forfeiture of leases for the non-payment of rent by the lessee, 
even though there was no penalty involved. '90 The observations of Lord Wilberforce in 
the Shiloh Spinners case9' also show that there may be some grounds, other than being 
penal, upon which the jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture of property should be 
exercised. It does, therefore, seem that, even where the forfeiture provision has no penal 
element the courts may exercise their jurisdiction to grant relief 192 Now, the question 
which arises is upon what ground or grounds the equitable intervention of courts to grant 
relief in such circumstances may be justified? To answer this question, it is perhaps 
appropriate to refer to some relevant judicial statements. 
186 Jbid, at p. 1025 
1117 Aid 
1n )Ulmer v. British Columbia Orchard Lands Ltd. [ 19131 AC 319 
"9 Ibid., at p. 325 
I" See the observations Of Gibbs C-J. and MurPhY J. in the Australian case of Legione v. Hateley (1993) 
152 CLR 406, at p. 425 
"' Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973] AC 691, at pp. 723-724 
192 See Lang, Forfeiture of Interests in Land, loc. cit., no. 10, at pp. 443,447 ; Carter, Breach of 
Contrac4 2nd ed., 1991, para. 1070 ; Harpurn, Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land, loc. 
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7.67 In Mussen v. Van Diemen's Land Co. 193, Farwell J., discussing the availability of 
specific performance to a purchaser who had failed to pay the instalments of the purchase 
price on time, stated: 
"There are no doubt cases where there has been a failure to pay the 
instalments and to complete the contract, and the purchaser has then come 
forward and said: 'I am here and now ready and willing to complete the 
contract and to pay the price originally stipulated by the contract and to 
carry out its terms', and then the court has said that it is inequitable and 
ainst conscience that the vendor should refuse specific performance and 
claim to retain the money already paid. That is because the court has said 
that if the plaintiff is willing and able to carry out his contract, 
notwithstanding the fact that temporarily at any rate he was unable to do 
so, if he is willing and able to carry out his contract, it being the primary 
intention of the parties that the sale should take place, it would be against 
conscience for the defendant to say. 'I will not give effect to the primary 
intention of the parties, but I will refuse to complete, and I will retain the 
money which has been paid to me'. PsI94 
It appears from this quotation that in Farwell J. 's view, the court should grant relief 
against forfeiture by decreeing specific performance where the vendor's refusal from 
specific performance, or in fact the vendor's emphasis on the exercise of his strict legal 
rights, is "inequitable or against conscience'. 
7.68 In the Australian case of Legione v. Hateley '95, Gibbs C. I. and Murphy I said: 
"A court of equity will grant specific performance notwithstanding a 
failure to make a payment within the time specified by the contract if there 
is nothing to render such an order inequitable. " 196 
In the same case, Mason & Deane JJ stated: 
"There is more to be said for the view that when the equitable jurisdiction 
is invoked to relieve against a forfeiture which is not in the nature of a 
penalty, equity looks to unconscionable conduct, ... especially when 
unconscionable conduct is associated with fraud, mistake, accident or 
surprise. "'97 
7.69 It does appear from the above statements that since one of the main reasons for the 
cit, no. 10, at p. 154 
'" [19381 Ch. 253 
194 Ibid, at pp. 263-264 
195 Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 
196 Ibid., at p. 429 
197 Ibid., at p. 444 
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equitable intervention is to prevent a party who emphasizes on the exercise of his legal 
rights in an unconscionable and oppressive way, the unconscionable conduct of the 
creditor in exercising his contractual rights should be regarded as the main ground, other 
than the forfeiture clause being penal, for the exercise of the jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture of the debtor's proprietary or possessory interest. "" It is not, however, emy to 
determine whether the creditor's conduct in the forfeiture of the debtor's interest in 
property for his breach is unconscionable. We will discuss this issue in the following 
section when considering the grounds for the exercise of the jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture following termination for breach of an essential term, which is the creditor's 
common law right. It is, for the time being, to be noted that considerations like the 
conduct of the applicant for relief, especially whether his default was wiMl, and the 
gravity of breaches in the words of Lord Wilberforce'99 can be regarded as some 
guidance to show whether the creditor's emphasis on the exercise of his strict legal right 
amounts to an unconscionable conduct. 
&3. The Relevant Circumstances for Relief Against "Legal Fodelturell 
7.70 Relief may sometimes be sought against forfeiture of the debtor's interest in 
property following termination for his breach of an essential stipulation which is the 
creditor's common law, as opposed to the contractual, right. It was argued200 that, in 
such a case, the courts should have jurisdiction to grant relief, though the weight of 
English authority is, it appears, against the existence of such a jurisdiction. Now, 
assuming that the jurisdiction exists, what are the circumstances in which this jurisdiction 
should be exercised? 
5.3.1. Reference to "Legal Forfeiture" as a Penalty: is it right? 
7.71 It should first be noted that such a forfeiture could not be regarded as a penalty. 201 
A penalty, in its strict sense.? 02, is the agreement of the parties, about a payment which 
I" See Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, 4th ed., 1993, p. 437 ; Greig & Davis, The Law of 
Contmct, 1987, p. 1295 
I" Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973) AC 691, at pp. 723-724 
211 Supra, paras. 7.48 et seq. 
2D' See Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, per Mason & Deane JJ at p. 445; Stem v. McArthur 
(1988) 62 ALJR 588, at p. 609 per Gaudron J. 
m As opposed to liquidated damages; see supra., para. 2.03 
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should be made or an act which should be done in the event of breach, which acts "in 
terrorem" of the defaWting party, while such a forfeiture is essentially the consequence of 
something (i. e. termination) which is the common law right of the creditor. Therefore, 
despite the contractual forfeiture provision which is merely the agreement of the parties 
as to the rights of the creditor upon breach, the legal forfeiture,? 03 is not rightly to be 
regarded as a penalty. 
7.72 Two small points need to be made here: a) Reference to such a forfeiture as a 
penalty, in the general sense that it is a punishment for the breach of the contract, may be 
made to show the disparity between the actual damages suffered as the result of breach 
and the value of interest which is subject to forfeiture under the creditor's common law 
right. 204 b) If there is a provision in the contract restating the common law right of the 
creditor to terminate and retake possession of the subject-matter in the event of an 
essential breach, it does not, as it was pointed out5, alter the essential character of the 
forfeiture, and merely regulates the creditor's common law right. 2w However, where 
such a clause provides for an additional liability to be imposed on the debtor for his 
breach of an essential stipulation, like the retention of moneys already paid or making 
some additional payments, the clause may be regarded as a penalty, in its strict sense. 
Reference to the forfeiture provision as a penalty in the cases of In re Dagenham 207 and 
Kilmer v. British Columbie8 seems to be in this sense. 
5.3.2. The Exercise of the Jurisdiction in Exceptional Circumstances 
7.73 The jurisdiction to relieve against such a legal forfeiture, as it was suggested2", 
should be exercised in exceptional circumstances. These circumstances have well been 
defined in the joint judgment of Mason & Deane JJ in the Australian case of Legione v. 
203 As opposed to the contrachW forfeiture. 
' in this sense, in the previous parts of this work, such a forfeiture has been referred to as a penalty. 
See, e. g., supra., paras. 7.15,7.50 
205 Supra., para. 7.60 
See the judgment of Mason & Deane JJ in Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, at p. 445 
Re Dagenham (Aames) Dock Co.. ex parte Hulse (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022 
2' Kilmer v. British Columbia Orchard Lands Ltd. [ 1913] AC 319 
M9 SU ra. P paras. 7.50,7.56 
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Hatele)ý'O. "Whether the exceptional circumstances exist in a given case", the learned 
,, 211 judges stated, "hinges on the existence of unconscionable conduct. They, then, 
expressing the impossibility of defining all the situations which may amount to 
unconscionable conduct on the part of a creditor in emphasising on the exercise of his 
strict legal rights, referred to some situations: if the conduct of the creditor has 
contributed to the debtor's breach, or where the object of the creditor in exercising his 
legal rights is merely "to take unconscionable advantage of the breach which will 
fortuitously accrue to him on forfeiture of the purchaser's interest under the contract! ', 
there will be a ground for the jurisdiction to be exercised. 212 
7.74 As it was already discussed, there are some judicial statements suggesting a 
'y2 
3 divergence of approaches in the reasonings of the majority in Lgeone v. Hatek -1 The 
approach taken by Gibbs CJ and Murphy J, it has been argued, suggests a somewhat 
broader view in the exercise of the jurisdiction, mainly in line with the principle laid down 
by Lord Wilberforce in Shiloh Spinnersý` case. Accordingly, the courts could exercise 
their jurisdiction if the forfeiture provision is only in the nature of a security for the 
production of a stated result which can effectively be attained when the matter comes 
before the court, and no circumstances of an exceptional kind need to be shown. 215 
It would appear that the judgments of the majority in Legione v. Hateley could be 
construed as suggesting a single approach: though Gibbs CJ and Murphy J argued, in 
general tenns, in favour of the exercise of the jurisdiction where "there is nothing to 
210 Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406; see also Harpurn, loc. cit., no. 10, at pp. 155-156 -, Carter, 
Breach of Contract, 2nd ed., para. 1069 ; Lang, loc. cit., no. 10, at pp. 444-445 
211 L 
, egione v. Hateley, ibid., at p. 449 
212 Legione v. Hateley, Ibid, see also Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, Equity Doctrines and Remedies, 
2nd ed., 1984, Para. 1827 
213 (1983) 152 CLR 406; we supra., para. 7.54 
214 Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding [1973] AC 691, at p. 722 
215 This was in fact the way Deane and Dawson JJ proceeded in theirjoint judgment in Stem v. Uh4rthur 
(1988) 62 ALJR 588, though they provided some further justifications showing, in effect the 
unconscionability of the vendors' insistence on the exercise of their legal rights, Their Honours bad 
already acknowledged that they had understood no "significant difference" between the approaches taken 
by the majority in Legione v. Hateley. 
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*216 render such an order inequitable' , they pointed out that in most cases where the parties 
have expressly made time of the essence, the exercise of the jurisdiction would be 
inequitable. 217 This in fact implies that the jurisdiction would be exercised in exceptional 
cases where the intervention of courts, despite the existence of a "time of the essence 
provision, could not be regarded as "inequitable". The existence of these exceptional 
circumstances, it is submitted, could only be justified where a degree of unconscionability 
could be shown in the vendor's conduct to insist on the exercise of his legal rights, and 
this in fact was what emphasized on by Mason & Deane jj. 218 It does therefore seem that 
the construction of Deane & Dawson JJ in Stern v. McArthur, as far as it proposes the 
lack of "any significant difference" in the approaches taken by the majority in Legione V. 
Hateley, is a right approach, though it is difficult to say that the judgments there did not 
require the proof of the existence of exceptional circumstances which renders the 
insistence of the vendor on the forfeiture as unconscionable. 
7.75 It is therefore suggested that to exercise the jurisdiction there should exist 
exceptional circumstances showing that the vendor's insistence on the exercise of his 
legal right of forfeiture amounts to unconscionability. Both in principle and also relying 
on some authorities this view may be supported: First, in principle, the right of forfeiture 
in such circumstances is basically, as it was already argued219, the vendor's common law 
right. To put somewhat differently, it is not a contractual right of forfeiture which could 
be categorized as being in the nature of security for the production of a stated result. It 
could not, therefore, it appears, be regarded as falling within the principle stated by Lord 
Wilberforce in Shiloh Spinner: 220 case. Neither could it, as it was suggested221, be 
considered as being in the nature of penalty, in its strict sense. Any attempt, therefore, to 
apply the principle laid down in the Shiloh Spinners case, and to derive a general rule 
applicable to both legal and contractual forfeitures from that will ignore the analysis put 
211 Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, at p. 429 
217 lbid 
218 See Ibid., at p. 444 
219 See supra., para. 7.60 
2" Shilah Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973] AC 691, at p. 723 
221 See supra., para. 7.71 
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forward above. Furthermore, even assuming the incorrectness of the above analysis, 
Lord Wilberforce, dealing with a situation involving an expressly contractual forfeiture 
provision, considered that the jurisdiction should be exercised in "appropriate and 
limiteCr222 cases, giving some general guidelines for ascertaining those appropriate 
circumstances. 223 
7.76 Second, some Australian authorities show the necessity of the existence of 
"exceptional circurnstances" for the exercise of the courts' jurisdiction: In Ciavarella v. 
BaIMW24, the Rgh Court, in a single joint judgment 223, was in no doubt to limit the 
exercise of the jurisdiction to exceptional circumstances which involved unconscionable 
conduct on the part of vendor. Two factors in Legione were referred to as the central 
points in finding the unconscionability on the part of the vendor in Ciavarella: the 
windfall which the vendor would have stood to gain had the forfeiture not been relieved 
against, and the vendor's solicitors' misleading conduct which had contributed to the 
purchaser's breach. m In Tang v. Chong 227 , Young 
J relieved a purchaser against 
forfeiture of his interest in property after termination for his failure to comply with a 
notice to complete. He based his judgment on the ground that it was "unconscionable" 
for the vendor to gain a windfall as a result of the purchaser's default where the 
purchaser's breach had been caused by the illness of his solicitor. In Ber? y v. Hodsdon2n 
the need for the existence of exceptional circumstances was expressly emphasized by 
Derrington J who refused to grant relief to a purchaser who had defaulted in the payment 
of the balance of the deposit, time being expressly made of the essence, after the contract 
had been brought to an end by the vendor. The learned judge, relying on Legione v. 
Hateley, limited the exercise of the jurisdiction to "exceptional circumstances" the 
222 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [ 1973] AC 69 1, at pp. 723- 724 
223 See supra., para. 7.62 
224 (1983) 153 CLR 438; this case was referred to in the judgment of Mason CJ in Stern v. McArthur to 
show the necessity of the existence of unconscionable conduct for the exercise of the jurisdiction, but it 
was not discussed in any otherjudgment delivered. 
2" Which included Mason and Deane JJ. and Gibbs CJ 
2m (1983) 153 CIR 438, at p. 453 
227 (Unreported) I December 1988, Supreme Court of N. S. W (briefly considered in: Butt Peter, Relief 
Against Forfeiture- Ifigh Court of Australia (1989) 63 ALJ 346, at p. 349) 
228 [1989) 1 Qd R 361 
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existence of which "depend(ed] upon the existence of unconscionable conduct". 229 No 
circumstances of this character could be shown in the instant case, because, in the words 
of the learned judge: 
"the position of the plaintiffs [i. e. the purchasers] is quite commonplace in 
such circumstances. Indeed, it is if anything better than usual by reason of 
the defendants' recent abandonment of the forfeiture of the deposit. It 
may be contrasted with the factual situation in Legione v. Hateley where 
the parties seeldng relief had constructed a building upon the subject land 
which would have amounted to a substantial windfa to the vendor and a 
substantial loss to them had the relief been refused. "230 
Finally, in TM Burke Estates Pty Ltd v. PJ Constructions (Vic) Ply Ltd (In Liq)231 the 
Appeal Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria, relying on Legione v. Hateley, 
favoured the view that relief after termination for breach of an essential term could be 
granted "if there are exceptional circurnstances" which "may include unconscionable 
232 conduct on the part of the vendor who rescinded the contracf' . The relatively 
large 
windfall which the vendor stood to gain, the improvements made by the purchasers with 
the vendors' consent, by building a display home on the land, which resulted in the 
considerable increase in the value of the property, and the vendor's refusal to make any 
allowance to the purchasers for the improvements were regarded as the relevant factors in 
finding out the unconscionability of the vendors' conduct. 233 
7.77 It could thus be concluded that the jurisdiction of courts to relieve against forfeiture 
of property after termination for breach of an essential stipulation should only be 
exercised in exceptional circumstances where the insistence of the creditor on the exercise 
of his strict legal rights amounts to unconscionability. Some useful guidelines have been 
suggested by Mason and Deane JJ in the form of some questions which should be 
answered to find out whether the exercise of his legal rights by the creditor amounts to 
unconscionable conduct: 
229 Ibid., at pp. 366-367 
230 Ibid., at pp. 367-368 
231 [1991] 1 VR 610 (Victorian Supreme Court, Appeal Division; Young CJ, Kaye and Murphy JJ) 
232 Ibid., at p. 620 
233 The case is interesting Erom. another point of view: the vendors had already, upon teffaination, resold 
the property. The equitable relief granted to the purchasers was by way of ordering the vendors to pay 
the value of improvements to the purchasers. 
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"(1. ) Did the conduct of the vendor contribute to the purchaser's breach? 
(2) Was the purchaser's breach (a) trivial or slight, and (b) inadvertent and 
not wilfid? (3) What damage or other adverse consequences did the 
vendor suffer by reason of the purchaser's breach? (4) What is the 
magnitude of the purchaser's loss and the vendor's gain if the forfeiture is 
to stand? (5) Is specific performance with or without compensation an 
adequate safeguard for the vendor? "23" 
The resolution of these questions- which, in most cases relating to the subject, may arise- 
wiff determine whether the creditor's conduct in rescinding the agreement and forfeiture 
of the debtor's interest gives rise to unconscionable conduct. 
7.78 The second of the above questions may, in fact, be resolved by a detailed 
examination of the facts regarding the conduct of the applicant for relief and the gravity 
of breaches involved, the factors which were referred to in the judgment of Lord 
Wflberforce in the Shiloh Spinner case". In most cases in which relief was granted the 
breach was trivial, and it was remedied by the debtor in a short period after the breach. 236 
The answer to the first question, i. e. whether the creditor's conduct has contributed to 
the breach, is also an important factor in deciding whether the debtor's breach was wilful. 
If the creditor's conduct created the reasonable impression in the debtor's mind that the 
creditor would not emphasize on the exercise of his legal rights, then the breach might be 
regarded as inadvertent. This was, in fact, the case in Legione v. Hatele? 7 where Mason 
& Deane ij held: 
"We have already found that Mr. Gardiner (the purchaser's solicitor) acted 
in reliance on the statement made by Miss Williams (the secretary of the 
vendor's solicitor) as he understood it. The consequence is that the 
23' Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, at p. 449 
233 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v. Harding [1973] AC 691, at pp. 723-724 
236 In Kilmer v. British Columbia [1913] AC 319, for example, the purchaser, f, ý ingto on 7th of kil pay the 
July, Promised to Pay without any failure on the 12th; and after the vendor terminated the contract and 
brought an action to enforce his legal rights under the contract, the purchaser counter-claimed seeking 
specific performance and paid the outstanding money into the court. In Legione Y. Hateley (1983) 152 
CLR 406, the purchaser tendered the outstanding purchase money only four days after the notice, 
required by the agreement, eVired. Also in Stern v. McArthur (1988) 62 ALM 588, in a long term 
contract for the sale of land, the purchaser had regularly paid the instalments for about eight years, then 
there were some defaults in payment between March 1977 and May 1978, but afterwards the instalments 
were again regularly paid. After termination of the contract by the vendors in February 1979, the 
purchasers in May 1979 deposited the whole sum which was outstanding under the contract of sale. 
237 Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 4(M 
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purchaser's breach was inadvertent and not WlIfUl.,, 
239 
The answer to the third and fourth questions will, indeed, reveal any disparity between 
the actual damages suffered by the creditor as the result of breach and the value of 
property which is subject to forfeiture. 239 This has been considered as an extremely 
important factor in deciding whether the court should exercise its jurisdiction to grant 
reliefo; and it is the element which has been referred to as the penal nature of the 
forfeiture provision in cases. 24' 
Relief against forfeiture by decreeing specific performance should also be an adequate 
safeguard for the creditor. This is so if the forfeiture provision has merely been inserted 
to secure the performance of a principal obligation. Also where the forfeiture is the 
consequence of a termination which is the creditor's common law right, if the creditor 
enforces his legal right not in order to protect himself "from adverse consequences which 
f v9242 he may suffer as a result of the contract remaining on oot . 
but to take unconscionable 
advantage of the benefits which may accrue to him as the result of the forfeiture, the 
specific performance would, as far as the creditor is concerned, be an appropriate remedy 
to be decreed. 
7.79 In cases where the jurisdiction should exceptionally be exercised- like commercial 
agreements where the parties are of equal bargaining power, or cases where the forfeiture 
has occurred following termination for breach of an essential term- the exercise of the 
jurisdiction will only be possible if the unconscionability of the vendor's conduct in 
stressing on the exercise of his legal rights is adequately evident and obvious. 
'36 Jbid, at p. 450 
239 M includes the value of the debtor's interest in the property, the improvements which he may have 
made to the property, the instalments which he may forfeit under the forfeiture clause and so on. 
21 Sm, e. g., Re Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co., ex parte Hulse (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022 ; Kilmer v. 
British Columbia Orchard Lands Ltd, [ 19131 AC 3 19 ; Starside Properties Ltd. v. Mustapha [ 19741 1 
VAR 816 
2A' See cases cited above: note 240 
242 Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, per Mason & Deane JJ at p. 449 
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5.4. Being Ready, Able and Willing to Perform: A General Condition to 
Exercise the Jurisdiction 
7.80 Relief against forfeiture of the debtor's proprietary or possessory interest would not 
obviously be granted unless the debtor is able, willing and ready to perform his 
contractual obligation. Since the relief given, in these cases, is normally a decree of 
specific performance or granting the debtor extra time to perform his contract, there 
would be no case for granting such relief where the debtor has not shown his readiness, 
ability and willingness to perform his obligation. In Barton, Yhompson v. Stapling 
Machinesw, Pennycuick J., in respect of relief against forfeiture of leases for non- 
payment of rent, referred to this requirement saying: 
"It is an invariable condition of relief from forfeiture for non-payment of 
rent that the arrears, if not already available to the lessor, shall be paid 
within a time specified by the court. The precise length of time is a matter 
of discretion and the time may be extended on subsequent application, but 
the imposition of the condition is not a matter of discretion; it is a 
requirement of law rooted in the principle on which relief is granted. It 
follows that readiness to pay arrears within such time as the court shall 
think fit is a necessary condition of the tenant's claim for relief. "244 
7.81 Being able, ready and willing to perform does not mean that the debtor must be able 
to perform his contractual obligation immediately. 245 It seems that if the court can be 
convinced that there is a "reasonable prospect'" of the debtor being able to perform the 
contract in a reasonable period of time, then the relief may be granted. 
6. Forms of Relief 
7.82 The most usual form of relief against forfeiture of the debtor's interest in the 
243[1966] 2 All ER 222, Pennycuidc J. 
244 Ibid., at p. 225 
' Starside Pýqperfies Ltd V. Mustapha [197411 WLR 816, where Carins L. J., at p. 825, said: "... I do 
not consider that the expression 'able, ready and willing to perform' means 'able to perform on that very 
day'. ... in Chandless- Chandless v. Nicholson [194212 KB 321 ... the original order for relief was on 
condition that payment of arrears was made within three months, and I believe it to be common for time 
to pay to be given, which would never be appropriate if it were a condition of relief that the applicant for 
relief should be able to pay immediately. " See also Hoggett, Houses on the Never-Never, loc. cit., no. 40, 
at p. 348 ; Keeton, Equity, 2nd ed., 1976, p. 314 
246 Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, in which Romer L. J., considering the In re Dagenham can 
said that "presumably the court", in that case, "was satisfied that there was a reasonable prospect of the 
company being able to satisfy the vendors, if extra time were given, for otherwise there was rio object in 
allowing them a further chance of completing the contract. " see also Pawlowski, Relief Against 
Forfeiture of Instalments, Estate Gazette, 27 March 1993, Issue 9312,122, at p. 123 
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subject-matter is, as it was probably noticed when discussing the relevant cases, decreeing 
specific performance or giving the contract-breaker further time to perform his 
contractual obligation. In unusual circumstances, however, there might be a case where 
the court is unable to grant this form of relief In such a case, would the court have to 
enforce the forfeiture provision which might also be penal in nature, or should there be 
another form to relieve the debtor from the consequences of his breach? 
7.83 The question was considered in the rather recent case of Jobson v. johnSon 247: The 
defendant agreed to purchase 62,566 shares in a football club for a total purchase price of 
L351,688 which was payable by an initial payment of L40,000 and six half-yearly 
instalments of 151,948. Upon his default in the payment of the second or any subsequent 
instalment, the defendant, under cl 6(6) of the agreement, had to retransfer the same 
amount of shares (though not necessarily the shares purchased) to the vendors for the 
sum of 140,000. Default having been made in the payment of the first instalment, a 
further variation agreement was entered into by the parties which changed slightly the 
date and amount of the instalments. The defendant paid a further V00,000, but failed to 
make any payment in respect of the balance. The plaintiff, as the assignee of the vendors, 
brought an action seeking specific performance of the retransfer agreement. The 
defendant claimed that the retransfer agreement was a penalty clause and unenforceable. 
He also counterclaimed for relief against forfeiture of his shares. 
At the trial, the counterclaim was struck out because the defendant had failed to comply 
with an undertaking to disclose certain documents relating to his recent financial 
circumstances. 2" Harman I held that, though the clause was a penalty, it was 
nonetheless enforceable unless the court, in its discretion, can grant the purchaser relief 
against forfeiture. Since such relief, because of the striking out of the defendant's 
counterclaim, was impossible, so the judge ordered specific performance of the retransfer 
agreement. 
247 jobSon V. JohnSon [1989) 1 All ER 621 
248 There was no appeal against this decision. That meant that it was not open for the appellate court to 
consider granting relief against forfeiture. 
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7.84 on appeal, the court was in no doubt that cl 6(6) was a penalty clause since it 
subjected the defendant to the same liability regardless of the gravity, nature and 
consequences of the breach. 249 The court was also unanimou? 50 as to the point that it 
should not allow the clause, with its apparent penal nature, to be enforced. 251 All the 
judges were of the opinion that in the ordinary course of events, relief by giving the 
defendant a further opportunity to pay the outstanding balance of the instalments with 
interest would have been considered had the defendant's counterclaim for relief against 
forfeiture not been struck OUt. 252 
in Nichols LJ's view, cl 6(6), in addition to being penal, had features which resembled 
those of forfeiture clauses. He pointed out: 
"In substance cl 6(6) is equivalent to a right to retake the property being 
sold in default of payment of the full price. Clause 6(6) was inserted as an 
attempt to give the vendors some "security" over the property being sold 
if the purchaser failed to pay in fa. i*253 
Kerr LJ was in agreement with Nichols LJ as to this point and held that in his view the 
clause was "much closer to what [was] commonly referred to as a 'forfeiture' than a 
, penaityp CiauSeq. 254 
7.85 It would seem clear that the clause had a hybrid nature: It was an agreed damages 
clause under which the defendant, instead of making a specific payment, had to transfer a 
certain property to the plaintiff if he defaulted in punctual payment of instalments. The 
clause, no doubt, was not a genuine pre-estimate of the plaintiffs likely losses, and so 
'Jobsonv. Johnson [1989] 1 All ER621, at p. 625 per Dillon LJ, p. 634 per Nichols U, and p. 638 per 
Kerr LJ 
2" Kerr LJ with considerable reluctance 
251 Jobson v. Johnson [1989] 1 All ER 62 1, at p. 629 per Dillon U, p. 634 per Nichols LJ, and p. 639 per 
Kerr LJ 
252 Jobson v. Johnson [198911 All ER 621, at p. 629 per Dillon LJ, pp. 635-636 per Nichols LJ, and p. 
638 per Kerr LJ 
233 Ibid., at p. 635. There were, of course, some problems with regard to such a construction: for 
instance, no property in the sham had been retained by the vendor; and the purchaser, under cl 6(6), did 
not have to trander the identical shares which he had purchased. (See p. 635 per Nichols U, and p. 638 
per Kerr W) Nonetheless, taking into account the other provisions of the contract, they could not 
undermine the fact that the real purpose for the insertion of the clause was to provide a fom of security 
over the property for the payment of the instalments. (See ibid., per Nichols LJ and Kerr W) 
254 ibid., at p. 638 
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was a penalty. Being penal, it could not be enforced beyond the actual losses which the 
plaintiff had suffered as the result of breach. 255 On the other hand, it was a forfeiture 
clause which had been inserted to provide a form of security over the shares for payment. 
There was no doubt that, even in the absence of a counterclaim for relief against 
forfeiture, the clause could not be enforced. The plaintiff, however, had to be adequately 
compensated, but how? 
7.86 Relief by granting the defendant an extra time to perform was impossible because of 
the striking out of the counterclaim. One possibility was to order the transfer of a 
reduced number of shares to the plaintiff so that it would cover his actual loss resulting 
from breach. The court, however, considered it as making a new contract for the parties, 
and therefore rejected this possibility. 216 The other possibility was simply to refuse to 
enforce the clause, and to enter a judgment for the plaintiff for actual damages he had 
suffered as the result of breach. But this was disclaimed by the plaintiff . 
257 
The majority of the Court of Appeal258 proposed the plaintiff two options: First, an order 
for the sale of the shares by the court, and payment of the outstanding balance of the 
instalments plus interest out of the proceeds. Second, an order for the specific 
performance of the retransfer agreement if the present value of the shares, according to 
an enquiry ordered by the court, did not exceed, by more than L40,000, the actual losses 
of the vendor as the result of breach. 259 If neither of these alternatives was acceptable by 
the plaintiff, then he would be left to sue for the unpaid instalments in a fresh action and 
the order for specific performance would be discharged. m 
2" Aid, at p. 627 per Dillon LJ, pp. 632-633 per Nichols LJ ; Kerr LJ thought that penalty clauses won 
not simply unenforceable. "In my view" he said "the combined effect of law and equity on penalty 
clauses is simply that they will not be enforced in favour of a plaintiff without first giving to the 
defendant a proper opportunity to obtain relief against their penal consequences. " (at p. 638) This view, 
with all respect, does not seem to be in line with the previous authorities which clearly establish that 
penalty clauses are unenforceable. To see some of these authorities see supra., chapter one ; see also 
Harpum, Equitable Relief- Penalties and Forfeitures (1989) 48 CLI 370, at p. 372 
256jobsonv. Johnson [198911 AD ER621, at pp. 634,637 per Nichols Lj 
257 Ibid., at p. 630 per Dillon LJ 
2" Dillon and Nichols LJJ 
259 Ibid., at p. 630 per Dillon LJ, and pp. 636-637 per Nichols Lj 
I Ibid., per Dillon LJ 
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7.87 The second of these alternatives was almost certainly not a real option, for the value 
of the shares, as appeared from both parties, had dramatically increased. The first option, 
in the words of Nichols U, was "equivalent in the different circumstances of this case to 
the automatic scaling-down of a (pecuniary) penalty clause". 261 It was also, it would 
seem, very similar to refief by granting the defendant an extension of time: The shares 
would belong to the defendant, but to pay the unpaid instalments, the court would order 
the sale of the shares to pay the arrears out of the proceeds. This was one of the reasons 
why Keff IJ disagreed with this form of relief Ffis lordship said: 
"The first alternative differs little from simply granting relief to the 
defendant in the usual way, save that this would be accompanied by what 
would in effect be an auction of the shares, in which both parties as well as 
9s2IS2 outsider could compete. 
7.88 Kerr LJ, therefore, offered another form of relief. - restitutio in integrum. The fairer 
solution without contravening any principle of equity, in his view, was that the shares 
should be retransferred. to the plaintiff (i. e. the specific performance of cl 6(6)) on 
condition that all the moneys paid by the defendant should be repaid to him, perhaps with 
interest, by the plaintff. 20 
7.89 It has been suggested that the majority's view is the correct one, because, according 
to the both normal and equitable rules for damages, the plaintiff "must be placed in the 
same position as if the agreement had been performed". 264 Some writers, on the other 
hand, have favoured the minority's view. 26' It would seem that, in the unusual 
circumstances of the case, Kerr LJ's view has much to commend it: First, as pointed out 
by Professor Furt'nston, in the circumstances of the case where the value of the shares had 
increased and the issue between the parties was largely about the right to the shares, not 
money, "a solution which leaves the shares in the plaintiffs hands is likely to be fairer 
261 Ibid., at p. 637 
262 Ibid., at p. 640 
263 Ibid 
I Harpum, Equitable Relief Penalties and Forfeitures (1989) 48 CLJ 370, at p. 373 
265 Furmston M P, ConbW Planning: Liquidated Damages, Deposits and Foreseeability Rule (1991) 4 
JCL 1, at pp. 6-7 ; Clarke MJR, Commentary on "Contract Planning, by Prof. Furmstoh" (1991) 4 JCL 
11, at p. 15 
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than a solution which leaves the shares in the defendant's hands. "2" 
7.90 Second, it should not be doubted that the rights of the plaintiff should not be 
prejudiced by the form of relief which is offered by the court. If the defendant's 
counterclaim had not been struck out, the court might have granted relief by extending 
the time for payment. In such a case, if the defendant had failed to perform his contract 
within the specified time, the court, subject to any further extension of time, would have 
ordered the specific performance of cl 6(6), and the shares, accordingly, would have been 
retransferred to the plaintiff. Put another way, in the ordinary course of events, the 
plaintiff had the probable chance of getting the shares back. Now, the relief offered by 
the majority ignores this probable right of the plaintiff, especially in circumstances where, 
as it appears from the report, the defendant preferred to let his counterclaim be struck 
7 
out. True that the plaintiff had the right to bid and buy the shares if there was a sale26 , 
but it was undoubtedly different from getting the shares back under cl 6(6). 
7.91 Third, the relief offered by the majority was very close to the ordinary relief by the 
extension of time which, because of the striking out of the counterclaim, was not open for 
the court to consider and grant it. 
7.92 Fourth, Kerr LJ's view was explainable in principle in the following terms: There 
was no objection if the parties had provided that upon any failure by the purchaser, the 
vendor would be entitled to retake possession of the subject-matter on terms that he 
should repay all moneys received under the agreement. Upon this analysis, cl 6(6) was of 
a penal nature because it did not take into account the moneys already received by the 
plaintiff, and to this extent, it was unenforceable. 26' Therefore, the counterclaim being 
struck out, there would be no objection to the enforcement of the clause if the plaintff 
was ordered to return the instalments received under the agreement. Put another way, 
after the retransfer of shares to the plaintiff, the retention of the instalments already 
received by him would be in the nature of penalty against which the defendant was 
266 Furmston, ibid., at p. 7 
21 As it was suggesW by Nichols LJ, Jobson v. Johnson [1989] 1 All ER 621, at p. 637 
2N Sm jobson v. Johnson [199911 All ER 62 1, at p. 640 per Kerr LJ 
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entitled to be relieved. This relief would take the form of ordering the plaintiff to repay 
those moneys to the defendant. Though this form of relief would return the parties to 
their pre-contractual position, it does not contravene the equitable principles relating to 
relief against forfeiture. For, as it will shortly be seen269, relief against forfeiture of 
instalments already paid might, in certain circumstances, be restitutionary in nature. 2" 
7.93 The case illustrates the possibility of some other forms of relief, where it is not, for 
any reason, open to the court to consider granting relief by extending the time of 
performance. It should, however, be noted that these are exceptional forms of relief, and 
could only be utilized in proper exceptional circumstances. 
2m See infra., chapter 8, section 2 
"0 See, e. g., Slee&nan v. DrinkJe [ 19161 1 AC 275; Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap 
imeshnent Ltd. [ 199312 All ER 3 70 
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Chapter 8 
Relief Against Forfeiture of Moneys Already Paid 
1. Introductory Remarks 
8.01 A contractual forfeiture provision, besides the forfeiture of the debtor's interest in 
the subject-matter, may also provide for the creditor's right to retain moneys already paid 
by the debtor in case of his breach of a contractual obligation. In sale of land by 
instalments, for instance, the parties may provide that if the purchaser made default in the 
payment of any instalment, the vendor would be entitled to terminate the contract, retake 
possession of the land and retain the moneys already paid by the purchaser. This may 
also happen in commercial agreements where the debtor's interest in the subject-matter 
may not be a proprietary or possessory interest. 
8.02 Granting relief against forfeiture of the creditor's interest in property in appropriate 
cases, the court also relieves the debtor from forfeiture of moneys already paid by him'; 
because where the court grants such relief by decreeing specific performance or giving 
the debtor extra time to perform the contract, the moneys paid by the debtor are taken 
into account as a part of his performance. If, however, relief from forfeiture of the 
debtor's interest in property was denied, or where the debtor was not ready and able to 
perform the contract and brought an action seeking only relief from forfeiture of moneys 
already paid, would there be a jurisdiction for the courts to grant such a relief? Assuming 
the existence of the jurisdiction, what are the circumstances upon which the jurisdiction 
should be exercised? And is there any relationship between the jurisdiction to strike out 
penalties and the doctrine of relief against forfeiture of moneys already paid. These are 
the questions with which this chapter will mainly be concerned. 
8.03 It will be seen that there are both equitable and statutory jurisdictions to grant relief 
against forfeiture of moneys already paid. Though the statutory jurisdiction has mainly 
originated in equity, and our main concern also is the study of the equitable jurisdiction, 
I See supra., pp. 258-259 
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nevertheless we will refer, briefly, to the statutory jurisdiction 2 after a rather detailed 
analysis of the equitable jurisdiction. 
8.04 The moneys which may be forfeited as the result of the debtor's breach might be a 
deposit or instalments of the contractual price. It has sometimes been suggested' that the 
principles relating to relief against forfeiture of moneys already paid do not extend to 
deposits, and can only be applied to part payments (i. e. the instalments of purchase price). 
It might, on the other hand, appear from some judicial statements that the equitable 
jurisdiction is equally available as to relief against forfeiture of deposits and part 
payments. 4 With all respect, neither of these views, it seems, can precisely reflect the 
situation: As it will be argued', there is an equitable jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture of deposits. The circumstances for the exercise of this jurisdiction, however, 
are, to some extent, different from those which are applied as to the relief from forfeiture 
of instalments. It is, therefore, appropriate to discuss separately the principles regarding 
relief from forfeiture of part payments and deposits. Thus, the second section of this 
chapter will deal with the equitable rules as to relief against forfeiture of instalments 
already paid, while the third section will be responsible for illuminating the jurisdiction of 
courts to relieve against forfeiture of deposits. 
2. Equitable Relief Against Forfeiture of Part payments 
Z 1. Existence and Scope of the Jurisdiction 
8.05 There is no doubt that, in certain circumstances, courts have equitable power to 
6 
relieve a debtor from forfeiture of instalments already paid. The scope of the 
2 See infra., Chapter 9 
'Downes T. A., Textbook on Contract, 3rd ed., 1993, p. 334 
4 See, e. g., Stoddoser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, at pp. 637-638 per Deming 
W; see also McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 503 
5 See infra., paras. 8.47 et seq. 
6 Furmston M P, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contractý 13th ed., 1996, p. 642; Treitel GIL, 
The Law of Contract, 9th ed., 1995, pp. 908-909 ; Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed., vol. 1,1994, para. 26- 
070; Guest A. G., Anson's Law of Contract, 26th ed., 1984, p. 513 ; Ogus A 1, The Law of Damages, 
1973, p. 54 ; Downes T. A., Textbook on Contract, 3rd ed., 1993, pp. 333-334 -, Pawlowski M., Relief 
Aping Forfeiture of Instalments (1993) Estate Gazette, 27 March 1993, issue 9312,122 
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jurisdiction, however, is highly controversial. In principle, where the forfeiture provision 
is in the nature of penalty- where, that is, the sum forfeited is wholly disproportionate to 
the damages caused by the breach- there seems less reason to justify the enforcement of 
the clause and to reject the availability of relief. A review of cases, however, shows that 
the position is far from clear. Two different situations may need different treatments, on 
the basis of whether the debtor is able, ready and willing to perform his obligation. 
2.1.1. The debtor able and willing to perform 
2.1-1-1. Relief bygranting cdra time to complete the contract 
8.06 It seems to be an unchallenged proposition that where the debtor is able, ready and 
willing to perform his part of the contract, the courts- subject to the limitations discussed 
in the preceding chaptei7- could have jurisdiction to relieve him against forfeiture of 
instalments by granting him extra time to perform his contractual obligation. ' In Slarside 
Properties Ltd v. Mustapha9, the facts of which have already been givenlo, Edmund 
Davies LJ, considering the judgment of the judge at the first instance, cited the following 
part of his judgment: 
one only has to consider the case where the defendant goes on paying 
regularly right up to a state where she has nearly accumulated a deposit of 
11250 and then defaults. If she loses all her payments to date it can not be 
argued that this provision is not a penalty. It cannot be a penalty one year 
' Supra., chapter 7 
8 Re Dagenham (Aames) Dock Co., ex parte Hulse (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022 ; Kilmer v. British 
Columbia OrchardLands Ltd. [1913] AC 319; Starside Properties Ltd. v. Mustapha [197411 WLR 816 
; 71ough, it was suggested, these cases deal with the different but related, question of relief against 
forfeiture of the payer's interest in property, nonetheless they can, it seems, be relied upon, to establish 
the existence of the jurisdiction to relieve from forfeiture of instalments; because firstly, in all these cases 
the purchaser was indirectly relieved from forfeiture of instalments already paid, and secondly, the 
argument of the court, particularly in Kilmer v. British Colombia and Starside Properties Ltd v. 
Mustapha, inter alia, was that the forfeiture provision empowering the vendor to retain the instalments 
already paid was in the nature of penalty against which the purchaser was entitled to be relieved. It, 
then, granted relief by giving the purchaser extra time to perform his contractual obligation. See also 
Funnston M P, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract, 13th ed., 1996, p. 642; Guest A. G., 
Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, para. 15-133; Treitel G. H., The Law of Contract, 9th ed., 1995, 
p. 908; Treitel GIL, Remedies for Breach of Contract, 1988, p. 242; Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed, vol. 1, 
1994, para. 26-070 ; Ogus AL The Law of Damages, 1973, p. 57 ; McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 
1988, para. 506 ; Guest A. G., Anson's Law of Contract, 26th ed., 1984, pp. 513-514; Downes T. AL, 
Textbook on Contract, 3rd ed., 1993, p. 334 ; Pawlowsld M., Relief Against Forfeiture of Instalments 
(1993) Estate Gazette, 27 March 1993, issue 9312,122 ; Meagher R P, Equity Doctrines & Remedies, 
3rd ed., 1992, para. 1827 
9 Starside Properties Ltd. v. Mustapha [ 197411 WLR 816 
10 Supra, para. 7.16 
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and not the next and therefore I am in no doubt that this is a penal 
provision. "" 
The Lord Justice, then, referred to the relief given by the court by postponing the order 
for possession for three months to enable the purchaser to perform his part of the bargain, 
and added: 
"That the contract between the parties imposed a penalty is unchallenged, 
and that the nature or dimensions of the penalty were such as to satisfy the 
court that justice required that relief therefrom should be granted was 
demonstrated by the original order from which the plaintiffs did not 
appeauM 
8.07 Although this jurisdiction has mainly been developed in cases dealing with contracts 
for the sale or lease of land, there is, nonetheless, no reason to confine it to any special 
type of agreements. 13 The observations of Romer LJ- who, as it will be seen, took the 
narrowest possible view with regard to the scope of the jurisdiction in the important case 
of Stockloser v. Johnson 14 ,a case dealing with a forfeiture provision in a contract for the 
sale of plant and machinery- show the general availability of the jurisdiction to relieve 
from forfeiture of instalments by granting the debtor extra time to perform his obligation: 
11... it appears to me that the cases establish that, if a purchaser defaults in 
punctual payment of instalments of purchase money, the court will, in a 
proper case, relieve the purchaser from his contractual liability to forfeit 
instalments (apart from the deposit) already paid to the extent of giving 
him a further chance and further time to pay the money which is in arrears 
if he is able and willing to do so. " 15 
Furthermore, regarding the hypothetical case of the purchase of a necklace by 
instalments, put by Denning LJ, on terms that upon default in punctual payment the 
purchaser would forfeit all instalments already paid, Romer LJ was in no doubt that the 
court would give the purchaser "further time to find the money if he could establish some 
"16 probability of his being able to do so... 
11 Aid., at p. 570 
12 Ibid., at p. 571 
11 See, e. g., Barton 7hompson & Co., Ltd. V. Stapling Machines Co. [ 1966] Ch. 499; supra., para. 7.22; 
see also Greig & Davis, The Law of Contract, 1987 (With Fourth Cumulative Supplement, 1992). pp. 
1458,1460 
14 Stocidoser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [195411 QB 476 
11 Ibid., at p. 643 
16 Ibid., at p. 644 
362 
8.08 The scope of the jurisdiction, its limitations, and the circumstances upon which it 
should be exercised 17 have already been fully dealt with" and need not be repeated here. 
11.1. Z Rdief by ordering repayment of theforfeitedinstaIments 
8.09 The more important question is if, because of any limitations of the jurisdiction to 
relieve from forfeiture by granting extra time, the court does not grant the debtor more 
time to pay, whether it has power to grant relief by ordering repayment of the instalments 
which are subject to forfeiture? The position does not seem to be clear": It has, relying 
on Stee&nan v. Drinkle2o, been suggested that the courts certainly have the jurisdiction to 
grant such a relief In this case2', the Privy Council refused to grant specific performance 
to a purchaser who had failed to pay the instalments of the purchase price on the due 
date, time having been expressly made of the essence. The Board, however, was in no 
doubt that the forfeiture provision empowering the vendor to retain the instalments paid 
by the purchaser was in the nature of penalty "against which", in the words of Viscount 
Haldane, "relief should be given on proper terms". 22 The form of relief which the Board 
suggested was that the purchasers should be relieved from forfeiture of the sums paid by 
them under the agreement, and for this purpose they should be at liberty to apply to the 
Court of the first instance-23 The case clearly establishes the jurisdiction of courts to 
relieve against forfeiture of instalments already paid, where the forfeiture constitutes a 
penalty. 
S. 10 There is, on the other hand, the dicta of Romer LJ who, delivering his judgment in 
17 See also Pawlowski hi, Relief Against Forfeiture of Instalments (1993) Estate Gazette, 27 Nfarch 
1993, issue 9312,122, at p. 123 
18 Supra., chapter 7 
" See, e. g., Furmston M P, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract, 13th ed., 1996, p. 642; Ogus 
AL The Law of Damages, 1973, pp. 54-56; Treitel G. H., The Law of Contract, 9th ed., 1995, p. 908; 
]McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, paras. 506-507; Pawlowski M., Relief Against Forfeiture of 
InsWments (1993) Estate Gazette, 27 Much 1993, issue 9312,122, at p. 123; Chitty on Contracts, 27th 
ed., vol. 1,1994, para. 26-070 at p. 1264 
2'Stee&nan v. Dtlnlde [191611 AC 275 
21 For ft faM of the caw see supra., pam. 7.11 
22 Aid, at p. 280 
23 lbid 
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Stockloser v. Johnson24, considered the cases regarding the issue, and took a view which 
has been described as "the narrowest view of the court's powers"'5. flis lordship 
concluded: 
"In my judgment, there is no sufficient ground for interfering with the 
contractual rights of a vendor under forfeiture clauses of the nature which 
are now under consideration, while the contract is still subsisting, beyond 
giving a purchaser who is in default, but who is able and willing to 
proceed with the contract, a further opportunity of doing so; and no relief 
of any other nature can properly be given, in the absence of some special 
circumstances such as fraud, sharp practice, or other unconscionable 
conduct of the vendor, to a purchaser after the vendor has rescinded the 
contraCt. sv26 
As it appears from this passage, in Romer Us view, the only relief which may be 
available from forfeiture of instalments already paid, where the contract has not been 
terminated for the debtor's default, is granting the contract breaker extra time in which to 
remedy his breach. After termination, however, in the absence of special circumstances, 
there is no jurisdiction to relieve from forfeiture. 27 Accordingly, the court would, in no 
case, in the absence of special circumstances, have power to grant relief by ordering the 
repayment of the instalments already paid. 
8.11 It will shortly be considered 29 that the dicta of Romer LJ have been based on an 
unconvincing explanation of the previous cases which do not justify such a conclusion. 
Furthermore, the premises relied upon by his lordship, though correct in themselves, do 
not lead to such a result. It is, therefore, submitted that the first view is correct and the 
courts, in proper circumstances, have power to grant relief against forfeiture of 
instalments already paid by ordering the creditor to return the forfeited sums. 
24 Stoclaoser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
25 Waddam, Tim Law of Contmcts, 2nd ed., 1984, p. 343 
26 Stockjoser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, at p. 644 
" It was fully discussed and submitted before that after termination, even where the contract has been 
terminated for breach of an essential stipulation, the courts should have power to gmnt relief by gmnting 
the defaulting party a further time to remedy his breach. See supra., paras. 7.48 et seq. 
28 lqfra, paras. 8.21 et seq. 
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2.1.2. The debtor unable or unwilling to perform 
2.1.2. L Availability of Relief: Generally 
8.12 Where the defaulting party is either unable or unwilling to perform his contractual 
obligation, no question of granting relief against forfeiture of instalments paid by giving 
him an extra time to remedy his breach would arise, because, as it was argued before", 
being able, ready and willing to perform is a necessary condition for decreeing specific 
perfomiance or granting the debtor extra time to perform his part of the bargain. Now 
the question in such a case is whether courts have jurisdiction to grant relief by ordering 
repayment of the instalments to the debtor? 'O It would seem that the decision of the Privy 
Council in Stee&nan v. Drinkle" establishes the existence of such a jurisdiction. The 
logical inference to be drawn from the case is that where the forfeiture provision is in the 
nature of penalty and the court is, for any reason, barred from affording relief by granting 
an extra time, the debtor may be relieved by the court ordering the creditor to return the 
forfeited instalments. 
2.1.2.2. Availability of Relief: opposing views 
2.1.2.2.1. Farwell J in Mussen's case 
8.13 The decision in Stee&nan v. Drinkle has been narrowly interpreted by Farwell J in 
Mussen v. Van Diemen's Land Co. ": In an agreement for the sale of land by instalments, 
it was provided that in proportion to the amounts paid by instalments, the purchaser 
would be let into possession of certain parts of the land, and that upon default in punctual 
payment, the vendor would be entitled to rescind the contract and retain the instalments 
already paid. Default having been made, the vendor terminated the agreement and 
retained about 140,200 which was the sum paid by the purchaser in excess of the price of 
the land which had been conveyed to him. After about six years, the purchaser brought 
an action claiming the return of the forfeited sum on the ground, inter alia, that the 
29 Supra., paras. 7.80-7.81 
30 See Treitel G. H., The Law of Contract, 9th ed., 1995, p. 908 ; Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed., vol. 2., 
1994, para. 36-273 at pp. 637-638 McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 506 ; Ops A I, The 
Law of Damages, 1973, pp. 55-56 Diamond A. L., Sutton & Shannon on Contracts ; 7th ed., 1970, pp. 
423-424 ; Meagher R P, Equity Doctrines & Remedies, 3rd ed., 1992, para. 1827; Beale R, 
unreasonable Deposits (1993) 109 LQR 524, at p. 526 
31 Stee4jVM V. Drinkle [1916] 1 AC 275 
32 Mussen v. Van Diemen's Land Co. [1938] 1 All ER 210, [19381 Ch. 253 
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forfeiture provision was in the nature of penalty against which he was entitled to be 
relieved by ordering the vendor to return some part, if not the whole, of the moneys 
already paid under the agreement. 
8.14 Farwell J was in no doubt that there were cases in which equity would relieve 
against penalties. The basis for such an intervention, in his view, was that it was "against 
conscience for a party who had the money to retain it". 33 His lordship stated: 
"To entitle a plaintiff to relief from a penalty, it is necessary, in my 
judgment, for him to show that there is some ground or another on which 
it would be unconscionable for the defendants to retain the money, or the 
whole of the money. , 34 
On the facts of the case, however, he concluded that there was nothing unconscionable to 
justify the existence of the jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture . 
35 He confined the 
cases in which relief had been granted, with the exception of one case, to cases where the 
court was able to decree specific performance. Then he explained Stee&nan v. Drinkle36 
as an exceptional case, concluding that the reason for the relief in that case was that the 
purchaser was able, ready and willing to perform the contract, and the vendors were 
refusing to permit specific performance. His lordship pointed out: 
"In my judgment, the whole basis of that decision turns on the fact that the 
appellant was willing to perform the contract, and the only reason why 
performance was impossible was that the respondents refused to agree to 
specific performance and the terms of the contract made it impossible for 
the court to decree specific performance. The Board thereupon thought 
that it was unconscionable for the respondents to take up the attitude of 
saying: "We will not complete but we will retain the money, " and on that 
ground the Board granted relief. 9937 
The judge, therefore, thought that Stee&nan v. Drinkle turned on its particular facts and 
had no general application. Thus, since the purchaser, in the present case, was not ready 
and willing to perform, there was no ground for the court to grant relief florn forfeiture. " 
33 Ibid, at pp. 215-216 
34 Ibid., at p. 217 
35 ibid. 
36 Stee&nan v. Drinkle [191611 AC 275 
37 Ibid., at p. 219 
38 The court also relied on two other factors: first even if the purchaser were ready and wining to 
perform, his delay in bringing the action would make it impossible for the court to consider specific 
performance. Further, in the circumstances of the case where the purchaser had stood by for six years 
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According to Farwell J., therefore, the court would have no jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture by ordenng repayment of the instalments, which are subject to forfeiture, to the 
payer, where he is not able, willing and ready to perform his part of the bargain. 
S. 15 Farwell J's view, so far as it recognises unconscionability as the basis for the 
equitable intervention to relieve from forfeiture, should be supported. " His narrow 
interpretation of Steechnan v. Drinkle4o does, however, seem to be subject to a number of 
serious objectione: 
First, in that case, the Board emphasised the penal nature of the forfeiture provision, and 
realised the necessity of relief against such a penalty. 42 The Board did not put any 
emphasis on the vendor's conduct and did not even mention that the vendor's conduct- in 
not allowing the specific performance, though the purchaser was ready, able and willing 
to perform, and at the same time insisting on his contractual right to retain moneys 
already paid- amounted to unconscionability. It should, no doubt, be accepted that the 
purchaser's readiness and ability to complete the contract was a relevant factor in 
deciding whether relief should be givee, but the judgment by no means shows that 
willingness and ability were the necessary prerequisites to any relief which may be given 
against forfeiture. 
and had not made the smallest attempt to complete the contract, it was not unconscionable for the vendor 
to insist on the performance of the oontmctual term. Second, the purchaser had received a part of what he 
had bargained for. Tberefore, it would not be unconscionable for the vendor to retain, under the 
conuwtual provision, the moneys already paid. See ibid, pp. 219-220; see also Harpum C., Relief 
Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, at p. 158 
" See Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [ 1984] CLJ 134, ibid. 
40 Steedmm v. Drinkle [191611 AC 275 
41 Farwell Ps narrow explanation was also criticized by Denning U in Stockloser v. Johnson [195411 
All ER 630, [195411 QB 476, at p. 639. In his lordship's view, "the court was much influenced by the 
W that the purchaser had allowed nearly six years to elapse before claiming restitution. He had already 
had a good deal of land conveyed to him and, during his six years' delay, values had so greatly changed 
that it may be that he had his money's worth. At any rate, it was not unconscionable for the defendant to 
retain the money. " 
42 It is helpfid to recite the relevant words of the judgment: "... the stipulation in question was one for a 
penalty against which relief should be given on proper terms. " Steedman v. DrInkle [191611 AC 275, at 
p. 280 
43 See thejudgrnent of Somervell LJ in Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, at 
pp. 635-636 
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Second, in principle, there could be no justification for the view requiring readiness and 
ability as conditions precedent for relief from forfeiture by ordering repayment of the 
forfeited instalments. Where the forfeiture provision amounts to a penalty, i. e. where the 
amount which is subject to forfeiture greatly exceeds the actual loss suffered by the 
creditor, there should, in principle, be an equitable jurisdiction to relieve the debtor from 
forfeiture on terms that the creditor should be fully compensated for losses caused by the 
breach. 
Third, accepting the readiness and ability as preconditions for relief would lead to an 
unjustifiable distinction between penalty clauses and forfeiture provisions which are of 
penal nature. As to the fonner, relief would be given regardless of the debtor's readiness 
and wiflingness to perform. With regard to the latter, however, the provision would be 
enforced where the purchaser is not able, ready and willing to complete his contract. 44 
Fourth, the view night also lead to an important practical problem which has well been 
put by a learned writer in the following terms: 
"If a vendor terminated a contract because a purchaser failed to pay on 
time, then as a result of the decision in Slee&nan v. Drinkle, that 
purchaser would know that he would not thereafter obtain a decree of 
specific performance. It would be an exercise in futility to require the 
purchaser to have gone through the ritual of indicating his readiness to 
perform the contract. "4*' 
in view of the above observations, it would seem that Farwell J's narrow interpretation of 
Stee&nan v. Drinkle is, with respect, not correct and should not be followed. " 
2.1.2.2.2. Conflicting dicta in Stockloser v Johnson 
8.16 A narrow version of Farwell J's views, however, was expressed in obiler &cIa by 
Romer LJ in Stockloser V. johnSOIý7 . 
The case was concerned with the purchase of 
certain plant and machinery- which had been hired out on the royalty basis- by the 
44 See Ogus AL The Law of Damages, 1973, p. 56 ; Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the 
purchaser of Land [19841 CLJ 134, at p. 158 
45 Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, at pp. 158-159 
46 See also Pawlowski M., Relief Against Forfeiture of Instalments (1993) Estate Gazette, 27 March 
1993, issue 9312,122, at p. 123 where he observed : "In essence, Farwell J's judgment ignores the 
resfitutionary nature of the form of equitable relief now under discussion. " 
47 Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
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plaintiff and taking over the benefits of the hiring agreements. The contracts provided 
that the purchase price should be paid by certain instalments; and that upon default in 
payment of any instalment for a period exceeding 28 days, the seller would be entitled, on 
giving a fourteen-day notice, to rescind the agreement, retake possession of the plant and 
machinery and retain all instalments already paid. Due to the bad weather, the amount of 
royalties received by the buyer was not as much as he had expected, and apparently this 
resulted in the buyer's failure to pay the instalments due. Default having been made, the 
seller gave notice rescinding the agreements, retook possession of the subject-matters and 
retained the moneys paid by the buyer. The buyer never expressed his willingness and 
ability to perform the contracts. 
in an action by the buyer for the recovery of the forfeited instalments on the ground that 
the forfeiture provision amounted to a penalty, the Court of Appeal was of the unanimous 
opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief. According to the facts, the instalments 
of the purchase price should have been of the same value as the royalties anticipated from 
the hiring agreements. There, therefore, was nothing unconscionable for the seller to 
retain the instalments paid, because they were the least that he would have expected even 
if the contracts had not been entered into. 
8.17 There was, however, a sharp distinction of opinion on the question whether the 
court had jurisdiction to relieve from forfeiture by ordering repayment of instalments 
already paid. Somervell and Denning LJJ took a wider view of the equitable jurisdiction 
of courts. Holding that the cases establish a wider power for courts to give relief against 
forfeiture even though there is no sharp practice by the creditor, and even though the 
vendor is not able to perform his contractual obligation, Somervell LJ emphasised on 
unconscionability as the basis for the equitable intervention. "' He pointed out: 
"All I am concerned to say is that, in my opinion, the cases do not 
establish (i) that relief could never be given unless the plaintiff could show 
that he is financially in a position to complete and would be willing to do 
so if the defendant were himself prepared to waive the breach and 
complete the contract, or (ii) that after rescission no relief can be given 
unless there is fraud or sharp practice. ... As the basis of the plaintiffs 
right if he has one, is the unconscionability of the defendant's retaining 
48 ibid, at p. 634 
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am which have been paid to him as instalments, ... the circumstances of the particular case should be looked at and the question is not one to be 
decided by looking only at the contract. "49 
His lordship's views were shared by Denning LJ who rejected the debtor's ability and 
willingness to complete the contract as conditions for giving relief by ordering repayment 
of the forfeited sums. Emphasising on the fact that readiness and willingness are 
conditions for granting relief by decreeing specific performance, the leamed Lord Justice 
said: 
the plaintiWs object here is not to re-establish the contract. It is to get 
his money back: and to do this; I do not think it is necessary for him to go 
so far as to show he is ready and willing to perform the contract. "'O 
He, then, referred to Stee&nan v. Drinkle, 51 as a clear authority which shows the equitable 
jurisdiction of courts to relieve the buyer from forfeiture of moneys already paid by 
ordering the seller to repay them on terms which court may think fit. 52 As to the 
circumstances in which such a power should be exercised, Denning LJ, expressing his 
total agreement with Somervell LJ, said: 
"Two things are necessary: first, the forfeiture clause must be of a penal 
nature, in the sense that the sum forfeited must be out of all proportion to 
the damages; and, secondly, it must be unconscionable for the seller to 
retain the money. viS3 
8.18 Romer LJ, on the other hand, held that before termination if the purchaser was able, 
ready and willing to perform, the only relief which n-dght be available was giving the 
defaulting purchaser a ftirther opportunity to perform his contractual obligation; and no 
relief would be granted, in the absence of special circumstances such as sharp practice, 
fraud, or other unconscionable conduct, after the vendor had terminated the contract for 
' Ibid., at p. 636 
50 Ibid., at p. 637 ; see also his lordship's observations at pp. 638-639 where he concluded that the 
purchaser does not lose the equity of restitution simply because he is not able and willing to perform the 
conMkCL "Nay, that is", he continued, "the very reason he needs the equity. The equity operates, not 
because of the plaintifrs default, but because it is, in the particular case, unconscionable for the seller to 
retain the money. In short, he ought not unjustly to enrich himself at the plaintiff s expense. " 
31 Steedman v, Drinkle [1916] 1 AC 275 
32 Stocidoser v. Johnson [195411 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, at p. 637 
33 Ibid., at p. 638 
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the purchaser's breach. 54 His lordship based his judgment on the following grounds: 
1) In principle, people are expected to be bound by their bargains. Equity has never 
interfered with the contractual terms simply because they are improvident and turn to be 
hard on one side. Thus, in the circumstances where the parties are on terms of bargaining 
equality with each other, and there is no element of duress, pressure or acting under the 
stress of economic necessity, there seems no ground for equity to intervene if the terms of 
the agreement turns to operate hardly on either party. 55 
2) What cases, with the exception of one case, establish is that a purchaser, who has 
defaulted in the punctual payment of his instalments, may be relieved against forfeiture of 
the instalments already paid only by giving him a further chance and further time to pay 
the outstanding balance. His lordship referred to Re Dagenham (Thames) DocO and 
Kilmer v. British Colombia 57 as cases in which relief was granted by giving the purchaser 
a further opportunity to pay the arrears and interest. He emphasised on the point that the 
court in these cases did not declare the forfeiture provision, which was in the nature of 
penalty, void. All it did, according to him, was to relieve the purchasers from its 
operation on payment of the residue with interest. 58 Reference had also been made to 
Public Works Comr. v. HU129 and Mayson v. Cloueto which admittedly did not have 
much bearing on the issue under discussion. "' 
3) Stee&nan v. Drinkle62- though it, at first sight, appeared to establish a wider 
54 Jbid, at p. 644 
55 Ibid., at pp. 640-641 
M Re Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co., ex Parte Hulse (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022 
'7 Kilmer v. B? 1fish Columbia Orchard Lands Ltd. [ 1913 ] AC 319 
' He also pointed out that in the Re Dagenham case, it was not clear whether the company (i. e. the 
purchaser) had asked for a further time to perform the contract (though he gathered from the papers that 
it had not). Ibid., at p. 641 
" Commissioner of Public Works v. Hills [ 19061 AC 3 68 
60 mayson v. Clouet [ 19241 AC 980 
61 MaySon V. Clouet was a case concerned with the recovery of instalments already paid in the absence of 
a provision entitling the vendor to retain them. The case did not deal with the question whether the court 
would have granted relief, had there been a forfeiture provision. In Public Works Comr. v. Hills, in 
Romer Li's view, the only question was whether the forfeited sums were penalty (in the strict sense) or 
liquidated damages. The Privy Council held that it was the former. (at pp. 642-643) It win shortly be 
argued that this case could be relied upon to show that what Romer LJ concluded cannot be maintained. 
(see infra., paras. 8.27-8.29) 
62 Steedman v. Drinkle [ 191611 AC 275 
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jurisdiction- was a special case and cannot be regarded as of general application. The 
special aspects of the case were explained by his lordship and can be summarised in the 
following terms: First, relief against forfeiture by ordering repayment of the forfeited 
instalments did not seem to have been argued or introduced by the plaintiffs. Second, the 
vendors did not contest it. Third, the only sum subject to forfeiture was 11,000 which 
was a small sum compared to the purchase price. This may explain why neither party 
attached much importance to the issue. Fourth, it was not clear why the prepayment was 
not regarded as a deposit. 63 His lordship also referred to Farwell J's observations in 
Mu&wn v. Van DiemenP, and found himself in agreement with Farwell J in that the case 
could not be considered as of general application. 65 
2.1.2.2.3. Following Romer U's narrow view of the jurisdiction in some subsequent 
cases 
S. 19 Romer Us view was followed by Sachs J in Galbraith v. Mitchenall &tales Lid" 
and by Oliver J in Windsor Securities Lid v. Loreldal ". in the former case, Sachs J 
thought that Romer ILJs view had been supported by the Court of Appeal in Cwnpbell 
Discount Co. v. Bridge. He, therefore, chose to follow the narrower view saying: 
"It appears to my mind that the proper course for a court of first instance 
to adopt is to follow the line which appears most to accord with 
established authority. I have come to the conclusion that I ought to follow 
the view expressed in the judgment of Romer LJ, for the reasons which he 
there gave. "69 
63 Stockloser v. Johnson [ 195411 All ER 630, [195411 QB 476, at p. 644 
64 Mussen v. Van Diemen 's Land Co. [1938) 1 All ER 210, [1938] Ch. 253 
63 Srockloser v. Johnson [195411 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, at p. 644 
m [1964] 2 All ER 653, [196512 QB 473, for a consideration of the case see also Polack YL, Equitable 
Relief in Conuacts [1965] CLJ 17 
67 (1975) The Tinies, 10 September 1975. Oliver J., having discussed the views expressed in wveral 
authorities, held that if he bad to choose between these conflicting views, "he would think it preferable, 
particularly in the Vacation Court, to adopt the more conservative view expressed by Lord Justice Romer 
in &ýoser v. Johnson. " see also Wilkinson H. W.. Relief Against Forfeiture in England and Australia 
(1989) 53 The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 307 
" [1961] 2 All ER 97, reversed in the House of Lords on another ground which did not involve the 
consideration of StocIdoser v. Johnson: see [ 1962] AC 600, [196211 All ER 3 85 
69 Galbraith v. Mitchenall Estates Ltd. [ 196512 QB 473, [1964] 2 All ER 653, at p. 658 
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ZLZ3. Analysing the Confliefing views: Concluding Discussion 
8.20 The narrow view of the court's jurisdiction, expressed by Farwell J in Mussen7o and 
echoed by Romer U71, and its subsequent support: 72 have led some writers to suggest that 
the weight of English authority is against affording positive relief by ordering the vendor 
to return the forfeited instalments to the purchaser. 73 It would, however, seem that such 
an approach cannot be maintained. To argue for this view, it is necessary to consider 
analytically the basis for the narrow view, and see how far the reasons suggested for that 
approach actually support it. Furthermore, some cases which may support the availability 
of the positive relief against forfeiture of instalments should be discussed. 
To start with, thus, the arguments of Romer LJ in Stockloser v. Johmon74 would 
analytically be examined. This will follow a consideration of the support lent to the 
narrow view of the court's jurisdiction by subsequent authorities. It will, then, be 
observed whether the ability and willingness to perform should always be considered as a 
necessary prerequisite to grant any kind of relief, and whether there could be any basis for 
the view that after termination, in the absence of special circumstances, no relief of any 
kind against forfeiture of instalments could be available. The discussion will be concluded 
by a review of cues and judicial statements which may, directly or indirectly, support the 
broader view of the court's jurisdiction. 
2.1.2.3.1. The analysis of Romer U's arguments in Stockloser v Johnson for the 
narrow view 
8.21 Romer LJ's view has been based on premises which cannot, it seems, sustain the 
conclusion on which he arrived: 
First, his lordship's reasoning, in principle, are arguments which are normally presented 
in favour of the principle of sanctity and freedom of contracts. This principle is always in 
conffict with the equitable doctrine of relief against penalties and forfeitures. Exactly the 
7(OMU&Mv- Van Diemen's Land Co. [1938] 1 AUER 210, [1938] Ch. 253 
71 StockJoser v. Johnson [1954) 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, at p. 643 
72 See Galbraith v. Utchenall &Iales Ltd. [1965] 2 QB 473, [196412 All ER 653 ; Windvor Securities 
Ltd v. Loreldal (1975) The Times, 10 September 1975 
73 SM e. g., Pawlowski M., Relief Against Forfeiture of Instalments (1993) Estate CJawtte, 27 himh 
1993, issue 9312,122, at p. 124 
74 Stockjoser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
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same arguments may be presented against the intervention of courts to strike out 
penalties, but no case suggests that as penalties are a part of the parties' agreement, they 
should literally be enforced . 
7' True that the equitable doctrine of relief against penalties 
and forfeitures should be confined to situations where established authorities justify such 
an intervention, but it cannot be accepted that any argument in favour of the principle of 
sanctity of contracts may undermine the equitable doctrine of relief against penalties and 
forfeitures. In short, any reason which may, in principle, justify the court's intervention 
against penalties can be relied upon to explain it in the context of forfeitures of penal 
nature. 76 
8.22 Second, two of the cases relied upon by his lordship, as it was suggested beforW1, 
are, in fact, concerned with the different, but related, question of relief against forfeiture 
of the purchaser's interest in property. 79 The court in those cases recognised the penal 
nature of the forfeiture provision and relieved the purchasers against it by decreeing 
specific performance which was what the purchasers had claimed for: In Kilmer v. British 
Colombido, the purchaser expressly counterclaimed for specific performance and paid the 
arrears of instalments with interest into the court. Also in the Re Dagenhewn cas4? 1, 
though the report is not clear about the point, the extension of time granted by the court 
indicates that the purchasers had declared their readiness, ability and willingness to 
11 As Somervell W in Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, observed: "Any 
penalty provision is, of course, in one sense, a term of the contract, and all the plaintiff was seeking to do 
in the numerous cases in which equity gave relief was to enforce the bargain. " at p. 636 
11 Set also Treitel G-I-L, Remedies for Breach of Contract, 1988, p. 243 , Pawlowski M., Relief Against Forfeiture of Instalments (1993) Estate Gazette, 27 March 1993, issue 9312,122, at p. 124 ; cf Polack 
y-, Equitable Reffief in Contracts [1%51 CLJ 17, at pp. 20-21 
77 Re Dagenham (7hames) Dock Co., ex parte Hulse (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022 , Kilmer v. British Columbia orchard Lands Lid. [ 19131 AC 319 
78 SUPra., paras. 7.05 et seq. 
79 See also the judgment of Dixon J., with whom Rich and McTiernan JJ. concurred, in the Australian 
case of McDonald v. Dennys Lascelles Ltd. (1933) 48 CLR 457 where he observed that the view adopted 
in these cases "seem to have been that relief should be granted, not against the forfeiture of the 
instalments, but against the forfeiture of the estate under a contract which involved the retention of the 
purchase money" at p. 470 ; see, too, the observations of Gibbs C. J. and Murphy I in Leglone v. Hateley 
(1983) 152 CLR 406, at pp. 426-428 
80 Kilmer v. British Columbia 0ý, chard Lands Ltd. [1913] AC 319 
81 Re Dagenham (77james) Dock Co., ex parte Hulse (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022 
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perform the agreement. 82 Furthermore, in the course of his judgment in the Kilmer case, 
Lord Moulton83, explaining Re Dagenham, observed: 
"That was a case like this of forfeiture claimed under the letter of 
agreement and a cross action for specific performance. sv84 
in such cases, the most proper relief which may be given is decreeing specific 
performance or granting the debtor an extra time to perform his contractual obligation. 
Thus, these cases, with respect, by no means show that giving a further oppoftnity to 
perform the contract is the only relief which may be granted against forfeiture of the 
instalments already paid. 
8.23 Third, Romer LJ's explanation of Stee&nan v. Drinkle85- as a special case which 
cannot be regarded as of general application- was mainly based on the observations of 
Farwell J in MusseW6, reasons against which have already been given. 87 Flis lordship's 
comments as to the case to show its special aspect- and therefore to lessen its authority- 
in addition to not justifying the conclusion at which he reached, are open to a number of 
objections: 
1) The points that the issue had not been argued or introduced by the plaintiffs and it was 
not contested by the defendants, if correct, show that the unconscionability of the court 
permitting the vendor to retain the instalments under a penal forfeiture provision was so 
obvious that the Board made it clear that, even at the latest stage, the plaintiffs were at 
liberty to apply to the court of first instance for relief against forfeiture of instalments. 
Put another way, the forfeiture provision being penal in nature, the Board had no doubt 
that the plaintiffs should be relieved against that by ordering the vendor to return the 
forfeited instalments. If the defendant's possible arguments against such a relief would 
make the situation difFerent, the Board would certainly have made it clear that the 
82 Ihd that not been the cm, the court would not have granted any extension of Urne. See Barton 
7hompson & Co.. Ltd V. Stapling Machines Co. [ 1966] Ch. 499, at p. 5 10 per Pennycuick J. 
83 Delivering the judgment of the Board prepared by Lord Macnaghten 
" Kilmer v. British Columbia Orchard Lands Ltd, [1913] AC 319, at p. 322 
85 Steedman v. Drinkle [1916) 1 AC 275 
" Mussen v. Van Diemen's Land Co. [1938] 1 All ER 210, [1938] Ch. 253 
17 Supra, para. 8.15 
See supra., para. It. 18 
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plaintiffs, subject to the defendant's possible defences, were entitled to apply for relief 
The Board, however, clearly held that the forfeiture provision was penal in nature against 
which relief should be given, and whether or not the defendants contested such a relief 
seemed immaterial. 
2) Although the forfeited sum was a small amount in comparison with the purchase price, 
the Board was in no doubt that the plaintiffs should be relieved against its forfeiture. 
Granted that the parties did not attach much importance to the issue", the judicial 
Committee was not prepared to ignore it and let the penal forfeiture provision be 
enforced. 
3) There is nothing in the report to suggest that the prepayment was a deposit: The 
parties did not call it a deposit in their agreement, and no evidence was presented by 
either party that they had, in fact, intended the advance payment to be a deposit. There, 
therefore, seems to be no supporting reason for the contention that the prepayment might 
have been forfeitable as a deposit. 90 
2.1.2.3.2. A consideration of the support lent to the narrow view by subsequent 
authorities 
8.24 Though Romer LJs view has been followed in a few subsequent cases"', no original 
argument has been presented to support the narrow view of the court's jurisdiction. Only 
Sachs I referred to the support lent to this view by the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Cwnphefl Discount Co. v. Bridge92. In that caSe93, the only judge who expressly referred 
to Stockloser v. AmW&9w? 4 was Holroyd Pearce U. The Lord Justice cited certain parts 
of the judgement delivered in the case to show, apparently, that there should be an 
element of unconscionability to justify the equitable intervention of courts. 9' Then, 
" Though there is less evidence to support such a contention. 
90 Even if the PmPaYment was a deposit, there might be a possibility of intervening to relieve aping its 
forfeiture. See infira., paras. 8.49 et seq. 
91 Galbraith v. Mitchenall Estates Lid [1965] 2 QB 473, [196412 All ER 653 ; Windsor Securities Ltd 
v. Loreldal (1975) The Times, 10 September 1975, as to the latter case see Wilkinson IL W., Relief 
Against Forfeiture in England and Australia (1989) 53 The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 307, at p. 
308 
92 Campbell Discount Co. v. Bridge [1961] 2 All ER 97 
93 The case was very different from a case dealing with a forfeiture provision. For the facts of the case 
see supra., pam 4.16 
94 Stocidoser v. Johnson [195411 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
95 Campbell Discount Co. v. Bridge [1961] 2 All ER 97, at p. 102 
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without committing himself to any of the views, his lordship turned to the facts of the 
case before him, and discussed the point that there was no element of unconscionability in 
the instant case. Harman LJ expressed his disagreement with every attempt to extend the 
equitable jurisdiction to intervene in the contractual relations of the parties on the ground 
that the agreement had turned out to be harsh or disadvantageous to one of them. 96 He, 
however, did not refer to Stockloser v. Johnson at all. Davies LJ only agreed with both 
judgments and did not add anything to them. 97 
Referring to the facts of the case9g, it is quite understandable why their Honours, 
disagreed with the extension of the equitable intervention. Granting equitable relief in the 
circumstances of that case, even accepting the majority's view in Stockloser v. Johnso? P, 
might have been regarded as "a novel extension"100. The case, therefore, it seems, did not 
lend any support to Romer LJ's view"'; and without any authoritative support, Sachs J. - 
it is, with all respect, submitted- should have followed the majority's view. 102 
2.1.2.3.3. Ability and vAllingness to perform: is it a necessary condition for any kind of 
relief? 
8.25 Being able, ready and willing to perform the contract cannot be regarded as a 
condition precedent for any relief against forfeiture of instalments. It is, of course, as it 
was discussed"', a condition where the court considers granting relief by decreeing 
specific performance or giving the debtor extra time to remedy his breach. If, however, 
96 Ibid., at P. 103 where he said: "... I rather deprecate the attempt to urge the court on what are called 
equitable principles to dissolve contracts which are thought to be harsh, or which have turned out to be 
disadvwtageous to one of the parties. " 
97 Ibid., at p. 104 
98 Supra, para. 4.16 
99 Stockjoser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
100 Cwnpbell Discount Co. v. Bridge [1961] 2 All ER 97, per Holroyd Pearce LJ, at p. 103 
101 See also Ogus A I, The Law of Damages, 1973, p. 56 ; for the opposite view see Chitty on Contracts, 
27th ed., vol. 2., 1994, para. 36-273 ; Professor McGregor thought that the case only lent indirect support 
to Romer Us view; he, however, was of the opinion that Sachs J should have followed the majority's 
view in Stockloser- for it was the ratio decidendi of the case- and should have decided for the plaintiff. 
McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 5 10 
102 As his lordship himself said: "In Stockloser v. Johnson the first of the foregoing views was adopted by 
Sornervell and Denning LJJ and, had the matter rested there [i. e. had there not been any authoritative 
support for the narrower view], it might well have been proper for a court of first instance simply to 
follow the majority view. " at p. 657 
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relief by ordering repayment of the forfeited instalments is under consideration, there 
seems no reason to justifY the contention that, as a prerequisite for relief, the debtor 
should be ready, able and willing to complete his contract. This was originally the view 
taken by Farwell J in Mussen 104 which has already been adequately considered. "' 
2.1.2.3.4. Availability of relief after termination 
8.26 The view that after termination, in the absence of special circumstances such as 
fraud, accident and unconscionable conduct, no relief of any kind against forfeiture may 
be available has, for the following reasons, less to commend it: 
1) There is no doubt that relief by ordering repayment of the forfeited instalments can be 
granted even where the contract has been terminated for the purchaser's breach of an 
essential time stipulation. Stee&nan v. Drinkle'06 is a clear authority which supports this 
VieW. 107 
2) There are also many cases'" in which the courts have exercised their equitable power 
to relieve from forfeiture by decreeing specific performance or granting the debtor extra 
time to remedy his breach, even though the contract had been validly terminated. 
However, where the creditor exercises his fight to terminate for the debtor's breach of an 
essential stipulation, the availability of such a relief is controversial: it was already 
discussed and suggested that, even in this situation, the courts should have jurisdiction to 
grant this form of relief, '09 
2.1.2.3.5. Direct or indirect support for the availability of positive relief in cases 
8.27 There are a number of cases which, directly or indirectly, support the broader view. 
We briefly refer to these cases and judicial statements: 
113 Supra., pam. 7.80-7.81 
104 Mussen v. Van Diemen's Land Co. [ 1938] 1 All ER 210, [193 81 Ch. 253 
Io-' Supra., pam. 9.15 
106 Steedman v. Drinkle [ 191611 AC 275 
107See also the observations of Denning W in Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 
476, at p. 637 
"0 See, e. g., Re Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co., ex parte Hulse (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022; Kilmer v. 
British Columbia Orchard Lands Ltd. [ 19131 AC 319; Starside Properties Ltd. v. Mustapha [ 1974] 1 
WLR 9 16; Transag Haulage Ltd. v. Leyland DAF Finance Pic. [1994] 2 BCLC 88 
109 Supra., pams. 7.49 et seq. 
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First, in Public Works Commissioner v. Hills"O, in a railway construction contract, it was 
provided that upon non-completion of the line within the specified period, the contractor 
would forfeit certain percentages of moneys payable to him, retained as a guarantee fund 
to answer for defective work, and also certain security money lodged with the employer's 
Agent-General. The Judicial committee of the Privy Council held that the forfeiture 
provision was not a genuine pre-estimate of damages; and therefore, the moneys cannot 
be retained by the employer as liquidated damages. The Privy Council, in fact, relieved 
the contractor from forfeiture of moneys which should have been paid (repaid in case of 
the security money) to the contractor upon tennination of the contract for non- 
completion if there had not been a forfeiture provision. 
8.28 In Romer LJs view"', this case was an irrelevant authority, and this also appears 
ftorn Denning LJ's judgment' 12 . 
There, however, seems to be no compelling reason to 
distinguish this case from the situation which is now under consideration. It may be said 
that in the Hill's case, the forfeiture of moneys which belonged to the plaintiff [i. e. the 
contractor, that is, the promisor) was in issue, but here we are concerned with a 
stipulation providing for the forfeiture of moneys which used to belong to the defendant 
[i. e. the promisee]. Such a difference may be true, but does it justify the different 
treatments as to the two kinds of forfeiture provisions? ' 13 True that in normal forfeiture 
cases, the moneys, which are now subject to forfeiture, used to belong to the promisee. 
14 However, in most cases' , they 
become the property of the promisor, as soon as the 
contract is prematurely terminated; and unless there is a forfeiture provision, they should 
be returned to him. There seems, therefore, to be no convincing reason to regard the 
Hill's case as an irrelevant authority. 
110 Commissioner ofPublic Works v. Hills [1906] AC 368 
"'Stockloserv. Johnson [1954] 1 AUER 630, [1954] 1 QB476, at p. 642 
112 Ibid., at p. 637, where he said: 'rhere is, I think a plain distinction between penalty cases, strictly so 
called4 and cases like the present. It is this. When one party seeks to exact a penalty from the other, he 
is seeking to exact payment of an extravagant sum either by action at law or by appropriating to himself 
Moneys belonging to the other party, as in Hill's case. ... In the present case, however, the defendant is 
not seeking to exact a penalty. He only wants to keep money which already belongs to him. " 
113 See Law Commission, Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid, Working Paper no. 61,1975, 
pam 59 at pp. 4445, see also infra., para. 8.75 
114 Where, for example, the prepayment is a conditional payment. see supra., paras. 6.20,6.37 
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8.29 This proposition is supported by the recent judgment of the Privy Council in 
Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd 115 where the Hills 
case 116 was applied as an authority to hold that the forfeiture of an unreasonable deposit 
was in the nature of penalty against which relief should be given by ordering repayment of 
the forfeited sum. The Judicial Committee, referred to the Hills case as a "clear authority 
that in a case of a sum paid by one party to another under the contract as security for the 
performance of that contract, a provision for its forfeiture in the event of non- 
performance is a penalty from which the court will give relief by ordering repayment of 
the sum so paid, less any damage actually proved to have been suffered as a result of non- 
completion. "' 17 Despite the fact that in Dojap there was no doubt that the deposit was 
also a part payment, and belonged to the defendant as soon as it was paid, the Privy 
Council applied the Hills case as a clear authority to order the repayment of the penal 
deposit. 
It is, therefore, suggested that the Hills case'18 can be relied upon to establish a wider 
jurisdiction for the courts to relieve, in a proper case, against forfeiture by ordering 
repayment of the sums which are subject to forfeiture. 
8.30 Second, in The Scaptrcide"9, Lord Diplock"O was prepared to assume (without 
deciding the point) "that moneys already paid by one party to the other under a 
continuing contract prior to an event which under the terms of the contract entitled that 
other party to elect to rescind it and to retain the money already paid might be treated as 
money paid under a penalty clause, and recovered to the extent that it exceeded to an 
unconscionable extent the value of any consideration that had been given for it. "121 This, 
in his lordship's view, was regarded as the express opinion of the majority in Stockloser v. 
I Is Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojaplnveshnents Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER370 
1116 Commissioner ofPubfic Works v. Hills [19061 AC 368 
"'workers TrustandMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER370, at p. 376 
'Is Commissioner of Public Works v. Hills [1906] AC 368 
119 Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. v. Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The Scaptrade) [198312 AC 694 
120 With whom other members of the House agreed. 
121 jrbid, at p. 702 
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jommI22. 
8.31 Third, the conflicting opinions delivered in Stockloser v. Johnson were considered 
in the recent case of Dojap'23. There, the Privy Council was in no doubt that it would not 
order the payment of a deposit which had been provided for, but not yet been paid, if the 
sum was a penalty. 124 But as to the question of the recoverability of such a deposit by the 
payer, where it has already been paid, the Board considered the dicta of Romer LJ and 
the majority in Stockloser v. Johnson'25. Their lordships left open the question that which 
of the conflicting dicta was correct. They only distinguished the case from Stockloser v. 
Johnson on the ground that the latter case was concemed with a situation in which "a 
party [was] seeking relief from forfeiture for breach of contract to pay a price by 
instalments, the party in default having been let into possession in the meantime. 1917A The 
Board, thus, under the authority of the Hills case 12', relieved the purchaser from 
forfeiture of his deposit by ordering the vendor to return it less damages actually suffered 
as the result of breach. '2" 
8.32 It would seem that, in effect, the Privy Council's conclusion supports the broader 
view of the jurisdiction'29: In both Dojap and Slockloser cases, the question was whether 
the court had jurisdiction to relieve the debtor/purchaser from a penal provision, which 
empowers the innocent party to retain an advance payment, by ordering the forfeited sum 
to be returned. The advance payments in Stockloser v. Johnson were the instalments of 
the purchase price, while in Dojap, it was called a deposit. Considering that a deposit is, 
in general, forfeitable at law when the contract goes off for the purchaser's default'", if 
11 SwockJoser Y. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
123 Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [ 1993] 2 All ER 370 
11 lbid, at p. 375 
125 Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [195411 QB 476 
121 Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 370, at p. 376 
127 Commissioner of Public Works v. Hills [ 1906] AC 368 
128 Sm Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 370, at pp. 
376-377 
I" See also Beale R, Unreasonable Deposits (1993) 109 LQR 524, at p. 528 
130 See supra., pams. 6.31,6.38; infra., para. 8.45 
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there is a jurisdiction to relieve the purchaser from forfeiture of his deposit by ordering its 
repayment, a fortiori, such a jurisdiction should be recognised with regard to the 
forfeiture of instalments. 
8.33 Furthermore, the Board concluded that the deposit amounting to 25% of the 
purchase price, in the circumstances of the case, was not a true deposit by way of earnest, 
and the provision for its forfeiture, therefore, constituted a penalty. 13 1 Now, considering 
132 the different functions of a sum of money paid as a deposit , though the sum was not a 
true earnest money, it undoubtedly was a part payment of the price. The Privy Council 
held that the provision for the forfeiture of this money was a penalty and, in fact, relieved 
the purchaser from the forfeiture by ordering its repayment. This, it would seem, 
supports the view that courts, may, in proper circumstances, have jurisdiction to relieve 
the debtor from forfeiture of his instalments by ordering the creditor to return the 
forfeited sums less damages caused by the breach. 133 
2.1.2.3.6. Conclusion 
8.34 The reasons given above all show that the majority's view in Slockloser V. 
Johnson'34 should prevail. 135 Put another way, the courts have jurisdiction to grant 
131 Workers DwstandMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER370, at p. 376 
132 See Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 ChD 89; see also supra., para. 6.39, Infira., para. 8.45 
133 it may also be argued that the logical inference from the judgment of the Privy Council in Dojap is 
that any disguised penalty should not be enforced. The provision for forfeiture of instalments already 
paid also might, in some cases, be a disguised penalty and act in terrorem. It therefore, smms that the 
decision could be regarded as a support for the availability of positive relief against forfeiture of 
instalments. 
134 &ockloser v. Johnson [195411 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
135 See also Guest A. G., Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, p. 795; Goode R. M., ffire-Purchase 
Law and Practice, 2nd ed., 1970, p. 381; Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, 4th ed., 1993, pp. 437- 
438; Ogus A 1. The Law of Damages, 1973, p. 56 ; Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the 
purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, p. 144; Carter J. W., Breach of Contract, 2nd ed., 1991, pars. 1259 at 
p. 487-, Pawlowski, though favouring the broader view, believes, relying on Galbraith v. Mtehenall 
Estates Ltd. [1965] 2 QB 473, [196412 All ER 653, that the weight of English authority is "against 
affording positive relief to a purchaser in the form of a right of recovery of instalments already paid. " 
Pawlowski M., Relief Against Forfeiture of Instalments (1993) Estate Gazette, 27 March 1993, ism 
9312,122, at p. 124; Some writers suggest that English law, as to this point, still appears to be 
undecided: see, e. g., Wilkinson H. W., Relief Against Forfeiture in England and Australia (1989) 53 The 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 307, at pp. 308-309; Meagher R P, Equity Doctrines & Remedies, 3rd 
ed., 1992, para. 1827 
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positive relief against forfeiture of instalments already paid. 136 This relief may be 
available, even after the contract has validly been terminated by the creditor for the 
debtor's breach, regardless of the debtor's ability and willingness to complete the 
contract. 
2. L Conditions for the Exercise of the Jurisdiction 
8.35 Having considered the availability and the scope of the jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture of instalments, and the forms of relief which may be available, it is now 
appropriate to discuss the circumstances upon which the jurisdiction should be exercised. 
Two situations- on the basis of the ability and willingness of the payer to perform, and 
the form of relief which may be afforded by courts- invite separate consideration: First, 
where the payer is able, willing and ready to complete and the court considers granting 
relief by extending the time of performance or decreeing specific performance. Second, 
where the court, for any reason, is unable to grant extension of time and is considering to 
order a positive relief 
2.2.1. Negative relief 
8.36 Where the debtor is able, ready and willing to perform his contractual obligation, 
137 
subject to the limitations discussed earlier , the form of relief will be decreeing specific 
performance, or giving the debtor a further opportunity to perform his part of the 
contract. In proper circumstances, the court has also jurisdiction to extend the time 
given. 13' The circumstances in which this form of relief may be granted have already been 
11 Though the courts have, until the recent decision of the Privy Council in Dojap, been reluctant to 
grant this form of relief compared with the negative relief (i. e. extension of time) or striking penalties (in 
strict sense) out. See Quest A. G., Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, p. 796; Chitty on Contracts, 
27th ed., vol. 1,1994, para. 20-070; Waddams S M, The Law of Damages, 1983, p. 540. As to hire. 
purchase agreements, it has been suggested that it is unlikely for the courts to grant any positive relief 
(see, e. g., Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed., vol. 2., 1994, para. 36-273). This may be justified on the ground 
that in hire-purchase agreements, it is extremely difficult to prove that the retention of instalments by the 
owner is unconscionable, because the hirer has had the benefit of using the subject-matter for the period 
he has paid the instalments for. (see Goode R. M., Hire-Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd ed., 1970, pp. 
380,381); However, the existence of the jurisdiction to grant such a relief, in proper circumstances, 
should not be doubted. see, e. g., Diamond A. L., Equitable Relief for the Purchaser of Hire-Purchase 
Goods (1956) 19 WLR 498, p. 506 ; Diamond A. L., Equitable Relief in Hire-Purchase: A Rejoinder 
(1958) 21 NILR 199, p. 201; Goode, Mid see also the general observations of Knox J. in 7Mnsug 
Haulage Ltd v. Leyland DAF Finance Pic. 1994] 2 BCLC 88, at p. 95; for the opposite view see Prince 
E. L, Equitable Relief in the Law of Hire-Purchase (1957) 20 NILR 620 
137 SUpra, chapter 7 
138 Starside Properties Ltd. V. Mustapha [ 1974] 1 WLR 816, at p. 824 per Edmund Davies LJ and p. 926 
per Lawton LJ 
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discussed and need not be repeated here. "' 
2.2.2. Positive relief 
8.37 If, due to any of the limitations of the jurisdiction, the court refused to grant 
negative relief (i. e. extension of time or specific performance), or where the debtor was 
unable or unwilling to complete the contract, the court might have jurisdiction to grant 
positive relief In order to give such a relief, two conditions are necessary: first, the 
forfeiture provision should be of penal nature; second, it should be unconscionable for the 
creditor to retain the instalments. 140 Each of these requirements should briefly be 
considered. 
2221. Beingpenal in nature 
8.38 Deming LJ, discussing the circumstances upon which the positive relief may be 
granted, said: 
'Tirst, the forfeiture clause must be of a penal nature, in the sense that the 
sum forfeited must be out of all proportion to the damages ... 
041 
Thus, to meet the first requirement, it must be shown that there is a gross disproportion 
between the value of the sum or property to be forfeited and the actual losses which are 
likely to result from breach at the time when the contract is entered into. "" The tests 
discussed earlier to distinguish liquidated damages from penalties'43 would seem to be 
applicable here to see whether or not the forfeiture clause is in the nature of penalty. The 
time for the application of the test would be the time when the contract was made'", as it 
141 is the settled principle with regard to distinguishing liquidated damages from penalties. 
2.2.2.2. Unconscionabifity 
8.39 To grant relief, besides the forfeiture clause being penal in nature, it must be 
139 See supra., pam. 7.59 et seq. 
140 StockJoser v. Johnson [195411 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, per Denning W. See also McGregor on 
Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 508; It has sometimes been doubted whether these two conditions are 
distinct, or whether the first, being penal, is a "manifestation of unconscionable behaviour". see C)Off & 
jones, 17he Law of Restitution, 4th ed., 1993, pp. 433434 
"I Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, at p. 638 per Denning U 
142 See Pawlowdd M., Relief Against Forfeiture of Instalments (1993) Estate Gazette, 27 March 1993, 
issue 93 12,122, at p. 123 
143 See supra, pun. 2.24 et seq. 
144 See PawlowsK ibid 
145 See supra., para. 2.20 
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unconscionable for the creditor to retain the money. 146 This requirement has much been 
emphasised by SomerveR LJ in Stockloser v. Johnson 147 . Hs 
lordship, having concluded 
that the statements of law in cases indicate a wider jurisdiction, observed: 
"It would, of course, have to be shown that the retention of the 
instalments was unconscionable, in all the circumstances. 12141 
To discern this requirement, all circumstances surrounding the contract, as well as the 
contractual terms, should, at the time when the jurisdiction is invoked, be examined. This 
can clearly be inferred from Somervell Us judgment where he said: 
"As the basis of the plaintifrs right, if he has one, is the unconscionability 
of the defendant's retaining sums which have been paid to him as 
instalments, I agree that the circumstances of the particular case should be 
looked at and the question is not one to be decided by looking only at the 
contract. "'49 
in the words of Denning LJ, "[t]his equity of restitution is to be tested, not at the time of 
the contract, but by the conditions existing when it is invoked. "150 
8.40 The court would grant positive relief if it was convinced that, taking an the 
circumstances into account at the time when the jurisdiction is invoked, retaining the 
instalments already paid would unjustly enrich the defendant at the plaintifr s expense. "I 
Put another way, having regard to the actual loss suffered by the creditor when he 
146 See Guest A. G., Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, p. 796 [Where the buyer had the benefit of 
the subject-matter, the court would not easily be satisfied as to this point. ] see also Harpum C., Relief 
Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, at p. 144 ; Goode R. M., 11ire-Purchase 
Law and Practice, 2nd ed., 1970, p. 381; Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed., vol. 1,1994, para. 20-070 ; 
McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 508; The requirement of "unconscionability" has 
sometimes been described as a "vague and woolly jurisprudence'. see Goff & Jones, The Law of 
Restitution, 4th ed., 1993, p. 434 
147 StoCldoser V. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
142 SlocIdoser v. Johnson, Ibid., at p. 634; see also per Denning LJ at p. 638; Mussen v. Van Diemen 's 
Land Co. [193811 All ER 210, [1938] Ch. 253, at p. 217 per Farwell J., see supra., para. 8.14 
149 Stockjoser v. Johnson, ibid, at p. 636 
150 Ibid., at p. 639; see also the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dimensional Inveshnent Ltd. 
v. The Queen (1967) 64 DLR (2nd) 632, where Ritchie J said: "Whether a provision in a contract is penal 
or not depends upon the construction of the contract but the question of unconscionability must depend 
upon the circumstances of each case at the time when the clause is invoked. " at p. 638 ; see also 
McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 508, no. 44 
151 Denning LJ said: "The equity operates, not because of the plaintiffs default, but because it is, in the 
particular case, unconscionable for the seller to retain the money. In short he ought not uroustly to 
enrich himself at the plaintffs expense. " Slockloser v. Johnson, ibid., at p. 639 ; see also McGregor on 
Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 508, no. 44 ; Pawlowski M., Relief Against Forfeiture of Instalments 
(1993) Estate Gazette, 27 March 1993, issue 9312,122, at p. 124 
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exercised his right of forfeiture, the court would consider the point whether the forfeiture 
unconscionably overcompensated the creditor. 112 In this regard, different factors may be 
relevant: The most important among them is the actual loss suffered by the creditor as a 
result of the breach, taking into account the benefits which he may have received under 
the agreement, and also the amount of instalments paid... which are now subject to 
forfeiture. One nice illustration is the facts of Stockloser v. Johnson"' itself. In this case, 
even if the forfeiture provision was in the nature of a penalty it was not 
unconscionable for the seller to retain the instalments. That was because the buyer had 
the benefit of the hiring agreements, and thought that the royalties received under those 
contracts would be higher than they, in fact, were. 156 His position, in the words of the 
trial judge, which was cited with approval by Denning LJ, was like "a gambler who [had] 
lost his stake and [was] now saying that it [was] for the court of equity to get it back for 
hire. 157 
8.41 The debtor's conduct may also be relevant. He may act in a way to disentitle 
himself to relief The debtor, for example, may have considerably delayed in bringing his 
action to claim relief against forfeiture. 158 This n-dght have some influence on the court to 
decide, considering all other factors, that it was conscionable for the creditor to retain the 
instalments. 159 
152 See Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, at p. 144 
153 As Denning W suggested where the forfeited instalments was only five per cent. of the price, there 
would be no equity by which the contract-breaker could claim its repayment; but the situation would be 
very different after ninety per cent. of the price had been paid. Stockloser v. Johnson [19541 1 All ER 
630, [1954] 1 QB 476, at p. 639 
Swockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
Denning LJ was prepared to hold that the clause was in the nature of a penalty (see Ibid., p. 639), 
though Somervell and Romer LJJ had a different view. 
156 Owing to the bad weather, the royalties turned to be less than what the buyer had expected. 
157 Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [195411 QB 476, at p. 629 
11 See Goode R. M., Hire-Purchase Law and Practice, 2nd ed., 1970, p. 381 
I" See, e. g., Mussen v. Van Diemen's Land Co. [1938] 1 All ER 210, [19381 Ch. 253, and Denning Us 
explanation with regard to this case in Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, at 
p. 639 where he said: "... in Mussen's case the court was much influenced by the fact that the purchaser had allowed nearly six years to elapse before claiming restitution. " 
386 
8.42 it is not clear whether it is a relevant factor to inquire if the breach was wilful. '" 
Undoubtedly it is relevant, as it was suggested'", where the debtor seeks relief against 
forfeiture of his interest in the property. 162 In the context of relief against forfeiture of 
instaiments already paid, however, the unconscionability of the creditor exercising his 
contractual right to retain the instalments would highly depend on the forfeited 
instalments being out of all proportions to the actual loss suffered by the creditor, taking 
all the above factors into account. Further, it has not been regarded as a relevant fitctor 
where the debtor seeks relief against a penalty, in its strict sense. It is, therefore, 
submitted that the wiffidness of the debtor's breach should not satisfy a court to hold that 
it is not unconscionable for the creditor to retain the instalments. 
2.3. Tenns of Relief 
8.43 It cannot be doubted that the relief given by the court might be conditioned on 
certain terms. One main reason behind this probably is the famous maxim of equity to the 
effect that a person who seeks equitable relief must be prepared to do equity towards the 
other party. 163 Put another way, he must be ready to act justly, in its popular sense of 
doing "what is right and faie)164 towards the defendant. It is, thus, obvious that the court 
should not grant relief to the defaulting debtor on an equitable basis while its order might 
create some unfairness to the innocent party. 
8.44 Where the debtor is relieved from forfeiture by giving him a further time to perform 
his contract, the order is normally conditioned upon the payment of interest, as weU as 
the outstanding instalments. 165 Thus, the creditor receives both what he had bargained 
11 Some writers consider it as a relevant factor. see, e. g., Pawlowski M., Relief Against Forfeiture of 
Instalments; (1993) Estate Gazette, 27 March 1993, issue 9312,122, at p. 124 ; for the opposite view see 
Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, 4th ed., 1993, p. 438 
161 Supra, paras. 7.69,7.77 et seq. 
11 See, for instance, Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding [1973] AC 691, at pp. 723-724 per Lord 
Wilberforce; Legione v. Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406, at p. 449 per Mason & Deane JJ. 
11 "He who seeks equity must do equity. " see generally Martin J. E., Hanbury & Martin's Modem Equity, 
Fourth ed., 1993, p. 26; Baker P. V. and Langan P. St. J., Snell's Equity, 29th ed., 1990, p. 30. This has 
been described as a rule of "unquestionable justice". see Neeson; v. Clarkson (1845) 4 Hare 97, at p. 10 1 
per Wigram V. C. 
164 Baker P. V. and Langan P-SLJ., Snell's Equity, 29th ed., 1990, p. 30 
163 Re Dagenham (Aames) Dock Co., ex parte Hulse (1873) LR 8 Ch App 1022, where the forfeiture 
provision was referred to as "a penalty from which the company [was] entitled to be relieved on payment 
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for, and also an interest for the period in which the payments remained outstanding. It is, 
however, far from clear'" what the terms would be if the court relieved the debtor by 
ordering the creditor to return the forfeited instalments. The judgment of the Privy 
Council in Steetbnan V. Drinkle167 refers to the necessity of granting relief on "proper 
termsý`", but does not explain them. No other English court has, apparently, ever been 
reported to exercise the jurisdiction to grant positive relief from forfeiture of instalments. 
It would seem that the least term on which the relief should be conditioned is that the 
creditor must be fully compensated for damages he may suffer as a result of the breach. 169 
The following observations may support this proposition: 
First, with regard to agreed damages clauses, the court strikes out penalties on condition 
that the defendant should compensate the plaintiff for losses caused by the breach. 
Refusing to enforce forfeiture clauses of penal nature- where it is unconscionable for the 
defendant to retain the money- is quite analogous to the unenforceability of penalties (in 
its strict sense). It would, therefore, seem that the positive relief should also be 
conditioned on the full compensation of the creditor for damages resulting from the 
debtor's breach. 
Second, in Doiap"O, where relief against forfeiture of a penal deposit was given, it was 
expressly conditioned on the payment of damages actually proved to have been suffered 
by the vendor as a result of the breach. 17' This case is a good example of a positive 
relief", and it, therefore, could be a clear guide with regard to the terms on which the 
positive relief should be conditioned. 
It is, therefore, submitted that the courts, exercising their jurisdiction to grant positive 
of the residue of the purchase-money with interest. " at p. 1025 per James LJ (emphasis added); Kilmer v. 
B? 111A Columbia Orchard Lands Ltd. [1913) AC 319 
166 See the observations of Sachs J in Galbraith v. Mitchenall Estates Ltd. [196512 QB 473, [1%412 All 
ER 653, at p. 658 
16'Swee&nan v. Drinkle [1916] 1 AC 275 
168 The judgment reads as follows: "... the stipulation in question was one for a penalty, against which 
relief should be given on proper terms. " see ibid., at p. 279 
169 See Greig & Davis, The Law of Contract, 1987 (With Fourth Cumulative Supplement, 1992). p. 1459 
170 Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [ 199312 All ER 3 70 
171 ibid., at pp. 376-377 
172 It V1, as just argued that this case can be relied upon to show the wider jurisdiction of courts to relieve 
against forfeiture. supra., Paras. 8.31-8.33 
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relief should order the repayment of the forfeited sums less damages actually suffered by v 
the creditor resulting from breach. 
3. Equitable Relief Against Forfeiture of Deposit 
3.1. Introductory Remarks 
8.45 A deposit, as it was discussed before'73, differs from a part-payment in that it is 
forfeitable at law, upon default being made by the payer in performing his contractual 
obligations where this results in termination of the agreement by the payee. 174 The reason 
for this lies in the purpose of making a payment as a deposit 173 : In addition to being a part 
of the contractual price if the contract is completed, a deposit is a guarantee for the 
completion of the agreement-17'5 This has clearly been established by numerous cases. 177 
I oWe V. SMjth178' nH Cotton LJ observed: 
"The deposit, as I understand it, ... is a guarantee that the contract shall be 
performed. If the sale goes on, of course, not only in accordance with the 
words of the contract, but in accordance with the intention of the parties 
in making the contract, it goes in part payment of the purchase-money for 
which it is deposited; but if, on the default of the purchaser the contract 
goes off, ..., he can have no right to recover the deposit. "179 This function of a deposit confers on it a special characteristic which distinguishes it from 
113 Supra., paras. 6.09,6.31 
174 It does not necessaffly need to be a monetary sum. Other goods may also be "traded in" instead of the 
monetary deposit see Guest A. G., Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, para. 15-131, citing 
Commission Car Sales (Hasting) Ltd. v. Saul [ 1957] N. Z. L. P- 144 
173 See Atiyah, Introduction to the Law of Contract, 1995, p. 439; Farrand J T, Contract and Conveyance, 
4th ed., 1983, p. 204 
176 See, e. g., Howe v. &nith (1884) 27 Ch D 89, at p. 101 per Fry LJ; see also supra., para. 6.39 
177 Lea v. "itaker (1872) LR 8 CP 70,27 LT 676; Catton v. Bennett (1884) 51 LT 70; Collins v. 
Stimson (1883) 48 LT Rep. N. S. 828,11 Q. B. Div. 142, Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 89; Soper v. 
Arnold 14 App. CaS. 429 where Lord Macnaghten said: "Everybody knows what a deposit is. The 
purchaser did not want legal advice to tell him that. The deposit serves two purposes- if the p=hase is 
carried out, it goes against the purchase money- but its primary purpose is this, it is a guamntee that the 
purchaser means business. " at p. 435, also per Lord Herschell at p. 433; Depree v. Bedborough (1863) 4 
Giff. 479, at p. 493; Exparte Barrell M 10 Ch. 512, at p. 514 per James LJ 
178 Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 99 
179 Ibid., at p. 95 ; see also the observations of Fry LJ at p. 10 1, and Bowen LJ at p. 98 where he said: 
a deposit, if nothing more is said about it, is, according to the ordinary interpretation of business men, a 
security for the completion of the purchase. But in what sense is it a security for the completion of the 
purchase? It is quite certain that the purchaser cannot insist on abandoning his contract and yet recover 
the deposit, ... "; Sprague v. Booth [19061 AC 576, at p, 580; John Baker & Co. Ltd. v. Littman [1941] Ch. 405, at p. 412 per Clauson LJ 
389 
a part payment. 
8.46 With this characteristic, a deposit has always been treated as a good alternative to 
providing for agreed damages. "' The agreed damages clause is, no doubt, subject to the 
penalty doctrine'81, while allowing equitable relief against forfeiture of deposit might be 
regarded as against its purpose and function. On the other hand, a deposit might be 
excessive in amount without any relation to the loss suffered by the payee as the result of 
breach. Just as a penalty, it may act in ferrorem and be a means of intimidating the payer 
to perform his contract, and penalizing him in case of default. This may justify the 
existence of an equitable jurisdiction to relieve the payer against its forfeiture. 
The special character and status of the deposit on the one hand, and the purpose and 
spirit of the equitable intervention of the courts to relieve against penalties and forfeitures 
on the other has made the position as to the recoverability of the deposit by the payer 
after termination of the contract for his breach unclear, uncertain and controversial. This 
section will, therefore, be devoted to illuminating the position under English law: the 
availability of equitable relief against forfeiture of deposit, the basis for this jurisdiction, 
the circumstances upon which it may be exercised, and the relationship between that and 
the penalty doctrine are the issues which will in turn be dealt with. 
3.2. The Eidstence of the Jurisdiction to Grant Relief 
3.2.1. Relief by granting extra time to perform 
8.47 It cannot be doubted that where the court relieves a payer from forfeiture of his 
interest in the property or instalments of purchase price by decreeing specific performance 
or giving the contract breaker extra time to perform his contract, the payer is also 
relieved against forfeiture of his deposit. Thus, if he performs his contractual obligation 
within the time granted and the agreement is completed, the deposit, which was subject to 
forfeiture, will be considered as a part of the contract price. It can also not be doubted 
that, in appropriate circumstances, if the payer is ready, able and willing to perform his 
contract, relief against forfeiture of deposit by giving a further time and opportunity to 
180 Furmston M P, Contract Planning: Liquidated Damages, Deposits and the Foresetability Rule (199 1) 
4 JCL 1, at p. 2 
191 Supra, chapter 2 
390 
p rf rM be ted. 
192 
e0 may grart In 8t""side PrOPerfies Ltd v. Mustapha'", a deposit of 
L1250 was payable by instalments. Upon the purchaser's default in the punctual payment 
of one of the instalments, and the vendor's terrnination and forfeiture of the instalments of 
the deposit already paid, the court relieved the purchaser from forfeiture by granting him 
a further time to complete the agreement. Neither at the trial nor in the Court of Appeal, 
which recognised the jurisdiction of the court to grant a further relief, was the nature of 
the payments made as instalments of the deposit questioned. The case, therefore, can 
provide an authority for the view that a payer may be relieved against forfeiture of his 
deposit by giving him an extra time to perform his contractual obligation, if he is willing, 
able and ready to complete, and if the forfeiture amounts to exaction of a penalty. The 
conditions for the existence of such a jurisdiction, its limitations and the circumstances 
upon which it may be exercised appear to be the same as those which were, examining 
the equitable relief from forfeiture of the payer's interest in the property, considered. 184 
3.2.2. Relief by ordering repayment of deposit 
8.48 The most controversial issue is whether courts have jurisdiction to relieve a payer 
from forfeiture of his deposit by ordering its repayment. Though, in principle, there 
seems no reason why such a jurisdiction should not be available, case law as to the issue 
does not appear to be very clear: Some earlier cases deny the existence of any equitable 
power for the courts to order repayment of deposit; conversely, there are a few 
authorities which have applied the penalty doctrine to relieve the payer against forfeiture 
of deposit. In the recent years, however, there have been some judicial decisions which 
have shed much fight onto the issue, the recent decision of the Privy Council in Workers 
Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd. "' being the most important one 
of them. These recent developments, together with the previous conflicting authorities, 
after a brief consideration of the issue in principle, should in some detail be discussed. 
182 See Pawlowsld K Relief Against Forfeiture of Deposits (1992) Estate Gazette, 21 Nov 1992, Ism 
9246,76, at pp. 77,78 
183 [1974] 1 WLR 816, [197412 All ER 567, for the M description of the case see supra., para. 7.16 
194 See supra., chapter 7 
183 Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [ 199312 All ER 370 
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3.22L Considaing the issue inpyinciple 
8.49 In principle, disregarding the special status of deposits, there seems no reason why 
the rules against penalties should not be applicable to the forfeiture of deposits. There is 
little difference between agreeing on a special sum of money to be paid upon breach, and 
agreeing on the same sum to be forfeited upon default. "' As far as the penalty doctrine is 
concerned, both these sums can reflect the genuine attempt of the parties to pre-estimate 
the likely loss which might flow from breach, or they may be an excessive amount, 
without any relation to the probable loss, stipulated to act in terrorem of the defaulting 
party. These considerations suggest that a deposit, if it is in gross disproportionate to the 
likely loss resulting from breach, should be held to be a penalty, and just as a penal sum is 
not recoverable by the innocent party, it should also not be forfeitable by the payee. 
On the other hand, deposits enjoy a special characteristic: They are guarantees that the 
contract will be performed and completed. Being a guarantee, it should be forfeited if the 
contract is terminated for the payer's default, because otherwise it cannot be regarded as 
a guarantee. A deposit is not provided for to decide about the amount of damages which 
may result from breach. It is not the primary function of a deposit to compensate the 
payee for damages which is likely to be suffered by him as the result of breach. Put 
another way, a contract may provide both for a deposit as a guarantee for the 
performance and completion of the contract, and for an agreed damages clause as an 
attempt to pre-estimate the losses which are likely to flow from breach. 187 The latter is 
subject to the penalty doctrine and may be held penal if it has no relation to the likely loss, 
but the former has primarily nothing to do with damages"' and should be forfeited if the 
contract goes off for the payer's breach. It is because the parties have intended a deposit 
to act as a guarantee, and an agreed damages to pre-assess the future probable losses. 
186 See Carter I W, A Comment on Dojap (Reasonable Deposit) (1993) 6 JCL 269, at p. 271; Pawlowski 
K Relief Against Forfeiture of Deposits (1992) Estate Gazette, 21 Nov 1992, Issue 9246,76; Murdod S, 
Deposits, Penalties and Equitable Relief (1993) Estate Gazette, 22 May 1993, Issue 9320,122 
110 See, e. g., Lock v. Bell [1931] 1 Ch. 35 
In Though it should be taken into account if the innocent party claims further damages resulting from 
breach. see Lock v. Bell, Mid; Commission Car Sales (Hastings) Ltd. v. Saul [1957] N2. L. R. 144, at p. 
146; see also Guest A. G., Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, paras. 15-131,15-132 
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IZZI Earlier cases against any equitable intervention 
8.50 The special characteristic of a deposit has led the courts to hold in several instances 
that the rules against penalties have no application to the forfeiture of deposits. '" In 
Depree v. Bedborough'90, in an action for the recovery of deposit by the assignee of the 
purchaser, Sir John Staurt the Vice Chancellor observed: 
"I am unable to follow the argument of counsel for the assignees, that 
upon the abandonment there arisen a right to have the security returned 
which was exacted to prevent the contract being abandoned on the part of 
the purchaser; and no case can be found to support that view- at any rate 
none has been cited to show that in a case like this a person making 
default has been held to be entitled to the security which he paid to 
prevent an abandonment of his contract. " 191 
Furthermore, the vice-chancellor, emphasising on the point that there has been a default 
on the part of the purchaser, said: 
"... How the person who is in default can, upon that default, and in 
consequence of that default, acquire any right to the money which was 
parted with as a security that there should be no default, it is difficult to 
conceive, ... 
"92 
8.51 In Hinton v. Sparkes'93, Bovill CJ was quite explicit about the non-applicability of 
the penalty doctrine to deposits. He said: 
"The intention of the parties, as I collect it from the agreement, is, that this 
is to be taken as the ordinary case of payment of a deposit, which is to be 
forfeited on the purchaser's failure to complete the contract. ... The 
numerous cases referred to as to the distinction between penalty and 
liquidated damages have in my judgment no application to a contract in 
the form of that now in question. " 194 
The most commonly cited judicial opinion as to this point is the observations of JesseH 
10 See, e. g., Lea v. Whitaker (1872) LR 8 CP 70,27 LT 676; Cation v. Bennett (1884) 51 LT 70; 
Ockenden v. Henly EB &E 485,27 LT (QB) 36 1; Collins v. Stimson (1883) 48 LT Rep. N. S. 828,11 
Q. B. Div. 142; Soper v. Arnold 14 App. Cas. 429 per Lord Herschell at p. 433; Depree v. Bedborough 
(1863) 4 Giff. 479; Ex parte Barrell LR 10 Ch 512, at p. 514; Hinton v. Sparks (1868) LR 3 CP 161-, 
Wallis v. Smith (1882) 21 Ch. D. 243; Lock v. Bell [1931) 1 Ch. 35-, Linggi Plantations Ltd v. 
jagatheesan [1972] 1 M. L. J. 89 (P. C. ); see also Guest A. G., Benjan-dn's Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, 
Paras. 15-132,15-133; Atiyah P S, Adams J N, The Sale of Goods, 9th ed., 1995, pp. 502-503 
190 (1863) 4 Giff. 479,66 ER 795 
191 Ibid., at p. 483 
192 ]bid, at p. 482 
(1868) LR 3 CP 161 
Ibid., at p. 165 
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M. IL in Wallis v. Smith'95 which is to the sinfilar effect: 
"There is a class of cases relating to deposits. Where a deposit is to be 
forfeited for the breach of a number of stipulations, some of which may be 
trifling, some of which may be for the payment of money on a given day, 
in all those cases the judges have held that this rule [the rule against 
penalties] does not apply, and that the bargain of the parties is to be 
carried out. "196 
3.2.2.3. Casesfor the intervention and application of the penalty doctrine. - 
Consideration andAnalysis 
8.52 In the early years of the century, there have been some cases where the rules against 
penalties have been applied to deposits. In Commissioner of Public Works v. Hills'97, the 
Privy Council held that the contractor who had failed to complete the project on time was 
entitled to get its security money back, subject to a deduction of the employer's actual 
loss as a result of the breach. Lord Dunedin, delivering the judgment of the Board, 
applied the rules against penalties to the clause providing for the forfeiture of deposit and 
other certain retention moneys, and argued that the amounts provided to be forfeited 
upon default could not be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate of damages. '" 
8.53 The case may illustrate the application of the penalty doctrine to deposits, and it has 
often been so regarded. '99 It may, however, be said that the sum which was referred to as 
a "security money" in this case was not in fact a deposit which has the special character of 
1" (1882) 21 Ch. D. 243 
196 Ibid., at p. 258; see also Lock v. Bell [1931] 1 Ch 35; Lowe v. Hope [19701 Ch. 94, [1969] 3 AD ER 
605 where Pennycuick J was in no doubt C* upon termination, a vendor would be entitled to forfeit the 
deposit. at p. 98 and p. 607 respectively; Commission Car Sale v. Saul [19571 N21. R. 144, at p. 146 
(sale of goods, forfeiture of a deposit of 25%); Reid Motors v. Wood [ 19781 1 N21. R. 319, at p. 325; 
see also the Scottish case of Roberts & Cooper, Ltd. v. Christian Salvesen & Co., Ltd, (1919) S. C. 794 
where Lord President (Strathclyde), reviewing English and Scottish authorities and expressing the view 
that the law as to the forfeiture of deposits is the same in both jurisdictions, said: "... it is well-settled law 
that where, in a contract of sale, the intending buyer deposits part of the price, he cannot, if he repudiates 
the contract without justification, claim repayment of the deposit. ... Holding these viewsý it is 
unnecessary that I should express any opinion upon the question whether the forfeiture of the deposit is to 
be viewed as penalty or liquidated damages.,, at pp. 806,808, and per Lord Mackenzie at p. 812 (Lord 
SkeffingtOn dissenti'W. In Zemhunt (Holdings) Ltd. v. Control Securities Mc (1992) S. C. 58, the above 
view was expressed to be "the correct statement of the law of Scotland". at P. 66 per Clerk LJ 
Commissioner ofPublic Works v. Hills [1906] AC 368 
Ibid., at p. 376 
See, e. g., Beale H., Unreasonable Deposits (1993) 109 LQR 524, at p. 525; Adams J E, The Usual 
10% DePOsit-Can it be justifies still? (1983) 80 Law Society's Gazette 2811, at p. 2813, no. 17; 
Pawlowski K Relief Against Forfeiture of Deposits (1992) Estate Gazette, 21 Nov 1992, Issue 9246,76 
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being a guarantee for the completion of the agreement. The contractual clause which 
dealt with the consequences of the creditor's breach (i. e. cl. 17), provided for the 
forfeiture of the security money and other retention moneys, upon default, "as and for 
liquidated damages sustained by the said Government [i. e. the employer] for the non- 
completion of the said line"m. It would, therefore, seem that the parties had intended to 
pre-assess damages which might have resulted from breach, rather than to provide for a 
sum of money to act as a guarantee for the completion. True that they called the sum 
also a "security", but the Privy Council, it appears, regarded it as an amount agreed upon 
to determine the amount of probable future losses as a result of the non-completion. 
Since the special status of a deposit is due to its distinctive characteristic which the 
amount in question in the Hill's case2o' lacks it, it seems to be hardly surprising that the 
Privy Council did not regard it forfeitable. Put another way, it being recognised as an 
amount agreed upon to pre-assess damages, the Board had no difficulty to apply the 
penalty doctrine to decide whether it was a genuine pre-estimate. 
8.54 This can be supported by the statement of Lord Mackenzie in the Scottish case of 
Roberts & Cooper v. Salvesen & Co. 202, who, on the question of the recoverability of 
deposit by the defaulting purchaser, did not consider the Hill's case to be in point, saying: 
"It would be necessary to consider this topic [i. e. the application of the 
penalty doctrine, as it was applied in the Hill's case] if the case raised the 
question whether the 13,000 was of the nature of a penalty or was 
liquidated damages ... . 
In my opinion that question does not arise here, 
inasmuch as the 0,000 was a deposit in the sense in which that term is 
used in the cases referred to. [i. e. as guarantee for the performance]. "203 
8.55 Pye v. British Automobile Commercial Syndicate Ltd. 204 has also been regarded as 
supporting the applicability of the penalty doctrine to deposits. 205 In this case, in an 
200 Commissioner ofPublic Work-vv. Hills [1906] AC 368, at p. 373 
201 Commissioner ofPublic Worka v. Hills [ 1906] AC 368 
202 [1918] S. C. 794 
203 ibid., at P. 812 
204 [1906] 1 KB 425 
2w See AdaMS J E, 71e Usual 10% Deposit-Can it be justifies still? (1983) 80 Law Society's Gazette 
2811, at p. 2813, no. 17; Pawlowsid K Relief Against Forfeiture of Deposits (1992) Estate CWZM 21 
Nov 1992, Issue 9246,76 
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action by the buyer for the recovery of deposit, the technical rules against penalties were 
applied, and the deposit, having been recognised as not being in the nature of penalty, 
was held to be forfeitable. Bigham J., considering the statement of Jessel M. R. in Wallis 
v. &nith* concluded that the authorities cited for that view did not support it. He, 
however, observed that being a deposit was a circumstance which had to be taken into 
account when determining the nature of payment, saying: 
11 
... 
I think that there is some ground for saying that where the sum of 
money in question has been deposited, that is a circumstance which must 
be taken into account by a judge in ascertaining the intention of the 
parties. 99207 
It should be noted that in this case also, like the Hill's case2o, the forfeiture clause 
provided for the forfeiture of deposit, upon default, "as and by way of liquidated 
damages"2". 
8.56 Furthermore, in Brickles v. SheIP10, the Privy Council, refusing to decree specific 
performance of a contract for the sale of land after termination of the agreement for the 
purchaser's default, regretted that a claim for the recovery of the deposit, in the 
alternative, had not been inserted, so that there could have been "a complete adjudication 
on aH matters in dispute between the parties" . 
21 1 The statement may imply that the Board 
might have relieved the purchaser against forfeiture of the deposit had there been a claim 
for such a relief But the nature of relief which might have granted, and the grounds on 
which it might have been based are by no means clear. Needless to say, therefore, that 
the case cannot be regarded as an authority for the view that the rules against penalties 
should be applied to deposits. 
3.2.2.4. Recent developments: Reasonableness of deposit 
8.57 Despite the above cases and judicial statementS212, the observations of Jessel M. R. 
2' Wallis v. Smith (1882) 21 Ch D 243 
207P), ev. British Automobile Commercial Syndicate Ltd. [1906] 1 KB425, at p. 430 
208 Commissioner ofPublic Works v. Hills [ 1906] AC 368 
201 Jýw v. British Automobile Commercial Sý, ndicate Ltd. [1906] 1 KB 425, at p. 426 
210 [1906] 2 AC 599 
211 Ibid. at p. 604 
212 See also Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. Ltd. [19621 1 All ER 385, [1962] AC 600, per Lord 
Denning at p. 631 
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Si 13 in Wallis v. MW has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Linggi Plantations Lid 
v. Jagatheesan". in a contract for the sale of an estate for $3,775,000, a 10% 
forfeitable deposit was provided for and duly paid. Upon default, the vendors forfeited 
the deposit, though they could prove no damages resulting from the breach. The 
purchasers claimed for the recovery of the deposit, relying on the section 75 of the 
Contracts (Malay States) Ordinance 1950, on the ground that the forfeiture amounted to 
a penalty. The Privy Council held that the rules relating to deposit have always been 
treated as distinct from the law against penalties. 
Lord Hailsham. of St. Marylebone, delivering the judgment of the Board, said that "a 
reasonable deposit has always been regarded as a guarantee of performance as well as a 
payment on account, and its forfeiture has never been regarded as a penalty in English 
law or common English usage . 
"215 The Board, thus, treated a 10% deposit as a 
reasonable depoSit216 , and did not regard it subject to the penalty doctrine, and 
consequently subject to the sec. 75 of Contracts Ordinance 1950. The Privy CounciL 
however, was careful to confine its decision to deposits which are "reasonable". A 
deposit, in the words of Lord Hailsham LC "might turn out to be the imposition of a 
217 
penalty, by purporting to render forfeit something which is in truth part payment". 
This implies that a deposit, being unreasonable, might be regarded as a penalty which is 
subject to equitable relief . 
219 
8.58 The observations of Lord Hailsham LC was relied upon in the recent case of 
213 Wallis v. Smith (1882) 21 Ch D 243 
214 [197411 NELL 89 
215 Ibid. 9 at p. 
94 [emphasis added] . In his lordship's view, the rules relating to deposit was much older 
than the rules against penalties. They were imported from the civil law and, assuming the deposit or 
earnest to be reasonable, forfeiture of a deposit was not normally subject to equitable relief. at p. 91 per 
Lord Hailsham LC, citing Wallis v. Smith (1882) 21 Ch D 243 
216 The Board held that them was "nothing unusual or extortionate' in a 10% deposit. Ibid., at p. 93 
217 Ibid., at p. 94 
218 It has Surprisingly Sometimes been Suggested that even a deposit equal to 90% of the purchase price 
cannot be treated as Penal. set Johnston P, Selling Land by Instalments (1992) Estate Gazette, I Feb 
1992, issue 9204,73 
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Workers Trust wd Mercimt Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd. 219 . 
It was stated that the 
above view did accurately reflect the law: "It is not possible", in the words of Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson, "for the parties to attach the incidents of a deposit to the payment of 
a sum of money unless such sum is reasonable as earnest money. "220 In the case, a 
contract for the sale of land in Jamaica provided for the payment of a deposit of 25% of 
the purchase price (cl. 4), with express power in the vendor to forfeit it upon default (cl. 
13). The purchasers having failed to provide a satisfactory undertaking for the payment 
of the balance of the purchase price on the required date, the vendors terminated the 
contract, and purported to forfeit the deposit. The purchasers rendered the balance with 
interest three days later, but it was refused. They, then, started proceedings claiming, 
inter afia, relief against forfeiture of the depoSit. 221 The claim was rejected by the judge; 
but on appeal, the Court of Appeal of Jamaica relieved the purchaser from forfeiture to 
the extent that the deposit exceeded 10% of the contract price. The vendors appealed 
against the decision to grant relief and the purchasers cross-appealed claiming that they 
should have been relieved against forfeiture of the whole deposit. The amount of the 
deposit being recognised as unreasonable, the Privy Council held that the provision for its 
forfeiture, in the absence of special circumstances to justify it, would amount to the 
imposition of a penalty and, accordingly, the purchasers should be relieved against the 
forfeiture. 
8.59 A few ftnportant points could be referred to in this decision: First, Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson, delivering the judgment of the Board, tried to summarise the law relating to 
penalties and forfeitures in general terms. He observed: 
"In general, a contractual provision which requires one party in the event 
of his breach of the contract to pay or forfeit a sum of money to the other 
party is unlawful as being a penalty, unless such provision can be justified 
as being a payment of liquidated damages, being a genuine pre-estimate of 
the loss which the innocent party will incur by reason of the breach. One 
exception to this general rule is the provision for the payment of a deposit 
by the purchaser on a contract for the sale of land. Ancient law has 
219 Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER370 (P. C. ) 
I Aid, at p. 706 and p. 374 respectively 
22, Tu purchaser also claimed specific performance which was rejected by the judge at first instam. 
But it was not in issue before the Court of Appeal and Privy Council, for DqJap had arranged to purchase 
the same land from the first mortgagee. see ibid, p. 372 
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established that the forfeiture of such a deposit (customarily 10% of the 
contract price) does not fall within the general rule and can validly be 
forfeited even though the amount of the deposit bears no reference to the 
anticipated loss to the vendor flowing from the breach of contract. %'2n 
Although it might seem that this statement does not accurately reflect the law as to 
penalties and forfeitures223, it does clearly confirm the special status of deposits. This 
special status, described as "anomalouS"22' by the Board, has been traced back to the 
Roman law of arra, and possibly further back. 22' A deposit, therefore, has expressly been 
treated as forfeitable upon default, without equity having any power to relieve against 
such a forfeiture. 226 
8.60 Second, the reason for deposits being treated differently from other advance 
payments is that such a payment is intended by the parties to act as an earnest for the 
performance of a contract, or as a security that the purchaser means business. Obviously, 
if the purchaser defaulted in the performance of his contractual obligations, such a deposit 
might be forfeited, for it was the primary intention of providing for such an advance 
payment. 
8.61 Third, the special status afforded to deposits is capable of being abused by the 
I Workers Dwst and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 370 (P. C. ), at p. 
705 and p. 373 respectively 
273 FIrstly, it would seem that, as far as the onus of proof is concerned, an agreed damages clause is, 
primafacie, valid unless the defendant shows that it is not a genuine pre-estimate of the probable losses 
resulting from breach. see Robophone Facilities Ltd. v. Blank [ 1966] 3 All ER 128, [1966] 1 WLR 1428, 
at p. 1447; Secondly, it was discussed that the relief afforded by courts against forfeiture of advance 
payments (except deposit) is to some extent different from relief against penalties. Such a relief may 
normally be granted if the forfeiture clause is penal and it is unconscionable for the payee to reWn the 
money. (see supra., paras. 8.37 et seq. ) Thirdly, the Privy Council regarded the forfeitability of a deposit 
as an exception to the general rule, while it would seem that the general rule, as it was considered in 
detail (supra., para. 8.45 and references made therein), is that a deposit should be forfeited upon default 
without any equitable relief being available, and the relief against forfeiture of deposit is an exception. 
see the illuminating observations of Carter J W, A Comment on Dojap (Reasonable Deposit) (1993) 6 
JCL 269, at pp. 270-27 1, who describes the general proposition of the Privy Council "as either a 
profound statement of a new principle, or as a loose and perhaps inaccurate attempt to state 
compendiously two different rules". 
I Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 370 (P. C. ), at p. 
705 and p. 373 respectively; see also Guest A. G., Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, para. 15-132 
225 Relying on Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch. D. 89, at pp. 101-102 per Fry LJ; see Workers Trust and 
merchant BankLtd. v. Doiap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 370 (P. C. ), ibid 
Workers Trust v. Dojap, ibid 
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parties: They may provide for an excessive sum of money as a deposit, and in this way 
escape from the application of the rules against penalties. Put another way, they may 
insert a disguised penalty in their contract by calling it a deposit. There has always been a 
tendency that such an abuse could not be allowed. As pointed out, in the Linggi case227, 
Lord Hailsham LC confined the special status of deposits to advance payments which are 
in tmth a deposit. His lordship referred to them as "reasonable deposite'. Before him, 
Denning LJ expressly recognised the power of courts to relieve against forfeiture of 
deposits which were excessive in amount. He pointed out: 
"... suppose that a vendor of property, in lieu of the usual ten per cent. 
deposit, stipulates for an initial payment of fifty per cent. of the price as a 
deposit and part payment, and later, when the purchaser fails to complete, 
the vendor re-sells the property at a profit and, in addition, claims to 
forfeit the fifty per cent. deposit. Surely the court will relieve against the 
forfeiture. The vendor cannot forestall this equity by describing an 
extravagant sum as a deposit, any more than he can recover a penalty by 
calling it liquidated damages. v9229 
This passage implies that Denning LJ recognises the special status of deposits by 
accepting the forfeitable nature of "the usual ten per cent. deposit", but he confines the 
rule to "true deposits" by believing in the equity's power to relieve the purchaser from 
forfeiture of an excessive amount described as a deposit. 
8.62 Likewise in Dojeo, it was emphasised that the special status of deposits is only 
afforded to reasonable deposits. 230 The main task of the courts in dealing with the 
question of the forfeiture of deposit is to decide whether the advance payment provided 
for and described as a deposit is reasonable in amount as a real "earnest money". If it is, 
then it is forfeitable upon default and there is no equitable power to relieve against such a 
forfeiture, even where the amount of deposit has no possible relation to the loss suffered 
by the payee as a result of the breach. 231 But if it is not, it cannot be treated as a deposit, 
as if the parties have not stipulated for a deposit at all. 2" It is an advance payment which 
227 Linggi Plantations Ltd. v. Jagatheesan [ 1974] 1 ULJ 89 
m Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, at p. 638 
229 Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd, v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [ 1993] 2 All ER 370 (P. C. ) 
231 ibid., at p. 374 
" See ibid., at p. 373 
232 See ibid, at p. 376, where Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: "If it [the vendor] cannot establish that the 
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the provision for its forfeiture, if not justified according to the special circumstances of 
the case, may be regarded as a penalty. 
A reasonable deposit, accordingly, might be a penalty in a sense that it is not a genuine 
pre-estimate of damages, but the special status of deposits requires that no relief against 
forfeiture of such a penal sum can be afforded. Such a penalty, in the words of Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson, has been referred to as a "pern-Lissible penalty". 233 Also an 
unreasonable deposit, though it is subject to the penalty doctrine, may, in certain 
circumstances, not be held to be a penalty, for it might be recognised as a genuine pre- 
estimate of the payee's likely losses which might flow from breach. The Privy Council 
described it as drawing a line "between a reasonable, permissible amount of penalty and 
an unreasonable, impermissible penalty". "' 
8.63 To sum up the discussion, it may be stated that the present position of law stands as 
follows: A deposit, if it is reasonable as an earnest money, is not subject to the rules 
against penalties and forfeitures. 23' It means that such a deposit would be retained by the 
payee if the contract was terminated for the payer's default, even if the amount of deposit 
had no relation to the actual loss which is likely to be suffered by the payee by reason of 
the breach. An unreasonable deposit, however, may be ordered to be refunded by 
relieving the payer against its forfeiture. " 
This special status afforded to deposits, though it looks simple and clear at first sight 
creates several problems some of which may have still remained unsolved. Drawing a fine 
between a reasonable and unreasonable deposit in different contracts is one of them: How 
whole sum was truly a deposit, it has not contracted for a true deposit at all. " 
233 Ibid., at p. 374; see also Carter J W, A Comment on DqJap (Reasonable Deposit) (1993) 6 JCL 269,8t 
p. 271 
234 Ibid., at p. 374 
235 see also Guest A. G., Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, paras. 15-132,15-133 ; Atiyah P S, 
Adam J N, Ile Sale of Goods, 9th ed., 1995, pp. 502-503 
236 it should be mentioned here that this is the legal position disregarding the discretionary judSdCtion 
afforded to courts by statute to order the repayment of deposit in contracts for the sale or exchange of an 
interest in land, (sec. 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925). The statutory jurisdiction will shortly be 
discussed. see infra., chapter 9, paras. 9.10 et seq. 
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can a reasonable deposit be distinguished from an unreasonable one? In other words, 
what are the tests to determine the reasonableness of a deposit? Secondly, it does not 
seem to be clear whether an unreasonable deposit is subject to the rules against penalties, 
in its strict sense, or it should be subject to the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture, as discussed earlier237 . These 
issues should in turn be considered here. 
3.2.3. Test of Reasonableness 
8.64 The only case which might shed some light on the question of determining the 
reasonableness of a deposit is Doje8. In that case, a deposit of 25% of the contractual 
price was held to be unreasonable. As a primary point, the Privy Council rejected the 
argument of the judge at first instance to the effect that the deposit was reasonable 
because it was the common practice of banks selling property in Jamaica to demand 
deposits of between 15% to 50%. 239 A deposit, therefore, cannot be regarded as 
reasonable merely because it is commonly asked for by a certain group of vendors or 
sellers. ' This would seem to be the right approach. Determining the reasonableness of 
deposits by a reference to the common practice of certain groups would open a floodgate 
for abusing the special rules relating to deposits, and consequently evading the law as to 
penalties. 
8.65 The Board expressed its view as to a reasonable deposit in sale of land in the 
BoHowing tenns: 
"... without logic but by long continued usage both in the United Kingdom 
and formerly in Jamaica, the customary deposit has been 10%. A vendor 
who seeks to obtain a larger amount by way of forfeitable deposit must 
show special circumstances which justify such a deposit. 2v241 
237 See supra., pams. 8.37 et seq. 
238 Workers D-ust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Invesonents Ltd. [ 1993] 2 All ER 370, for the facts 
of the case see supra., para. 8.58 
2" Ibid, at p. 374 
240 See also Beale R, Unreasonable Deposits (1993) 109 LQR 524, at pp. 528-529 
241 Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 370 (P. C. ). at p. 
374; see Anonymous (1818) 3 Madd. 494,56 ER 586, where Sir John Leach, the Vice-chancellor 
observed that, though there was no fixed rule as to what amount should be deposited, it would be a useful 
rule that the usual deposit of 10 per cent. should be made when biddings were opened. see also Adams J 
E, The Usual 10% Deposit-Can it be justified still? (1983) 80 Law Society's Gazette 2811 ; Oakley A J, 
Deposits: still a guarantee of Performance?, part 1 [1994) The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 4, at p. 
41; The Conveyancing Standing Committee's Consultation Paper, Deposits on Exchange of Contracts in 
402 
An increase in the amount of deposits in Jamaica because of the introduction of a transfer 
tax of 7.5% by the Transfer Tax Act 1971 was not regarded as justifying the deposit in 
question: First, as to the tax element, although it was not unreasonable to stipulate for 
the advance payment of such a tax, there was no justification for the view that such an 
advance payment should be capable of being forfeited if the contract was not completed. 
For, in the words of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, "such tax is either not in the event payable 
242 or is recoverable by the vendoe' . Second, apart from the tax element, there was no 
evidence to show special circumstances which might justify a deposit of 25% as being a 
reasonable deposit-243 
In the Board's view, therefore, the "long continued usage" was regarded as the key point 
in determining the reasonableness of the deposit. As to the contracts for the sale of land 
this usage has been quite clear: A deposit of 10% has normally been provided for as a 
guarantee for the completion of the agreement. 2" Therefore, if the parties stipulate for 
an amount larger than 10% of the purchase price as a deposit, the vendor must show 
some special circumstances which may justify the larger deposit. In the absence of such 
circumstances, the deposit would be regarded as unreasonable, as it was in Dqjap`. 
8.66 It still remains to be decided what constitutes a reasonable deposit in contracts 
other than sale of land where there may be no established continued usage as there is with 
regard to the land transactions. This seems to be one of the most problematic areas in the 
law relating to deposits. We will come back to this issue later when analysing the law 
applicable to the forfeiture of deposits. " 
Residential Conveyancing-Time for a change?, Feb. 1988, para. 1; To see the history of giving deposits 
in sale of land see Wilkinson K Deposits: who needs them? (1984) 81 The Law Society's Gazeft 347; 
Wilkinson K Deposits: way back when? (1984) 81 The Law Society's Gazette 1268 
242 Workers Trust andMerchant BankLtd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 370, at p. 375 
243 See DOjap, ibid. 
244 See the Second Report of the Conveyancing Committee: Conveyancing Simplifications (1985), para. 
3.10; The Conveyancing Standing Comn-dttee's Consultation Paper, Deposit on Exchange of Contracts in 
Residential Conveyancing- Time for Change?, Feb. 1988, para. 11 
2,45 Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Doiap Inveshnents Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 370 
2A6 Sm infra., pams. 9.79 et seq. 
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3.3. Unreasonable Deposit. - subject to the penalty doctrine or equitable 
relief against forfeiture? 
8.67 There is no doubt that a deposit being held as unreasonable may be regarded as an 
unpermissible peaty against its forfeiture the payer would be entitled to be relieved. 
The question, however, is upon what grounds such a relief should be granted: Is an 
unreasonable deposit subject to the penalty doctrine so that if there was a gross 
disproportionate between the amount of deposit and the loss which is likely to flow from 
breach, it would be held to be a penalty? or is it subject to the equitable doctrine of relief 
against forfeiture as pronounced by Somervell and Denning LJJ in Stockloser v. 
47? Johmow 
. 
3.3.1. Application of the Penalty Doctrine? 
8.68 in Dojee", though Stockloser v. johnson'49 was referred to, nonetheless Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson, referring to the conflicting views of Somervell and Denning LJJ on 
the one hand and Romer LJ on the other, did not think it necessary to decide which of 
those views were correct. His lordship tried to distinguish Stockloser v. Johnson on the 
ground that it was a case "where a party [was] seeking relief from forfeiture of contract 
to pay a price by instalments, the party in default having been let into possession in the 
251 
meantime'. '" It is quite puzzling upon what principles the case was so distinguished , 
but in any event, the Board held that the deposit of 25% was not a reasonable deposit, 
and so the provision for its forfeiture was a "plain penalty', 252 . The Board, therefore, on 
the authority of Public Works Commissioner v. Hills"', relieved the purchaser against its 
forfeiture by ordering the vendor to return the whole deposit less damages actually 
suffered by it as the result of the breach. 
8.69 Applying the decision in the Hill's case has been taken as an indication that Lord 
247 Stockjoser v. Johnson [195411 All ER 630, [1954) 1 QB 476, at p. 636 per Somervell LJ and p. 638 
per Denning LJ; see supra., paras. 8.37 et seq. 
248 Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [ 1993 ]2 All ER 370 
21 &ockjoser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
250 Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 370, at p. 376 
211 See McKenchick E, Contract Law, 2nd ed., 1994, p. 333 
252 See Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 370, at p. 376 
20 [19061 AC 368 
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Browne-W'ffldnson was thinking in terms of the rules against penalties. 254 It has also been 
suggested that ordering the entire deposit to be repaid and not allowing the vendor to 
keep any part of that shows the tendency of the Board to apply the penalty doctrine. 255 
This argument may, however, be open to doubt: it is not clear how the application of the 
equitable jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture in the line drawn by Deming LJ would 
result in the court allowing the vendor to keep some [probably the reasonable] part of the 
deposit. As emphasised by the Board, the deposit being recognised as unreasonable, the 
situation is as if the parties had never stipulated for a true deposit. If, therefore, the 
purchaser was to be relieved against forfeiture of such an advance payment, quite apart 
from the application of any certain set of rules, there would be no justification to allow 
the vendor to keep any part of that, except what which would compensate him for his 
actualloss. 
8.70 It is true that in the Hill's caSe256, the Privy Council applied the penalty rules to 
decide whether the security and retention moneys could be regarded as genuine pro. 
estimate of actual losses which might be suffered by the payee as a result of the breach, 
and true that relying on this case might show the application of the penalty doctrine to the. 
unreasonable deposit in Dojee 57 , but it is submitted that the issue cannot be regarded as 
solved and settled. The following may support the proposition: 
First, the general statement of law made by Lord Browne-WiMnson at the beginning of 
his judgemene", showed that the Board was thinking of the same rules to be applied to 
penalties and forfeiture of moneys already paid, that is, in the Board's view, the sum 
agreed to be paid or forfeited upon default, if it could not be justified as a genuine pre- 
254 See Beale H., Unreasonable Deposits (1993) 109 LQR 524, at p. 528 ; Wallace K Deposit or penalty? 
The price of greed (1993) 44 NELQ 207, at p. 209; see also Sn-dth S A, Contract, (1994) Current LeSW 
Problems (Vol. 47, part 1, Annual Review, edited by Pettet B), p. 25 who considered that Lord Browne- 
WiWnsOn effectively assessed the reasonableness of the deposit on the same grounds as stipulated omm.; Chitty on Contracts, 27th ed., vol. 1,1994, para. 26-064; Treitel G. H., The Law of Contract, 9th ed., 1995, p. 907; Murdod S, Deposits, Penalties and Equitable Relief (1993) Estate Gazette, 22 h4ay 1993, 
Isme 9320,122 
' Beale K Ibid.; Smith S A, ibid. 
256 Commissioner OfPublic Works V. Hills [19061 AC 368 
2" Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Doiap Inveshnents Ltd. [ 1993) 2 All ER 3 70 
2M See supra., para. 9.59 
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estimate of the loss which might flow from breach, would be regarded as unlawfid for 
being a penalty. Now, bearing this in mind, it would hardly be surprising to see that the 
Board, without any hesitation, tended to apply the penalty rules to the forfeiture of an 
unreasonable deposit, for, in the Board's view, it was apparently the law which was 
applicable to forfeitures. Since the general statement made by the Board does not 
accurately state the law as to relief against forfeiture 259 , so the application of the penalty 
doctrine to the forfeiture of unreasonable deposits may, it seems, not be regarded as an 
accurate legal position. 
Second, although the Board was referred to Stockloser v. Johnson2", the conflicting 
opinions expressed in that case were not considered in detail. The difference of opinion 
in that case, as stated by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, was that whether, "if the forfeiture had 
been a penalty, the court had jurisdiction to order repayment". 261 The majority were in 
favour of such a jurisdiction, but Romer LJ was against it. The Board did not refer to the 
point that, in the majority's view, being penal was not the only requirement to relieve 
against forfeiture, but it had also to be unconscionable for the payee to retain the money. 
It was Romer Us view which was relied upon by the vendors to show that, even if the 
forfeiture clause was in the nature of penalty, the purchaser would not be relieved by 
ordering the repayment of the deposit. The Board, however, distinguished the case, on a 
somewhat puzzling ground, to enable itself, it appears, to decide that an unreasonable 
deposit, which was penal in nature, could be ordered to be refunded. The reference to 
Stockloser v. Johnson, therefore, does not indicate that the Board regarded the equitable 
jurisdiction of relief against forfeiture as inapplicable to the forfeiture of unreasonable 
deposits. 
3.3.2. Application of the rules relating equitable relief against forfeiture 
8.71 The above analysis may support the view that unreasonable deposits should be 
subject to the equitable relief against forfeiture. The following reasons may also be 
forwarded: 
See supra, note 223 
260 Slockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [195411 QB 476 
20 Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Inveshnents Ltd. [ 199312 All ER 370, at p. 376 
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First, the dicta of Denning LJ in Stockloser v. Johnson 262 is in line with this proposition. 
Second, a deposit, as it was discussed, has different functions: it is a guarantee for the 
due completion of the contract, and at the same time a payment on account of the 
purchase price. 263 Where a deposit is not regarded as a reasonable deposit, it means that, 
in truth, it is not an earnest to bind the bargain. It, therefore, cannot be considered as a 
real guarantee, but it is still an advance payment on account of the contract price . 
264 
Thus, there is no difference between such a deposit and a mere part payment to justify the 
application of different rules as to them. In other words, the rules relating to the 
equitable relief against forfeiture which are applicable to part payments, should also be 
applied to unreasonable deposits. 
Third, the application of the technical rules of the penalty doctrine to deposits may, in 
some cases, result in unjustifiable and absurd consequences: One of these rules is that if a 
single sum is provided to be paid upon different breaches of varying importance, there is, 
then, a presumption that the agreed sum is a penalty. 265 When the parties are negotiating 
the agreed damages clause, they are going through the process of pre-determining the 
amount of losses which might flow from every breach [or at least, they are supposed to 
do so], and they can avoid the presumption by being careful in drafting their agreement. 
However, the situation as to deposits is different: The parties, agreeing about a deposit, 
are not normally in a position to pre-assess the amount of future probable losses. They 
agree upon a sum of money to act as a guarantee for the due completion of the 
agreement. It is, therefore, the nature of a deposit to be forfeited upon every default 
which leads to non-completion. Thus, almost as to every deposit, there would be a 
presumption that it is a penalty, for it may be forfeited (even without any express 
agreement) upon different breaches of varying importance. Therefore, application of the 
penalty doctrine would mean that, unless the presumption is rebuttedm, the deposit 
262 Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476, at p. 638; see supra., paras. 9.38-8-39 
20 Howe v. &nIth (1884) 27 Ch D 89; see supra., para. 6.39 
2m For example, if the deposit, being unreasonable, is not regarded as a penalty, it will certainly 
constitute a part of the purchase price. 
265 See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v Mew Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. [19151 AC 79; see also 
supra., paras. 2.36-2.37 
W6 See supra., paras. 2.38 et seq. 
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would constitute a penalty, and in case that it is recognised as unreasonable267, it will be 
ordered to be returned, even if, in fact, there is no gross disproportionate between the 
amount of the unreasonable deposit and the actual losses suffered by the vendor. 
8.72 In view of the above reasons, it is submitted that an unreasonable deposit should be 
subject to the rules relating to equitable relief against forfeiture of part payments. " 
Accordingly, an unreasonable deposit should be refunded if, in addition to being in the 
nature of penalty, it was unconscionable for the payee to retain it. 269 Thus, where, for 
example, the unreasonable deposit, despite being in the nature of penalty, is not grossly 
disproportionate to the loss actually suffered by the payee as a result of the breach, or 
where the benefits derived from the contract by the payer justifies the retention of the 
unreasonable deposit by the payee, the payer's claim for relief against forfeiture may be 
refimed, on the ground that it is not unconscionable to allow the payee to keep the 
unreasonable deposit. 
3.4. Analysis of the Low 
3.4.1. The Possibility of the Application of the Penalty Doctrine to Deposits 
8.73 It has been suggested by many writers and commentator s270 that the little difference 
between deposits and sums agreed upon as agreed damageS271 does not justify the 
application of Merent rules to them. Both may be a genuine attempt of the parties to 
pre-estimate damages, and, in some cases, they both may act as a penalty. it has, 
267 For the reasonable deposit even if penal in nature, would be considered as a permissible penalty. see 
Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investinents Ltd. [ 1993 ]2 All ER 370, at p. 374; supra., 
para. 8.62 
20 A general tendency towards this view can be inferred from Carter J. W., Breach of Contract 2nd ed., 
1991, para. 1259; Beatson J, Discharge for Breach: The Position of Instalments, Deposits, and other 
Payments Due before Completion (1981) 67 LQR 389, at p. 392; Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, 
4th ad., 1993, p. 433; Harpurn C. Deposits as Penalties (1993) 52 CLJ 389, at p. 390 
20 For the requirement of unconscionability see supra., paras. 8.39 et seq. 
2'0 See, e. g., FurmstOU M P, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract 13th ed., 1996, p. 641; 
McGregor on Damages, 15th ed., 1988, para. 502; Atiyah P S, Adam J N, The Sale of Goods, 9th ad., 
1995, P. 503; 
271 See Carter J W, A Comment on Dojap (Reasonable Deposit) (1993) 6 JCL 269, at p. 271; Pawlowdd 
K Relief Against Forfeiture of Deposits (1992) Estate Gazette, 21 Nov 1992, Issue 9246,76; Murdod S, 
Deposits, Penalties and Equitable Relief (1993) Estate Gazette, 22 May 1993, Issue 9320,122; Mic 
distinction between the law's treatment of stipulated sums and its treatment of forfeiture clauses has 
sometimes been referred to as "anomalous": see Smith S A, Contract (1994) Current Legal Problems 
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therefore, been emphasised that the rules against penalties should be applicable to 
deposits. 272 In other words, any deposit, not being a genuine pre-estimate of damages 
which is likely to flow from breach, should be held to be a penalty and refundable. There 
may be many advantages for this view, among them the symmetry in the application of 
the simflar rules to the similar areas of the law, and also perhaps the practical simplicity of 
the application of the established rules relating to penalties to deposits are the most 
important ones. The Law Commission also has felt it hard to see why these two concepts 
should not be treated similarly. 273 
8.74 It is perhaps appropriate to discuss the differences between a deposit and an agreed 
sum to be paid upon breach to see how efficient the above proposition could be. There 
are three main differences suggested as justifying the different treatments afforded to 
relief against penalties and relief against forfeiture of deposits. These differences relate to 
the time for the payment of a sum of money as a deposit on the one hand and as an 
agreed damages on the other, the prior ownership of the payee as to a deposit which is 
subject to forfeiture, and the primary purpose of providing for a deposit and an agreed 
damages. 
3.4. L 1. Diffmnce in 77me of Payment 
8.75 The payment of a deposit is made in advance before any default occurs, while an 
agreed sum is agreed to be paid after breach. 274 Put another way, in agreed damages 
case, it is the innocent party who normally brings an action to recover the agreed vim, 
but in deposit cases, the innocent party is normally in the position of a defendant who 
resists the return of the forfeited deposit. It may be thought that such a difference may 
bear a practical significance: The party who pays a deposit pans with the payment and is 
(vol. 47, part 1, Annual Review, edited by Pettet B), at p. 24 
272 Farrand j T, Contract and Conveyance, 4th ed., 1983, p. 204 (Professor Farrand feels d0culty in 
seeing how equity has come to tolerate not intervening and relieving against forfeiture of deposit as a 
-, penalty". ); TreAel G. H., The Law of Contract, 9th ed., 1995, p. 907; see also Treitel G. H., Remedies for 
Breach of Contract, 1988, p. 242 
271 Law Commission's Working Paper, no. 61, "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid", 1975, 
para. 57 
274 Farrand J T, Contract and Conveyance, 4th ed., 1983, p. 204; Treitel G. H., The Law of ContraM 9th 
et, 1995, p. 907; Furmston M P, Contract Planning: Liquidated Damages, Deposits and the 
Foresecability Rule (1991) 4 JCL 1, at pp. 4-5; Law Commission's Working Paper, no. 61, "Penalty 
Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid", 1975, para. 58 
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likely to be far more conscious about the consequences of his default which is the 
forfeiture of his depoSit275, while the party who agrees to pay a sum of money upon 
default, which might look a remote contingency to him at the time of entering into the 
contract, is less likely to have seriously intended it. 276 But does this justify the application 
of different rules to these two concepts? If it does, then where it is established that the 
defaulting party had seriously intended to pay the penal sum upon his default, and he was 
completely conscious about the consequences of his breach, there would be no 
justification for not enforcing the penalty. But the agreed damages clauses have never 
been treated as such. 2n 
3.4.1.2. Forfeiture of deposit as a sum already belonged to thepayee 
8.76 When a deposit is paid, it belongs to the payee as soon as it is paid, and upon 
default, the payee only keeps the money which had already belonged to him, while a 
penalty is exacting the payment of an excessive sum of money or appropriating to himself 
moneys which belonged to the other party. 278 This difference was specially emphasised 
by Deming IJ2" who regarded the forfeiture clause in the Hill's case2so as a penalty in 
the strict sense, and as being distinct from forfeiture of deposit and moneys already paid. 
In the Hill's case, in his view, unlike the case of deposits, the security and retention 
moneys belonged to the payer, and the provision for forfeiture of such moneys should be 
and, in fact, was- viewed as subject to the rules against penalties. 
275 Bigharn L in P)w v. British Automobile Commercial Syndicate Ltd. [1906] 1 KB 425, said: "Them is 
also this huther fact that this agreement does not merely contain a stipulation that in the event of a 
breach of the contract the sum of L300 shall be paid as liquidated damages. The plaintiff hem has 
himself already paid this sum to the defendants. He has parted with the money, and that circumstance is 
significant to show that he did not intend to have it back if he committed a breach of the agmmenL" at 
p. 430 
"I Especially where the sum is far in excess of the loss which may be likely to flow from breach. see 
Atiyah, Essays on Contract, Essay 12: "Freedom of Contract and the New Righf', 1990, pp. 368-369, 
where Professor Atiyý considering the primary purpose of parties providing for a penalty clause, 
concludes: "... it seems to me clear that the common law's refusal to enforce penalty clauses shows an intuitive understanding that such clauses are not genuine contractual promises or obligations. They are fACS, masquerading as contractual Promises. "; see also Atiyah, Introduction to the Law of Contzvcý 
1995, p. 299 
277 See Law Commission's Working Paper, no. 61, "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid", 
1975, Pam. 59 
"' See Law Commission's Working Paper, loc. cit., para. 58 
279 Slockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 All ER 630, [195411 QB 476, at pp. 488489 
280 commissioner ofPublic Works V. Hills [ 19061 AC 368 
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The significance of such a distinction may be open to doubt: A contract may provide for 
the forfeiture of either a sum of money which already belongs to the payee or a sum 
which is in the payee's possession but belongs to the payer. In both cases, it would seem 
that the same rules should be applicable to the forfeiture clause. This is supported by the 
P281, reliance made on the Hill's case by the Privy Council in Doja, to order repayment of 
the forfeited deposit. Notwithstanding that in Dojap, the deposit belonged to the vendor 
as soon as it was paid but in the Hill's case the security money belonged to the payer, the 
Privy Council applied the same rules to the both situations. Further, as argued by the 
Law Commissiotim, the recoverability of an unpaid deposit by the prospective payee 
after termination seems to break down the above distinction 283 , though 
it may be argued 
that such a deposit also already belonged to the prospective payee, as soon as the 
contract is entered into. 
3.4. L3.77se Primary Purpose of Proviifingfor a Deposit and an Agreed Damages 
8.77 The purpose of an agreed damages clause is normally to pre-estimate the amount of 
loss which is likely to flow from breach, while a deposit primarily is a guarantee that the 
contract will be performed. It would seem that it is this distinction which may justify the 
application of different rules to these two concepts. 284 
It has been argued that every penalty is also, in a sense, a guarantee for the completion of 
the agreement. 23' In Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. Ltd. 286 , Lord Radcliffe observed: 
"I know, of course, that to travel to another branch of equity's relief 
jurisdiction, the precise reason why a deposit made on a sale of land is not 
recoverable if the bargain goes off by the purchaser's default is that it is 
treated as a guarantee (see Howe v. Smith); but nevertheless every penalty, 
281 Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 All ER 370 (P. C. ) 
2' Law Commission's Working Paper, no. 61, "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid7,1975, 
para. 59 
283 Sm, e. g., Hinton v. Sparkes (1868) LR 3 CP 161; Damon Cla Naviera &4 v. Hapa&Lloyd 
International &1 [19851 1 All ER 475, [1985] 1 WLR 435; see also Waddams S M., The Law of Damages, 1983, p. 540 
254 Cf. Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, at p. 162 
28-5 See Fan-and J T, Contract and Conveyance, 4th ed., 1983, p. 204; Professor Treitel suggests that the 
difference "lies in the motive force of the words used". See Treitel G. H., The Law of Contractý 9th ed., 
1995, p. 907 
226 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. Ltd. [1962] 1 All ER 385, [1962] AC 600 
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even a penal bond, is in some sense a guarantee for the due performance 
of the contract, and I do not see any sufficient reason why in the right 
setting a sum of money may not be treated as a penalty, even though it 
arises from an obligation that is essentially a guarantee. v%287 
It is no doubt true that a penalty in some sense can act as a guarantee, since, regardless of 
the penalty doctrine, the non-completion of the agreement would result in the recovery of 
the penal sum by the innocent party. However, what seems to be important and 
determinative is the primwy purpose of an agreed damages and a deposit: This can, in 
fact, objectively show the intention of the parties when they make the contract. When the 
parties agree about the amount of damages which may flow from breach, they do not, 
objectively, intend it as a guarantee for the completion, and conversely agreeing about the 
deposit, the parties, objectively, have the guarantee aspect in mind, and do not intend the 
deposit to be an amount to compensate the payee for damages resulting from breach. " 
This gives a deposit, its special status. In any event, it seems, it should be accepted that a 
deposit is a special creature? 29, different from an agreed damages: Application of the 
penalty doctrine to deposits would mean the negation of this legal institution, or keeping 
the name of deposits but without any content. If the parties are required to genuinely pre- 
estimate damages which is likely to flow from breach when agreeing about deposit, then 
such a sum cannot be called a deposit: it is, in fact, an agreed damages which, instead of 
an undertaking to pay it upon default, the promisor pays it in advance. Whatever the 
history of deposits? 90, it has been accepted in this legal system, and it has practically been 
used by the contracting parties for a very long time, with the intention of acting as a 
guarantee. It would, therefore, seem inappropriate to treat it just like an agreed damages 
287 Ibid., at p. 624 
238 That is why if the amount of deposit falls short of the sum needed to compensate the innocent party, 
be is entitled to bring an action for the recovery of his loss, taking into account of course, the amount of 
the forfeited deposit. see, e. g., Lock v. Bell [ 193 1] 1 Ch. 35. The Law Commission has observed that 
-deposits are usually arbitrary sums, seen not as potential compensation but as a Complete Or Partial 
guarantee against breach and an inducement to perform. " see Law Commission's Working Paper, no. 61, 
Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid", 1975, para. 65 ; Professor Farrand says: "The 
traditional ten per cent on a sale of land represents pure practice and is never even a perfunctory pre- 
estimate. " see Farrand J T, Contract and Conveyance, 4th ed., 1983, p. 204; see also Carter J W, A 
Comment on Dojap (Reasonable Deposit) (1993) 6 JCL 269, at p. 271 
20 See Carter J W, A Comment on Dqjap (Reasonable Deposit) (1993) 6 JCL 269, at p. 271, Barnsley's 
Conveyancing Law and practice, 3rd ed., p. 224 
2w See Howe v. &dth (1884) 27 Ch D 89, at pp, 101-102 per Fry LJ; see also Wilkinson K Deposits: 
who needs them? (1984) 81 The Law Society's Gazette 347; Wilkinson K Deposits: way back when? 
(1994) 81 The Law Society's Gazette 1268 
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while parties have no intention of assessing damages when agreeing upon that. It is, 
therefore, suggested that, despite many criticisms, the approach taken by many English 
courts to treat it as distinct from an agreed damages clause, with its special status, is the 
correct one. 
8.78 In the meantime, it should not be forgotten that the whole discussion about the 
special status of deposits assumes the deposit to be a true and reasonable one291: The 
parties should not be allowed to misuse the special rules relating to deposits, just Eke they 
are not allowed to agree upon an excessive amount as agreed damages. The approach 
taken by the Privy Council in Dqjtp292, therefore, should be generally welcomed, though 
in some detailed points, arising out of the decision, it might need some elaboration. it 
should be hoped that this task will effectively be done in the future. 
3.4.2. A Consideration of the Reasonableness Test 
3.4.2L In Contractsfor the Sale of Land 
8.79 The final point to conclude this section is the issue of the reasonableness of a 
deposit. In contracts for the sale of land, as it was pointed out2o, because of the long 
continued usage, a deposit of 10% has been regarded as reasonable. "A vendoe, said 
Lord Browne Wilkinson in Dojap, "who seeks to obtain a larger amount by way of 
forfeitable deposit must show special circumstances which justify such a deposit. "2" This 
shows that being in a certain proportion to the contract price would not always be a 
decisive factor: a deposit may be more than 10% of the contract price, but the vendor win 
have to show some special circumstances to justify the reasonableness of such a deposit. 
The Law Commission, proposing in general the application of the penalty doctrine to 
deposits, thought that deposits in land transactions had a special status and proposed a 
statutory specified percentage of the purchase price as a valid and forfeitable deposit. 
They said: 
"We are by no means convinced that at the present time ten per cent. is the 
29' See, e. g., Linggi Plantations Ltd. v. Jagatheesan [1974] 1 NEJ89; Workers Trust and Merchant Bank 
Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd, [1993] 2 All ER 370; see also supra., paras. 8.57 et seq. 
292 Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Doiap Investments Ltd. [199312 All ER370 
293 Supra., pm. 8.65 
294 Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [ 1993] 2 All ER 370, at p. 374 
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right figure and we are inclined to think that a lower figure, perhaps five 
per cent. would be preferable. "2" 
However, in the fight of the Privy Council's decision in Dojap, it does now seem 
extremely unlikely that a deposit of 10% would be regarded as unreasonable. 2* 
3AZZ In Other Transactions 
8.80 The problem remains unsolved as to the contracts other than sale of land. On the 
one hand, in some of these contracts- such as sale and purchase of cars, package holiday 
contracts'97- there is a quite settled practice of requiring the payment of a deposit to 
guarantee the completion of the contract. On the other, it is not clear whether there is an 
established long continued usage with regard to the amount of the forfeitable deposits in 
these contracts-298 
8.81 One possible solution which might be inferred from the general proposition of the 
P299 Privy Council at the beginning of their discussion in Doja, , 
is that deposits in contracts 
other than sale of land are, from the outset, subject to the rules against penalties. The 
I" Law Commission's Working Paper, no. 61, "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid", 1975, 
para. 66, citing the suggestion of the California Law Revision in its 1973 Recommendations as to 
forfeitability of a five per cent deposit on contracts to purchase real property ; see also Oakley A J, 
Deposits: still a guarantee of performance?, part 11 [1994] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 100, at 
pp. 100-101, where he suggests that "the forfeiture of 10 per cent. deposit will generally leave the vendor 
comfortably ahead in financial terms. " ; Adams J E, The Usual 10% Deposit-Can it be justifies so? 
(1983) 80 Law Society's Gazette 2811, where Professor Adams, observing that the 10% deposit produces 
a bonus to the vendor in great majority of cases, suggests the introduction of the lower figure of seven per 
cent (at p. 2812) ; Wallace FI, Deposit or Penalty? The price of greed (1993) 44 NILQ 207, at p. 212 ; 
Such an overcompensation may be seen in Windsor Securities Ltd. v. Loreldal and Lester (1975) The 
Times, 10 Sep. 1975, where a 10% deposit amounting to F. 235,000 was successfully forfeited while the 
property could be resold at a profit of L150,000. In Oliver J's view, there was nothing to show that the 
forfeiture was unreasonable or in the nature of penalty. 
"6 See Atiyah, Introduction to the Law of Contract, 1995, p. 437, no. 27 ; Harpum, proposing the 
availability of equitable relief against forfeiture of deposits, suggests that the usual 10% deposit would be 
difficult to be regarded as unconscionable to be retained by the payee. 0brpum C., Relief Against 
Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, at p. 164) ; see also Harpum C, Deposits as 
Penalties (1993) 52 CLJ 389, at p. 390 ; Pawlowski M, Relief Against Forfeiture of Deposits (1992) 
Estate Gazette, 21 Nov 1992, Issue 9246,76, at p. 78 ; Oakley A J, Deposits: still a guarantee of 
performance?, part H [19941 Ile Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 100, at p. 107 ; Storey I R, 
Conveyancin& 4th ed., 1993, p. 265; Fan-and J T, Contract and Conveyance, 4th ed., 1983, p. 204 
297 See Milner A, Liquidated Damages: An Empirical Study in the Travel Industry (1979) 42 M. L. R. 508 
2" Professor Atiyah suggests that in the context of sale of goods, providing for the forfeitable deposits of 
up to 10% is not uncommon. Atiyah P S, Adams J N, The Sale of Goods, 9th ed., 1995, p. 548 ; see also 
ReJdMotors v. Wood [1978] 1 N2. L. P_ 319, where, as to a contract for the sale of goods, it was stated: 
In the normal course of business, a deposit as security for completion of the transaction is usually in the 
vicinity of 10 per cent. of the total price. ... " at p. 327 per Coates J. 
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Board, stating the general application of the penalty doctrine to the sums agreed to be 
paid or forfeited upon breach, regarded "the provision for the payment of a deposit by the 
purchaser on a contract for the sale of land v300 as an exception to the general rule. This 
may imply that deposits in other transactions are subject to the general rule proposed by 
the Board. 301 This is also what was proposed by the Law Commission as one of the 
provisional solutions . 
302 The fact that it was a proposition for reform by the Law 
Commission shows that it has not been the Law, as it may generally be understood. 303 
8.82 In addition to the criticisms made to this general statement of the lawm, the 
proposed solution itself, may be subject to some objections: 
First, the solution proposed ignores the primary purpose of providing for a deposit which 
is to guarantee the performance and completion of the contract. This, as it was argued 303 , 
may result in negating the institution of deposit and replacing it by an agreed damages 
which is paid in advance. 
Second, it may lead to the conclusion that there is no difference between a deposit and a 
part payment . 
3" True that a deposit is also an unconditional part payment, but it should 
be observed that every unconditional part payment could not be regarded as a deposit. 
The main Merence, it seems, lies in this point: A deposit is intended to be a guarantee 
for the completion of agreement, but not a part payment. No doubt that, in certain cases, 
"9 Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] 2 AUER 370 
31 ibid., at p. 373 [emphasis added] 
' It has also been argued that there is no "long continued usage" for the payment of a certain percentage 
as a deposit in sale of goods, and, therefore, deposits in such contracts may well be subject to the 
equitable relief against forfeiture. see Oakley A J, Deposits: still a guarantee of performance?, part 11 
[19941 The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 100, at p. 107 
302 Law Commission's Working Paper, no. 61, "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid", 1975, 
paras. 65-66 
303 See Beale H., Unreasonable Deposits (1993) 109 LQR 524, at p. 529 
304 See Carter J W, A Comment on Dojap (Reasonable Deposit) (1993) 6 JCL 269, at pp. 270-271; 
supra., note 223 
305 Supr&, para. 8.77 
306 Assimilating deposits to the unconditional part payments, it has been suggested that the equitable 
relief against forfeiture should be available in respect of deposits, as it is with regard to the forfeiture of 
unconditional payments. The writer sees the only relevant difference in that the right to retain a deposit, 
in case of termination for the payer's default, is implied. see Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture ad 
the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, at p. 162 
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an unconditional part payment may also, in effect, act as a guarantee- for it creates, by 
the fear of its forfeiture, a motive in the payer to complete his agreement3"- but this is 
not, it would seem, what has primarily been intended by the parties when entering into the 
contract. This justifies that a deposit should have its special status. 
Third, it raises the question that upon what grounds a deposit in sale of land should be 
treated Merently as from deposits in contracts other than sale of land. Put another way, 
what justifies such a different treatment? The Law Commission has answered this 
question in the following terms: 
"Land transactions, ..., stand on a somewhat different 
footing. The 
position with regard to the status of the deposit is probably better 
understood and in most cases the vendor and purchaser will be acting with 
legal advice. It may therefore be that deposits paid in connection with 
sales of land and houses merit special treatment. "'O' 
If such an explanation is accepted as the basis for the different treatment, then in any 
other contract where the parties have well understood the status of deposit and risk of 
losing it upon default, the deposit should be regarded as forfeitable. Thus, the 
construction of the contract and discovering the real intention of the parties would 
determine whether the deposit should be forfeited without any equitable intervention to 
relieve against its forfeiture, or it should be subject to the rules against penalties. 
Furthermore, it should be observed that a deposit has a settled meaning among people 
who enter into a contract. As it was observed more than 100 years ago by Lord 
Macnaghten in Soper v. Arnold": 
"Everybody knows what a deposit is. The purchaser did not want legal 
advice to tell him that. The deposit serves two purposes- if the purchase is 
carried out, it goes against the purchase money- but its primary purpose is 
this, it is a guarantee that the purchaser means business. 0 10 
In this way, it seems that it should be presumed that the parties know the purpose of 
providing for a deposit, and intend it to act as a guarantee for the completion of the 
agreement. 
"7 See Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 89, at p. 10 1 per Fry LJ 
" Law Commission's Working Paper, no. 61, "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid7,1975, 
pam 66 
30 14 App. Cas. 429 
310 Ibid., at p. 435 
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8.83 The other possibility might be that there is no justifiable ground for distinguishing 
land transactions from other contracts . 
31 1 The purpose of providing for a deposit in both 
groups of contracts is the same, and therefore, in principle, the rules as to deposits in both 
should be the same. The only difference might be that in contracts for the sale of land, 
the reasonableness of the deposit could rather easily be determined by referring to the 
long continued usage of providing for a 10 per cent. deposit in these transactions . 
312 It is, 
however, a difficult task to ascertain what constitutes a reasonable deposit in contracts 
other than sale of land 3 ", especially since there is, apparently, no decided case on the 
point. it would perhaps be preferable for the legislator to step in, and provide for a 
certain percentage of the contractual price to be presumed as the reasonable deposit. 
This may be something between 5 to 10 per cent. of the contract price. The parties, of 
course, are in liberty to provide for a higher percentage as the forfeitable deposit, but 
such a sum should be justified referring to the special circumstances of the case. In the 
absence of such special circumstances, the amount provided for as a deposit would be 
subject to the equitable doctrine of relief against forfeiture, as proposed earlier. 314 
8.84 Having concluded that a reasonable deposit has its special characteristic, and is 
subject to forfeiture without equity having any power to intervene, while an unreasonable 
deposit should be subject to the equitable jurisdiction of relief against forfeiture, it may be 
proposed, in general terms, that the courts have power to relieve against forfeiture of 
deposits, if the forfeiture clause is in the nature of penalty, and it is unconscionable for the 
payee to retain the deposit. This would be in line with what was suggested by Lord 
Denning as to relief against forfeiture of advance payments in Stockloser v. Johnsot? ". 
To determine the unconscionability, however, one important factor is the reasonableness 
311 See Greig &- Davis, The Law of Contractý 1987 (With Fourth Cumulative Supplement, 1992), p. 1462; 
Oaldey A J, Deposits: still a guarantee of performance?, part 11 [1994] The Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer 100, p. 107; Guest A. G., Benjamin's Sale of Goods, 4th ed., 1992, para. 15-132 
312 See Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993) 2 All ER 370, see also 
references cited in note 241 above. 
313 It has sometimes been suggested that where there is no "long continued usage" for the payment of a 
deposit, the whole deposit should be recoverable subject only to a deduction for provable damages 
suffere& see Oaldey A J, Deposits: still a guarantee of performance?, part H [1994) The Conveyan= MW 
Property Lawyer 100, at p. 107 
314 SUpra., par& 9.72 
315 SyoCkjoSer V. JohnSon [ 1954] 1 All ER 630, [1954] 1 QB 476 
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of the deposit: In this way, if the deposit was reasonable, then it would not be 
unconscionable for the payee to retain it3 16. But if it was unreasonable, then, considering 
other factors, it should be ascertained whether the retention of the deposit amounts to 
unconscionabiflty. 
316 Some judicial statements rnay support this: In Bigham J's view, for example, being a deposit is a 
circumstance which must be taken into account to determine whether it should be regarded as in the 
nature of penalty: we Pye v. British Automobile Commercial Syndicate Ltd. [1906) 1 KB 425, at p. 430; 
see also the observations of Lord Skerrington in the Scottish case of Roberts & Cooper v. SaNesen & Co. 
[1918] S. C. 794, at pp. 914-815 
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Chapter 9 
Statutory Jurisdiction to Relieve Against Forfeiture 
1. General Remarks 
9.01 In addition to the equitable jurisdiction of relief against forfeiture, there are, in 
certain instances, some statutory measures which empower the court to relieve a payee 
against forfeiture of moneys already paid. These measures mainly relate to specific 
contracts' or specific areas of the laW, and the detailed analysis of them falls beyond the 
scope of this study. It is, however, appropriate to have a general reference to some of 
these statutory measures. 
9.02 The measures taken with regard to consumer credit transactions to protect the 
consumer against the probable harsh and disadvantageous contractual terms contain 
certain provisions which deal with the forfeiture clauses: They empower the court, in 
certain and proper cases, to grant the consumer relief against forfeiture of both his 
interest in the subject-matter and/or moneys already paid. The Consumer Credit Act 
1974 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 3 contain the most 
important part of these regulations, and should briefly be looked at. Consideration should 
also be given to the important discretionary power of courts, conferred by sec. 49(2) of 
the Law of Property Act 1925, to relieve against forfeiture of deposits in contracts for the 
sale or exchange of an interest in land. The possible inter-relation of this statutory power 
with both the penalty doctrine and the equitable rules to relieve against forfeiture of 
deposits makes it appropriate to consider it in some detail. Thus, after a brief look at the 
main statutory provisions to relieve against forfeiture in consumer context, the 
4 discretionary power of courts under sec. 49(2) will be examined. 
I For example, contracts for the sale or exchange of an interest in land, see sec. 49(2) Law of Property Act 1925 
2 For instance, consumer law (see, e. g,, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994, SI 
1994/3159) 
3SI 1994/3159 implementing the EC Directive of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Toms in Consumer Contracts: 
see [1993] OJ L95/29 
4 The forfeiture of leases for breach of covenants or conditions is also mainly governed by statute: sec. 146 of the Law of Property Act 1925 regulates the power of courts to relieve the lessee against forfeiture 
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2. Statutory Relief Against Forfeiture In Consumer Context 
21. Consumer Credit Act 1974 
9.03 The Consumer Credit Act 1974, as a piece of legislation aiming towards the 
protection of consumers, contains certain provisions which are similar in effect to 
measures for the equitable relief against forfeiture. These provisions provide for certain 
measures either to protect the consumer's possessory interest in property, or to afford a 
positive relief to him by ordering repayment of moneys already paid by him. 
2.1-1. Protection of the consumer's possessory interest 
9.04 The possessory interest of a consumer in the property resulting from a regulated 
agreement', within the scope of the Act, is protected in two ways: First, requiring the 
creditor to serve a default notice before being able to repossess for the debtor's default: 
sections 87-89 of the Act concem the enforcement by the creditor of the remedies 
provided for the breach under a regulated agreement. The creditor cannot take 
immediate action to enforce his contractual rights to terminate and retake possession of 
the subject-matter for the debtor's default unless he serves a default notice giving the 
debtor at least seven days time during which he may remedy his breach. Second, 
relieving the debtor against forfeiture by making time orders: Under section 129 of the 
Act, courts have general and wide power to allow the debtor time for both payment or 
of his interest in the subject-matter for breach of any covenant or condition other than non-payment of 
renL Relief against fbrfeiture for non-payment of rent, though it originally has an equitable basis (see, 
e. g., Bowser v. Colby (1841) 1 Hare 109, (1841) 66 ER 969 at pp. 125-126 and p. 976 respectively ), is 
mainly governed by sections 210-212 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1852. Furthermore, sec. 38 of 
the Supreme Court Act 1981 empowers the High Courts to grant summary relief in any action for a 
forfeiture for non-payment of rent. Such a relief in county court proceedings has been regulated by sec. 
138 of the County Court Act 1984. 
5A regulated agreement, according to the definition given by sec. 189(l) of the Act, is a "consumer 
credit agreement" or a "Consumer hire agreement", other than an "exempt agreement": Any personal 
credit agreement Y. e. an agreement for providing any amount of credit by any person (the creditor) to an 
individual (the debtor)] by which the creditor provides a credit of not exceeding E15,000 to the debtor is 
referred to as a "consumer credit agreement". (sec. 8, CCA 1974) A "consumer hire agreement" is an 
agreement for the bailment of goods made by a person with an individual (the hirer) which, not being a 
hire-purchase agreement, is capable of subsisting for more than three months and does not require the 
hirer to make payments exceeding E15,000. (sec. 15, CCA 1974) [The amount of E15,000 in both 
definitions has been substituted by L5,000 by The Consumer Credit (Increase of Monetary Limits) order 
1983, Sl 1983/1878, art 4, Schedule, part U. ] Certain agreements, like land mortgage agreements in 
which the creditors are local authorities or building societies, which otherwise fall within the scope of the 
definitions above, have been titled as exempt agreements. These agreements have been listed in or under 
sec. 16 (sec. 189(l), CCA 1974), and are not regulated by the Act except for the provisions relating to 
extortionate credit bargains (secs. 137-140, CCA Act 1974). 
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remedying any breach of contract which is not related to the payment of money. Such a 
time order, in fact, relieves the debtor against forfeiture of his interest in possession of the 
property for his default. 
2.1.2. Positive Relief 
9.05 The Act also empowers the court to order, in certain circumstances, repayment of 
moneys already paid by the hirer or debtor following termination of the contract for the 
debtor's default. Two main instances merit mentioning: First, as to a regulated consumer 
hire agreement6 the court may7, in an application by the hirer after the recovery of 
possession of goods by the owner otherwise than by action" or in a proceeding where it 
makes an order for the delivery to the owner of goods9, order repayment of the whole or 
part of any sum paid by the hirer to the owner in respect of goods. Where, thus, it 
appearsjust for this power to be exercised, the court, "having regard to the went of the 
enjoyment of the goods by the hirer, may order the whole or part of the moneys already 
paid by the hirer to be returned to him. Second, a general power to reopen extortionate 
credit bargainslo to do justice between the parties has also been afforded to the court by 
the Act". In reopening the agreement, the court may, inter afid, order the creditor to 
repay the whole or part of any sum paid under the credit bargain by the debtor 12 for the 
purpose of "relieving the debtor ... 
from payment of any sum in excess of that fairly due 
and reasonable". The court, thus, has a statutory power to grant positive relief against 
forfeiture of moneys already paid with regard to specific credit agreements which may be 
exercised where "the court thinks just" to do so. 
As to definition of the regulated consumer hire agreement see supra., note 5 
Under section 132 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 
8 Sec 132(l)(a), CCA 1974 
9 Sec 132 (2), CCA 1974 
10 "Credit bargaiif' has exactly the same meaning as the credit agreement [any agreement between an 
individual (the debtor) and any other person (the creditor) to provide credit of any amount] where, in 
computing the total charge for credit, no transaction other than the credit agreement is to be taken into 
account. Where other transactions are also to be taken into account, the credit agreement together with 
those transactions are referred to as "credit bargain". (sec. 137 CCA 1974). When a credit bargain is 
extortionate is dealt with by section 138, CCA 1974. 
11 Sec 137, CCA 1974 
12 Sec 139(2)(c), CCA 1974 
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2. Z Unfair Tenns In Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 
9.06 These regulations, which implement the EC Council Directive 93/13 on Unfair 
13 
Terms in Consumer Contracts , were made on 8 December 1994 by the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry under the European Communities Act 1972, sec 2(2), and 
came into force on Ist July 1995. They generally provide that unfair terms in contracts 
concluded between a consumer 14 and a seller or supplier15 are not binding on the 
consumer. 16 
9.07 Any contractual term which has "not individually been negotiated" 17 , and "contrary 
to the requirement of good faith causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and 
obligations to the detriment of the consumer"18 has been referred to as an unfair 
contractual term. The Regulations contain "an indicative and non-exhaustive"19 list of 
terms which may be considered as unfair . 
20 Being indicative would mean that the terms 
listed would not necessarily be regarded as unfair if the court was not satisfied that the 
term in question had all the necessary prerequisites for being considered so. Furthermore, 
the court may regard a term in a consumer contract as unfair, even though it has not been 
fisted in the Schedule 3 of the Regulations. 21 Yet the list, it is thought', could be 
considered as a guideline for the sort of contractual terms which might have the effect of 
creating an imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations to the detriment of the 
consumer. 
13 [1993] OJ L 95/29 
"' A "consumer" is a natural person who, in making contracts within the scope of the Regulations, is 
acting for purposes outside his business. (Reg. 2) 
15 A "seller" or "supplier" means a person who sells goods or supplies goods or services, and, in making 
a contract within the realm of the Regulation, is acting for purposes relating to his business. (ibid. ) 
16 Reg. 5(l), If the contract was capable of continuing in existence without the unfair term, it would still 
be binding on the parties. (Reg. 5(2)) 
17 Reg. 3(l) 
19 Reg. 4(l) 
19 Reg. 4(4) 
20 Schedule 3, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 
21 See Treitel G. H., The Law of Contract, 9th ed., 1995, p. 251; Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of 
Contract, 5th ed., 1995, p. 316 
22 See Treitel G. H., The Law of Contract, gth ed., 1995, ibid; Professor Treitel refers to these tenns as 
-primafade unfair tenns". Treitel, ibid 
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9.08 Among the terms fisted in Schedule 3 of the Regulations is the term which has the 
object or effect of "permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer 
where the latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for 
the consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier 
where the latter is the party cancelling the contract". 23 Although there has been some 
academic debate on the necessity of payment of mutual deposits in contracts for the sale 
of land2ý and the insertion of mutual forfeiture provisions, nonetheless in practice they 
have rarely been used. The normal forfeiture provisions allow only the creditor to retain 
moneys already paid in case of the premature termination of the contract for the debtor's 
default. The illustration given in the Schedule is, it has been submitted 25 , based on the 
civil law institution of inclusion of forfeiture provisions by which a contract may, in 
certain circumstances, be terminated both by the payer upon the forfeiture of his deposit, 
and by the payee on the return of the double of the deposit. It would, however, seem that 
the Regulations may still apply to forfeiture clauses in consumer contracts: The fist, as it 
was emphasized, is only indicative and non-exhaustive, and does not prevent the court 
from categorizing a forfeiture provision as an unfair term even though it has not been 
specifically listed in the Schedule. Hence, a forfeiture provision in a standard consumer 
contract may be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes 
a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations to the detriment of the 
consumer. 
9.09 A forfeiture provision being regarded as unfair would not be binding on the 
consumer. It follows that not only the creditor cannot sue the consumer for any unpaid 
amount which is to be forfeited under the forfeiture clause, but also the consumer can 
recover back any money which has been forfeited under the unfair term. Put another 
way, the court would, in consumer transactions for the sale or supply of goods and 
23 para. (d), Schedule 3 
24 See, e. g., The Conveyancing Standing Committee's Consultation Paper, Deposits on Exchange of 
Contracts in Residential COnveyancing-Time for a change?, Feb. 1988, para. 22; Wilkinson K Dqxdts: 
who needs them? (1984) 81 The Law Society's Gazette 347, p. 347; Wilkinson K DqxsiU: way back 
when? (1984) 81 The Law Society's Gazette 1268; Wilkinson, Deposits-Time for a Change? (1988) 52 
The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 237, at pp. 238,241 
25 Tmitd GIL, TM Law of Contmcý gth ed., 1995, p. 912 
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services, have statutory jurisdiction to relieve the consumer against forfeiture of moneys 
already paid by ordering their repayment. This jurisdiction would be exercised where the 
forfeiture clause is, within the definition of the Regulations, categorized as an unfair tenn. 
3. Statutory jurisdiction to relieve against forfeiture of deposit 
3.1. General Considerations 
9.10 There is also, with regard to the contracts for the sale or exchange of an interest in 
iand26, a statutory jurisdiction to relieve the purchaser against forfeiture of his deposit. 
Due to the importance of this statutory power, its equitable nature and the possible inter- 
relation between the penalty doctrine and the circumstances upon which this jurisdiction 
should be exercised, it is appropriate to examine the relevant legislation in some detail. 
9.11 Sec 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides: 
"Where the court refuses to grant specific performance of a contract, or in 
any action for the return of a deposit, the court may, if it thinks fit, order 
the repayment of any deposit. " 
The subsection clearly empowers the court to order repayment of the purchaser's deposit 
on its discretion. The scope of this jurisdiction and the circumstances in which this 
discretionary power should be exercised have invited a considerable academic debate", 
though the subsection has only been invoked in a limited number of caseS28 - This section 
will devote itself to a brief discussion on the historical background of the enactment of 
26 See sec. 49(3), Law of Property Act 1925 
27 See, e. g., Treitel G. H., The Law of Contact 9th ed., 1995, pp. 907-908 ; Farrand J T, Contact and 
Conveyance, 4th ecL, 1983, pp. 205-206; Annand R. & Cain B., Conveyancing Solutions, 3, Remedies 
under the Contact, 1988, pp. 48-50; Adams J E, The Usual 10% Deposit-Can it be justifies still? (1993) 
80 Law Society's Gazette 2811, p. 2812 ; Wilkinson H. W., Returning the Purchaser's Deposit (1980) 130 
N. L. J. 668; Thompson M. P., Relief Against Forfeiture (1981) 125 S. J. 405; Harpurn C., Relief Against 
Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, pp. 169-175; Oakley A J, Deposits: still a 
guarantee of Performance?, Part 11 [19941 The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 100, pp. 101-103; 
Wallace K Deposit or Penalty? The price of greed (1993) 44 NILQ 207, pp. 212-215, Pawlowski K 
Relief Against Forfeiture of Deposits (1992) Estate Gazette, 21 Nov 1992, Issue 9246,76, pp. 77-78; As 
to discussions about the equivalent of sec 49(2) in some Australian states see: Greig & Davis, The Law of 
Contact, 1987 (With Fourth Cumulative Supplement, 1992), pp. 1462-1463; Lindgren, Time in the 
performance of Contracts, 1976, paras. 739-748 
" See, e. g., Charles Hunt Ltd v. Palmer [1931) 2 Ch. 287 ; James Macara Ltd. v. Barclay [1944] 2 All 
ER 31; Schindler v. Pigault (1975) 30 P&C. K 328; Cole v. Rose [1978] 3 All ER 1121; Universal 
Corp. v. FIve Ways Properties Ltd. [1979] 1 All ER 552; Faruqi v. English Real Estates [197911 WLR 
963; Maktoum v. South Lodge Flats Ltd. (1980) The Times, 21 April 1980; Dimsdale Developments 
(&uth East) Ltd. v. DeHaan (1983) 47 P& CR I 
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the subsection which reveals the primary object of the legislation. The scope of the 
jurisdiction and the exercise of this discretionary power will then in turn be dealt with. 
The latter discussion will make it clear whether, exercising the power under the 
subsection, the rules relating to penalties or equitable doctrine of relief against forfeiture 
could/should be applied. 
3.2. Historical Background 
9.12 The primary purpose behind the enactment of the subsection was, as it was 
suggested by the draftsman in his commentary", to remove the unsatisfactory 
consequence resulting from cases like Re Scott and Alvarezs Contrado where the 
purchaser, though he could successfully resist a decree of specific performance, was at 
law not entitled to recover his deposit. The typical example was the case where the 
court, due to a pre-root defect in the vendor's title which was not known to him and 
consequently the purchaser was not entitled to rely on it3 ' as a ground for rescission, 
would not decree specific performance 32 . but, at the same time, the purchaser would be 
regarded as in breach if he did not complete the contract. The first consequence of the 
purchaser's breach was the forfeiture of his deposit by the vendor which, considering the 
circumstances of the case, was not a satisfactory result. 33 Section 49(2) was, in fact, a 
legislative response to mitigate the injustice of such cases. 34 This has also been made 
clear by Clauson J. in James Macara Ltd v. Barcla where he, considering the scope of 
the jurisdiction, said: 
"The primary purpose of the provision was to remove the difficulty which 
had stood in the way of a purchaser who, though in a position to 
successfully resist specific performance in equity, was at law precluded 
29 Wolstenholme & Cherrys Conveyancing Statutes, 13th ed., Vol. 1,1972, p. 125 ; See also WiUdnson 
(1980) 130 N. L. J. 668 
30 [1895] 1 Ch. 569, [189512 Ch. 603 ; Also see Re National Provincial Bank of England and Marsh 
[189511 Ch. 190 ; Beyfus v. Lodge [19251 Ch. 350 
31 See sec 45(l)(b), Law of Property Act 1925 
32 To decrft specific Performance in such a case, in the words of Lindley L. J. in Re Scott and Alvarez Is 
Contract [1895] 1 Ch 569, [1895] 2 Ch 603, would result in "manifest injustice". (at p. 614) ; cf. Aid., 
Lopes LI at p. 614 
33 See Re Scott andAhwezs Contract [1895] 1 Ch 569, [1895] 2 Ch 603, per Lindley LI at p. 614 
34 Schindler v. Pigault (1975) 30 P&C. R. 328, at p. 336 per Megarry J.; Also see Harpum C., Relief 
Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [ 1984] CLJ 134, at pp. 169-170 
33 [1944] 2 All ER 31 
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from recovering his deposit. 06 
9.13 There is no doubt now that the subsection does cover such a situation and, in fact, 
even a situation where it is shown that the vendor's action for specific performance has 
failed or would fail, but the purchaser has neither legal nor equitable ground to refuse 
performance and rescind the contract. 37 In Faruqi v. English Real Estates" the plaintiff 
contracted to purchase a registered property "subject to entries on the registers of title". 
A deposit of 10% was provided for and duly paid. On inspecting the charges register, it 
was found that the vendor's title was subject to restrictive covenants contained in a deed 
of 1883. The court held that, though the purchaser had agreed to purchase subject to the 
entries on the register whatever they might happen to be, the vendors had in equity the 
duty to disclose any defects in the title which were known to theM39, and failing to do 
this, they would not be entitled to a decree of specific performance. Thus, despite the 
legal right of the vendors to retain the deposit prior to the enactment of section 49(2) of 
the Law of Property Act 1925, the purchaser held to be entitled to recover the deposit 
under the subsection. 41 
3.3. The Scope of the Jurisdiction 
3.3.1. The Broad Interpretation of the Subsection: the existence of a wide 
discretion 
9.14 It is now clear that the statutory jurisdiction of courts to order repayment of the 
42 deposit is not confined to a situation for which it was enacted . The wording of sec 
36 ibid., at p. 32 
37 See Charles Hunt Ltd. v. Palmer [1931] 2 Ch. 287; Finkielkraut v. Monohen [1949] 2 All ER 234 ; 
Faruqi v. English Real Estates [197911 WLR 963; A-4. Jones & Sons Ltd. v. Weeden (1964) 82 W. N. 
(pt. 1)(N. S. W) 326 
38 ibid. 
39 Ibid, at p. 967, per Walton I 
40 Ibid, at p. 968 
41 The, deposit had been paid to a stakeholder. The Court's declaration, therefore, was that the plaintiff 
was "entitled to give a good receipt and discharge for the deposit to the stakeholder. " pp. 968-969 
42 Universal COrP- v. Five Ways Properties Ltd. [ 197 9] 1 All ER 5 52; See also Treitel G. H., The Law of 
Contract, 9th ed., 1995, pp. 907-908; Furmston M P, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston's Law of Contract, 
13th ed., (Butterworths, 1996), p. 642; Downes T. A., Textbook on Contract 3rd ed., 1993, p. 334; 
Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, p. 171; Harris D, 
Remedies in Contract and Tort, 1988, pp. 28-29; Thompson (1981) 125 SI 405,406; Wilkinson (1980) 
426 
49(2) clearly supports a broad interpretation of the subsection: Though its first limb refers 
to a situation where the court has refused to decree specific performance, the second 
limb, i. e. "in any case for the return of a deposit", is apparent in conferring upon the 
courts a wide discretionary power to order the return of the purchaser's deposit. 43 
9.15 The first support for the broad construction of the subsection can be found in the 
observations of Megarry I in Schindler v. Pigaue. The learned judge considered that 
the subsection empowered the court to mitigate the vendor's right at law to forfeit the 
deposit. 45 The jurisdiction of the court, in his view, was not limited to cases where there 
was an unconscionable conduct attributable to the vendor. This discretionary power was 
exercisable "where justice required it"'". In the case itself, Megarry I was prepared to 
exercise the jurisdiction to relieve the purchaser against forfeiture of his 10% deposit 
where he had failed to comply with a notice to complete the contract. The purchasees 
failure was partly attributable to the vendor who had denied access to the property, 
making it practically impossible to the purchasers to make a sub-sale through which they 
could get enough funds to complete the agreement. Though an order for specific 
performance might have been refused in any event according to the facts of the case, yet 
the case does illustrate a clear tendency towards a wide and flexible interpretation of the 
subsection. 
130 N. L. J. 668,669 
43 It may be thought thatý as a rule of interpretation, regard should be had "to the mischief which the 
enactment is intended to deal with". As it has been pointed out in "Maxwell on The Interpretation of 
Statutes", "it is a canon of interpretation that all words, if they be general and not precise, am to be 
restricted to the fitness of the matter, that is, to be construed as particular if the intention is particular*. 
[12th ed., Langon P. St. J., p. 86,1969, This was contended by the defendants in Universal Corp. v. Five 
Ways Properties Ltd., ibid, at p, 555] It should, however, be noted that, as observed by Buckley U in 
the Five Ways case, "that doctrine ... does not entitle the court to disregard the plain and natural meaning 
of wide general terms in a statute. If the language is equivocal and requires construction, then the 
doctrine is 8 PrOPer One to refer to; but if the language is quite plain then the duty of the court is to give 
effect to what Parliament has said, and it seems to me that in the present case Parliament has conferred a 
wide and general discretion". [at p. 555] See also Bennion F., Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed., 1992, 
pp. 403405 
44 (1972) 30 P& CIL 328 
43 lbid, at p. 336 
46 Aid 
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9.16 Mervyn Davies Q. C., in Cole v. Rose 47 . relying on the judgment of Megarry 
J., 
thought that the jurisdiction of courts under the subsection depended on the existence of 
"some special circumstances in the particular matter, being circumstances that suggest 
that it is perhaps unfair or inequitable that the purchaser should lose his deposit". 48 This 
"surprisingly narrow reading of Megarry J's view ioO was not followed in Universal Corp. 
v. Five Ways Properties Ltd. " where Buckley L. J., preferring the views of Megarry J., 
held that the courts had an unfettered and unlimited jurisdiction to order the repayment of 
deposits. 
The case was concerned with a contract to purchase land in London by a Liberian 
corporation who had intended to finance the purchase from funds in Nigeria. Due to a 
change in Nigerian exchange regulations, the purchaser was unable to remit enough funds 
to complete the agreement on time. The vendors, having served a notice of completion, 
terminated the agreement and forfeited the 10 per cent. deposit which had been duly paid 
by the purchasers. In an action for the recovery of the deposit under sec 49(2) of the 
Law of Property Act 1925, Walton J. at first instance" held that the statutory power 
under the subsection, "considering the mischief against which it [was] directed", could 
only be exercised where the court would not have decreed specific performance to the 
vendor. On the facts, the purchaser would not have been able to resist the decree of 
specific performance; and therefore, the case fell outside of the ambit of the subsection . 
52 
Even if he was wrong on the point, he went on to observe that there had to be severe 
limits on the application of the sub-section: There must, as the first and crucial step, be 
an act or ornission on the vendor's part which, in the circumstances of the case, "is not 
straightforward or is tricky, or has some other mark of equitable disfavour attached to 
it" 53 
47 [1979] 3 All ER 1121 
48 Aid., at p. 1130 
49 Farrand J T, Contract and Conveyance, 4th ed., 1983, p. 205 
" [197911 All ER 552 
51 [197813 All ER 1131 
32 Ibid, at p. 1137 
53 Ibid. 
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9.17 The Court of Appeal reversed Walton Ts decision. Buckley L. J. observed that the 
jurisdiction under the subsection was "unqualified by any language of the subsection". S4 
This discretionary power, though it must be exercised judicially and with regard to all 
relevant circumstances, is not confined to a situation where the vendor's conduct has been 
somehow open to criticism. " It could be exercised where the "justice of the case 
requires", taking the word "justice" to be used in a wide sense. Thus, the repayment of 
the purchaser's deposit must be ordered where it is "the fairest course between the 
parties". 56 
3.3.2. Subsequent Authorities Supporting the Broad View of the Court's 
Discretion 
9.18 The unfettered and unlimited jurisdiction of courts to order repayment of the 
purchaser's deposit, established in the Five Ways case, has been confirmed by the 
subsequent authoritieS57: In Maktoum v. South Lodge Flats Ltd. 58, Mervyn Davies Q. C., 
sitting as a Deputy Ifigh Court Judge, applied the subsection to order repayment of the 
purchaser's deposit, amounting to 10% of the purchase price, which had been forfeited to 
54 Universal Corp. v. Five Ways Properties Ltd. [1979] 1 All ER 552, at p. 555; Also in Eveleigh L. J. 's 
view, the limitations contended for on the scope of the jurisdiction was "not plain and obvious". at p. 556 
Universal Corp. v. Five Ways Properties Ltd. [1979] 1 All ER 552, at p. 555 
Universal Corp. v. Five Ways Properties Ltd. [ 1979] 1 All ER 552, Ibid. 
37 In Australia, apart from one Victorian case where the narrow view has been favoured (in re Hoobin, 
Perpetual Fiecutors and Trustees Association ofA ustralia Ltd. v. Hoobin [ 1957] V. R. 34 1, per O'Bryan 
J. at pp. 350-35 1), the statutory jurisdiction has consistently, it appears, been construed in a broad way: 
see, e. g., Zsadony v. Pizer [1955] V. L. R. 496, per Deane J. ; Jones v. Mallett (1958) unreported (on 
appeal, see [1959] V. R. 122) where Adams J. said: "... I consider that the court has a discretion not to be 
fettered by particular rules, but exercised in favour of the purchaser, where consideration of justice and 
himess require it. ", This passage was cited with approval in Yammouni v. Condidorio [ 19591 V. R. 479 ; 
Nelson v. McDonald. unreported, 27 Nov. 1972, Sup. Ct. of N. S. W., per Mahoney J., cited with apparent 
approval in Lucas & Tait (Inveshnents) Pty. Ltd. v. k7ctorian Securities Ltd. [1973] 2 N. S. W. L. R. 268, 
Street C-L in Equity ; Mkon v. Kingsgate Mining Industries Pty. Ltd. [ 1973 ]2N. S. W. L. R. 713 , Poort 
v. DevelOPment Underwriting Mcloria) Pty. Ltd. [1976] V. R. 779 (affirmed on appeal: [1977] V. R. 454) 
where CAllard L. citing his unreported decision in Brew v. H%itlock, June 1965, said: "The court now 
would have jurisdiction conferred on it to order the return of the deposit whenever the contract under 
which it was paid was not completed by the parties, but was determined prior to conveyatice. " (at p. 795) 
cf. section 69 of the Property Law Act 1974-1986 of Queensland which confines the recovery of deposit 
by a purchaser to a situation where a decree of specific performance "would not be enfbrced against the 
purchaser by the court by reason of a defect in or doubt as to the vendor's title, but such defect or doubt 
does not entitle the purchaser to rescind the contract-. See also New Zealand Law Commission, Report 
No. 29, A New Property Law Act 1994, sec. 55, paras. 284-289, and Preliminary Paper No. 16, The 
Property Law Act 1952 (A discussion Paper), 199 1, paras. 1 gs. 2os 
m (1980) The Times, 21 April 1990; for a rather detailed account of the case based on the transcript of 
the judgment see Harpuni C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, at pp. 
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the vendor pursuant to the termination of the contract for the purchaser's breach. 
Though the purchaser's claim for specific performance was refused", yet the facts of the 
case suggest that the court would have decreed specific performance, had the vendor 
sued for it. Thus, the case illustrates a broad application of sec 49(2) to order repayment 
of the deposit. 
60 9.19 in Dimsdale Developments (South East) v. DeHaan , the purchasers 
having paid a 
deposit of almost 10 per cent., failed to complete the agreement on the contractual date. 
They also failed to comply with the vendor's notice requiring completion. Thus, the 
vendors terminated the contract and forfeited the deposit. They shortly resold the 
property at a profit of about 15%, having incurred expenses amounting to a total of 
16500, which was about half of the forfeited deposit. In the purchaser's action for, inter 
alia, the recovery of his deposit, Mr. Gerald Godfrey Q. C., having cast some doubt on 
the appropriateness of the application of the discretion under the subsection where the 
vendor was entitled to specific performance, saw himself bound to follow the decision 
of the court of Appeal in the Five Ways case 62 . 
He, therefore, held that the justice of the 
case required the exercise of the discretion, but only on terms that the purchaser should 
61 submit to the deduction of the vendor's loss resulting fi-om breach. 
3A Exercise of the Jurisdiction 
3.4.1. General Remarks 
9.20 Having concluded that the discretionary power conferred upon the courts to order 
174-175 
" It has been suggested that this is precisely the sort of case in which the purchaser should be relieved 
against forfeiture of her interest in the property by decreeing specific perfomance. See Harpum, ibid., at 
p. 174, no. 39 
60 (1983) 47 P. & CR 1 
61 ibid., at p. 11, "section 49(2y', in his view, " was plainly enacted so as to mitigate [the] obvious 
injustice" resulting from cases where the vendor is for some reason not entitled to specific perfortnance, 
but the purchaser is not entitled to rescission. Thus, "in a case in which the vendor", he said, "is entitled 
to specific perfbnnance, it is difficult to discern any reason why the justice of the case should require that 
the defaulting purchaser should recover his deposit. " 
62 Universal Corp. v. Five Ways Properties Ltd. [1979] 1 All ER 552; see Dimsdale Developments (South 
East) Ltd v. DeHaan (1983) 47 P& CR 1, at p. 12 
63 Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd. v. DeHaan (1983) 47 P& CR 1, at p. 12 
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repayment of deposits under sec. 49(2) Law of Property Act 1925 is a wide and unlimited 
jurisdiction, the important question is "how this unfettered jurisdiction should be 
exercised"? Upon what circumstances can a court order repayment of the purchaser's 
deposit under its statutory power? The decided cases do not give a clear answer to this 
question. The established point appears to be that the jurisdiction should be exercised 
where it is "just and equitable to deny to the vendor the enjoyment of a forfeited 
deposit"". In Megarry Js view", the repayment of a deposit under the subsection 
should be ordered "where justice required it", dependent on "a general consideration of 
the conduct of the parties (and especially the applicant), the gravity of the matters in 
question, and the amounts at stake". " Buckley L. J. proposed the exercise of the 
jurisdiction where it would represent the fairest course between the partieS67, subject to 
this power being exercised "judicially and with regard to all relevant considerations, 
including the very important consideration of the terms of the contract... "68. 
3.4.2. Being the "Fairest Course between the Parties" 
9.21 Being "fair, "equitable" or "just" as tests for the application of the statutory 
jurisdiction does not resolve the problem: These are some undefined factors and do not 
set certain and specific boundaries to determine the circumstances upon which the 
jurisdiction would be exercised. One thing appears to be clear: Where the vendor is 
refused a decree of specific performance and the purchaser, though he could successfully 
resist specific performance, is not in a position to rescind the contract and recover his 
deposit, it is very likely that an order for the return of the deposit would represent the 
fairest course between parties. But, the jurisdiction is not restricted to this situation: it 
might be exercised in cases where the court would have ordered specific performance had 
64 See Lucas and Tait (Investments) Ply. Ltd. v. Victoria Securities Ltd. [1973] 2 N. S. W. UL 268, per 
Street C. J. in Eq. at p. 273 
65 Schindler v. Pigault (1975) 30 P&C. R. 328 
66 Schindler v. Pigault (1975) 30 P&C. R_ 328, at p. 336 ; These are, in fact, the factors suggesW to be 
considered where the court considers exercising its jurisdiction to grant relief against forfeiture of the 
payer's interest in the subject-matter: see Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding [1973) AC 691, at pp. 723-724 
per Lord Wilberforce; see also Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [19841 
CLJ 134, p. 172 
67 UniversdCorp. v. Five Ways Properties Ltd. [197911 All ER552, at p. 555 
68 jbid 
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the vendor sued for it69, and even in cases where the purchaser has wrongfully repudiated 
the agreement. 70 What are the factors in such cases which should be considered in order 
to deteffnine whether or not the court would exercise its statutory jurisdiction in favour 
of a defaulting purchaser? 
IAIL The relevant circuiWances in the Five Ways case 
9.22 In the Five Ways case7l, though Buckley LT did not consider the merits of the 
purchaser's contention that the deposit should be ordered to be returned on the ground 
that the vendor was at all relevant times aware that the plaintiff needed to finance the 
contract from Nigeria, he was, nonetheless, clearly inclined to consider such an argument 
as defensible. He said: 
"It is not clear to me that, when the circumstances are investigated at the 
trial, the trial judge might not justifiably reach the conclusion that, having 
regard to all the relevant circumstances, including those in which the 
notice of rescission and forfeiture were given, it would not be more just to 
order repayment of the deposit, leaving the defendant such remedy in 
damages as may be available to it, than to allow it to retain the very 
substantial deposit which was paid in this case. "72 
Considering the relevant circumstances of the case shows that, other than the purchaser's 
above contention, only twelve days after the notice of rescission when the purchaser's 
money became available, the vendor declined to proceed with the contract. Furthermore, 
the deposit in itself was a very large amount, while considering the short life of the 
contractý the amount of damages suffered by the vendor was presumably much lesser than 
the deposit. In short, the relevant circumstances were, it seems, as follows: 
1) Granted that the vendor knew that the contract was intended to be financed from 
abroad, the breach was a) not intentional, b) trivial ; 
2) The purchaser was, at all relevant times, willing to complete the contract, while the 
vendor refused to proceed with the contract only twelve days after rescission ; 
3) The amount of the deposit was presumably much higher than damages which might 
69 See, e. g., Universal Corp. v. Five WaYs Properties Ltd. [197911 All ER 552; Maktoum v. South Lodge 
Rats Ltd. (1980) The Times, 21 April 1980; Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd. v. DrHaan 
(1983) 47 P& CR 1 
70 See, e. g., cam referred to above, no. 69 
71 Universal COrP- v. Five WqV-T Properties Ltd. [ 1979] 1 All ER 5 52, The facts of the can have already 
been given. See supra, para. 9.16 
72 jbid, at pp. 555-556 
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have been suffered by the vendor. 
3AIZ CIrcumstancesfor the e-vercise of thejupisifiction in the Maktomm case 
9.23 The relevant circumstances for the exercise of the jurisdiction in Maktoum v. South 
Lodge Flats Ltd. 73 has been summarized by Mr Harpum from the transcript of the 
judgement: 
"(i) All the payments that were required of the plaintiff were made 
punctually, whereas the defendant was dilatory in performing his 
obligations. (H) the defendant had served a notice to complete at almost 
the earliest possible date despite the delays on its side. (iii) The plaintiff 
had paid the whole purchase price within the due time and the failure to 
complete was of most technical kind, likely to be short-lived, and not such 
that it could possibly have caused any material loss or much inconvenience 
to the defendant. (iv) The defendant stood to gain by the purchaser's non- 
performance. It could resell at a possible profit of L259,000, and it had 
had the benefit of the interest-free use of the instalments paid by the 
plaintiff in advance. (v) The deposit of 1122,100 was a considerable sum 
of money. Against this were the consideration that the parties had 
expressly agreed to the forfeiture of the deposit (which is hardly of any 
weight as it would be implied anyway), and that the specific performance 
claim had prevented the defendant from reselling, so that it might have 
missed the best price. "74 
It is clear enough that the conduct of the parties [(i) and (ii) above], the gravity of breach 
(iii) and the amounts at stake [(iv) and (v)] were the issues which were considered 
relevant to determine whether the repayment of the deposit could be the fairest course 
71 between the parties. 
3.4.13. Relevant circunatances in the Dintsdale case 
9.24 In Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd. v. DeHaaW6, Mr. Gerald Godfrey 
Q. C., having considered the financial position of the parties- i. e. the extra expenses 
incurred by the vendor as a result of the breach, the profit on resale and the amount of 
73 (1980) The Times, 21 April 1980 
74 Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, at pp. 174-175 
75 See also WlIsOn v- King$94te Mining Industries [1973] 2 N. S. W. L. P, 713, where Wootten J. - 
considering the willingness Of the purchaser to complete and the vendor's unwillingness to proceed with 
the contract only four days after termination (conduct of the parties), that the breach was due to "the 
temporary inadvertence" of those who had properly been employed to act for the purchaser (the gravity of 
the breach), that there was no evidence for damages suffered by the vendor and the fact that if he had 
suffered any loss, a remedy at law was available to him- found it inequitable to allow the vendor to retain 
the deposit. at pp. 734-735 
76 (1983) 47 P. & C. P- I; fbr the facts of the case see Supra., para. 9.19 
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deposit- concluded: 
"In the end ... the defendants, if the deposit is not returned, will be some 123,250 better off. In my judgment this does call for an exercise of my 
discretion in favour of the plaintiffs. ""' 
The facts, as reported, show that the purchaser's breach was due to their financial 
problem resulting from their inability in sorting out their planning and mortgage matters. 
The vendor's act in terminating the contract did not seem to be harsh and unreasonable: 
the purchasers failed to complete the agreement on the contractual date, i. e. October 28. 
The vendor's notice requiring completion was sent on 10 November which was not 
complied with. There was then a period of further correspondence and delays. On 
January 25, the vendors informed the purchaser that they regarded the contract as 
repudiated. The only circumstance which led the court to exercise its jurisdiction under 
the subsection was, it appears, the financial position of the parties: the fact that the 
amount of deposit was considerably greater than the amount needed to compensate the 
vendor for his actual losses resulting from breach. 
9.25 In contrast, at least in one English case", making profit by the vendor and being 
better off as the result of termination and forfeiture of deposit has not been regarded as an 
adequate basis to attract the exercise of the discretion where the purchasers had 
deliberately refused to perform their contract. In Goff J. 's view, this is "inherent in cases 
where a deposit is forfeited". 79 Also in Barrett v. Beckwith OV6.2)'0, Holland J. '" did not 
consider it appropriate to make a comparison between the financial position of the vendor 
dcon the footing that the contract had been completed in due time with his position on the 
footing that the contract was not completed", in order to discern whether the court's 
77 Ibid., at p. 12 
" Michael Richards Properties Ltd. v. Corporation of Wardens of St. Saviour's Parish, Southwark 
[1975] 3 All ER 416. In this case, Goff J. was of the view that, though the jurisdiction was not limited to 
the special situation for which it was enacted, "outside of that ambit, it should only be exercised, if at 
sparingly and with caution. " at p. 424 
'9 Ibid, at p. 425 
so (1974) 1 B. P. P- 9439, [19741 A. C. L. D. 55; A short report of the case has also appeared in 7`he 
Australian DigesL 2nd. ed., 42,441444 
"' Sitting as the judge of New South Wales Supreme Court. It should be noted that sec. 55(2A) of the 
Conveyancing Act. 1919 in New South Wales is the equivalent of sec. 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 
1925 with very similar wording and almost the same effect. Holland J. confirms the view that the 
discretion under the subsection should be exercised where "it is unjust and inequitable for the vendor to 
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discretionary power should be exercised. Nor did he regard the increase in the value of 
the property as relevant. In the learned judge's view, the existence of these factors was 
not of themselves enough to attract the exercise of the statutory power. Other 
considerations such as problems as to title, rnisrepresentation, mistake or inequitable 
conduct on the vendor's part should also be present. 
3.4.3. Concluding Analysis 
9.26 Considering the decided cases on the point, it would seem difficult to draw some 
certain fines and boundaries for the circumstances upon which the statutory jurisdiction 
should be exercised. It has even been suggested that the "attempted classificatior&', 
within the general category of the exercise of the jurisdiction where it is unjust and 
inequitable to allow the vendor to retain the deposit, "will tend only to obscure rather 
than to elucidate the approach to the exercise of this statutory jurisdiction". 82 TWO 
important points, however, can be derived from cases: First, the vendor should not be 
deprived from his legal right to forfeit the deposit unless it is certain that allowing him to 
retain it would be unjust and inequitable. Therefore, the mere consideration that the 
purchaser would suffer some hardship resulting from the loss of his deposit should not be 
regarded as an adequate basis for the exercise of the statutory power. 83 Second, the 
jurisdiction should not be exercised in a way to negate or weaken the primary purpose of 
providing for a deposit as a guarantee for completion and due performance. This has 
rightly been emphasized by Wootten J. in Wilson v. KingSgate Mining JndUgrieS84 Where 
he said: 
"It is no doubt important that the court should not adopt an attitude in 
ordering the return of deposits under sec. 55(2A) [the equivalent of s. 
49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 in New South Wales] which would 
weaken the proper function of a deposit in providing a sanction for 
insist upon due performance of the contract and in default to forfeit the deposit". 
82 Lucas & Tait (Investments) Ply. Ltd. v. Victoria Securities Ltd. [1973] 2 N. S. W. L. P- 268, per Street 
C. J. in Eq. at p. 273 
83 See, e. g., Lucas v. k7cloria Securities, ibid., where the fact that the purchaser was confronted with an 
unexpectedly rigorous practice on the part of the Sydney City Council which might have precluded him 
from obtaining Planning consent and renovation of the building in the manner described by the purchaser 
was not considered as jusWng the exercise of the statutory power. See also Long v. Worona Ply. Ltd 
(1973) 1 B. P. I; L 9109 (N. S. W. Sup. Ct., Helsham J. ) shortly reported in The Australian Digest, 2nd. ed., 
Vol. 42,186 ; Poort v. Development Underwriting (Victoria) Pty. Ltd. [1976] V. P, 779 (affimed by the 
Full Court: [1977] VR 454), Gillard J. at p. 786 
84 [197312 N. S. W. L. K 713, at p. 735 
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purchasers treating the making and completion of a contract with due 
seriousness and good faith. " 
3.4.3. L ApplIcadon of the penalty docftine? 
9.27 It has been suggested by several writers"' that, in determining the circumstances 
upon which the discretionary power should be exercised, the rules against penalties 
should be applied. Thus, under the statutory jurisdiction, a deposit would be ordered to 
be repaid if its retention by the vendor amounted to a penalty. In other words, where 
there is a gross disproportion between the amount of the deposit and the damages which 
are likely to be suffered by the vendor as a result of the breach, the courts should, on the 
appfication of the purchaser, exercise their statutory discretion. Some cases in which the 
court has exercised its jurisdiction to order repayment of the purchaser's deposit on the 
mere ground that the actual losses suffered by the vendor is disproportionately less than 
the deposit may support this proposition. " 
9.28 The great advantage of this view is moving towards a symmetry in the law 
applicable to penalties and forfeiture of advance payments. It, however, ignores the 
primary purpose for which a deposit is provided: Application of the rules against penalties 
would result in the unfortunate situation that a deposit would not be more than a cover or 
security for damages to which the vendor might be entitled. It, in the words of Wootten 
J., would weaken the primary purpose of providing for a deposit which is a guarantee for 
the due performance and completion of the contract. Thus, the real character of a deposit 
would be lost, and it would be replaced by the agreement of the parties as to the pre- 
assessment of damages which may be suffered by the vendor as a result of breach. 87 
3.4.3.2. Application of the rules relating to relief againstfor . 
fielture qfpartpaymenis? 
9.29 One other possibility is the application of the rules relating to relief against 
85 See, e. g., Treitel G. R, Remedies for Breach of Contract, 1988, p. 241 ; Goff & Jones, The Law of 
p, eWtution, 4th ed., 1993, p. 428; Pawlowsld K Relief Against ForfeiturC of Deposits (1992) Estate 
Gazette, 21 Nov 1992, Issue 9246,76, at p. 78; Wallace FL Deposit or Penalty? The price of greed (1993) 
44 NELQ 207, at pp-213-214 ; Thompson (1981) 125 S. J. 405,406 ; cf. Carter I W, A Comment on 
DOjap algasonable Deposit) (1993) 6 JCL 269, at p. 271 
" Sce, c. &, Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd. v. DeHaan (1984) 47 P. & C. R. I 
117 See supra., para. 8.77; All criticisms about the possibility of the application of the penalty doctrine to 
the equitable relief against forfeiture of deposits may also be repeated here. See also Lindgren, Time in 
the Performance of Contracts, 1976, para. 745 
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forfeiture of part payments in the line suggested by Denning L. J. in Slockloser v. 
Johnson"". Thus, the forfeiture of deposit being considered as a penalty, the court would 
exercise its statutory jurisdiction to order the repayment if the retention of the deposit by 
the vendor would be unconscionable. 
It can be argued that in most cases where the statutory jurisdiction has been exercised it 
was unconscionable for the vendor to retain the deposit, for a close consideration of the 
relevant circumstances of these cases would reveal that to allow the vendor to keep the 
deposit would unjustly enrich him at the purchaser's expense. However, it is difficult to 
suggest that the exercise of the statutory power would be limited to cases where the 
forfeiture of deposit is regarded as a penalty. " The statutory power has clearly been 
exercised in cases where the purchaser, though being in a position to successfully resist a 
decree of specific performance, was at law precluded from rescinding the contract and 
recovering his deposit9o, no matter whether or not the forfeiture of deposit amounted to a 
penalty. it would therefore seem that the application of the rules relating to relief against 
forfeiture as suggested by Denning LT91 would unnecessarily limit the scope of the 
jurisdiction. 
9.30 Furthermore, the special character of deposits, as pointed out92, requires a special 
treatment as different from part payments. Applying the above rules may result in the 
recoverability of a deposit by the purchaser where it should, due to its special status, be 
forfeited. There may well be cases where a customary 10 per cent. deposit is penal in 
nature and it is also unconscionable for the vendor to retain it, but an order for the 
recovery of deposit in such cases might be contrary to the special character of the 
deposit. In short, the application of these rules would, it seems, result in both a) 
unnecessary limitation of the discretionary power under the subsection where it should be 
88 stockjoser v. Johnson [195411 All ER 630, [195411 QB 476 
89 Though, as it was already argued (supra., para. 8.7 1), there is, in most cases, a presumption in favour 
of the contention that the forfeiture of deposit constitutes a penalty, Yet it does not mean that such a 
forfeiture is always penal in nature. It is quite obvious that this presumption, in proper cases, could be 
rebutted. See supra., paras. 2.38 et seq. 
90 Charles Hunt Ltd. v. Palmer [1931] 2 Ch. 287 ; Faruqi v. English Real Estates [ 1970] 1 WIK 963 
91 Stockloser v. Johnson [195411 All ER 630, [195411 QB 476 
92 supra., para. 8.77 
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exercised, and b) extending it to some situations where an order for the recovery of 
deposit would be contrary to its special status. 
3.4.3.3. Application of the rules relating to equitable relief againstforfeiture of 
deposits? 
9.31 The third possibility is the application of the rules relating to relief against forfeiture 
of deposits as it was previously discussed. 93 In this way, a reasonable deposit% would be 
immune from any intervention of courts under the statutory power, but an unreasonable 
deposit would be ordered to be returned if its forfeiture amounted to a penalty and it was 
unconscionable for the vendor to retain it. This view would result in a symmetry in the 
law applicable to the equitable relief against forfeiture of deposits and the statutory 
discretion to order their repayment. It is, however, to be noted that in the majority of 
cases9s where the statutory discretion has been exercised, the deposit was a customary 
10% deposit which is normally regarded as reasonable. % It would, therefore, seem that 
the statutory jurisdiction has apparently a wider scope than the equitable rules against 
forfeiture of deposits. 
, 3.4., 3.4. Application of the test suggested by Lord Wilberforce in the Shilok Spinners 
case 
9.32 The other possibility is the application of the tests suggested by Lord Wilberforce in 
Shiloh Spinners Lid v. Harding' as to relief against forfeiture of an equitable interest in 
property. According to this view, in exercising its statutory discretion, the court should 
consider the conduct of the parties, particularly whether the applicant's default was 
wflU the gravity of the breaches and the disparity between the amount of deposit and 
the damages caused by the breach. Though at first sight this might not seem an 
"Supra., paras. 8.72,8.84; Though the Law Corrunission in its Working Paper did not discuss the 
statutory jurisdiction as to relief against forfeiture of deposit in land transactions, its general 
recommendation for reform in this area was, to some extent, similar to this alternative. See Law 
Commission's Working Paper, no. 6 1, "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid", 1975, paras. 65- 67 
' For the requirement of reasonableness, see supra., paras. 8.79 et seq. 
91 See, e. g., Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd. v. DeHaan (1984) 47 P. & CX I; Faruqi v. English Real Estates [1979] 1 W. L. P, 963 ; Universal Corp. v. Five Ways Properties Ltd, [1979] 1 All ER 552; CharlesHuntLtd v. Palmer [1931] 2 Ch. 287 
16 See WorkersTrust and Merchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap Investment Ltd. [1993] 2 WLR 702, [1993] 2 All 
ER 370, supra., paras. 8.64-8.65; See also Storey I. R., Conveyancing, 4th ed., 1993, p. 265 
0 [1973] AC 691; See supra., para. 7.62 
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8 
appropriate type of relief to be employed as an analogY9 , most cases regarding the 
issue 
strongly support it. Megarry J., introducing the broad interpretation of sec. 49(2), 
thought the jurisdiction should be exercisable "on wider grounds,... including a general 
consideration of the conduct of the parties (and especially the applicant), the gravity of 
the matters in question, and the amounts at stake. "99 Other cases, following the broader 
view, in effect, employed these considerations to determine whether the discretion should 
be exercised, though they did not put any clear emphasis on them. 100 Considering these 
factors, the court, it appears, can determine whether an order for the repayment of the 
deposit would be the fairest course between the parties, bearing in mind that the primary 
purpose of providing for a deposit and whether the amount of the deposit can reasonably 
be regarded as a guarantee for the due performance and completion of the contract 
should also always be taken into account. 101 This will, it seems, give the courts the 
opportunity to consider the relevant circumstances of the case in a rather broad way, and 
to decide upon what the justice of the case requires. 
3.5. The relationship between the statutory power and the equitable 
InherentJurisdiction 
9.33 There is one small issue which still remains unclear: What is the relationship 
between the equitable jurisdiction of courts to relieve against forfeiture of deposits and 
" That is because Lord Wilberforce employed these tests to determine "appropriate" cases "where the 
primary object of the bargain was to some a stated result which could effectively be attained when the 
matter came before the couM and when the forfeiture provision had been added by way of security for the 
production of that result. " Shiloh Spinners Ltd. v. Harding, ibid., at p. 723. His lordship considered such 
situations as appropriate cases where the court can exercise its power to relieve the purchaser against 
forfeiture of his interest in the subject-matter. (See supra., para. 7.19) It is quite clear that this type of 
relief is based upon the assumption that the contract is capable of being specifically performedL supra, 
para. 7.27; see also Harpurn C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [1984] CLJ 134, p. 
172 
" Schindler v. Pigault (1975) 30 P. & C. R- 328, at p. 336 
11 See, e. g., Universal Corp. v. Five Ways Properties Ltd. [1979] 1 All ER 552, supra., para. 9.22; 
Maklount v. South Lodge Flats Ltd. (1980) The Times, 21 April 1980, supra., para. 9.23; Wilson v. 
Kingsgate Mining Industries [1973] 2 N. S. W. L. P, 713, at pp. 734-735, supra., note 75 
101 See Poort v. Development Underwriting (Victoria) Pty. Ltd. [1976] V. R. 779 (affirtned on appeal: 
[19771 V. R. 454) where Gillard J., considering the circumsUnces upon which the subsection should be 
owrcised, observed: "Not only should the court consider the terms of the contract between the parties, but 
it seem to me that there am a number of other relevant considerations to be kept in mind, namely, the 
conduct of the respective parties, whether the vendor can be adequately compensated, Particularly having 
regard to the nature and size of the premises sold and the subsequent history of the pren-dses, and whether 
having regard to the same factors, the amount of the deposit can be regarded as a mutually fair and 
reasonably proportioned securilyfor due performance by the purchaser. " at p. 786, citing his decision in 
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their statutory power? Does the statutory power cover all cases in which the court would 
have exercised its equitable jurisdiction to order the repayment of deposit? And if yes, 
should the circumstances upon which these two jurisdictions are exercised belremain 
different? 
3.5.1. The Statutory Power Broader than the Equitable Jurisdiction 
9.34 It would seem that the court's statutory power is broad enough to include every 
case in which the court would have inclined to the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction. 
Both the broad wording of the subsection and the liberal interpretation of courts"' 
support this view. The subsection does, it is suggested, confer on the courts a 
discretionary power which is much broader than the equitable inherent jurisdiction. 103 
Since the subsection covers the cases where the court, exercising its inherent equitable 
jurisdiction, would have relieved the purchaser from the forfeiture of his deposit, the 
circumstances upon which the equitable jurisdiction would have been exercised should, it 
is submitted, be regarded as the relevant factors to determine whether the court should 
exercise its statutory power. Thus, an unreasonable deposit'04, being in the nature of 
penalty, would be ordered to be returned to the purchaser if it was unconscionable for the 
vendor to retain it. 'O' Outside this ambit, though there is no equitable jurisdiction to 
relieve against forfeiture of deposit 106 , the court has still an unlimited statutory power to 
order, in proper cases, the repayment of the deposit. As it has been emphasized, this 
power should be exercised where, considering all the relevant circumstances of the case, 
Brew v. Whitlock, June 1965 (unreported), [emphasis added] 
102 See supra., paras. 9.14-9.17 
103 Ile PrOPOsit'On accords with the pnnclple that an area where the legislator steps in, a change in law 
should be presumed. This could, for example, be seen as to relief against forfeiture of leases for breach of 
covenants Other than Payment of rent where the prevailing view is that, by the enactment of sec 146(2) 
of the Law of Property Act 1925, any general equitable inherent jurisdiction which might have previously 
existed has been ousted: see, e. g., Official Custodian for Charities v. Parway Estates Development Ltd. 
[198511 Ch. 151, at p. 155; Smith v. Metropolitan City Properties Ltd. [1986] 1 E. GIAL 52; Billson v. 
Residential Apartments Ltd. [19911 3 All ER 265 (reversed on other grounds by the House of Lords: 
[1992] 1 All ER 141); see also Evans & Smith, The Law of Landlord and Tenant, 4th ed., 1993, p. 211 
104 For the issue of reasonableness of deposit see supra., pams. 8.79 et seq. 
105 See supra., paras. 8.72,8.84 
106 See supra., para. 8.63 
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the repayment of the deposit is the fairest course between parties. '" It was already 
considered that, to determine the fairness in individual cases, among the alternatives 
discussed above"S, the last view'09 has attracted much support among cases. Thus, 
considering the conduct of the parties, the gravity of breaches and the amounts at stake, 
the court would be able to determine whether the statutory power, in cases which would 
have fallen outside the scope of the equitable jurisdiction, should be exercised. 
3.5.2. Apparent Problems 
9.35 Two further points in this respect need some clarification: First, the equitable 
jurisdiction of courts is normally exercised by ordering repayment of the deposit less 
damages suffered by the vendor as a result of the breach"', while exercising the statutory 
power, the courts only order the repayment of the deposit and leave the vendor to claim 
for his damages, if any, in an independent action. "' Now, considering this apparent 
distinction, it might be thought how the statutory power could cover situations where the 
court would have exercised its inherent equitable jurisdiction. There seems to be no 
reason why the courts should not be able to condition their order under the subsection on 
some equitable terms. True that the apparent wording of the subsection refers to 
"repayment of any deposit" and does not speak of any condition, yet, considering the 
broad discretion conferred upon the courts, it does not seem to be contrary to the spirit of 
the subsection if the courts make their order subject to the compensation of the vendor 
for damages caused by the breach. 112 
The difficulty may also be overcome by conditioning the exercise of the statutory power 
on the submission of the purchaser to compensate the vendor for actual losses suffered. 
107 Universal Corp. v. Five Ways Properties Ltd. [ 1979] 1 All ER 5 52, supra., para. 9.20 
" Supra, pams. 9.27 et seq. 
109 Supra., pam. 9.32 
110 See, e. g., Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Dojap investment Ltd. [1993] 2 WLR702, [1993] 
2 All ER 370 (P. C. ), see also supra., para. 8.44 
111 See, e. g., James Macara Ltd. v. Barclay [ 1944] 2 All ER 3 1; Universal Corp. V. Five WCOW PNpertles 
Ltd. 11979] 1 All ER 552, at pp. 555-556 per Buckley L. J.; Lucas & Tait ply. Ltd. v. k7cloria Securities 
Ltd. [1973] 2 N. S. W. LIL 268, where Street C. J. in Eq., stating the possibility of exercising the cOurt'S 
discretionary power to order repayment of the deposit, says: "In appropriate cases he [the vendor] should 
be left to Prove the damages Payable to him by the defaulting purchaser in accordance with the 
established rules governing the measure of damages... " at p. 273; Wilson v. Kingsgate Mining IndwMes 
[197312 N. S. W. L. R. 713, at pp. 735-736 per Wootten J. See also Thompson (1981) 125 S. J. 405,406 
112 See Williams T. C. & Lightwood J, M., Williams on Vendor and Purchaser, 4th ed., Vol. 1, p. 3 1, no. c 
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Though this distinction might be true in some commonwealth jurisdictions'20, it cannot 
now be maintained in England: The recent decision of the Privy Council in Dojap 121 
showed that the deposit, being considered as unreasonable, should, in proper 
circumstances, be ordered to be repaid in full less only damages caused by the purchaser's 
breach. The court cannot order the return of that part of the deposit which exceeds a 
reasonable amount, because the situation is as if the parties have not provided for a true 
deposit at all. 122 In England, therefore, the equitable jurisdiction of courts to relieve 
against forfeiture of deposits is also a "nothing or all" remedy, just like the statutory 
power. 
ordered the rest to be returned to the purchaser. ; Delbridge v. Low [1990] 2 Qd. R. 317, at pp. 330-331 
per Derrington J.; Mehmet v. Benson (1963) 81 W. N. (Pt. 1) (N. S. W. ) 188 
'20 In Australia for example: see cases cited above, note 119 
121 Workers Trust andMerchant Bank Ltd. v. Doiap Investment Ltd. [1993] 2 WLR 702, [199312 All ER 
370 
122 Ibid, at p. 376 
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The broad discretion of the courts would certainly allow them to refUse the exercise of 
their power if the purchaser did not submit to a deduction in respect of the vendor's 
damages. "' This was effectively achieved in Dimsdale Developments (South East) Lid 
V. DeHaW, 114 where Gerald Godfrey Q. C., sitting as a Deputy Judge, saw no reason why 
the purchasers should not pay damages to the vendors for losses caused by the breach. 
He, then, said: 
"... I will exercise my discretion in favour of the plaintiffs, but only if they 
are prepared to submit either (1) to a deduction of L6500 from the deposit 
to cover the defendant's losses, or (2) to an inquiry as to damages in that 
regard ... with an order for the deduction from the deposit of the sum 
certified on the inquiry to be due from the plaintiffs to the defendants. "' 15 
9.36 Second, the remedy afforded to the purchaser under the subsection is a "nothing or 
all" remedy. "'6 In other words, the court cannot exercise its statutory power to order the 
return of that part of the deposit which, for instance, exceeds a reasonable amount. It 
should either order the repayment of the whole deposit or refuse to exercise its discretion. 
This has been made clear by Vaisey I in James Macara Lid v. Barclay"' where he said: 
"... it should be noticed that while the court may order the return of the 
whole of the deposit, it is not, at any rate in terms, authorised to allow the 
return of less than the whole. ... it must be all or nothing. "' 
18 
Bearing this in mind, it may be thought that the court might be able to order the 
repayment of a part of the deposit which exceeds the reasonable amount under its 
inherent equitable jurisdiction' 19, while it is not possible under the statutory power. 
113 See the observations of Gillard J. in Poort v. Development Underwriting [1976] VIL 779 (affirmed by 
the Full Court: [1977] V. R. 454) where the learned judge, considering the "all or nothing" character of 
the purchaser's remedy under the subsection, thought that this would not raise any great difficulty: In 
order to exercise the discretionary power, the purchaser must satisfy the court that the innocent vendor 
would not be injured by the exercise of the jurisdiction. "The obvious method to achieve this objectiver 
the judge said "would be for the defaulting purchaser to offer to pay any damages which the vendor had 
suffered by his default ... " at p. 795 
114 (1984) 47 P. & C. R. I 
I Is Ibid., at p. 12 
116 This has sometimes been regarded as the weakness of this remedy: see Adams J E, The Usual 10% 
Deposit-Can it be justifies still? (1983) 80 Law Society's Gazette 2811, p. 2812 ; But cf Harpum C., Relief Against Forfeiture and the Purchaser of Land [ 1984] CLJ 134, at p. 171 
117 [1944] 2 All ER 31 
'Is Ibid, at p. 32 
119 See, e. g., Freedom v. A. H. R. Constructions Pty. Ltd. [1987] 1 Qd. K 59, at pp. 64-66,70 per McPherson J. who permitted the defendant to retain an amount equal to 10% of the purchase prim but 
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Conclusion 
The following could be referred to as the summary of conclusions and propositions at 
which this study has anived: 
The intervention of courts to relieve against penalties and forfeitures historically stems 
from the relief afforded to contract-breakers in the Chancery Courts. Such a 
jurisdiction, which was well established in the mid-seventeenth century and was then 
adopted by the Common Law Courts, was based on the concept of fairness: it was, in 
the eyes of equity, inequitable to allow a party to exact a disproportionately large 
penalty while it was possible to compensate him for the actual loss suffered as a result 
of the breach, and while the clause had been stipulated as a means of security. Despite 
the historical basis for the intervention of courts, many attempts have been made to 
juo* the'doctrine on other legal or economic grounds. Although it is, due to the 
shortcomings of all justifications, difficult to adopt any single justification for the 
doctrine, yet it seems that "fairnese' should, as the first basis for the intervention, still 
be in the front line. 
several practical rules have, in the course of time, been developed to distinguish 
enforceable liquidated damages from an unenforceable penalty. These rules have well 
been brought together and stated in the leading case of Dunlop Pneumatic Yývre Co. 
Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd.. An agreed sum being disproportionately 
large in comparison with the damages which might conceivably result from breach at 
the time when the parties enter into the contract will not be regarded as a genuine pre- 
estimate of the loss resulting from breach, and thus may be struck out as being a 
penalty. The move in English law, following some Australian authorities, to return to 
the concepts of being "extravagantly" large, or "unconscionable" in amount to justify 
the intervention of courts, is a welcome move, being both in fine with the principle of 
freedom of contract and limiting the relief to situations where the unfairness and 
hardship resulting from the literal enforcement of the parties agreement is evident, and 
also harmonious with attempts made at international and European levels to unify the 
law in this area. In all these model laws or general conditions, the intervention of 
courts is reserved to a situation where there is excessive disparity between the agreed 
1 [1915] AC 79, per Lord Dunedin 
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sum and the actual loss resulting from breach. 2 It should however be mentioned that 
to achieve such a harmony, there is still, it seems, a long way to go: In English Law, 
and most other common law legal systems, the loss which may conceivably result from 
breach at the time when the contract is made, is the basis for the comparison between 
the agreed sum and the actual loss- and the other practical rules for the distinction 
between liquidated damages and penalties have been developed accordingl3? - while 
international documents refer to the actual loss as the basis of the comparison. 
Furthermore, the agreed sum, being recognized as a penalty, is normally regarded as 
unenforceable in the English legal system, and it is the promisee who has to prove his 
actual loss to be able to get compensation for damages resulting from breach; while it 
appears from international documents that in case the agreed sum is regarded as penal 
in nature- by being recognized as excessively in excess of the actual loss- the judge 
may only reduce the agreed sum to a reasonable amount which can compensate the 
promisee. 
* An agreed damage clause may, in certain circumstances, act as limiting the promisor's 
liability as a result of any likely future breach. In such a case, the following two 
situations should be distinguished: 
I- Where the agreed damage clause is regarded as liquidated damages, i. e. by not 
being recognized as a penalty, there is no doubt about the validity of the clause. 
Such a clause, thus, will effectively finfit the promisor's liability, though it may, in 
certain circumstances, be subject to the statutory restrictions regarding limitation 
clauses. 
2. If the clause is a penalty, then the validity oý and the extent to which, such a clause 
may limit the promisor's liability are unclear: it has, in this study, been suggested 
2 See, e. g., Article G of the UNCITRAL's "Uniform Rules on Contract Clauses for an Agreed Sum Due 
upon Failure of Performancer which allows the reduction of the agreed sum, by a court or tribunal, where 
"the agreed sum is shown to be substantially disproportionate in relation to the loss that has been 
suffered by the oblige6'. [emphasis added]; see also Article 4.508 of the first version of "The Principles 
of European Contract Law" (Article 9: 509 in the revised version, 1996) which provides: "-.. despite any 
agreemM to the contrary the specified sum may be reduced to a reasonable amount where it is gros* 
excesshv in relation to the Ion resulting from the non-pufortuance and the other circumstanom" Pam 
(2) [emphasis added]; Article 7.4.13 of UNII)ROTT's "Principles of International Comm=W 
Contracts7, Rome 1994, is in the simils terms. Article 7 of the Council of Europe's "Resolution (78)3 
Relating to Peral Clauses in Civil Law" provides as such: -The sum stipulated may be reduced by the 
court when it is manifestly excessive. ... " Appendix to the Resolution, adopted by the Committee of Nfinisters on 2 March 1978 (emphasis added). 
3 For example, the Presumption Of being in the nature of penalty where a single sum is provided to be 
paid upon different breaches of varying unportance 
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that the whole question should depend on the construction of the clause to 
detennine whether the intendon to limit the liability to the a&reed amount could be 
attributed to the parties. 
A clause providing for the acceleration of instalments, due to be paid in certain 
periodical intervals, may, in certain circumstances, be subject to the penalty doctrine: 
where the clause provides for the acceleration of only principal- and not interest or 
finance charge, or any element like that- there seems no reason to subject the clause to 
the penalty doctrine; while providing for the acceleration of elements other than 
principal- like interest or finance charge- as well as principal, may invite judicial 
intervention as being penal in nature. 
The well-established rule in English law is that the penalty doctrine is only applicable 
where there is a breach of contract between the contracting parties. This rule however 
extends to a situation where the agreed sum has made payable upon termination it and 
only if, termination is based upon breach of a contractual obligation by the promisor. 
The rule, however, especially as to its application to termination clauses, leads to some 
unsatisfactory anomalies, among which are the possibility of the avoidance of the 
application of the penalty doctrine by skilful drafting, and the clearly unjust 
consequences as to certain contracts, like hire-purchase or similar agreements. It has, 
considering the purpose of the courts' equitable intervention and all other factors, been 
submitted in this thesis that the courts should extend their power to any situation 
where there is a legal liability upon termination, irrespective of whether the agreement 
is terminated for the exercise of an option by the promisor, or for the occurrence of 
breach or any other event stipulated in the contract by the promisee. 
The application of the penalty doctrine to minimum payment clauses- provided to be 
paid upon termination, particularly in financing transactions- is one of the major 
sources of confusion and uncertainty in this area of the law: such a clause is nonnally 
held to be a penalty where it provides for the promisee's true loss of bargain if the 
breach upon which termination is based is a non-repudiatory breach, or even if 
termination has been provided to be based upon every breach of contract, whether 
repudiatory or not. The parties, of course, can promote a simple term into the 
category of conditions- by, for instance, agreeing upon a "time of the essence! ' 
provision- and achieve the desired consequences without any problem caused by the 
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possible application of the penalty doctrine. it has, in this thesis, been argued that the 
present law is not- for many reasons, particularly giving priority to the form over 
substance, and not being harmonious with commercial realities of life- satisfactory. It 
has alternatively been proposed that a n-dnimum payment clause providing for the 
recoverability of the promisee's true loss of bargain should be uphel(L regardless of 
whether termination has been provided to be based upon a repudiatory or a non- 
repudiatory breach. This is because a) such a loss should be regarded as the legally 
recoverable loss in the event of termination for any breach by the promisor, for 
providing for the pron-dsee's right of termination upon breach of a specific term, in the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary, prima facie indicates the common intention 
of the parties that the breach of that term would be considered as a repudiatory breach, 
going to the root of the agreement and entitling the promisee to recover his loss of 
bargain upon termination for that breach; b) the parties should not be taken as 
confined to the legally recoverable loss when they agree upon damages in advance, but 
they can pre-estimate the actual loss resulting from termination even if it is not 
recoverable in an action for unliquidated damages at common law. 
In financing transactions, up a minimum payment clause in a way to include 
the true loss of bargain- and not to exceed it greatly, in order to avoid its non- 
enforceability for being a penalty- is of great importance. Two important factors 
should, inter afid, be taken into account: a) A proper discount should be given for the 
interest element in future instalments so that the recoverable amount could represent 
the present value of the future instalinents. b) A proper allowance should also be 
given for the increased value to the creditor resulting from possible repossession and 
disposing of the subject-matter. 
Upon the premature termination of a Contract for the promisor's breacf4 one of the 
important issues is the possible remedies available to the contract-breaker, at common 
law or equity, to recover his advance payments where there may also be a clause in the 
contract providing for the forfeiture of the promisor's probable interest in the subject- 
matter, as well as moneys already paid. The most important feature of the discussion 
Res on the possible inter-relationsWp of the equitable rules to relieve against forfeiture 
and the penalty doctrine. 
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The recoverability of advance payments at common law depends on the construction 
of the contract to determine the intention of the parties as to the nature of the payee's 
right to the part payment. If the payee's right is conditional upon completion of the 
contract or a specific part of the contract, then the payer, upon premature termination 
of the contract which results in the condition being failed, will be entitled to recover 
his advance payment. Where the parties have expressly, e. g. by providing for a 
forfeiture clause, or implicitly, e. g. by regarding the advance payment as a deposit, 
shown their intention that the payee's right to advance payments is unconditional, 
there will be no right at common law for the payer to recover the advance payments 
where the contract is prematurely terminated for his breach, though relief in equity, in 
certain circumstances, may be available. 
There is no doubt that, in certain circumstances "where the primary object of the 
bargain is to secure a stated result which can effectively be attained when the matter 
comes before the court, and where the forfeiture provision is added by way of security 
for the production of that result", the courts have equitable jurisdiction to relieve 
against forfeiture of the promisor's interest in the subject-matter. Such a jurisdiction, 
though it has mostly been developed through cam concerning land, is not restricted to 
such cases. It may be available in commercial contracts, though it has been limited to 
cases where the forfeiture of proprietary or possessory interest in the subject-matter is 
in stock. Whether such a relief, in English law, may be available after termination for 
breach of an essential stipulation is not settled yet: the weight of English authority is 
against the existence of such a jurisdiction, but there is much to be said in favour of the 
view that the courts, even in such a situation, have the equitable power to relieve 
against forfeiture, though this power could only be exercised sparingly and in 
exceptional circumstances. In Australia, there is, now, no doubt about the existence of 
such a jurisdiction, but its scope and circumstances upon which it should be exercised 
are, to a large extent, controversial. 
* To exercise the jurisdiction to refieve against contractual forfeiture of property, 
certain factors like conduct of the applicant for relief, the gravity of the breach in 
question, and the disparity between the value of property which is subject to forfeiture 
and the actual losses caused by the breach should be considered. It has, in this thesis, 
Shiloh SpinnerS Ltd V. Har&ng [19731 AC 691, at p. 723 per Lord Wilberforce 
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been argued that the gross disproportion between the actual loss and the value of 
interest, which is subject to forfeiture, should be considered as a sufficient ground to 
attract the judicial intervention of courts. Thus the courts would grant relief against 
forfeiture of property where the forfeiture clause could be considered as a penalty. 
This, however, has not it appears, been regarded as the sole ground for the exercise of 
the courts' equitable power which may also be exercised where the unconscionable 
conduct of the promisee in exercising his legal rights is evident. Factors like the 
conduct of the applicant for relieý or the gravity of breaches in question are 
undoubtedly relevant to determine whether the pron-dsee's emphasis on the exercise of 
his strict legal rights amounts to unconscionable conduct. 
The jurisdiction to relieve against legal forfeiture5 of property, which may not rightly 
be regarded as a penalty in its strict sense, should only be exercised in exceptional 
circumstances. The existence of these circumstances depends on the existence of 
unconscionable conduct on the part of the promisee. Whether the creditor has 
contributed to the breach, the gravity of the promisor's breach, and whether the 
creditor's emphasis on the strict exercise of his legal rights is for taicing 
unconscionable advantage from breach, could be regarded as the relevant elements in 
discerning this unconscionability. 
* Although a clause providing for the forfeiture of moneys already paid and an agreed 
damage clause have much in common, and it is, in principle, difficult to justify the 
application of different principles as to them the position in English law as to the 
equitable relief against forfeiture of moneys already paid seems very much unsettled 
and controversial. The least controversial proposition is that a defaulting payer may 
be relieved against forfeiture of his part payments by granting an extension of time to 
complete the contract. Where, however, the payer is not ready, willing or able to 
complete, or where decreeing specific performance or granting extra time is, for any 
reason, impossible, it has, following the majority's view in Slockloser v. Joktswý, 
been submitted that the courts should have jurisdiction to grant relief by ordering 
repayment of the instalments. To grant such a positive relief, the existence of two 
conditions are necessary: a) the forfeiture provision must be of a penal nature, in a 
For the conhig between "legg foileiture and "ContrachW forfeitum- see pra., 7.60 SM pariL 
r' [ 1954] 1 AH ER 630, [195411 QB 476 
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sense that them should be a gross disproportion between the forfeited sum and the 
likely actual loss which may result from breach at the time when the parties enter into 
the contract. b) It must be unconscionable for the creditor to retain the forfeited 
money. To discern this requirement, all circumstances surrounding the contract, at the 
time when the jurisdiction is invoked, must be examined. The court, thus, would grant 
such a positive relief only where it was convinced that the forfeiture would, 
considering the actual loss caused by the breach and all benefits received by the 
creditor, urjustly enrich the creditor at the promisor's expense, or unconscionably 
overcompensate him. 
Al though, at first sight, there seems no substantial difference between providing for an 
agreed damage to be paid upon breach and a deposit to be forfeited upon default, the 
special character of a deposit, as a guarantee of performance, has led most English 
courts to treat any possible relief which may be afforded against forfeiture of deposits 
rather differently from the penalty doctrine. Recent developments, especial1y in the 
light of the recent Privy Council case of Workers Trust and Merchant Ltd v. Dojap 
investment Lid. 7, show that a deposit, being considered as reasonable, would be 
immune from any intervention of courts on equitable grounds. Thus, a reasonable 
deposit, though it might not be a "genuine pre-estimate of damages" and may be 
regarded as a penalty in this sense, is not subject to the penalty doctrine or any 
equitable intervention. It is not clear whether forfeiture of unreasonable deposits is 
subject to the penalty doctrine or the rules relating equitable relief against forfeiture. 
it has been argued and submitted, in this study, that the latter is more likely. in 
general terms, it may be proposed that the courts have jurisdiction to relieve against 
forfeiture of deposit if the forfeiture is in the nature of penalty, and it is unconscionable 
for the payee to retain the deposit. To determine the unconscionability, however, one 
important factor is the reasonableness of the deposit: thus, a reasonable deposit would 
not be unconscionable to be retained by the payee. 
9 In certain instances, the courts have also been empowered by statute to relieve against 
forfeiture. An important illustration is the discretionary power conferred upon the 
courts under sec. 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 to relieve against forfeiture 
of deposit in contracts for the sale or exchange of an interest in land. Although the 
[199312 AU ER 370 
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subsection was first enacted for a specific purpose, it is now clear that the statutory 
jurisdiction of the courts is a wide discretionary power to order the return of the 
purchaser's deposit, not limited for the purpose for which it was enacted. It is very 
difficult to determine the circumstances for the exercise of the jurisdiction in general 
terms, but it has been argued in this thesis that the courts should, following the tests 
suggested by Lord Wilberforce in the Shiloh Spinners case8, consider the conduct of 
the parties, the gravity of breach in question and the disparity between the deposit and 
the damages caused by the breach to determine whether an order for the repayment of 
the deposit can constitute "the fairest course between the parties". It seems that, at 
least in English law, the statutory power of courts is broad enough to include cases 
where the court would have exercised its equitable power to relieve against forfeiture 
of deposit. 
8 Shiloh *nners Ltd, v. Harding [19731 AC 691 
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